Re: McMullen Part V

Going out on a limb; unlikely Navy would have lobbied against invasion in 1945-46. Couple of reasons. Mc Arthur leading Allies, the early preparations for troops from Europe to enter the Pacific, Air Force's fire bomb campaign against Japanese cities in 1945 to burn Japan to ground and the general attitudes of US towards Japan in 45 because of Pearl Harbor history in 41. Despite estimates of 46, that some 6 million troops needed to invade and casualties expected for US.

Re: October 2019 Handgrenade - Clausewitz and Jomini

Regarding Clausewitz and the Japanese, I would also point to the influence of Mahan on the Japanese Navy, which appears to have been extensive and catastrophic.  I would point to Sadao Asada's magesterial From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006) for an extremely persuasive and indepth look at jhis influence during the pivotal years of the Imperial Japanese Navy's development. 

Second Report from Annapolis McMullen Naval Symposium September 17-18, 2015.

 By John T. Kuehn (JTK) 

Sorry this took so long to post.

  “Newport and the Cultivation of American Naval Leaders:  Education and Wargaming at the Naval War college in the century after WW I;

Chair – John Hattendorf, papers by the Naval War College faculty.

1.--Jon Logell looked at wargames at the Naval War College (NWC)  in the interwar years.

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