David,
I disagree to a degree with you. The US definitely needs a grand strategy, whether it is articulated or merely just understood by all. Indeed, I would argue that those nations that believe in the post-WWII political and economic system and the rule of law loosely (and often poorly) follow a grand strategy that attempts to advance that system or at least stop its decline. How well that is working is another matter.
It seems to me that the desire and ability to successfully compete for power (or if you prefer - to effectively assert, advance and defend one's national interests - assuming one has a sense of what those are) is the goal of grand strategy. As such, it covers much more than military considerations.
During the Cold War, the United States had a grand strategy, its competition for power with the Soviet Union....Today I do not believe the United States has or needs a grand strategy
I would say that the US today has the same grand strategy that it has had since 1945, which is to be the essential global power, the power that asserts itself in every area of the world, and seeks to organize the world in a way that makes America indispensable.
To coin a phrase, am thinking, am 'full-on' with Ralph Hitchens comments upon the broader aspects to Grand Strategy and Rome relying on stable political institutions, most agreeable this is a lesson for military science.
As much as would rather not bring films into this discussion there is a line at the end of the Patton movie, where Gen. Bradley tells Patton the need after defeating Germany is for a broader understanding of the role and mission for military organizations and persons.
I seldom use the term "grand strategy," but I would define it as an overall framework shaping and coordinating the strategies a government has for dealing with a number of problems or situations. Thus during World War II, the question of whether the United States and Britain should focus their attack on Germany mainly on a cross-Channel invasion of France or on operations going through the Mediterranean was a question of strategy. The balance between the European and Pacific Theaters was a question of grand strategy.
Prof. Peifer -- You certainly started a long and very interesting thread. I agree with those who believe ancient conflicts to be relevant to strategic thinkers and planners (and students) today. The Second Punic War in particular has always fascinated me, in part because the sources of Rome's ultimate victory lay beyond the military realm. They were fortunate, to be sure, in eventually finding a general who proved to be the equal of Hannibal, in terms of the range of his military skills.
Prof. Peifer's Proposed Course sounds very challlenging and likely very enlightening. Along those lines mentioned in your closing summary of the work, should like to urge that at least 3 added volumes be included substantively to the subject catagories for planned materials.
One of those is Prof. Richard Rosecrance's[Harvard and UCLA] work on Nuclear Proliferation for the Modern era of warfare, given the importance of Nuclear technology and war to modern and current History and Politics.
All, to Rob's point. Define your terms. I did so here:
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/Engli...
First principles: we should be clear, at least in our own heads and within our own classes and writings about what we mean by a term like "grand strategy." It has at least two meanings that we hopelessly muddle together all the time.
