

2016

H-Diplo

 [@HDiplo](https://twitter.com/HDiplo)

Roundtable Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse
Roundtable and Web Production Editor: George Fujii

Introduction by Yafeng Xia

Roundtable Review
Volume XVIII, No. 5 (2016)
10 October 2016

Jeremy Friedman. *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World.*
Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2015. ISBN: 978-1-4696-2376-4 (cloth, \$32.95).

URL: <http://www.tiny.cc/Roundtable-XVIII-5>

Contents

Introduction by Yafeng Xia, Long Island University, Brooklyn	2
Review by Michelle Getchell, Triangle Institute for Security Studies.....	6
Review by Ryan Irwin, University at Albany, SUNY	9
Review by Artemy M. Kalinovsky, University of Amsterdam	13
Review by Chris Miller, Yale University	16
Author's Response by Jeremy Friedman, Harvard Business School	18

© **2016 The Authors.**

[Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 United States License.](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/)

Introduction by Yafeng Xia, Long Island University, Brooklyn

A year ago, when I learned that Jeremy Friedman's book, *Shadow Cold War* was forthcoming in the fall of 2015, I wrote to him inquiring about how to translate the English title into Chinese. As a non-native speaker of English, I had a hard time figuring out what "Shadow Cold War" really meant. The Chinese are familiar with the term "shadow cabinet" (影子内阁), but "影子冷战" (Shadow Cold War) doesn't make any sense in Chinese. Friedman responded promptly, writing, "'shadow' functions as an adjective. Since there was the regular 'Cold War' between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, there was also a 'Shadow Cold War' going on between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC)." Thus, it could be translated into "另一场冷战" (the other Cold War).

As a Chinese national and someone who has written and published on Sino-Soviet relations during the Cold War, I am very much impressed with the originality of the book. Previous scholarship has explored the Sino-Soviet split from the perspectives of conflicts of national interest, the evolution of the U.S.-USSR-PRC triangular relationship, domestic politics, clashes of the egos of various leaders, and the role of ideology, among others. Friedman argues that the Sino-Soviet split "should be seen *also* (italic is mine) as the geopolitical mechanism by which the demands, ideas, and interests of the newly decolonized states challenged and ultimately came to shape the revolutionary agenda of the global Left centered around the international communist movement" (2). In a nutshell, *Shadow Cold War* explores how the Sino-Soviet competition played out in the Third World during the Cold War.

Given *Shadow Cold War's* many strengths, it is not surprising that all four reviewers applaud Friedman for producing a deeply researched and carefully argued work of scholarship. Michelle Getchell notes that "Friedman illuminates the crucial and heretofore missing dimension of revolutionary ideology and the role it played in policy decisions and international relations." Ryan Irwin points out that "*Shadow Cold War* is an impressive piece of scholarship that draws upon an inspiring base of research..." Artemy M. Kalinovsky similarly believes that the book "is deeply researched, beautifully written, and makes a number of important contributions to ongoing debates about the nature of the Cold War," arguing that "*Shadow Cold War* steps into the larger historiographical discussion regarding the place of the Third World in Cold War History and the impact of the Cold War on the history of decolonization." Chris Miller concurs, noting that "Friedman's evidence corroborates historiographical trends that see decolonization as a central facet of the broader Cold War."

Ultimately, the reviewers raise few substantive criticisms and most of those reflect more on the directions for future research and publications. Irwin suggests that Friedman should have started "his story from WWII;" Kalinovsky asks, "what, exactly, was the USSR's ideology?;" and Miller notes that "the task now is to take a closer look at concepts of development and modernization in socialist thought."

The study of Sino-Soviet relations occupies a special place in the study of Cold-War international history as well as the history of the post-WWII international Communist movement and decolonization. Any change in Sino-Soviet relations impacted and altered not only the global political structure during the Cold War, but also to a great extent determined the fate of the Socialist bloc. When the Sino-Soviet split took place in the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet alliance broke up. The direct outcome of this split was the division of the international Communist movement and the weakening of the Socialist bloc. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet antagonism and the new alignment between Beijing and Washington compelled the Soviet Union to amass an army of over a

million men along the Sino-Soviet border. Not only was this a heavy burden on Soviet national power, but it also threatened to divert the Kremlin from its struggle to confront the United States and control Eastern Europe. *Shadow Cold War* reminds us that “the outcome of the Sino-Soviet clash would therefore have fateful consequences for the Left around the world. Though the Soviets emerged victorious from their struggle with the Chinese by the late 1970s, it was a Pyrrhic victory” (218). More damningly, Beijing had adjusted its foreign policy in an attempt to join forces with the United States to counter the Soviet Union. And President Richard Nixon’s successors operated in a new arena of triangularity that shifted the dynamics of international diplomacy. This played an important part in the drama of 1989 and the collapse of Communism in the Soviet Union.

It is worth noting that *Shadow Cold War* is not about the Sino-Soviet split *per se*. As Friedman writes, it is about “the evolution of Soviet and Chinese policy in the developing world” from 1956 to 1976 (23). This book adds much to what we do not know about Soviet and Chinese policy and ideological debates about the Third World, which intensified the Sino-Soviet discord and competition. Thus, the book puts the Sino-Soviet “split in the greater historical context of both the Russian and the Chinese revolutions” (7). But the debate on what actually caused the Sino-Soviet split during the Cold War is likely to continue.

In a recent book on Sino-Soviet relations from 1945 to 1959,¹ Chinese historian Shen Zhihua and I argue that Sino-Soviet principle differences did not start at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956. At that time, Sino-Soviet relations became closer and there was little if any hostility. Later, in the process of resolving the October Crises in Poland and Hungary as well as dealing with its aftermath, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev invited the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to participate in handling European affairs, and the CCP came forward to mediate and help Moscow pacify the Eastern European countries and calm the political tensions in the Socialist bloc. This is direct evidence that China and the Soviet Union cooperated more closely during that period. In reality, Sino-Soviet relations were in the ascendancy in 1956 and 1957 and facilitated the cooperation of both nations. Sino-Soviet divergence in foreign and domestic policies first occurred in 1958-1959 as a product of their disagreements in understanding the nature of the current era and the different stages of development of the PRC and the Soviet Union. The Chinese insisted that the current world was still in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution, and the main task for the Socialist bloc was to prepare for war and to support revolution. The Soviet Union maintained that the current era was a period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and a time of struggle and coexistence between two antagonistic systems. Meanwhile, they also faced a very different international environment. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union was one of the five permanent members of the United Nations, and was a status quo power. China was excluded from the UN and was a revolutionary power. China and the Soviet Union thus differed in their overall perceptions of the international situation and adopted different strategies.

In a forthcoming book on the Sino-Soviet split,² Chinese scholar Danhui Li and I argue that Sino-Soviet disagreements over domestic and foreign policies in the late 1950s evolved into the Sino-Soviet polemics of

¹ Zhihua Shen and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945-1959: A New History* (Harvard Cold War Studies book series) (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015).

² Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1960-1973: A New History* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016). The book is scheduled to be out in the fall of 2016.

1960-1964, manifesting themselves in the rivalry for the leadership role of the Socialist bloc and the international Communist movement. This originated from the demand on the Socialist countries for unity and concentration in thought, actions, and policies. It was only later that the discord escalated to conflicts over national interests such as border and security issues. The immature Socialist state-to-state relations were replete with many contradictions, those between internationalism and nationalism, between centralism (and unity) and different national conditions (and different interests), among others. This inherent structural drawback led to instability in relations among the Socialist countries, which was a major contributing factor to the short-lived alliance of the Socialist bloc and the resultant collapse of the Soviet system.

Participants:

Jeremy Friedman is an Assistant Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. He received his Ph.D. in History from Princeton in 2011. In addition to *Shadow Cold War*, he has published articles in *Cold War History* ("Soviet Policy in the Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s," *Cold War History*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2010): 247-272.) and *Modern China Studies* ("Free at Last, Now What: The Soviet and Chinese Attempts to Offer a Road-Map for the Post-Colonial World," *Modern China Studies*, vol. 22, no. 1 (2015): 259-292.). His current project is tentatively titled *Modelling Revolution: Constructing Third World Socialisms*.

Yafeng Xia is Professor of History at Long Island University in New York. He is also guest professor at the Center for Cold War International History Studies, East China Normal University in Shanghai. He was Research Fellow (September 2011–June 2012) and Public Policy Scholar (June–August 2010) at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC. He is the author of *Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949–1972* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), coauthor of *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History*, with Zhihua Shen (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015), and *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1960–1973: A New History*, with Danhui Li (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), as well as many articles on Cold War history. He is completing a book manuscript (with Zhihua Shen), tentatively entitled, "A Purported Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il Sung, and the Myth of Sino–North Korean Relations, 1949–1976".

Michelle Getchell earned her Ph.D. in History at the University of Texas at Austin in 2014. Her article on the 1954 Guatemala coup was published in the Spring 2015 issue of the *Journal of Cold War Studies* and her article on narcoterrorism was published as a chapter in the edited volume *Beyond the Eagle's Shadow: New Histories of Latin America's Cold War*. She is at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, and is currently working on her first monograph, which explores Soviet-Latin American relations in the Cold War.

Ryan Irwin received his Ph.D. at Ohio State University and his scholarship explores the historical relationship between globalization and decolonization. Although he writes specifically about the changing mechanics and shifting perceptions of American global power, his interests cover comparative imperialism, international institutions, nonstate activism, and technological development. His first book, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (Oxford University Press, 2012), investigated the way small, non-European nation-states altered the international system at the height of the Cold War. His current projects include an intellectual history of the mid-1970s, as well as a political history about the growth and transformation of the nation-state during the mid-twentieth century.

Chris Miller is a historian who studies Russia, economics, and the Cold War. His first book, which examines the influence of Chinese economic reforms on Soviet perestroika, will be published in 2016 by the University of North Carolina Press. Chris is the Associate Director of the Program in Grand Strategy at Yale University and a Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy. He is currently working on a several new projects on Russian and Soviet economic and intellectual history.

Artemy M. Kalinovsky is Assistant Professor of East European Studies at the University of Amsterdam. He is the author of *A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). He has also co-edited and co-authored several works, including *The Routledge Handbook of Cold War Studies* (London: Routledge, 2014), *Cold War Orientalism: Interlocking Orientologies in the Cold War Era* (London: Routledge, 2015), and *Missionaries of Modernity: Advisory Missions and the Struggle for Hegemony in Afghanistan and Beyond* (New York: Hurst, 2016). His current work is focused on development in Soviet Central Asia.

Review by Michelle Getchell, Triangle Institute for Security Studies

This extraordinary and exceptional work of history opens with a memorable vignette of a meeting between Latin American revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, during which Nasser warned Guevara against becoming another “Tarzan,” (1) i.e. a white man living among and expecting to lead black men. The two iconic figures represented two very different revolutionary agendas, and Friedman makes clear from the outset that his mission is to examine the clash between those agendas – between what he describes as the anti-imperialist revolution and the anti-capitalist revolution. In this view, the Sino-Soviet split was not merely about interests or egos, but was “the geopolitical mechanism by which the demands, ideas, and interests of the newly decolonized states challenged and ultimately came to shape the revolutionary agenda of the global Left centered around the international communist movement” (2). Because the Chinese and Soviet views of revolution were shaped by their countries’ distinctive histories, the Soviets focused on the triumph of socialism over capitalism, while the Chinese were primarily concerned with the anti-imperial struggle. While the Soviets viewed decolonization as a positive development that could further the march of socialism worldwide, the Chinese viewed socialism as a means by which to transform the global balance of power. The existing scholarship on the Cold War in the Third World either has not benefited from archival access, or has focused more on power dynamics and disparities between the Cold War superpowers and the nations of what is increasingly being referred to as the ‘Global South.’ Friedman illuminates the crucial and heretofore missing dimension of revolutionary ideology and the role it played in policy decisions and international relations. He views ideology as fluid; not only did it adapt to changing circumstances, it helped guide policy adaptations as well.

With the acceleration of decolonization in 1959 and 1960, the Chinese began to push the Soviets to adopt a more fiercely anti-imperialist line. The Chinese revolutionary leadership viewed the continued focus of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on peaceful coexistence and relations with the West as a betrayal of Asian and African interests. Both China and the USSR embarked upon efforts not merely to expand their influence in these regions (necessitating the construction of an entire bureaucratic apparatus and the training of scholars and cadres), but to create a new theoretical framework for Third-World revolution. From the outset, Friedman demonstrates, the differences in the Chinese and Soviet approaches to this task were apparent (28). While the Soviets championed state-led economic growth, the Chinese focused first and foremost on the anti-imperialist struggle. For the USSR, cultivating an international perception of itself as committed to peace served overarching strategic goals. This perception would open opportunities for the Soviets to expand their influence in developing countries and to thereby promote state-led industrialization and economic planning, and nationalization of private industry, which would in turn strengthen indigenous working classes and bolster socialist ideology worldwide. While the Chinese continued in this early period to publicly toe the Soviet line, they were privately skeptical of this approach, employing class-based analysis primarily to determine the strength, influence, and potential of indigenous anti-imperialist movements. The Soviet failure to support China in its border dispute with India in 1959 was a turning point in Sino-Soviet relations, after which the Chinese became much more vocal in asserting the belief that the Soviets were prioritizing détente with the non-socialist world over proletarian internationalism and socialist solidarity. Friedman shows that India was an important early case study of the very different revolutionary agendas of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the USSR (43-44). For the Soviets, India’s international prestige and commitment to peace made it a crucial ally; the Chinese, on the other hand, viewed India as a threat to the formation of a broad anti-imperialist alliance and, along with other nonaligned leaders like Yugoslavia’s Josip Broz Tito and Egypt’s Nasser, as setting a dangerous precedent for the Third World.

While bilateral Sino-Soviet relations were not particularly hostile in the early 1960s, the differences between the two revolutionary projects were revealed in Chinese and Soviet policies in Africa (44-58). The Soviets favored anticapitalist measures and focused on building socialism, while the Chinese were primarily concerned with developing a militantly anti-imperialist solidarity and viewed the prospects for constructing socialism in Africa as unrealistic. The Soviet approach entailed more meddling in the domestic economic and political affairs of African countries, while the Chinese demanded a commitment to purging all remaining Western influences from African societies. In the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the competing revolutionary agendas of the USSR and the PRC clashed as never before. The outcome of the crisis seemed to confirm what the Chinese had been saying all along – that for the Soviets, détente with the West would always take priority over socialist solidarity and proletarian internationalism. Friedman suggests that at this early stage, the Chinese were seeking to mobilize Afro-Asian sentiment in an attempt to force changes in the Soviet party line. Only after the Missile Crisis did the Sino-Soviet split burst openly onto the international stage. With the Chinese taking a more frankly confrontational stance against the Soviets, they had to do more than just present an alternative revolutionary ideology. Their ideological pronouncements had to be backed by material aid and by a developmental model that could properly rival the Soviet model.

The 1964 ouster of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev from the Kremlin marked a transition in the Soviet approach to Third World national liberation movements. The traditional narrative holds that the successor regime headed by Leonid Brezhnev reoriented its foreign policy stance in favor of national interests and scaled back commitments to Third-World national liberation movements. In fact, as Friedman demonstrates, Brezhnev took a much more activist approach to such movements, providing material and military aid to petitioners whom Khrushchev had denied. This insight alone overturns much of what we thought we knew about Soviet foreign policy in the Brezhnev era.

As the Cultural Revolution gathered steam in the PRC, Chinese foreign policy suffered disastrously. Chinese diplomats in foreign capitals meddled in domestic politics and alienated many of the people they had previously sought to woo. Moscow's attempts to capitalize on this state of affairs frequently involved the imposition of more ideological and political control over its allies. With Soviet ideologists emphasizing loyalty to the CPSU line, nationalism was seen as a bigger threat to proletarian internationalism, while Soviet economic policy became more flexible. Yet the Soviets were unable to convert Chinese foreign policy disasters into positive gains for themselves, and their more militantly anti-imperialist approach led to difficulties in relations with Asian, African, and Latin American countries. Though the unity of the Communist world had shattered, never to be repaired, the Sino-Soviet competition ultimately petered out as China began to prioritize economic development over its geopolitical standing. The 1970s, moreover, witnessed a shift in the priorities of the developing world, from political decolonization to international economic justice. The Soviets, having for years been portrayed by the Chinese as part of the rich white world, struggled to incorporate Third World demands while shying away from a full embrace of the New International Economic Order. The pursuit of détente with the Nixon administration, while reviving the commitment to 'peaceful coexistence,' did not diminish Soviet material and military support to Third World client regimes, as the Soviets found themselves caught between their own desire for détente, and the fears and anxieties of their Third-World allies about what that commitment would mean for them. In the early 1970s, Moscow signed a number of 'friendship treaties' with its most important and loyal allies in order to reassure them that their interests would not be sold out in the pursuit of peaceful coexistence with the West. The Soviets attempted to adapt to this new state of affairs by assimilating just enough of the Third World program to reject demands for a fundamental restructuring of the international economic order. Meanwhile, the Chinese emerged from the diplomatic isolation of the Cultural Revolution and in the early 1970s launched a major

diplomatic and aid offensive in the developing world. At the same time, the ascension of China to status-quo power, as evidenced by its entrance into the United Nations and rapprochement with Washington, shifted the terrain of the Sino-Soviet competition from the international communist movement and nationalist and progressive parties to interstate relations and international organizations. By the mid-1970s, Chinese missteps – including support for the apartheid regime in South Africa and the maintenance of diplomatic relations with Augusto Pinochet’s Chile – combined with China’s own reorientation toward domestic development and industrialization (the “Four Modernizations”), constituted in effect the relinquishing of the Sino-Soviet competition for the Third World. The death of Mao in 1976 only compounded and consolidated these trends.

This book is a *tour de force*; Friedman conducted archival research in a mind-boggling ten countries and eight languages, and even obtained interview access to high-level Soviet officials such as former First Deputy Chief of the Central Committee’s International Department Karen Brutents. While the scholarship on the Sino-Soviet split is fairly robust, this book is the first to examine how the competition played out in the Third World. Friedman does not neglect to view that competition from the vantage point of the developing world, and while concisely explicating the intricacies of Marxist-Leninist ideology, he remains attentive to the ways in which the struggle for ideological leadership of the revolution not only led to doctrinal modifications and innovations, but transformed the very nature of the revolution. Historians of U.S. foreign policy might take offense at Friedman’s (gentle) reminder that the Cold War was not merely a bilateral struggle between the United States and the USSR, but they would do best to heed his advice and take a multiplicity of factors into account before determining that Soviet actions were necessarily a response to those of the United States. As he meticulously demonstrates, much of Soviet policy in the developing world was not a reaction to U.S. policy, but was part of the intra-Communist struggle for revolutionary leadership. Especially given that access to many of the archives Friedman consulted has been subsequently restricted, this book will likely remain for the foreseeable future as definitive as it ever gets in the field of historical scholarship. Moreover, while many readers will no doubt be dissatisfied with the treatment here of particular regions or periods, that Friedman manages to cover so much ground while keeping the book at a length which is manageable for undergrads is not only a testament to his research acumen and writing skills, but is (hopefully) also indicative of his proffering of a research agenda to which he and others will contribute in the near future.

Review by Ryan Irwin, University at Albany, SUNY

Irreconcilable Differences

What was the Sino-Soviet Split? Jeremy Friedman tackles this question with creativity and nuance in *Shadow Cold War*, framing the Sino-Soviet relationship as a second Cold War. This conflict was harder to comprehend than the capitalist-Communist clash, especially to Western observers who assumed the protagonists were on the same side, but the stakes were just as high. In Friedman's retelling, this was a fight to define the meaning of revolution. China and the Soviet Union both believed that modernization and revolution went hand-in-hand and that oppressed peoples would achieve dignity only when industrialized countries lost their stranglehold on world affairs. However, this similarity could not paper over their genuine ideological differences—rooted in alternative views about the relative importance of socialism and freedom—and these differences became irreconcilable against the backdrop of decolonization.

In substantiating this claim, *Shadow Cold War* bridges two distinct historiographies. First, Friedman brings the Sino-Soviet Split into dialogue with New Cold War history, which has used new archives to transform scholarship about the superpower contest.¹ Past historians have tended to blame the split on interpersonal wrangling—China's Mao Zedong and the Soviet Union's Nikita Khrushchev famously hated each other—or the timing of Beijing's Great Leap Forward, which overlapped with Moscow's repudiation of Stalinism.² Similar to many New Cold War historians, Friedman puts precedence on ideology.³ The Bolsheviks, he argues, saw revolution in the context of Russian history. "Unlike the Chinese Revolution with its nationalist emphasis and rhetoric," Friedman explains, "[Vladimir] Lenin made demolishing Russian nationalism one of the regime's early political objectives" (7). Convinced that the Tsar had used nationalism to mask economic inequality, the Bolsheviks saw capitalism as the root cause of Russia's problems, and championed policies that promised to make the Soviet Union into a more egalitarian, productive, and socialist society.

In contrast, anti-imperialism oriented China's understanding of revolution. Mao came to power by mobilizing anti-Japanese nationalism, and he consistently treated class as a malleable device that could be altered through loyalty and education. His principle objective was not to create an anticapitalist society; he wanted to repel foreign influence, thereby delivering independence to the Chinese masses. History, in other words, determined how Soviet and Chinese theorists defined revolution, and then shaped their policymaking preferences in power. In Friedman's mind, the similarities between the two countries were superficial.

¹ A primer is Odd Arne Westad, "The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century," in Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Cold War: Origins, Volume I* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-19.

² Representative scholarship includes Herbert Ellison, ed., *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective* (Seattle: University of Washington, 1982); Lorenz Luthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).

³ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Although the violence of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution resembled the violence of Joseph Stalin's collectivization programs, deeper differences separated these projects:

Violence was used with an eye toward creating the most obedient and effective economic and political machine [in China] rather than as a means of breaking entire classes of people who did not fit into the Marxist schema (12).⁴

This distinction frames *Shadow Cold War's* second intervention, which focuses on decolonization. The scholarship here has tended to emphasize themes of racial solidarity and tensions between the so-called First and Third Worlds.⁵ Friedman sets his eyes on rehabilitating the revolutionary side of the postcolonial moment, and, in the process, revealing the nature of Second World-Third World relations during the 1960s. African and Asian nationalists had big dreams in these years, and they flocked to China and the Soviet Union because the former was ostensibly free of foreign influence and the latter had achieved industrialization without capitalism. Friedman adeptly recounts the interactions between China, the Soviet Union, and various decolonized countries. Too often, he argues, we tell this story on Europe's terms, forgetting the dynamism of Chinese and Soviet foreign policy and the aspirations of Asian and African socialists. "But something important is lost if we do not see the second half of the twentieth century for what it was: an attempt by many around the world to catch up to the most developed countries and achieve a more just and egalitarian division of wealth on both a domestic and international scale" (224). The ambition of such an effort seems impossible today.

Shadow Cold War unfolds in two parts. Act one shows how the debate over postcolonial sovereignty heightened tensions between Moscow and Beijing. Khrushchev's attempt to coexist peacefully with the West always clashed with Mao's espousal of self-reliance, but these disagreements remained dormant until Europe relinquished control of its African colonies during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Decolonization created an audience. And African and Asian leaders not only wanted unified societies and developed economies; they laid claim to the mantle of revolution, and asked tough questions about how to create free, unified, modern societies from the rubble of empire. As Chinese and Soviet leaders reoriented themselves in this environment—and presented their ideas about the ideal relationship between capitalism and imperialism—long-simmering differences boiled over and semantic distinctions became irresolvable disagreements. Moscow wanted to replace capitalism with socialism, while Beijing saw socialism as a tool to combat imperialism.

Shadow Cold War's second act explores the costs and consequences of this intellectual tussle. Ultimately, Moscow chose to contort itself, Friedman argues, stretching its resources to outmaneuver China and remain relevant in places that shared China's mantra. This effort succeeded, but it emptied the Kremlin's coffers and unmoored the country's convictions, effectively ending the prospect of a global working-class revolution. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union sounded a lot like China. Rather than leading to a unified Second World-Third

⁴ This distinction dovetails with the scholarship of Stephen Kotkin, including *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997) and *Stalin* (New York: Penguin, 2014).

⁵ Representative scholarship includes Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Color Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Robert Rakove, *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

World front, this victory merely divided African and Asian leaders—many of whom saw Moscow as coeval to Washington—making it easier for the West to reestablish its influence after the 1970s. China, meanwhile, responded to its defeat abroad by reforming its economy, which Friedman treats as a natural extension of Chinese anti-imperialism. If one appreciates socialism’s ambiguous place among China’s communists, Deng Xiaoping’s programs were less remarkable than they appeared at the time.

Friedman’s analysis is astute. A stupendous amount of research went into *Shadow Cold War*, giving the narrative a fresh feel. The book draws on materials from China, Russia, and numerous other countries. Friedman uses this research to explore unfamiliar voices, and his overall thesis lends elegance to an otherwise dizzying compendium of events, decisions, and locales. *Shadow Cold War* is a diplomatic history with an argument about ideas, and one potential critique of the book is its handling of intellectual nuance. Lenin shows up in the introduction and conclusion, but there is little sense of how Friedman’s actors digested Lenin’s writings over time, and while anticapitalism and anti-imperialism are explained well, the terms occasionally shortcut longer, messier expositions of thinkers and their institutions. Diplomacy and conflict drive *Shadow Cold War* forward, so even when Friedman stops to explain how Beijing and Moscow threw words at each other, this jujitsu feels like background noise. It would be interesting to see Friedman’s thesis represented as intellectual biography, rooted in a different sort of archive and focused on shades of intellectual gray and change over time.⁶ Who drove intellectual discourse in China and the Soviet Union in these years? How did the concept of revolution evolve as the Sino-Soviet Split unfolded? Did debates about race, which crested with decolonization, alter the meaning of communism?

Beyond these questions, *Shadow Cold War* challenges Cold War scholars to rethink their assumptions. For instance, do we need the Cold War? Historians have proved that the superpower conflict meant different things to different people, and even when politicians employed comparable vocabularies they gave their words different meanings, rooted in regional history, local politics, and strategic convenience. Can an ideological struggle have meaning if ideology means something different to every participant? New international history has forced historians to grapple with this question, and by treating the Sino-Soviet Split as a “shadow” Cold War, Friedman tacitly stretches the riddle to its conceptual limits. In his hands, the Cold War was not a fight over communism and liberalism; it was a contest to determine the contours and endpoint of revolution. Framed in this manner, one might ask whether it is time to cast the Cold War aside. After all, revolution, capitalism, and imperialism have long, rich, historical epistemologies. They are bigger than the Cold War, and if Friedman is correct that Soviet and Chinese leaders were fighting over these deeper issues—and I’m convinced by his argument—perhaps we should contextualize their conversation in a literature about sovereignty and globalization after the nineteenth century.

This raises a question about periodization. When did this story—whatever we call it—begin? Friedman has unearthed a remarkable number of documents and explained these documents carefully. But his argument is bigger than his story, which is meant as a compliment—he has said something important. It would be interesting to tell his story from World War I. Many of Friedman’s protagonists were born in the 1890s, so their convictions probably hardened long before Friedman indicates, and their engagement with Lenin’s writing—their ideas about capitalism and imperialism—surely changed over time. Similarly, the challenge of

⁶ Representative examples might be Pankaj Mishra, *From the Ruins of Empire: The Intellectuals Who Remade Asia* (London: Allen Lane, 2012) or David Milne, *Worldmaking: The Art and Science of American Diplomacy* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

decolonization would look different if contextualized in a longer story about the networks that connected revolutionaries during the early twentieth century. Friedman hints, for example, that African and Asian decolonization presented Moscow and Beijing with distinct, new challenges. These distinctions are left implicit, and it would be fascinating to learn how the geography of revolution shaped debates about capitalism and imperialism.

Few books nudge their readers to revisit long-held assumptions. *Shadow Cold War* is an impressive piece of scholarship that draws upon an inspiring base of research, and Friedman's thesis makes it impossible to view the communist world monolithically. The book deserves an audience, especially among scholars who are interested in the Cold War, the diplomacy of ideas, and the twentieth century.

Review by Artemy M. Kalinovsky, University of Amsterdam

For years, some of the most exciting work on the Cold War has come from specialists focusing on the Sino-Soviet alliance-turned-rivalry. In recent years alone we have had several outstanding books, including Sergey Radchenko's *Unwanted Visionaries*, which examines Gorbachev's attempts to change Moscow's relations with China and other Asian countries, as well as Austin Jersild's prize-winning *Sino-Soviet Friendship*, which examines the relationship at the level of its everyday of Soviet specialists and Chinese¹. These books approach similar questions from different angles: to what extent was the split about a battle for primacy in the Communist world? What role did the fear and legacy of imperial domination play in Chinese responses to Soviet claims of leadership? Why did Moscow find it so difficult to accept the Chinese as equals?

Jeremy Friedman's outstanding *Shadow Cold War* is the latest contribution to this fertile discussion. The book is deeply researched, beautifully written, and makes a number of important contributions to ongoing debates about the nature of the Cold War.

First, although Friedman does not engage the question directly, his book is a very strong response to works that suggest that the Cold War was largely unimportant and primarily Washington's project for domination and disciplining of the domestic public.² While Friedman focuses on Soviet and Chinese policymaking and has little to say about the Soviet-or Chinese-U.S. relations - as he points out, correctly, there is infinitely more ink spilled on debating U.S. foreign policy towards the Third World than on investigating the Soviet and Chinese sides of the story – (22), he clearly shows that Soviet and Chinese leaders certainly saw themselves as engaged in a competition with the United States. Until the late 1960s, the disagreement between Moscow and Beijing was arguably as much about how to compete with Washington as anything else.

Second, *Shadow Cold War* steps into the larger historiographical discussion regarding the place of the Third World in Cold War History and the impact of the Cold War on the history of decolonization. A number of scholars have taken the position the "Global Cold War" is really the history of former colonies emerging as independent states, negotiating their sovereignty and future place in the world.³ Studying these processes through the lens of the Cold War is therefore at best distorting, and at worst a way of reinforcing a historical narrative that puts European and North American countries at the center of world events. Friedman does not take on this debate explicitly, but he does explain in his introduction that he is writing about the "nexus" of decolonization and the Cold War (1-2). This proves to be a very productive way to explore not just how

¹ Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Austin Jersild, *The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014).

² See Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and the debate between Anders Stephanson and Odd Arne Westad in Joel Isaac and Duncan Bell, eds., *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

³ See, for example, Matthew Connelly, "Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence," *The American Historical Review* 105:3 (2000): 739-769; Jason Parker, "Cold War II: The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the Postwar Era," *Diplomatic History* 30:5 (2006): 867-892.

officials in Beijing and Moscow responded to this changing world, but also how some post-colonial leaders navigated the options for security, nation building, and economic development the Cold War competition provided.

Third, the book joins a growing list of works that take Soviet development aid seriously.⁴ The Soviet Union may have been falling quickly behind the U.S. in terms of technology and even the amount of aid it could offer, but it had abundant resources of human capital (in the form of engineers and teachers). Moreover, while there were voices calling for Moscow to be more judicious about its aid and to think more about the Union of Soviet Social Republics' [USSR] own economic needs, in the long term the USSR generally proved willing to forgive debts or repeatedly postpone repayment. Ultimately, however, one comes away from this book with the feeling that Soviet foreign aid was less important as a tool in competition with Washington than it was with Beijing.

Finally, the book does an admirable job of enriching our understanding of how Soviet foreign policy worked. In considering how opinions were formed and decisions taken, Friedman moves beyond the familiar sources of the Foreign Ministry and Politburo, and considers the role played by often overlooked organizations like the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa. The impulse behind the Committee's creation may have been the need to show the de-colonizing world that the Soviet Union was neither a colonial power nor interested solely in European working classes, but in fact committed the Soviet Union to a much more global liberation project. Ultimately, however, the Committee, which included representatives of the foreign ministry, academic institutes, as well as party cadres, became an important tool not just for outreach to the 'Third World' but for interpreting events in Asia and Africa and thus helping to define policy.⁵ Moreover, as Friedman notes, the Committee drew in politicians and cultural figures from the Soviet Union's own periphery. The competition for the Third World as part of the 'Shadow Cold War' thus transformed not just foreign policymaking but Soviet domestic politics. (Here, though, Friedman misses an opportunity to engage with the emerging literature on how the Cold War transformed Moscow's relationship to its own 'south.'⁶)

⁴ The literature is now growing rapidly, but see David Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12:1 (Winter 2011): 183-211; Alessandro Iandolo, "Imbalance of Power: The Soviet Union and the Congo Crisis, 1960-1961", *The Journal of Cold War Studies* 16:2 (Spring 2014); Iandolo, "The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Model of Development in West Africa, 1957-1964", *Cold War History* 12:4 (November 2012); Ragna Boden, "Cold War Economics: Soviet Aid to Indonesia," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 10:3 (Summer 2008): 110-128.

⁵ Another work where these sources are put to excellent use for a deeper understanding of Soviet foreign-policymaking in the Third World is Natalia Teleneva, *Our sacred duty: the Soviet Union, the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, and the Cold War, 1961-1975* (PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2014).

⁶ See, for example, Ted Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years, 1945-1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Masha Kirasirova, "'Sons of Muslims' in Moscow: Soviet Central Asian Mediators to the Foreign East, 1955-1962," *Ab Imperio* 4/2011, 106-132; Hannah Jansen, "Negotiating Russian Imperial Aryanism: Soviet Oriental Studies in the Cold War," in Leslie James and Elisabeth Leake, eds., *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 145-166; Artemy M. Kalinovsky "Not some British Colony in Africa: Khrushchev, De-Stalinization, and Development in Central Asia," *Ab Imperio*, 2/2013.

Friedman approaches ideology in a nuanced way, but one that begs further discussion. He states in the introduction that ideology should be treated as a "prism through information about the world is received and deciphered" (21). Throughout the book, Friedman shows how Soviet leaders, scholars, and others tried to make sense of the world and adjust their policy accordingly. At the same time, the ideology had to be flexible enough to accommodate the diverse range of ideas about revolution and development circulating in the post-colonial world. As Friedman shows, Marxist-Leninism was a tool that helped them understand these changes, but it had constantly to be revised. Thus, in deciding how to approach independent Algeria under Ahmed Ben Bella, Soviet scholars were ready to accept that the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) would play the role of the "vanguard" party and its path would be that of "socialist revolution" even if elements of the party's economic program were closer to the Yugoslav or Chinese model. Such flexibility was necessary because Algeria "was the key to the ideological competition with Beijing in Africa" (136-37).

This raises a question, however: what, exactly, was the USSR's ideology? If the Soviet Union was willing to concede on key matters such as the role of a 'bourgeois-nationalist' party like the FLN, the possible paths of economic development, and the role of different classes in the revolutionary transition, what was the ideological struggle about? In the introduction, Friedman says that ideology helped policymakers and analysts decide "which regimes could be relied upon to remain loyal to the Socialist bloc and which might defect?"(22) The answer to this question was based, for a "Marxist-Leninist" around "class origins and the consequent interests and strengths of various social groups or political leaders."(22) But the rest of the book shows that the competition with China made Soviet interpreters so flexible that these categories sometimes lost their original meaning. And in the conclusion, Friedman rightly states the Soviet Union won a "Pyrrhic" victory in its contest with China, because in the process it had to adopt much of the Chinese approach to anti-imperialism. (218) So what were the Soviets really fighting for? Where were the limits of their ideological flexibility? Had Soviet pre-eminence in Asia and Africa become an ideology of its own?

I do not want to suggest that the 'realists' had it right. On the contrary, this book has made me more convinced than ever that ideology was important. Yet I suspect that behind the 'revealed' ideology lay something deeper and also more vague. As Friedman points out, it is futile to hope for ever better archival access in the hopes of understanding the 'real' motivations of leaders. He is right in more ways than one, since there are motivations that one cannot always clearly articulate. One comes away from *Shadow Cold War* with the sense that the post-war party leaders and *mezhdunarodniki* – the analysts and experts who staffed foreign policy institutions - felt a more ambiguous, but forceful sense of entitlement to leadership in the major changes of the twentieth century.

Review by Chris Miller, Yale University

In *Shadow Cold War*, Jeremy Friedman argues that the roots of the Sino-Soviet split lie in the two countries' differing ideologies. Put simply, the Soviets were anti-capitalist, whereas the Chinese were anti-imperialist. "The [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) both claimed to be 'Marxist-Leninist' parties and they consequently battled for what they believed to be the mantle of leadership of a single global revolution," Friedman explains. "However, they were in fact two very different parties confronting different problems and pursuing different agendas" (7).¹

This might seem like a simple starting point, but Friedman uses this dichotomy to explain not only "the Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World"—as the subtitle promises—but to illuminate the course of decolonization and the Cold War more generally. Friedman recognizes, of course, as he puts it, that "these two revolutions were not strangers. [Vladimir] Lenin had famously connected them by declaring that imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism" (2) But there was a vast difference of emphasis: for the Soviets, "replacing capitalism with socialism would always remain their top priority," while for the Chinese, "having had more direct experience with the trials and tribulations of imperialism...socialism was seen as a tool with which to shift the global balance of power" (2).

Friedman argues that this difference in interpretation was present from the earliest stages of each country's revolution. The Soviets dabbled with an anti-imperialist agenda in the years immediately following 1917. They hosted a 'Congress of the People of the East' in Baku in 1920 to whip up sentiment against the British Empire, and trained and funded anti-British Indian activists at a special school in Tashkent. Yet by the late 1920s, the most radical of these schemes were wound down, as Soviet politics turned toward reckoning with class divides at home.

By contrast, Friedman argues, China's revolution was more flexible on questions of domestic class structure, yet stayed true to its anti-imperialist ideas. This may surprise readers familiar with the ideological motivations behind both the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Yet Friedman argues that China's "transition to socialism...focused more on dissidence and disobedience, especially within the party, than on eliminating whole groups based on their class background" (12).

For the Chinese, Friedman argues, Marxism was not only attractive because of its "anti-Western character. The shock of defeat and humiliation at the hands of foreigners had not only ignited nationalist sentiment, but it had also led slowly and fitfully to a recognition that fundamental social, political and economic changes would be necessary if China were to survive, let alone compete, in the modern world" (10). Under Mao Zedong's guidance, the Chinese Communist Party saw "development, not only economic but social and cultural as well," (10) as a key reason to support Marxist ideas.

This difference in ideological emphasis, Friedman argues, made the Sino-Soviet split all but inevitable. The two powers' alliance was rocked by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's death and Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 secret speech, which denounced Stalin's crimes, but disputes about how to respond to decolonization led relations to spiral downwards. Khrushchev was committed to a policy of peaceful coexistence, Friedman argues, which required the Soviets to downplay the possibility of immediate socialist revolution in newly independent

¹ I should note that Friedman was a colleague of mine at Yale.

African and Asian countries. Moscow sought to build influence in the Third World by providing aid and diplomatic support, but it was wary of rocking the boat. China had no such reservations, Friedman shows, and by 1960—which the United Nations (UN) declared the ‘Year of Africa’—it was becoming clear that the Soviets and Chinese had very different plans for how African and Asian politics should develop.

The trouble the Soviets faced was that their suggestion that postcolonial African and Asian states follow the non-capitalist path of development did not meet these countries’ demands for rapid change. Few people in Asia or Africa saw capitalism as a viable route to modernization or to political influence. “You cannot be a capitalist when you have no capital,” as Mali’s planning minister put it (70). But the Soviet-backed “non-capitalist path seemed, to many in the region, a scarcely more credible alternative. Newly-decolonized countries wanted change, fast—something only the Chinese seemed to be offering.

Citing a dozen examples across Asia and Africa, Friedman shows how China’s offer of rapid change and immediate, complete decolonization was more appealing to many Third World leaders during the 1960s than were Soviet ideological offerings. By the early-1960s, therefore, the Soviet Union concluded that it needed to develop more radical and ‘anti-imperialist’ policies to win support from Third World leaders. As soon as it did so, however, China’s venture for power in the Third World began to crumble, as the gap between Beijing’s ambitions and its resources became clear. But over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, Mao’s China succeeded in dragging the Soviet Union toward more radical and anti-imperialist positions in the Third World. “Moscow had reasserted its revolutionary leadership,” Friedman argues, only “by adopting large parts of the Third World agenda” (213).

Friedman concludes by showing how the ideological differences between China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [USSR] shaped how the Cold War ended. The perceived need to compete with China, for example, led the Kremlin to support revolutionary movements in the Third World that sapped Soviet finances. Indeed, Friedman suggests, the two socialist powers’ differing ideologies help to explain why the USSR collapsed while China did not. The failure of the Soviet Union’s planned economy fatally extinguished the Communist Party’s main claim to legitimacy. By contrast, anti-imperialist nationalism still serves the Chinese Communist Party well, which explains, Friedman suggests, why the “Chinese regime stayed firm” even as Eastern Europe’s Communists crumbled (221).

Friedman’s account is based on a wide array of sources, including impressive work in both Soviet and Chinese archives. It provides an interesting counterpoint to much of the existing literature on the Sino-Soviet split, by interpreting the ideological clash less as a debate about Stalin, and more as a fundamental disagreement about the ultimate goals of Marxism-Leninism. Friedman’s evidence corroborates historiographical trends that see decolonization as a central facet of the broader Cold War.

Friedman’s account of the Sino-Soviet split raises many important new questions for historians of Cold War-era international politics. The most interesting work that builds off of Friedman’s narrative, in my view, will examine how these competing ideologies were understood in the Third World. Both the Chinese and the Soviets, for example, promised ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ as the fruits of their approach to socialism. A growing literature has analyzed how these concepts were deployed and debated in a capitalist context. Making use of the framework that Friedman provides for understanding the differences between Chinese and Soviet political programs, the task now is to take a closer look at concepts of development and modernization in socialist thought, too.

Author's Response by Jeremy Friedman, Harvard Business School

I would like to thank Michelle Getchell, Ryan Irwin, Artemy Kalinovsky, and Chris Miller for their careful engagement with my book, their insightful and expansive questions, and for their many kind words. The questions they have posed would require nothing less than a comprehensive and integrated political and intellectual history of the world since at least the late nineteenth century, a task too big for multiple careers, let alone a single book

A number of the questions in these reviews revolve around ideology, which is central to both the conception and objectives of the book. I sought both to tie ideological issues and debates more concretely to political decisions and to shed some light on the flexibility and fertility of ideological discussions within the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as with many others who shared some version of a socialist worldview. Irwin contemplates the possibility of approaching these questions about the changing nature of socialist ideology via intellectual biography, and with him I hope to see further consideration of Soviet and Chinese academics and policymakers as intellectuals in their own right, with ideas of their own that are worthy of analysis even in the context of the often rigid system within which they operated. Scholars such as Jerry Hough, Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, and Galia Golan, among others, have explored Soviet academic debates about revolution and socialism especially in the developing world.¹ Now, with access to more archival materials, we can attempt to trace more precisely the relationships between academic discourse and political decisions, and between things that were made public and things that were not. The archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences is proving to be a useful place for this sort of work, and historians such as Timothy Nunan and Natalia Telepneva, as well as Chris Miller, are already fleshing out the connections between ideas and policy, as well as people and institutions, in Soviet engagement with the developing world.² Work on the Chinese side is somewhat further behind due to greater restrictions on access, but it is essential that our historical consideration of the role of ideology in policymaking take serious account of academic and intellectual voices in the so-called 'Second World.'

Deeper consideration of discussions of socialism, communism, revolution, development and other topics within Communist states will help us better answer Kalinovsky's question about the precise nature of Soviet ideology. Kalinovsky sets up his question with reference to a set of orthodoxies which then had to be maintained or jettisoned in what he calls "concessions." While I do argue in the book that the Chinese challenge to Soviet pretensions to revolutionary leadership led Soviet leaders to shift their agenda, I would characterize these shifts less as concessions than as evolutions in Soviet thinking on the revolutionary process in the developing world. When faced with new or unexpected problems such as was often the case in the wake

¹ See, for example, Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1986); David Klinghoffer, *Soviet Perspectives on African Socialism* (Rutherford: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969); Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World*, (Sydney: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

² See Timothy Nunan, *Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Natalia Telepneva, "Our Sacred Duty: The Soviet Union, the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies, and the Cold War, 1961-1975" (Ph.D. Dissertation: London School of Economics, 2014); Christopher Richard Miller, "Collapse: The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy" (Ph.D. Dissertation: Yale University, 2015).

of decolonization, it is useful to see where Soviet and Chinese policymakers and academicians saw room for growth, less so perhaps in the ultimate goals, where the ideological prescriptions indeed remained rigid, but rather in terms of priorities, sequences, approaches, and timelines for achieving various objectives. It is this room for evolution and experimentation with regard to socialism and revolution in the developing world that I explore in my current project. As Miller writes, one of the most promising areas for further research is how Soviet and Chinese ideologies were understood in the ‘Third World,’ but the novelty of the problem of ‘Third World’ socialism meant that approaches originating in developing countries could gain international currency as well, and even influence thinkers and policymakers in Moscow and Beijing, as I hope to show.

Irwin is certainly on the mark, therefore, when he asks how issues arising from the process of decolonization, such as race, which he has tackled in his own work, transformed the concept of revolution.³ He could just as well have asked, however, how the near ubiquity of Marxism as a framework for revolution as well as the existence of Communist countries that claimed ownership of that framework in turn shaped the post-colonial world. The very concept of a single world revolutionary process, which was accepted not only in Moscow and Beijing, but even by many around the world who did not call themselves Communists, demanded that different narratives of oppression and liberation needed somehow to be integrated. Russian revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin famously adapted nationalist struggle to the Bolshevik program by arguing that the nationalism of oppressed nations could be revolutionary. His successors in Moscow eventually had to come to terms with race and religion in a similar manner, or otherwise face their own revolutionary mortality. This meant, for example, embracing religion as a force for progressive popular mobilization, at least during some transitional stage of the revolutionary process, whether that meant political Islam in the Middle East or Liberation Theology in Latin America. It also meant accepting that economic imperialism was inextricably linked with racism once the focus of Third World leaders turned to changing the international terms of trade in the mid-1970s. Policymakers and academics in the USSR and PRC were often playing catch-up on these issues, however, and my current project will seek to examine in greater depth the way that developing world political leaders and activists such as Julius Nyerere, Sukarno, Agostinho Neto, and progressive Islamists in Iran produced their own revolutionary syntheses which then reverberated around the socialist world. They broadened the scope of identities of oppression and narratives of liberation such that a heterogeneous model of world revolution emerged which made practical solidarity and effective economic change very difficult to achieve. Adopting a model of intellectual discourse and policymaking in the Communist world that allows for ideological growth and adaptation is a fundamental part of tracing this evolution of the concept and practice of revolution in the later twentieth century.

It would be a bridge too far, however, to dispense with the Cold War completely, as Irwin suggests. It is certainly the case that issues of modernization and imperialism inspired revolutionaries around the world long before 1945 or even 1917, and it would be useful to remember, as Arne Westad does in his chapter on the “Empire of Liberty” in *Global Cold War*, that the Cold War was not so much a battle between revolution and reaction, as Moscow would have it, but rather between revolutionary traditions, including an older, liberal one that Washington sought to promote.⁴ But the mapping of ideological struggle onto a bipolar geopolitical

³ Ryan Irwin, *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁴ Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

one is still a dynamic worth studying in its own right, not least because of the ways in which the political pressures exerted by the superpowers during the Cold War constrained and directed the larger debates that Irwin dates to the late nineteenth century. The correction, rather, is to the historiographical tradition which sees the Cold War as primarily a contest for global supremacy while discounting the ideological motivations of the contestants. For the Soviet Union and China especially, ideology was central to their legitimacy both at home and abroad and, as such, inseparable from their geopolitical status. This is why, as Getchell writes, we need to look beyond the discrepancies in hard power between the superpowers and the 'Global South.' Ideology complicated those power discrepancies, though it certainly did not eliminate them. In addition, the telescoped timeframe of decolonization, which took contemporaries by surprise, is itself an argument in favor of the uniqueness of the Cold War era, because of the immediate importance it imposed on turning ideology into policy. One could almost imagine the Cold War as an attempt by rival teams of engineers to bring order to a chaotic flood by trying to rapidly build channels to contain the churning waters, a metaphor perhaps not too far removed from the reality of the massive hydroelectric projects that both sides built in the newly decolonized states.