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In 1962, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater penned an article for the *Tucson Daily Citizen* in which he predicted what the state would look like fifty years hence, in 2012. Along with continued population growth and economic development, the state would be marked by a harmonious relationship with its neighbor to the south. "Our ties with Mexico will be much more firmly established in 2012," he wrote, "because sometime within the next 50 years the Mexican border will become as the Canadian border, a free one, with the formalities and red tape of ingress and egress cut to a minimum so that the residents of both countries can travel back and forth across the line as if it were not there."¹

Today nobody in Arizona, Sonora, the United States, or Mexico labors under the impression that the border can be crossed without encountering "red tape," much less that it has vanished. Instead, the border and efforts to regulate migration across it have become leading political and social issues, nowhere more so than in Arizona. Joe Arpaio, who made his national reputation as a stern enforcer of anti-immigration measures, has been returned to office as Sheriff of Maricopa County (which encompasses most of Phoenix) six times, despite withering criticism from human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and federal charges of racial profiling. In 2010, the state passed a law requiring that immigrants carry authorization papers at all times and that police routinely check the immigration status of people whom they have reason to believe are in the country illegally. Civil liberties organizations filed suit to strike down the law as unconstitutional, alleging that it would lead to rampant racial profiling and the harassment of all Latinos. The Supreme Court struck down some of the law's provisions, but left standing the mandate for local law enforcement to demand papers.

With anti-immigration organizations calling for mass deportations of those living in the United States without documents, and prominent elected officials advocating the repeal of the fourteenth amendment’s guarantee that all those born on U.S. soil are automatically citizens, nativism has not been this strong in American society since the 1920s. And Arizona has led the way.

Geraldo Cadava’s *Standing on Common Ground* is, in a sense, an effort to explain why a leading white conservative figure such as Goldwater held hopes for a virtually open border so radically at odds with the state’s conservative establishment and Anglo majority in recent decades. Cadava argues that cooperation, rather than conflict, characterized this borderland in the decades after World War II. In those years, leading politicians and business interests in Arizona and Sonora forged cross-border economic, cultural, and political ties, much as had their predecessors in the mid-nineteenth century. Starting in the 1970s, however, the protests of Mexican-Americans, dissident Mexican students, and

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Indian peoples revealed the limits of this elite cross-border economic integration. And Anglo-American nativism in recent decades has all but replaced it.

The four reviewers in this roundtable all find *Standing on Common Ground* to be a fresh and powerful intervention into the history of the United-States-Mexico border. Eric V. Meeks argues that Cadava’s “account reveals an intertwined history of the two border-states that is unknown to most historians and to most residents of the region today.” Flannery Burke, emphasizing the ways in which border histories might speak to present disputes, observes that “postwar histories of cultural and commercial exchange between Arizona and Sonora can reorient conversations around the multiple points of unity, division, affiliation, kinship and alienation that have characterized the U.S.-Mexico borderlands,” rather than telling simple stories of the hardening of a once-open border.

Most historical treatments of the U.S.-Mexico border in the twentieth century center on the experiences of working-class migrants, their Anglo-American employers, and government bureaucrats and agents. Cadava, in contrast – and consonant with the larger shift from diplomatic history to foreign relations, with its greater emphasis on non-state actors – focuses on business leaders such as Goldwater and the Tucson department store mogul Alex Jácome and cultural productions such as a rodeo festival and statues of Spanish explorers. This emphasis elicits both praise and criticism from the reviewers. Andrew Needham argues that “by demonstrating the interplay of political, cultural, and economic interests for figures like Jácome, [Cadava] sheds new light on the way that Mexican American elites fit into and claimed new social and political positions for themselves as cultural brokers who attempted to direct the course of their ‘community.’” Katherine Benton-Cohen commends the book for showing how the “border region’s history continued in the post-war period to be defined by ‘transnational migration’ of everyone from, yes, undocumented migrants, to tourists, elite businessmen, and political officials.” She is particularly taken by Cadava’s chapter on Jácome. Among other achievements, she singles it out for offering a fresh vantage on Barry Goldwater. Most biographies, “which focus on the national level, exclude his relationship and extensive correspondence with Jácome. The result is a flattened portrait of Goldwater that underplays his border roots, and makes Cadava’s exploration of Jácome and Goldwater’s relationship especially valuable.”

Eric Meeks in contrast, questions the importance of Jácome and his counterparts. “Can we hold him up,” he asks, “as an example of the possibilities for more collaborative and amicable relations between the United States and Mexico if he was exceptional even during his time, when his conservative politics and promotion of unregulated development contributed to the displacement and exploitation of so many others?” In the end, Cadava’s emphasis on elite actors leaves Meeks unsatisfied: “When he mentions the plight of the poor, the working class, and international migrants, we learn much more about students, activists and organizers who took up the mantle of defending their rights and interests than we do about the migrants and workers themselves.”

Although it is not billed as such, *Standing on Common Ground* can also be read as a contribution to the burgeoning field of the history of conservatism. The iconic Barry Goldwater makes his appearance, but many of the conservatives here are Mexican-
American and Mexican, a virtually unstudied group. “One of the most perceptive of Cadava’s observations,” notes Burke, “is that ties between conservative populations in Mexico and the United States have had repercussions that are as influential as the divisions in the region.” The emphasis on conservative politics and economic development also prompts Andrew Needham to ask for more. Faulting Cadava for not pursuing “some of the central lines of inquiry historians have followed to explain the origins and consequences of Sunbelt growth” in his borderland context, Needham wonders how Mexican-American elites negotiated “the racial politics of American growth liberalism,” particularly whether they had access to the racialized federal mortgage guarantees that fostered residential segregation in so many cities, whether the border was “a line at which such policies stopped” or in fact they altered “Sonora as they reshaped Arizona?” And, he further wonders, “how did the ability to access or not access the benefits of the racialized New-Deal state shape the racial politics of Mexican American elites, their ability to articulate claims to whiteness, their views on immigration, and their relationships with banks, title companies, and other key institutions of the local growth machine?” That Standing on Common Ground prompts such questions, even if it does not answer them, may be taken as further evidence that scholars interested in the Mexican border will be reading and debating this book for years to come.

Participants:

**Geraldo Cadava** (Ph.D. Yale University, 2008) specializes in United States history, with emphases on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and Latino populations. He teaches courses on Latino History, the United-States Mexico Borderlands, Comparative American Borderlands, the American West, and the United States since the colonial period. His book Standing on Common Ground: The Making of a Sunbelt Borderland (Harvard University Press, Fall 2013) won the 2014 Frederick Jackson Turner Award. He is beginning a project on Latino Conservatism, and other research interests include the U.S.-Mexico border; memories of the U.S.-Mexico War between 1846 and 1916; and the movement of Mexican and Mexican American artists between Mexico and the United States, from 1920 to 2000.


**Katherine Benton-Cohen** is associate professor of history at Georgetown University, and previously taught at Louisiana State University. She holds degrees from Princeton University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She is the author of Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands (Harvard, 2009), which uses Cochise County, Arizona, to examine the history of race in America. She is currently finishing a book about the U.S. Immigration Commission, or Dillingham Commission, of 1907-1911, and the emergence of immigration as a federal policy problem.
From 2014 to 2017, she will be a Distinguished Lecturer for the Organization of American Historians.

**Flannery Burke**, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of History at Saint Louis University. She is the author of *From Greenwich Village to Taos* and is currently writing a cultural history of the twentieth-century American Southwest.

**Eric V. Meeks** is Associate Professor and Chair of the History Department at Northern Arizona University. His first book, *Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona*, examines how the ethno-racial classifications and identities of the diverse indigenous, mestizo, and European-descended residents of Arizona's borderlands crystallized as the region was politically and economically incorporated into the United States between 1880 and 1980. He is currently working on a book entitled *The U.S.-Mexican Borderlands: A Transnational History*.

**Andrew Needham** (PhD, Michigan, 2006) is Associate Professor of history at New York University focusing on recent US metropolitan, environmental, and American Indian history. He is the author, with Allen Dieterich-Ward of “Beyond the Metropolis: Metropolitan Growth and Regional Transformation in Postwar America,” *Journal of Urban History* 35 (Nov. 2009) which was awarded the Arnold Hirsch Prize for best article in urban history for 2009, and of *Power Lines: Phoenix and the Making of the Modern Southwest* (Princeton University Press, 2014). He is beginning work on a project entitled *Engineering Sustainability: Nature and Technology in Urban America*, examining the place of urban infrastructure in twentieth century regional politics.
Who is ‘standing on common ground’ in the borderlands? The answer, according to Geraldo Cadava, might be different than you think. In his engaging new history of post-World War II Tucson, Arizona, Cadava asks readers to rethink the assumptions of recent borderlands historians, journalists, and politicians. Cadava, who has family roots in Tucson, seeks to complicate—or, at the very least, extend the timeframe of—the arguments of historians who claim that the racial and national divisions of the Arizona-Mexico borderlands were complete by World War II (full disclosure: I am one of these scholars). Instead, Cadava argues, “the Arizona-Sonora borderland remained a space shaped by its diverse cross-border exchanges” (245). While no historians of the earlier period, as far as I know, have expressly denied this point, our assessment of race and border relations as having been hardened by World War II may have obscured the continued commercial and cultural permeability of the border. As Cadava persuasively argues, the border region’s history continued in the post-war period to be defined by “transnational migration” of everyone from, yes, undocumented migrants, to tourists, elite businessmen, and political officials (20). Yet, by the early twenty-first century, while those ties still existed, they were frayed by the rise of racist militias and the infamous Arizona state law SB1070, which targeted undocumented immigrants, and with it a stark image of racist division and of a nearly impassable geographical and cultural border.

As Cadava succinctly puts it, “In a basic sense, this book shows that Arizona was not always this way” (250). In his chapters on wartime military build-up, a regional cowboy festival, a downtown department store, student movements in northern Mexico and Tucson, a Central American Sanctuary Movement based in Tucson, and a political battle over public statues of Mexican revolutionary Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa and seventeenth-century mission founder Padre Eusebio Kino, Cadava explores in both English and Spanish-language sources the too-often overlooked urban borderlands center of Tucson, Arizona. Although other histories of Tucson exist, Cadava’s is the first designed for a national audience. If Phoenix has recently gathered significant scholarly attention, then Cadava argues that Tucson deserves its due—and for different reasons. As an Arizona native and scholar, I can vouch for Cadava’s contention that Tucson is far more infused in border culture than is the Phoenix area. In spite of Phoenix’s large Latino population, Tucson’s relationship with


Mexico is much more palpable in public celebrations, art, culture, and, not least, politics. To make the most obvious contrast, Phoenix’s Maricopa County continues to elect the infamous Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the subject of several federal civil-rights investigations. In contrast, Tucson’s Pima County has for nearly thirty-five years re-elected Sheriff Clarence Dupnik, an outspoken critic of Arizona state law SB1070, who called the law ‘racist’ and ‘disgusting.’ As Cadava writes in his introduction, Tucson was and is a “city still defined by its relations with Mexico” (6).

But what, really, does all this have to do with diplomatic and international history? The book does an excellent job of showing how important Tucson was and is to northern Mexico both culturally and politically. But it is not obviously diplomatic history. With the exception of the chapter on World War II, it uses no consular or federal records, the usual stock-in-trade of diplomatic historians. Still, it is very much relevant to the discussion of non-state actors who shape foreign relations, as I will shortly discuss. The rest of my review will focus on the aspects of the book that touch on issues relevant to these subjects. The opening chapter, for example, traces the symbiosis between the growth of the military economies on both sides of the border. Tucson, like San Antonio and other Sunbelt cities, owed its twentieth-century growth to the rise of a vast military expansion, particularly in aerospace. Little known to U.S. readers are the reliance on Mexican allies and the concomitant concerns over border security in an age of war. In a later chapter, Cadava tells the story of Tucson’s sanctuary movement, which arose during the brutal wars in Central America that brought hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans across the border for the first time. A new border flow of immigrants was coming from beyond Mexico, and as war refugees rather than as economic migrants. In response, Protestant and Catholic churches set up sanctuaries that created cross-racial alliances, drew international attention, and prompted federal legal action. Little is known outside of Arizona about these activists, or their vision, from a local and border perspective of the Cold War foreign policy emanating from Washington. All these sections of Cadava’s book—as well as his chapter comparing student movements at the University of Arizona and the University of Sonora—have relevance to scholars of diplomatic and international history. All convincingly highlight the political and economic connections between Mexico and southern Arizona (although, I should add, they might benefit by a brief comparison to analogous cities like El Paso, San Antonio, and San Diego).

But the chapter I found most interesting, and, unexpectedly, perhaps, with the most interesting lessons for diplomatic historians, was about a family and an institution almost unknown outside Tucson and northern Mexico—that of Jácome’s Department Store and its father-and-son owners. The store was founded in 1896 by prominent Tucsonan (or tucsonense, the local term for Mexican-origin residents) Carlos Jácome, who was one of only two Mexican-origin delegates at Arizona’s 1910 State Constitutional Convention (Arizona became a state in 1912). After Carlos died in 1932, his tenth child, Alex, took over the

business and ran it for the next forty years. Like his father, Alex was a savvy businessman and a Republican. Under the son’s leadership, the store expanded heavily in the 1950s and was a fixture of downtown Tucson until its closure in 1980.

This seemingly local story has relevance to international history in Jácome’s role as a non-state actor in border relations. (The chapter also serves as a kind of second volume to Samuel Truett’s work on the topic of business elites and cross-border relationships.) As Cadava observes, “Jácome’s department store was a successful family business, yet it also became a site for the negotiation of regionally defined relations between the United States and Mexico” (117). As a leader of many local organizations, Alex Jácome advocated for “his vision of U.S.-Mexico relations more broadly,” as in a speech to the Tucson Optimist Club in the 1950s, where he told an audience of businessman that they should cultivate “the business potential in customers from Mexico.” As a young man, he had crisscrossed Sonora’s abysmal back roads to meet local leaders, but “eating dust for several years” had paid off with a burgeoning business with Mexicans at his store (114). Later, he joined businessmen on both sides of the border to create the “Arizona-Mexico West Coast Trade Commission” (115).

Thanks to the father and son’s hard work and cross-border relationships, Jácome’s store was a hub for wealthy Tucsonans and northern Mexicans—a place to “see and be seen” for norteño (northern Mexican) elites (113). Unlike many Tucson businesses, Jácome’s accepted pesos as well as U.S. dollars, even after devaluation. By the time the store closed, it had 30,000 customer accounts. Cadava documents the business and personal relationships that northern Mexican families cultivated with Alex Jácome. He wrote letters of recommendations for Mexican students to attend the University of Arizona, allowed them to cash checks and keep accounts at the store, and put in a good word with immigration authorities. He advertised extensively in Sonoran newspapers, and his store became a home away from home for Mexican families and their high-school and college-age children studying in Tucson. As one Sonoran newspaper put it, “Jácome’s department store is the meeting place of the most distinguished businessmen and families from Mexico’s West Coast” (113).

Most interesting were Alex Jácome’s politics and relationship with Senator Barry Goldwater. Although Goldwater got his political start on the Phoenix City Council, his family had deep roots in southern Arizona. As a conservative Republican with a similar upbringing and business background as Barry Goldwater, Jácome had the ear of the powerful politician, became an important ally in the Mexican and Mexican American communities, and frequently lobbied Goldwater on border policy and commercial relations with Mexico. During the peso devaluations of the 1970s, for example, Goldwater—encouraged by Jácome—advocated for direct aid to Mexico, a quite different policy than one might have expected from the consummate conservative. Likewise, although Goldwater is known as a passionate opponent of federal civil rights law, he cultivated a genuine friendship with

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Jácome and Mexican businesspeople, which Cadava carefully documents in the Jácome and Goldwater papers. Jácome’s knowledge of the region was valued beyond partisan lines – a recognition of regional expertise, regardless of party affiliation. Shortly after his election to Congress representing southern Arizona, the Democrat Morris Udall wrote to Jácome in 1962, “If I were Secretary of State I think one of my first acts would be to recruit about fifteen men with your background and ability and turn them loose in Latin America” (119).6

Jácome’s regional prominence translated into honorary and actual diplomatic posts that reflected the importance of his business and cultural ties. According to Cadava, Jácome had originally considered becoming a diplomat before ending up at the helm of the family business, and over the years, he served as “Tucson’s honorary vice consul to Mexico, U.S. delegate to the 1954 Inter-American Indian Conference in Bolivia, and U.S. representative to a trade mission in Spain” (115). His wife was originally from Argentina, stretching Jácome’s ties past Mexico into South America, and he was a critic of the United States’ paternalistic policy toward Latin America.

The chapter on Jácome’s store is my favorite, if for no other reason that it showed a different Barry Goldwater than the national and caricatured versions. It situates Goldwater firmly in his borderlands origins, and even—though this was not explicitly mentioned—his Jewish ones. The Goldwater family, like the Steinfelds with whom Jácome’s had an important business relationship, were among several Jewish families in the Southwest border region to gain wealth and notoriety in the department store business. (Goldwater himself became an Episcopalian.) Goldwater’s ancestors dated to the 1850s in Arizona, when his great uncle Joe owned a general store with a Mexican partner, Jose Castaneda. The point here is not to argue that there was a straight line from Goldwater’s ancestors to his relationship with the Jácomes, but only to underscore the unique world in which Goldwater came of age and operated politically. I would have liked to see more on this topic, but what is included reminds us that ‘the local’ matters in the development of both foreign policy and national political careers.7 Cadava observes that biographies of Goldwater, which focus on the national level, exclude his relationship and extensive correspondence with Jácome. The result is a flattened portrait of Goldwater that underplays his border roots, and makes Cadava’s exploration of Jácome and Goldwater’s relationship especially valuable.

This goes to another point that Cadava makes: that border divisions were also as much about class—perhaps more so—than about race or nationality. The fractured border policy and racialized rhetoric that has dominated Arizona news in recent years ignores the fact that class, as much if not more than race, has divided the border region’s people and their

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6 Udall is mistakenly identified as a U.S. Senator in the text.

stance about cross-border relationships, culture, and economies. By making this point and many others, Cadava’s “book seeks to start a new conversation about the border” (252). And so it has.
Where a story begins changes everything. ‘And then the lovers died’ would be a very poor kick-off for *Romeo and Juliet*. ‘She gets on the plane’ would take much of the anticipation out of *Casablanca*. Historians are always at a disadvantage when they tell their narratives because, of course, most readers already know the ending. Often we meet the challenge by taking our readers and our students further back in time than they expect – the Seven Years’ War begins our telling of the American Revolution and the Trail of Tears becomes the start of Reconstruction. By instilling in students and readers a long view, we hope also to inculcate humility and complex, critical thinking. We ask our readers to re-evaluate their preconceptions. Our starting points indicate that the stories we tell are bigger, more intricate, and more far-reaching than they might first appear.

Rarely do historians shorten their narratives to achieve the same effect, but that is exactly what Geraldo Cadava has done in *Standing on Common Ground*. Rather than begin his story fifty to eighty million years ago with the volcanic eruptions and earthquakes that left copper deposits in the surface of the earth in southern Arizona, as an environmental historian might do; or with the decline of the Hohokom in the fifteenth century, as an ethnohistorian might do; or with the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, as a political historian might do, Cadava starts his story in the middle of the twentieth century. For those scholars and teachers who cover hundreds or even thousands of years of history in textbooks and survey classes, this might seem like a very small bite to chew. What Cadava shows, however, is that the transformations that accompanied World War II and the inclusion of southern Arizona in the post-war ‘Sunbelt’ hold the clues to the more complex, more intricate, more far-reaching, more humbling story that we need to hear if we want to chart a future for the U.S.-Mexico borderland.

In shortening his chronology, Cadava actively challenges another narrative: the narrative of the hardening border. This narrative commonly begins with the U.S.-Mexico war, shows the heightened tensions occasioned by the Mexican Revolution, traces the formation of the U.S. border patrol, and culminates with the Bracero program and contemporary efforts to limit immigration across the U.S.-Mexico border. Every chapter in this story begins with the recollections of an earlier generation who remember a time when people walked freely back and forth across the border. I have told this narrative in my own classes to show students how we got to where to we are. In the U.S. survey class, the narrative provides the additional benefit of moving students’ attention away from the eastern United States while continuing to tell the stories of immigration, industrialization, and rising global prominence so central to U.S. history. The story of the hardening border is a national story and a story of foreign policy. It is a story that makes sense of the growing population of detained immigrants in Arizona’s prisons, the growing number of separated families, and the violence that marks so many border crossings.

But it is not the whole story. As we fixate on the conflict and the sharp lines drawn between the U.S. and Mexico in such a narrative, we miss potential solutions to the violence and inequality that mark the Arizona-Sonora borderland. If the narrative of the hardening
border explains how we got to where we are, the story of the postwar borderlands landscape tells us where we may go from here. As Cadava notes, his story traces the “dense web of connections between Arizona and Sonora that have shaped the post-World War II history of each state and the region as a whole. Guided by this understanding of postwar borderlands, future policy debates that will affect the region must adopt as their frame of reference not only the protection of U.S. sovereignty against undocumented Mexican immigrants but also the full range of transnational connections that define borderland life” (9). Cadava views all borderland residents – university students, Tohono O’odham, businessmen, immigrants, maquiladora employees, and sanctuary activists among them -- as resources, rather than problems. In doing so, Cadava transforms the border into a borderland, a line into a landscape.

Other scholars have shown us this path before, but Cadava breaks new chronological ground. Sam Truett’s Fugitive Landscapes explores the hidden transnational copper borderlands of the late nineteenth century.1 Rachel St. John’s Line in the Sand uses Mexican and U.S. sources to trace not a hardening border, but a pulsing one, with as contingent a future in 1848 as at her book’s end in the 1930s.2 Their work allows Cadava to engage a transnational landscape that includes both Sonora and Arizona, but he takes the story into the period after World War II. The boom and bust of the Sunbelt economy, the student and Chicano protests of the 1960s and 1970s, and the spread of maquiladoras make for dense and rich sources that require concentrated and detailed attention. Cadava gives those events their due.

His tools for doing so are those of business and cultural history. Such tools illuminate well the years he investigates. Investment tallies, and such political developments as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy and the North American Free Trade Agreement appear in the pages of Common Ground, but so also do memories of Jácome’s Department Store in Tucson, student-exchange programs, and parades from Tucson’s Fiesta de Los Vaqueros. It is the rich descriptions of cultural history that make the borderlands a place rather than a problem in the pages of Common Ground.

Cadava’s tools also reveal that the border is more than a two-sided issue. Because there are far more than two sides to the story of the borderlands, he does not present ‘the other side.’ Mexicans and Americans, young and old, Anglos and Chicanos, Tohono O’odham and non-native, conservative and liberal, wealthy and poor, protesters and university administrators, all vie for a place on the stage in the story Cadava narrates. Such diversity sometimes made for interesting alliances. One of the most perceptive of Cadava’s observations is that ties between conservative populations in Mexico and the United States have had repercussions that are as influential as the divisions in the region. Between the

1 Sam Truett, Fugitive Landscapes: The Forgotten History of the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006).
early 1950s and the early 1970s the conservative Mexican American department-store owner Alex Jácome clashed with Chicano activists at the University of Arizona and strengthened his connections to conservative Mexican businessmen. As Cadava concludes: “The tensions demonstrated the deep divisions that existed among Tucson’s Mexican and Mexican American communities, while the friendships forged between politicians and wealthy Mexicans in Arizona and Sonora showed the possibilities of cross-border alliances based on the conservative ideologies of Arizona’s and Sonora’s Sunbelt borderland” (129).

Cadava’s claim may be controversial, but it is not a provocation. Rather, it is an invitation. As he argues: “Postwar histories of cultural and commercial exchange between Arizona and Sonora can reorient conversations around the multiple points of unity, division, affiliation, kinship and alienation that have characterized the U.S.-Mexico borderlands” (253). Instead of assuming a two-sided debate, Cadava asks those interested in the border to examine the multiple perspectives that make up the borderland community. Rather than contribute to polarized diatribes, Cadava pushes readers to consider where the borderlands, the nations of Mexico and the United States, and historians can go from here.

Historians who take up his charge have many decisions to make. Cadava takes as his area of investigation a north-south strip of land stretching from Tucson, Arizona to Hermosillo, Sonora. Should other historians do the same? Should they extend their range and look from Flagstaff to Guatemala City? Or should historians examine instead an east-west strip, perhaps extending from Chihuahua to Ensenada in the south and from Los Angeles to Santa Fe in the north? Is it possible to undertake such a rich investigation of varying perspectives in a region so large? The question has the potential to become tiresome, but historians nonetheless need to decide just where the borderlands begin and end in the stories they share.

And, of course, they will need to decide too where to begin and end their narratives. This is the greatest challenge Cadava poses. Historians are sometimes hesitant to conjecture how the narratives we write may affect the future, but Cadava insists that we ask. The story of the hardening border is a story of how we got to where we are: fences racial profiling, drug smuggling, the Minuteman Project, crime rings, and desert crossings that can mean death for those who risk them. The stories Cadava demands are stories of the full cast of the borderland’s residents – stories of indigenous people, students, workers, merchants, artists, scholars, and tourists-- stories that will help us chart a more hopeful future. We do not know the ending of the stories that we are writing, but we do know that where we begin can change everything.
I had the pleasure of reading half of Standing on Common Ground in Arizona and half of it in Puerto Peñasco, Sonora as a “cross-border tourist” (74). The trip was one of many that I have taken to Sonora and other locations in Mexico since I was a child growing up in Phoenix, among them two which involved homestay language programs similar to those Geraldo Cadava details in his book: one to Guadalajara in 1993 and another through Arizona State University to the Universidad de Sonora in Hermosillo in the very hot summer of 1995. In the second instance, I was the guest of a family who was coping with the repercussions of the previous year’s peso devaluation partly with income earned by relatives living temporarily in Arizona. I recall in particular the two days during which the city disconnected the electricity in their home and I slept in the hallway in search of a draft, and the unease I felt at the privilege of my return crossing into the United States while they faced the continuing economic crisis in Mexico. Having had such experiences growing up in the Sunbelt borderlands, I was fascinated to read Cadava’s nuanced history of the relationship between Tucson and Sonora, especially at a time when most people’s knowledge of the region comes from sensational journalistic accounts that emphasize only tensions and violence.

Cadava’s book is particularly enlightening when he discusses the regional borderland culture and cross-border economic, political, and diplomatic ties that flourished in the two decades after World War II. After the first chapter examines wartime mistrust, division, and border enforcement, subsequent chapters turn to the cooperative efforts and relationships of the post-war period. His account reveals an intertwined history of the two border-states that is unknown to most historians and to most residents of the region today. He deconstructs Tucson’s “Fiesta de los Vaqueros,” an annual rodeo and parade that romanticized Arizona’s and Sonora’s horse and cattle culture and that thrived in the 1940s and 50s. His analysis reveals enduring border paradoxes in which participants from both sides of the border at once “affirmed the language of regional togetherness” and “displayed the city’s inequalities during the mid-twentieth century” (60). The fiesta mythologized the region’s past as a Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. frontier to support ideologies of progress and modernization while ignoring the dispossession of small farmers and ranchers, the displacement of barrio residents, and the contributions and exploitation of Mexican and native laborers. At the same time, the fiesta painted an innocuous picture of—and thus reinforced—the region’s racial order. Cadava continues along these lines in the subsequent chapter by telling the story of Jácome’s department store and the trans-border consumerism that brought upper middle-class and elite Sonorans to Tucson, resulting in a largely forgotten period when Tucson’s thriving downtown was a true city center. Alex Jácome embraced conservative politics, maintaining an enduring correspondence with Barry Goldwater and casting himself in the mold of a civilizing Spanish missionary while serving as a booster for trans-border trade and Pan-American unity. But his refusal to acknowledge the inequities wrought by capitalist development alienated many Mexicans and Mexican Americans who viewed him as a vendido (sell-out) (159). Cadava admits that Jácome was “one of only a handful” of Mexican Americans who “succeeded” at this level in Sunbelt Arizona—a point I will return to shortly (116, 125).
The optimism of the post-war period declined by the mid 1960s, so the second half of the book necessarily turns to darker themes. Cadava uses the term “Student Movements” to refer both to student exchanges between the University of Arizona (U of A) and the Universidad de Sonora (Uni-Son) and Guadalajara, and to student protest movements from the late 1950s to early 1970s. On one hand, “When politicians, businesspeople, students, and teachers came to together at the U of A and Uni-Son, they marked those institutions as pinnacles of Sunbelt borderland’s modernization” (135). On the other hand, students on both sides of the border protested the failings and adverse repercussions of modernization. In Arizona, Chicanos charged the university with institutional racism and challenged widespread discrimination. They looked to their Mexican heritage to forge a distinct identity and aligned themselves with Sonoran students who embraced “global liberation movements” (163, 165). Cadava rightly points out the irony that each university’s students protested in isolation, demonstrating the salience of the international border. He proceeds with a brief discussion of the “darker side of economic development” in Mexico and Central America, describing how modernization and violent, U.S.-supported regimes spurred the migration of refugees who, once they reached the U.S., were subjected to nativism, racism and violence (177). Yet here too he demonstrates that Arizona’s reaction to Latino migrants was more dynamic than is generally recognized. He highlights Tucson’s sanctuary movement, in which some Arizonans rejected anti-immigrant sentiments and acted upon a vision of global justice to protect migrants and advocate for refugee rights, bringing “national and international attention” to the issue (199). In his final chapter, Cadava returns to the theme of a mythological past and provides an insightful analysis of Tucson’s debate in the 1980s over raising statues of Pancho Villa and the seventeenth-century missionary, Eusebio Franciso Kino.

Throughout the book, Cadava directs most of his attention to merchant elites, businessmen, politicians, college students, and activists, and relatively little to the experiences of those with less privilege and influence. As I hinted above, halfway into the book I found myself asking: as fascinating as it is, does Alex Jácome’s story deserve one of six chapters in a book on the Arizona-Sonora borderlands? Can we hold him up as an example of the possibilities for more collaborative and amicable relations between the United States and Mexico if he was exceptional even during his time, when his conservative politics and promotion of unregulated development contributed to the displacement and exploitation of so many others? Cadava recognizes this, writing in his Conclusion that in Jácome’s time, “the vast majority of borderland residents—especially many native people on both sides of the border and a majority of Mexican Americans in Arizona—remained economically, politically, and socially marginalized” (246). This being the case, might their stories warrant some chapters of their own? When he mentions the plight of the poor, the working class, and international migrants, we learn much more about students, activists and organizers who took up the mantle of defending their rights and interests than we do about the migrants and workers themselves. I was excited to see him recount the critically important work that immigrant-rights attorney Margo Cowan and the members of the Manzo Area Council performed as part of the sanctuary movement, but we learn about the experiences of Central American refugees almost solely through their lens.
My second critique concerns the spatial boundaries of Cadava’s work. His incorporation of Sonora into the history of the Sunbelt is most welcome, but I was surprised that he limited the Arizona side of the story to Tucson. It strikes me that one might be inclined to criticize my own book, *Border Citizens*, in a similar vein, though in my case it would be for not paying enough attention to Sonora.1 My decision to do so was based on the complexity of the history of racialization and inter-ethnic relations of multiple indigenous and ethnic groups over the course of a century, along with my belief that I could problematize the nation-state by examining its contested and contingent nature while incorporating enough of Mexico’s history to tell the story that needed to be told. In the case of *Standing on Common Ground*, while Cadava discusses communities and regions throughout Sonora, he does not do the same for Arizona. Most problematically, he seems to have artificially excised Maricopa and Pinal Counties, which border Tucson’s Pima County to the north, from the ‘Sunbelt borderlands.’ He suggests that Tucson was “the center of Arizona's and Sonora’s Sunbelt borderland,” (57) and yet in a number of ways Phoenix, together with other towns in Maricopa County (Scottsdale, Tempe, Mesa, Chandler, Glendale) and Pinal County to the southeast, were at least equally important in post-war years. This is pertinent to Cadava’s history because the experiences of many Sonorans in Arizona were centered in these counties, and because both Tucson and Sonora residents had to reckon with Phoenix’s economic and political ascendency throughout the Sunbelt era. Cadava is convincing that the post-World War II trajectory of Tucson’s history was deeply entangled with that of Sonora, but so too was it entangled with the history of the sprawling colossus to the north (if I may re-purpose the familiar Latin American phrase).

In fact, Maricopa County has long had an intricate and intimate connection to Sonora and Tucson. As early as 1917, during the Mexican Revolution, the Salt River Valley became the primary destination for Mexican migrants to Arizona, mostly because of the agricultural boom after the completion of the Roosevelt Dam. By 1920, there were some 8,000 more Mexican-born individuals living in Maricopa county than in Pima county.2 During and after World War II, immigration to these counties grew further due to a spike in commercial agriculture, urbanization, and the rise of a manufacturing and service economy. Among the migrants from Sonora and southern Arizona to Maricopa County were thousands of Tohono O’odham and Yaquis. Cadava spends significant time discussing Tohono O’odham experiences in Tucson, but not the experiences of the thousands who worked in the fields of the Salt River and Casa Grande valleys (often the same individuals who lived or spent time in Tucson). He leaves Yaquis and Akimel O’odham who lived in communities throughout south-central Arizona out of his account entirely. The descendants of these Mexican and indigenous migrants have been extremely important to the region socially, culturally, politically, and economically. For example, in the 1960s and 70s Mexican Americans in Tempe and Phoenix spearheaded Chicano Movement organizations like *Chicanos por la Causa*, whose significance extended well beyond Phoenix, and which, like

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the *Alianza Hispano Americana* (a group Cadava does discuss) has been sorely neglected by historians.

The Phoenix metropolitan area also became the economic and political power center of Arizona in post-war decades and the most significant Sunbelt boomtown between Texas and the Pacific Coast, with serious implications for the borderlands. Cadava overlooks this integral part of the history of the Arizona-Sonora Sunbelt despite his recognition of the importance of figures like Barry Goldwater, whose political career was centered in Phoenix. Demographics ensured the city’s political dominance throughout the Sunbelt era. Between 1940 and 1980, Maricopa County’s population was about three times that of Pima County, and by 2010 two-thirds of Arizona’s population lived there.3 These numbers have translated into electoral clout. The majority of the state’s most influential (and largely conservative) elected officials hail from the Phoenix metro area. Indeed, Cadava opens his Introduction with an account of how Senator Russell Pearce, from Mesa, spearheaded the anti-immigrant Arizona Senate Bill 1070, and Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio enforced it, but he removes the story from the context of Phoenix politics. This is not simply a problem of omission. Both Tucson and Sonora—along with smaller towns like Flagstaff, where I now live—have had to reckon with Phoenix’s dominance, and historians of this bi-national region should reckon with it as well.

These comments are by no means meant to diminish the importance of Cadava’s work, but are meant as food for thought in the context of a roundtable review. *Standing on Common Ground* is an excellent book. I welcome the author’s call to historians to examine “cultural, educational, and other exchanges” that constitute important instances of transnational relations beyond labor and refugee migration, and his related goal “to find the points at which the border—both arguments about it and the thing itself—is most flexible to change” (243). My comments should be read as a cautionary note that as borderlands historians eagerly look towards transnational horizons, as well we should, we do not adjust our line of vision so far that we lose sight of important connections and loci of power that reside within nation-states and the way these bear on transnational stories. Moreover, we should find ways to focus not only on those whose influence in forging transnational links are most clear in the written record, such as elites, businessmen, politicians, diplomats, middle-class activists, and college students and faculty, all of whom (including myself) have a relatively privileged ability to cross the border and to have their voices heard. We have much more work to do to tell the social history of those less visible in the archives, such as migrants, refugees, the working class, and poor men and women who perhaps feel the impact of the border in the most direct and powerful ways.

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Underlying Geraldo Cadava’s *Standing on Common Ground* is a story of the rise of a new region spanning the Arizona-Sonora border. Beginning in World War II, investment by both the U.S. and Mexican federal governments underwrote the construction of new highways, hydroelectric dams and irrigation works, and, in the case of the U.S. government, military bases and defense plants. At the same time, a group of transborder elites acquired new power to direct both the economic development and the cultural representation of their emerging region. Sonoran businessmen like Ignacio Soto, a cement magnate who became the Mexican state’s governor, collaborated with Arizona businessmen like Alex Jácome, a Tucson department store owner, to envision a shared future of modern development. As the postwar years proceeded, Tucson developed into the central node of a region that stretched as far south as Guaymas, two hundred miles distant on the Gulf of California. Cadava calls attention to these regional connections as a response to narratives of postwar development that have either seen the U.S. and Mexico as sharply divided, or have failed to incorporate the spatial transformations south of the border into the postwar history of the Southwest. “The dense web of … transnational connections that define[d] borderland life,” Cadava argues, “shaped the post-World War II history of each state and the region as a whole” (9). To give this region clarity and substance throughout his narrative, Cadava brings together two distinct terms. He names it the ‘Sunbelt borderland.’

In telling this story of regional formation, Cadava focuses on three distinct public discourses, exploring how they reflected and shaped ideas about the region’s past, present and future. The most consistent of these three was a language used by the region’s elites that suggested that a transnational partnership among businessmen and politicians would produce “profit, progress, and modernization.” Businessmen on both sides of the border would, in this vision, create a rising tide that would lift all boats. As Cadava points out in his preface, this elite discourse itself stood as a rebuke to narratives, such as Columbia Pictures’ 1940 epic *Arizona*, that represented Arizona’s development as an entirely Anglo project. Instead, drawing both on the language of Franklin Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy and on a vision of the romantic Spanish past, elite businessmen told a story of partnership, in which Anglo, Mexican, and Mexican American leaders worked to create both regional connections and material progress. Exploring the ways in which this discourse materialized in the annual life of Tucson, Cadava explores *la Fiesta do los Vaqueros*, an annual parade and rodeo in which Tucson’s elites directed the representations of the ranching past of the region and its “colorful,” racially diverse present “as a way of nurturing regional economic development; the intimate ties between transnational business and civic organizations and regional politics” (57–8). Examining the region’s universities, department stores, and other institutions, Cadava argues that regional leaders maintained a rhetorical consistency in insisting that transnational connections would produce economic prosperity and regional progress throughout the second half of the twentieth century. As this vision came under challenge from both those who portrayed the region as
riven with inequalities and those who demanded a hardening of the border, regional elites attempted to re-instantiate it through celebrations of Father Eusebino Kino, the seventeenth-century Jesuit who had established the chain of missions that reached across the present day border, as the original agent of modernization forged in the cooperation between diverse peoples.

This elite discourse obscured the roles working-class Mexicans, Mexican Americans and almost all Tohono O’odham Indians played in creating the region. It also obscured the inequalities that continued to structure the region. Cadava thus examines the emergence, particularly from the 1960s onward, of a second public discourse that critiqued the practices of exclusion and inequality that characterized southern Arizona and northern Sonora. Cadava carefully historicizes this rhetoric, locating it both in the experiences of migrants who traveled to Tucson for work in the 1940s and in the representations of Indianess as backward in *la Fiesta do los Vaqueros*. Indeed, he demonstrates how Tohono O’odham worked to maintain authority over particular parts of the festival even while participating in contests to determine “the most authentic Indian female.” (91) In the early chapters, however, this discourse remains mainly a fugue to the larger elite project the book charts. With the 1960s and the emergence of the Chicano movement, however, Cadava examines how some working class Mexican Americans, students, and immigration advocates overtly challenged elite representations of Tucson as racially harmonious. Instead, they argued that the claims of elites like Alex Jácome to speak for the region’s Mexican and Mexican American population elided the deep racial oppression that Chicanos and Mexican nationals faced in Tucson, oppression made apparent in the three trials between 1976 and 1981 of two Anglo ranchers charged with violating the civil rights of Mexican migrants they captured, an analysis of which makes up much of the book’s fifth chapter. Cadava carefully spatializes this language, exploring how the critiques of class and social structure offered by Mexican students, both in the University of Arizona and at la Universidad de Sonora, differed from the racialized critiques of U.S.-raised Chicanos. In bringing these languages of discontent, and the politics and events in which they were embedded, to the fore, the book undergoes two narrative changes. First, its focus gradually moves north of the border. While the early chapters give relatively equal space to people and institutions in Mexico, the latter chapters focus largely on Tucson. Second, the Tohono O’odham largely disappear from the narrative after the second chapter, as the book’s focus turns increasingly to examine questions of the public discourses surrounding migration, citizenship, and Mexican American belonging. This narrowing works well, serving to clarify and direct Cadava’s narrative, particularly in the fascinating final chapter that explores a public debate in the 1990s and 2000s about whether statues of Mexican revolutionary Pancho Villa, a symbolic representation of transnational struggle, or Spanish missionary Father Kino, the symbol of transnational unity, best represented the region’s ethos. It does, however, lead to questions about the ways that the regional ties that Cadava charts early in the book shifted and changed over time, as well as did the understanding of the place of native peoples within regional public discourse.

The final discourse exists mostly as a shadow within *Standing on Common Ground*. It is the discourse, so present in today’s politics, both in Arizona and the nation at large, that denies the idea of common ground itself. It is the language that casts the border as a hard line that
must be defended rather than a borderlands of cultural interaction. Despite the differences in the two discourses he charts throughout the book, Cadava suggests that both could find common ground, in the past and today, in opposing arguments that deny transnational ties and the efforts to instantiate these arguments in law. In largely sideling this portrayal of the border, and its manifestations in federal attempts to ‘harden’ the border such as Operation Wetback, which rapidly deported more than one million Mexican nationals in 1954, and 1994’s Operation Gatekeeper, which led to the emplacement of surveillance infrastructure between Tijuana and San Ysidro, within his broader narrative, Cadava’s book performs one of the broader goals the author lays out in the conclusion, to “demonstrate that the border has always signified many things at once even though public discourse in the early twenty-first century has by and large characterized it as a single and hard dividing line between countries, races, and civilizations.” (252-3)

“Sunbelt borderland” does not represent only a clever name for the region whose history Cadava narrates. It also reflects an attempt to bring together two sets of historiography that, despite frequently describing similar places, have existed almost entirely separately in historical scholarship. The great success of this effort, in my reading, lies in Cadava’s ability to extend the temporal reach of borderlands history through the era of postwar metropolitan development. “Sunbelt borderland,” in one sense, reflects the latest iteration of a scholarly effort, now more than a decade and a half long, to challenge Stephen Aron’s and Jeremy Adelman’s portrait of the historical transition ‘from borderlands to borders,’ in which the establishment of geographical border lines was mirrored by the simplification of social relations in the territory under question. Cadava’s book shows many of the hallmarks of recent works that challenge Aron’s and Adelman’s formulation. The border, he emphasizes, remained relatively unimportant for shaping social relations, as regional elites looked across it in their attempts to claim a right to rule, as consumers, tourists, and students easily crossed in either direction, and as capital flowed readily to either side of the border. He also demonstrates, similar to the work of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century borderlands scholars such as Rachel St. John, S. Deborah Kang, Samuel Truett, and Kelly Lytle Hernandez, that borderlands elites possessed the ability to manipulate national policy to meet their own ends, as Alex Jácome did in his ability to shape border policy to allow and encourage the flow of shoppers from Sonora. Cadava is unique, however, in


demonstrating that these patterns extended into the late twentieth century if not the present day. These complicated dynamics, he explains, “defied simple claims about the opening and closing of the border.” (245)

Extending the borderlands narrative through the postwar era also allows Cadava to draw new connections between borderlands history and Latino and immigration history. By focusing on the power of Mexican American businessmen like Jácome in borderland places, he gives new depth to narratives of class and political divisions within Latino communities, narratives that occupy a central place in Latino history. By demonstrating the interplay of political, cultural, and economic interests for figures like Jácome, he sheds new light on the way that Mexican American elites fit into and claimed new social and political positions for themselves as cultural brokers who attempted to direct the course of their “community.” Cadava also demonstrates how contentious efforts to articulate community and shared history were within Mexican American communities, as the class divisions that have long marked borderlands history gave rise to contrasting portraits of place. Finally, he demonstrates the ways that the shifting patterns of migration, including increasing migration into the region from outside of Sonora, reshaped the politics of migration within Tucson. In a sense, Cadava extends the work of David Gutiérrez’s Walls and Mirrors. Like Gutiérrez, he demonstrates how debates about migration created new divisions within Mexican-American politics; by locating those divisions in the space of the borderlands; however, Cadava shows how citizenship and belonging could be defined regionally as well as nationally.4

Cadava writes in deep conversation with the central historiographical concerns and currents of borderlands history. Extending the borderlands across the time of the Sunbelt allows him to provide new understandings of how concerns and currents born in the nineteenth century continued to structure the experiences, and languages, of historical actors into the postwar period. Standing on Common Ground is not as successful in the second historiographical project that “Sunbelt borderland” promises, a project of stretching the story of Sunbelt growth spatially across the border. This shortcoming reflects Cadava’s scholarly focus. While Cadava draws on existing Sunbelt scholarship to explain Tucson’s explosive growth, his book does not engage some of the central lines of inquiry historians have followed to explain the origins and consequences of Sunbelt growth. This is unfortunate because, as I hope to briefly show, Standing on Common Ground complicates, in fascinating ways, two of the central stories that Sunbelt historians have told, namely the relationship between federal economic policy and Sunbelt growth, and the Sunbelt as the birthplace and mainstay of contemporary American political conservatism.

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Sunbelt metropolises grew at the intersection of the postwar American political economy's two most powerful forces. On the one hand, federal growth liberalism disbursed capital in the form of defense spending, home mortgage and other credit guarantees, highway construction dollars and other projects intended to create broadly realized economic growth; on the other, growth machines at the metropolitan level competed to attract that capital (and the people who embodied it) and fix it in place in the form manufacturing plants, shopping malls, and subdivided housing. Using of corporate tax breaks, anti-union right to work laws, the subdivision of farm land for suburban housing, and the promotion of quality-of-life amenities, Sunbelt boosters took advantage of the absence of existing regulatory structures and the thinness of social safety nets at the state level to convince increasingly mobile capital and mobile people that their cities provided locational advantages. In stretching his narrative across the U.S.-Mexico border, Cadava potentially calls the relationship between Sunbelt growth and this particularly American form of growth liberalism into question. If the modernization of infrastructure in Sonora was part of the same process as the metropolitan growth of Tucson, how should we understand the relationship between the local politics of Sunbelt growth and national economic policy? Did the Mexican state have its own form of growth liberalism? If, as Elizabeth Tandy Shermer has argued in *Sunbelt Capitalism*, Phoenix's growth machine represented the first articulation of neo-liberal governance, a political philosophy that sought to put government to work for capital owners at the expense of others, did that articulation extend across the border? How should we understand the relationship between capital, migration, and state structure both regionally and bi-nationally? In short, did the elites of the Sunbelt borderlands look simultaneously toward Washington DC and Mexico DF? If so, what were the mechanisms?

These questions about political economy remain largely unanswered in Cadava's book. He reserves analysis of the relationship between the economic growth of the region and (bi)national development policies largely to a discussion of the location of military bases and defense manufacturers and the construction of infrastructure in the immediate postwar years. The federal policies that helped build the Sunbelt continued long after the initial phases of building a national security state, however. As the sociologist Monica


6 Shermer, *Sunbelt Capitalism.*
Prasad has recently argued, “mortgage Keynesianism” – the indirect funneling of federal dollars into the residential real estate market through mortgage guarantees by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and mortgage financialization through Fannie Mae – became the chief vehicle of national development policy, at least in the U.S. during the postwar years, helping to explain the continued spatialization of inequality within a nation that Prasad describes, in the title of her book, as The Land of Too Much. Long before Prasad’s book appeared in 2012, American metropolitan historians have argued that the exclusion of people of color from federal mortgage guarantees represented one of the primary processes whereby both economic and racial inequality have been reproduced in modern America. Much of this work has focused on Sunbelt cities. Indeed, scholars such as Bruce Schulman, Kevin Kruse, Matthew Lassiter, Nathan Connolly, and others have made analysis of the relationship between federal growth policies and the creation of spatial inequality in rapidly expanding metropolises perhaps the central narratives of Sunbelt growth.

Cadava potentially has much to say to this narrative. How did the Mexican American elites of Tucson negotiate the racial politics of American growth liberalism? Were they able to gain federal mortgage guarantees on their homes? Did the fact that 50 percent of Alex Jácome’s customer base was Mexican national and Mexican-American complicate his ability to access the racialized American credit market? Did the border represent a line at which such policies stopped, or did they flow across the border, reshaping Sonora as they reshaped Arizona? And how did the ability to access or not access the benefits of the racialized New-Deal state shape the racial politics of Mexican American elites, their ability to articulate claims to whiteness, their views on immigration, and their relationships with banks, title companies, and other key institutions of the local growth machine? Such questions could tell us much not only about Tucson, but potentially about El Paso, San Antonio, Miami, and Tampa, all places where Latino elites had significant access to levers of local political power. That Cadava does not ask them suggests some of the limits of his methodological focus on region as a discursive formation. Sunbelt cities and regions were created through representations of space such as the shared language of transnational friendship and cooperation that Cadava follows through the second half of the twentieth century. Regions take shape in more than just representations of space, however. They are

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more than imagined communities. They are also formed in the physical transformation of space and connections between spaces that represent the materialization of economic and political priorities at the local, national and transnational levels. With Cadava’s exclusive focus on the discursive articulation of region, it is easy to lose track of the physical forms that the Sunbelt borderlands assumed and how those material forms – the subdivisions and retirement communities surrounding Tucson and the *maquiladoras* built in northern Mexico to name just two – in turn reshaped representations of regionality.

*Standing on Common Ground* also complicates a second central narrative of Sunbelt growth – the Sunbelt as the birthplace and heartland of contemporary American conservatism – to a greater degree than Cadava engages. In his account of Alex Jácome’s career, Cadava explores, in fascinating depth, the relationship between Jácome and Phoenix’s Senator Barry Goldwater, in many ways the lodestar of Sunbelt conservatism. Jácome, Cadava shows, served as a vital informant for Goldwater on border policy, Mexican politics, and the broader course of Latin America. Elsewhere in the book, however, a brief aside notes that Tucson was the only portion of Arizona that Goldwater failed to carry in the 1964 Presidential election. Hidden in that aside is a political narrative that potentially stands athwart the easy association of Sunbelt growth with conservative ascendance. Tucson has, since the postwar resurgence of the Arizona Republican Party, remained the most reliably Democratic region in Arizona. Throughout most of the period Cadava narrates, it was represented in Congress by the Udall brothers, first Stewart and then Morris, both of whom occupied positions decidedly to the left of center. Indeed, when Morris Udall ran for president in 1976, he was generally regarded as the most liberal candidate in the race.9 Tucson was also, as Cadava notes in passing, the home town of Raul Castro, Arizona’s first Mexican-American governor, a politician who ended, in 1976, a stretch in which Republicans held the Arizona governorship for seven out of eight terms. Tucson, in short, stands as a striking counterpart to Phoenix, Orange County, and other Sunbelt areas where metropolitan development and conservative strength went hand in hand. Tucson appears to fracture, from the earliest stages of its postwar growth, the teleological connection between conservative resurgence and Sunbelt development. Why did politics remain competitive in Tucson throughout the postwar years when they did not in other Sunbelt cities? What was the role of Mexican-American voters in this political world? Were Mexican Americans welcomed into the structures of postwar conservatism? And what was the relationship between voting patterns for national, regional, and local elective offices? Tucson politicians, both Democratic and Republican, certainly embraced the national policies of mortgage Keynesianism. This political formation has the potential to greatly complicate our historical narratives of the politics of Sunbelt growth, demonstrating both how Sunbelt growth was not necessarily a result of local conservative dominance and exploring the differences, if any, that bi-partisan political competition created in the Sunbelt borderland. Tucson, in short, potentially serves as a place to demonstrate how

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Sunbelt development reached, in Matthew Lassiter’s words “beyond the red-blue divide,” and made ‘pro-growth’ policies the shared language of metropolitan politics writ large.\footnote{Matthew Lassiter, “Political History beyond the Red-Blue Divide,” \textit{Journal of American History} 98 (3) (2011): 760-764}

These comments should neither diminish the considerable accomplishments and insights of Cadava’s book nor dissuade scholars of the Sunbelt from reading it. Indeed, they should, as it implicitly challenges so many of their assumptions about their field of study. By making these challenges explicit, I hope to suggest some of the ways that \textit{Standing on Common Ground} can serve as a springboard for future work exploring, in particular, the place of Latinos within the material transformation and political organization of postwar America on the local and regional level, as well as examinations of regional growth as a particular manifestation of transnational and global changes in political economy. That Cadava’s book raises such questions is fully to its credit. Hopefully, other scholars will take up these and other fruitful directions \textit{Standing on Common Ground} reveals.
Many thanks to H-Diplo for organizing this roundtable on *Standing on Common Ground*, and to Katherine Benton-Cohen, Flannery Burke, Eric Meeks, and Andrew Needham for writing such thoughtful reviews. By publishing several roundtables like this one over the past couple of years, H-Diplo has expanded traditional conceptions of diplomatic history to include borderlands history. Indeed, the history of the United States-Mexico border is the history of the United States and the World. Along the border with Mexico we see in microcosm the same dynamics that have shaped U.S. interactions with other countries, including military conflict and cooperation; international economic relations; the two-way transfer of technological and educational expertise; and articulations of nationalism and racial difference. Yet the United States’ proximity to Mexico, the centuries-long history of movement across the border, and the bi-national—or non-national, third space—character of the region make it a somewhat unique place for studying U.S. foreign relations. Establishing a dialog with diplomatic historians was one of the goals I hoped to accomplish.

I appreciate that the participants in this roundtable clearly saw the major arguments and contributions I hoped to make. Namely, I told a story about the post-World War II U.S.-Mexico borderlands that focuses on a broad range of cross-border exchanges beyond undocumented labor migration and illicit drugs, which have dominated popular and scholarly accounts. I portray borderlands residents as “resources” who sought to solve regional challenges, as Burke put it, instead of as problems to be overcome. I challenge narratives of a hardening border; illuminate transnational ties between the United States and Mexico; and demonstrate how Mexico continues to shape the modern Southwest. I offer a counter-narrative to stories of a sharply divided region, and locate the origins of present-day debates about immigration in the social, political, and economic contexts of the 1970s. I complicate our understanding of ethnic and racial politics in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands by focusing on the evolution of Mexican and Mexican American conservatism. Still, the reviewers offer insightful criticism that, I hope, will inspire future work on recent borderlands history.

I call the bi-national region connecting Arizona and Sonora a ‘Sunbelt borderland’ in order to highlight how the characteristics of the U.S. Sunbelt from, say, Florida to California also defined economic, political, and cultural development in the transnational U.S.-Mexico borderlands. In other words, what U.S. historians by and large have considered a domestic phenomenon was also transnational. After World War II, federal government investment in their shared border region (in dam construction, agriculture, and defense, for example) became the economic development strategy of both the United States and Mexico. By the 1970s, private and corporate development in relative terms eclipsed federal government spending, leading to a move away from ranching and agriculture and toward service and other industries including *maquiladoras*. Strains of conservatism shaped culture and politics on both sides of the border. Sunbelt economics, culture, and politics transformed migration patterns and led to the border debates of the late twentieth and early twenty-first century.
None of the reviewers quibble with my basic argument, but Needham in particular suggests several ways that I might have elaborated or further developed the concept of the Sunbelt borderland. He argues that I could have looked more at how home loan policies, growth liberalism, and credit markets fostered inequality. In short, I might have focused more on questions of political economy, which, he writes, went “largely unanswered” in my book. He also suggests that I might have offered a more sustained analysis of Sunbelt politics, examining issues such as bipartisan competition. He notes that Tucson was home to leading Democrats such as Stewart and Morris Udall and therefore departed in important ways from Republican strongholds such as Phoenix, complicating a historiography that has emphasized the emergence of Sunbelt conservatism. (Incidentally, although the Democratic Governor Raúl Castro spent time in Tucson he was not from the city, as Needham writes, but rather from Cananea, Sonora). On both counts—economics and politics—I think I did more than Needham gives me credit for. I think I moved beyond a discursive analysis of modernization, progress, development, and transnational exchange. But his critiques are extremely insightful and point to how much more can be done with the Sunbelt borderland concept. There is no doubt that a more systematic examination of the Sunbelt dynamics he notes would have made Standing on Common Ground a better, if very different, book. I do hope that it becomes a “springboard for future work,” as he writes, that will elaborate, complicate, or even overturn my preliminary conclusions about the Sunbelt borderland.

The reviewers also ask how far beyond Tucson and Guaymas—the Arizona and Sonora cities that bound my study—the Sunbelt borderland extends. Because the patterns of immigration, political conflict, or free trade that I describe in Tucson and Hermosillo also apply to northern Arizona and Guatemala, Burke asks if the Sunbelt borderland encompasses these places as well. I would answer no. The shared space of the U.S.-Mexico border region—its daily crossings, geographic proximity, kinship, political negotiations—make it a “common ground” unlike Flagstaff and Guatemala City. But what about Phoenix? Meeks asks. Would the Sunbelt borderland encompass the state capitol? Mexican shoppers visited Phoenix shopping centers. Like the University of Arizona, Arizona State University had exchange programs with Sonoran universities. Youth from Phoenix took raucous road trips to Sonoran beach towns. Benton-Cohen implicitly jumps to my defense by arguing that Tucson has always had a stronger border culture than Phoenix. That is true in many ways. Tucson was part of the Gadsden Purchase land, the last strip of the continental United States ceded by Mexico in 1853. In percentage terms, Tucson’s Mexican-descent population has always been larger than Phoenix’s, though nowhere near as large as the Mexican-descent populations of border cities such as Nogales. Still, I would say that, yes, Phoenix should be considered part of the Sunbelt borderland, and perhaps someone will write a book comparing Tucson and Phoenix’s connections with Mexico. I also believe that the Sunbelt borderland extends east to South Texas and Tamaulipas, and west to California and Baja California. I dug deep into one region in order to explore its transnational economic, cultural, and political relationships, but the Sunbelt borderland concept can extend both thematically and geographically in several directions.

Finally, Benton-Cohen and Meeks would have liked me to have focused more on different groups of actors. Benton-Cohen would have liked me to include more about Jewish and other European descent borderlands merchants such as the Steinfelds, Zeckendorfs, Brackers,
Goldwaters, and Capins. The Steinfelds leased the Jácomes the property on which their store was located; Jácome and Goldwater, as I demonstrate, were close associates; and all of these families were important players in the cross-border economies of Arizona and Sonora. A book comparing the experiences of Mexican descent and European descent merchants—in terms of class, ethnicity, or religion—would be extremely interesting. Jewish merchants also experienced discrimination, leading families such as the Goldwassers to change their name to Goldwater. When they moved to the Southwest, many of them converted to Seventh-day Adventism, which also observed the Sabbath, in an effort to avoid anti-Semitism. Still, I believe that going too deeply into these topics would have taken me too far off course and probably would have forced me to focus more on families north of the border, even though there are interesting parallels in Sonora, such as Greek and Lebanese shop owners.

For his part, Meeks observed that I privilege the experiences of elites such as Alex Jácome instead of the working-class Mexican and indigenous people who suffered the consequences of the Sunbelt borderland’s economic and political conservatism. However true this charge is, I did not claim, as Meeks suggests, that elites like Jácome were “representative.” They were not, except in the minds of white politicians and businessmen who wanted Jácome and others to help them establish relationships with their Mexican counterparts in Sonora. Yet Jácome was extremely powerful, and I felt it was important to show not only how networks of power operated between Arizona and Sonora, but also how Mexican Americans could be central in the construction of regional power. Furthermore, Meeks’ book *Border Citizens* had already done a wonderful job reconstructing the working-class history of Mexican Americans and Native Americans in Southern Arizona. I relied on *Border Citizens* extensively, but I also wanted to write a book that focused on cultural and commercial exchange, two themes that have been underexplored in post-World War II borderlands historiography. Meeks is certainly right that we desperately need more transnational histories of working-class activism in the borderlands since World War II, which will shed light on how immigration and border debates took their current shape.

I’ve had ongoing conversations with several colleagues about what kind of historians we hope to be: do we want to begin conversations or have the final word? For my part—at least with my first book—I wanted to begin a conversation. To be sure, the conversations I hoped to bring to a full boil had already been percolating, in part through the work of the participants in this roundtable. Still, I hoped to initiate new scholarly exchanges about the post-World War II borderlands, cross-border conservatism, and a concept/place I call the Sunbelt borderland.