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The European Union (EU) is facing an important crossroads. Although Jean Monnet’s Europe survived the Euro crisis of 2012, it now appears that the European economy is heading into another recession, and this may well increase the support of anti-European political parties in many of the member states. These political parties, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Britain and the Front National in France, have challenged the movement toward further unity and economic integration, particularly where this has led to sizable immigration and social tensions. Polling indicates that many Europeans feel that integration is being forced upon them by their governments and an unresponsive bureaucracy in Brussels. Their pushback fuels the belief that Europe has a ‘democracy deficit,’ or, in other words, that the European project is an elitist undertaking against the will of the majority of Europeans. A recent Brookings study, provocatively entitled “Monnet’s Error?” concluded that Europe now found itself in a ‘catch 22’ situation, with “no desire to go backward, no interest in going forward, but [with it being] economically unsustainable to stay still.”

Looking at the issue through a geopolitical lens, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently came to a similar conclusion: “Europe thus finds itself suspended between a past it seeks to overcome and a future it has not yet defined.”

This roundtable seeks to address these issues. Along with a consideration of these two impressive scholarly books, which focus on the personality of the creator of the European Union as well as providing a case study of its first expansion, the commentators have been asked, if they wish, to reflect on additional, broader questions about the European Union. These questions arise from the two books but also concern the contemporary politics of the EU. Does Monnet’s Europe need institutional reform, and is the concept of ‘shared sovereignty’ workable in the twenty-first century? What direction should European leaders take in dealing with this ‘catch 22’ which they face? In addition, should we reconsider Jean Monnet’s achievement in light of these concerns about a ‘democratic deficit?’ This question is a more difficult one than some may realize. Americans have overwhelmingly tended to view Monnet and his devotion to European unity in an extremely positive light, a trend which shows few signs of abating. Earlier this year Strobe Talbott, the President of the same Brookings Institution which sponsored the critical study of contemporary European integration, published what can only be described as an encomium to Monnet’s work which concluded that “the progression toward a United States of Europe was the real Monnet Plan, and it may be back on track.”

1 http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/Fall%202014/Fall2014BPEA_Guiso_Sapienza_Zingales.pdf


The consensus of the four reviewers is that the two books under consideration are quite complementary, with Sherrill Brown Wells focused on the individual life and contribution of Jean Monnet, the brandy salesman who became dedicated to the creation of Europe, while Michael Geary’s work looks at the institutions Monnet helped shape, especially the European Commission, as they confronted the first expansion of the European community. Brown Wells's biography of Monnet is praised by Federico Romero and Gérard Bossuat as “elegantly written” and Lucia Coppolano as “compelling and informative,” with a vivid depiction of the trans-Atlantic networks within which Monnet moved and exercised his influence. Brown Wells takes Monnet from his experiences in selling brandy in Canada and the United States before World War I, through his efforts to coordinate the production of armaments between the British and French during that conflict, to his work with the League of Nations after the war. Monnet’s interwar activities as a banker helping various countries stabilize their currencies and negotiate loans further increased his international stature and contributed to his own understanding of what we might now call the forces of globalization. During World War II Monnet worked in Washington for the British and the French, and his network of powerful American associates and friends increased exponentially. All of this contributed to the important role he played in France’s modernization efforts after the war, and in the construction of the European Coal and Steel community, whose idea he had given to Robert Schuman, the French Prime Minister. Monnet’s key role in all of the early efforts to build European institutions, including the proposed European Defense Community, and the strong support he enjoyed in the United States, are central themes of Brown Wells’s book. Coppolano posits that Monnet’s power and influence were directly related to the relative influence of the United States in European affairs, and that as that influence began to wane after the EDC failed and as Europe recovered from the war, so did Monnet’s relative power and influence also decline. (Speaking from my own personal experience in researching the role of John McCloy, one of the key figures in the American Eastern Establishment and an influential figure in his own right on European policy, there was no statesman he revered more than Monnet, and Monnet’s reputation among his powerful American friends was extraordinary.)

Michelle Egan also regards the transnational networks which Brown Wells describes as central to Monnet’s effectiveness, although she argues for moving away from the “high politics” approach which both authors reflect toward a history of European movement which is not centered on the role of elites. The commentators also see in Monnet someone whose “elitist methods” and even “authoritarian” style, as Romero refers to him, certainly contributed to the “democratic deficit” in the European Union.

Michael Geary’s book takes a very different approach from that of Brown Wells, focusing on the institutions of the European Community, and examining their role in the first major expansion of the European Community, which arose out of his efforts at institution-building in the European Coal and Steel Community, would come to have a greater influence in the construction of Europe. The efforts of the European Commission, the executive body of the

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European Union, to gain influence over the expansion process is the central theme the Geary book explores. Geary is quite careful in his conclusions about the relative influence of the Commission as compared to the member states of the EU. He sees the Commission as largely subordinate to the national governments but able to influence the process through its technical knowledge of the *acquis communautaire*, the legislation, legal acts, and court decisions which have accumulated and constitute the body of law guiding the European Union. To some this might reflect the idiom that the ‘devil is in the details’ and the European Commission came to be the master of these details and achieved considerable influence in this manner. Although Geary is careful to limit his claim for the Commission’s influence as compared to the national governments, he clearly hopes to illuminate the inter-institutional relations within the European Community which have allowed for the growing power of the Commission and its thousands of European-oriented civil servants.

The commentators approach Geary’s book with varying levels of enthusiasm. Coppolaro finds Geary’s analysis convincing, but believes the book could be strengthened if Geary employed a more comparative analysis to reveal why the Commission was more influential on some issues and less on others. Romero compliments Geary’s “vast research” in the archives of the Commission, but believes that the Commission’s relative success was less than the author claims. Egan praises Geary’s detailed treatment of the Irish case, which has been neglected in the literature, and considers the book a “richly documented comparative analysis” of a period with implications for today’s EU. Bossuat is the most critical, insisting that the book overlooked many important secondary sources as well as important archives in France and Germany, leading him to conclude that the book offers only a fairly limited understanding of the European Commission’s influence.

Jean Monnet wrote in his memoirs that “Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” Skeptics might be forgiven for comparing Monnet’s faith in his progressive vision to Rahm Emmanuel’s line after President Barack Obama’s election that “You never want a serious crisis to go waste.” But this attitude does not recognize the conditions Monnet faced. Monnet lived in an era where it seemed as though Europe had to learn from the horrific crises of two wars and a threatening Soviet presence. Monnet believed that Europe must seek unity, and he was convinced that such unity was the only logical and proper response to the Cold War division of the continent. American leaders were so drawn to his optimism and faith in such a unified Europe that Monnet’s secretive and elitist methods did not disturb them. And no doubt they appreciated and were flattered that Monnet’s model was their own country, whose national unity and strength seemed to play such an important role in rescuing the world from

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6 Emanuel was liberally borrowing from Stanford economist Paul Romer who remarked in 2004 that “a crisis is a terrible thing to waste.” [http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t.html?_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/02/magazine/02FOB-onlanguage-t.html?_r=0)
fascism and dictatorship. Although Americans in 2014, concerned with their own problems and ‘pivoting’ toward Asia, may be inclined to neglect Europe and its internal struggles, it would be wise not to underestimate the historical achievement of Monnet and those Europeans who built the European Union. I guarantee we would miss it if it were gone.

Participants:

**Michael J. Geary** received his Ph.D. in History from the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. He is currently Assistant Professor of Contemporary European and EU History at Maastricht University in the Netherlands and Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. Geary has been the recipient of a number of prestigious fellowships at the Wilson Center, the College of Europe, University of Basel and a Fulbright-Schuman award. He is the author of *An Inconvenient Wait: Ireland’s Quest for Membership of the EEC, 1957-73* (2009). *Enlarging the European Union: The Commission Seeking Influence, 1961-1973* is his second book. He is currently working on a monograph that examines the relationship between EEC/EU enlargements and the integration process.

**Sherrill Brown Wells** earned her B.A from Vassar and her M.Sc. and Ph.D. from the London School of Economics. She has been a professorial lecturer in history and International affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University since 1992 and was a Visiting Professor at l’Institut d’études politiques (Sciences-po) in Paris in 2004. She has taught history at Rutgers and North Carolina State University and served as a historian at the Department of State from 1979-1991. Her major publications include *Pioneers of European Integration and Peace, 1945-1963* (Bedford/St.Martin’s, 2007) and *Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman* (Lynne Rienner, 2011). She is currently studying the relationship between Jean Monnet and the Belgian economist Robert Triffin and their promotion of European monetary union, 1957-1979.

**Thomas Alan Schwartz** is a Professor of History and Political Science at Vanderbilt University. He is the author of the books *America’s Germany: John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany* (1991) and *Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the Shadow of Vietnam* (2003), and with Matthias Schulz, the edited volume, *The Strained Alliance: US-European Relations in the 1970s*, (2009). He is currently working on a biography of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger entitled *Henry Kissinger and the Dilemmas of American Power*.

**Gérard Bossuat**, Jean Monnet chair *ad personam* of history of the European unity is professor emeritus of contemporary history at the University of Cergy-Pontoise (Val d’Oise) and Associate Researcher at the UMR IRICE 8138 ((Paris-1, Paris-4, CNRS), He wrote several books and signed numerous articles. He just published *La France et la construction de l’unité européenne, de 1919 à nos jours* (Paris, Armand Colin, 2012), and co-directed *La France, l’Europe et l’aide au développement, des traités de Rome à nos jours* (Paris, Ministère des Finances, IGPDE, CHEFF, 2013). This work was awarded the prize Luc Durand-Reville from the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques. He has also published « La Communauté européenne et les bouleversements consécutifs à la chute du
Mur de Berlin, » in Michèle Weinachter (dir. de), L’Est et l’Ouest face au mur, question de perspective (CIRAC, 2013). His most recent book is Monnet banquier, (Comité pour l’Histoire économique et financière de la France (September 2014). He is working with others researchers of the UMR IRICE on the Polish exiles to France and their input to the construction of a new Europe between 1940-1989 (Pr. Marès, Paris-1, et Pr. Laptos, Cracovie).

**Lucia Coppolaro** is Rita Levi Montalcini researcher at the University of Padova. She holds a Ph.D. in History from the European University Institute, Florence (2006). She was post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon. She was visiting professor at Universitat Pomepu Fabra, Barcelona and visiting fellow at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. She has written widely on GATT and the European Union’s trade policy and published articles in journals including Contemporary European History and International History Review. Her recent publications include “In search of power. The European Commission in the Kennedy Round negotiations (1963-1967),” in Contemporary European History, Vol. 23:1, (2014): 23-41 and The Making of a World Trading Power. The European Economic Community (EEC) in the GATT Kennedy Round Negotiations (1963-1967) (Farnham, UK; Aldershot, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013).

**Michelle Egan** is Professor, School of International Service at American University. She received her BA from the University of Warwick (UK) and Ph.D. from the University of Pittsburgh. Egan is editor for the Palgrave Series in European Union studies and Vice President of the European Studies Association. Her publications include Research Agendas in EU Studies: Stalking the Elephant (Ed. with Neill Nugent and William E. Paterson.) London, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics; Constructing a European Market: Standards, Regulation and Governance, Oxford University Press; Creating a Transatlantic Marketplace: Government Policies and Business Strategies, Manchester University Press; and forthcoming Single Markets: Economic Integration in Europe and the United States, Oxford University Press.

**Federico Romero** is Professor of History of Post-War European Cooperation and Integration at the Department of History and Civilization, European University Institute, where he is working at a research project on “The integration of post-imperial Europe in a globalizing world, 1968-1991.”

La démarche consistant à mettre au cœur de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne la Commission, est très intéressante dans la mesure où l’opinion publique accorde une grande importance aux « technocrates » de Bruxelles et leur prête une influence qu’ils n’ont pas forcément. L’auteur, d’une certaine façon, voudrait savoir si la Commission de la Communauté économique européenne, a eu une grande influence sur la doctrine et les négociations d’adhésion. Il ne trouve pas cette influence parce que les traités de Rome n’ont pas donné à la Commission un rôle décisif en cette matière même si elle a le privilège de prendre l’initiative en matière communautaire. Cependant, une étude plus fine des archives aurait montré des évolutions notables de la position de la Commission. La Commission est faite de commissaires et de fonctionnaires capables de penser leur action en dehors des bornes imposées par les traités. Ces hauts fonctionnaires et commissaires européens de la première génération sont attachés au succès de leur mission, comme les interviews de certains d’entre eux le montrent. Ils se sentent porteurs de l’intérêt général européen, une précieuse innovation d’éthique politique due à Monnet, à Schuman et Konrad Adenauer. Ils vivent dans une petite société européenne différente de celle des nations dont ils proviennent. Ils ont trouvé dans l’unité européenne l’idéal de leur vie. D’autres y ont vu une manière de rédemption, eux qui n’ont connu que la guerre. Ils veulent promouvoir un type de société caractérisée par l’égalité entre les nationaux d’Europe, par


Geary s’est servi des archives de l’Union européenne à Florence, d’archives britanniques, irlandaises, américaines, mais pas d’archives françaises, ni allemandes alors que de Gaulle est au cœur des premières années de la Commission CEE et l’obstacle principal à l’adhésion britannique. Ce livre offre donc une vision limitée de l’action de la Commission de la CEE.

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2 Publié sous la direction de Gérard Bossuat, Eric Bussière, Robert Frank, Wilfried Loth, Antonio Varsori. Bruylant, LGDJ; Nomos Verlag, 2010

3 Loth et Bitsch (dir. de), La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne, Bruylant, 2005

4 Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, Raymond Poidevin (dir.de), Institutions européennes et identités européennes, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998

5 Bossuat, Emile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission européenne, 1958-1987, Bruylant-De Boeck, 2011
Le second ouvrage, celui de Sherrill Brown Wells, présente une biographie de Monnet, illustrée par des photos. Il est destiné à faire comprendre le rôle de Monnet dans le processus étonnant de l’unité européenne. Il vient après ceux d’Eric Roussel et de François Duchène.\footnote{François Duchène, Jean Monnet, the first international Statesman of Interdependence, Norton, 1994 ; Éric Roussel, Jean Monnet, Fayard, 1996.} Mais il ne devient riche qu’à partir de 1938, laissant dans l’ombre le temps de la SDN (1919-1923), celui de l’aventure bancaire de la Trans-America et celui de la Chine (1929-1938). Pour ceux qui connaissent Monnet ou ont lu ses Mémoires\footnote{Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976).} et qui, a fortiori, auraient lu les deux biographies référencées plus haut, il n’apporte pas de nouveautés évidentes. Jean Monnet, unconventional statesman, présente la vie et l’action de Monnet dans l’ordre chronologique en 9 chapitres. Le dernier est le plus susceptible de discussions : « Jean Monnet : a critical assessment ».

Le livre bien écrit, mélange anecdotes sur Monnet d’après les témoignages et ses réflexions sur l’organisation politique du monde après la guerre. La dureté de Roosevelt et de Churchill envers de Gaulle est affichée sans ambages. Churchill ne déclarait-il pas en mai 1943 : « Ne serait-il pas temps d’éliminer de Gaulle comme force politique »? (Brown Wells, 80). L’auteure insiste souvent sur la vision stratégique de Monnet. Un visionnaire, dit-elle. Elle montre que Monnet a gagné la confiance, relative, de de Gaulle en 1945, ce qui n’était pas le cas à Alger en 1943. Elle rappelle la méthode Monnet consistant à convaincre personnellement ses interlocuteurs politiques en vue de réussir le plan de Modernisation appuyé sur le plan Marshall ou de faire approuver le Plan Schuman. Elle insiste sur le rôle de Monnet, Tomlinson et Bruce, les Américains de l’administration du plan Marshall en France (ECA) dans les déblocages de crédits pour la modernisation de la France. Elle avance l’idée que la planification à la Monnet était très originale puisqu’elle a sauvé le capitalisme néo-libéral grâce à l’État (121). Le livre présente la réussite de la CECA comme le résultat d’un ensemble d’idées originales (supranationalité) servies par une conjoncture éminemment incertaine mais profitable au projet quand Adenauer, Mac Cloy et Schuman ont pu soutenir le Plan Schuman. Certes, Monnet perdit son influence après la débâcle de la CED qui mériterait plus d’explications. Monnet, en effet, est attaqué régulièrement parce qu’il incarné le fédéralisme qui a échoué. Moins connue est la période 1954-1958 pendant laquelle Monnet agit dans l’ombre de Spaak pour promouvoir une autre communauté, Euratom, et plus modérément le Marché commun. On appréciera le fait que l’auteure montre l’isolement de Monnet et qu’elle rappelle les mots de Kohnstamm, un collaborateur de Monnet, lors de la réunion des ministres des Affaires étrangères des six à Messine en juin 1955: « Mr. Monnet, please, understand. They are not here to make Europe. They are here to bury you ! » (191). Le soutien américain aux diverses formes d’unité est patent. Monnet en est un artisan fidèle. Pourquoi? Pour renforcer le front de la guerre froide sans aucun doute mais aussi parce que l’Europe était prête à s’unir. Eisenhower dit que l’Europe avait les ressources humaines et économiques pour devenir une puissance globale à côté des États-Unis? (207) Kennedy, à notre avis, a mal assumé cette disposition d’esprit. Nixon
et Kissinger l’ont reniée totalement. L’impuissance de Monnet après l’échec de la CED est en effet une réalité à peine compensée par la création du Comité d’Action pour les États-Unis d’Europe (CAEUE), un puissant centre de lobbying politique aux États-Unis et en Europe.


L’auteur montre que tout n’a pas réussi à Monnet : échec de la CED, échec de l’Euratom, échec de l’égalité entre la Communauté européenne et les États-Unis, échec d’une communauté transatlantique, lenteur à créer une union politique. Ce livre permet au lecteur de suivre les aventures d’un héros du XXe siècle en offrant un récit bien organisé et bien écrit du destin extraordinaire d’un inventeur d’avenir, qu’on suive ses idées ou pas.

Ces deux ouvrages nous ramènent aux questions qui font l’actualité de l’Union européenne. L’Europe de Monnet a-t-elle besoin de réforme institutionnelle pour le 21e siècle ? Le concept de souveraineté partagée est-il mort et impraticable au 21e siècle ? A-t-on besoin d’un pouvoir central pour l’union monétaire ? Monnet est-il responsable du déficit démocratique européen ?

Les institutions européennes à 28 ne répondent plus à la diversité des options de politique européenne retenues par chaque pays participant. Certains veulent moins d’Europe, d’autres envisagent des coopérations renforcées, voire une fédéralisation de certaines politiques. Les institutions actuelles permettent d’arriver à des compromis minima. L’Europe est embourbée. Il n’y a pas de politique fiscale commune, ni de politique étrangère et de sécurité efficace. La politique d’immigration est insuffisante pour convaincre les eurosceptiques. Le processus d’unité se réduirait-il à une Eurozone ? Mais est-ce bien l’Europe de Monnet que les traités de la fin du XXe siècle ont développée, de
Maastricht à Lisbonne ? Pragmatique et visionnaire, Monnet voulait un partage consenti de souveraineté qui serait remis entre les mains du système communautaire, Parlement, Commission et Conseil des États. La Fédération d'États nations de Jacques Delors suppose de préciser quelles politiques seront communes et lesquelles resteront entre les mains des États. Le concept de souveraineté partagée, incarné par la Commission européenne, n’a pas de sens si chaque participant y apporte des limites d’application selon son bon plaisir. Les États membres n’ont pas encore choisi l’Europe unie qu’ils veulent. La complexité de la prise de décision par les divers échelons institutionnels brouille le sens de l’unité. L’incapacité de l’Union à répondre à l’essentiel des attentes des citoyens dans la lutte contre le chômage ou pour empêcher le système financier international de pirater les finances des États, par exemple, crée un malaise que les élections au Parlement européen du 25 mai 2014 ont dramatisé. Comment peut-on être représenté au Parlement européen par des partis attachés à détruire le système communautaire ?

La gestion de la monnaie unique est regardée comme insuffisamment adaptée aux attentes des milieux économiques, financiers et politiques européens. Il faut, selon certains, un gouvernement économique européen capable d’imposer les mêmes politiques fiscales et économiques dans tout l’espace de l’Eurozone. Mais comment procéder ? On voit bien que jamais les Grecs ne seront d’accord avec les politiques allemandes bien que les gouvernements espagnol, grec et portugais, voire français subissent la politique de l’euro fort et les contraintes budgétaires sur les déficits publics. Pour parvenir à une politique commune, l’essentiel est de faire intervenir le Parlement européen qui devrait voter l’impôt comme tout Parlement le fait. Le pouvoir central monétaire est le fait de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE), indépendante des États et de la Commission, et même du Parlement. Cette situation n’est pas acceptable durablement. Elle durera tant que les États seront incapables de choisir une politique monétaire que la BCE appliquera.

Il y a dans l’Union européenne un réel déficit démocratique que le traité de Lisbonne a partiellement comblé en instituant la co-décision pour tout acte législatif. Un dialogue est obligatoire entre le Parlement, la Commission et le Conseil européen pour ce qui concerne les matières éligibles par le système communautaire. Le rapport des citoyens avec leur Parlement européen est inconstant L’histoire de Monnet montre que la sanction démocratique n’était pas son but essentiel. La création d’une Assemblée commune de la CECA lui a été soufflée par les socialistes français et allemands en 1950. Parlement aux pouvoirs limités, l’Assemblée parlementaire européenne créée par les traités de Rome avait l’avantage d’être composée par des représentants parlementaires nommés par les États au sein des Parlements nationaux qui donc avaient une expérience démocratique et informaient leur Parlement d’origine des enjeux des politiques communautaires. Sa transformation en Parlement européen élu au suffrage universel en 1979 n’a pas rapproché les députés européens des citoyens. Monnet n’y est pour rien. Ce sont les chefs d’États, inventeurs des traités de Rome, qui ont limité sciemment les pouvoirs de l’Assemblée parlementaire européenne, ce sont eux qui ont décidé son élection au suffrage universel, ce sont eux qui ont préparé le traité de Lisbonne lui donnant enfin plus de pouvoirs. L’insistance de Monnet en 1974 à promouvoir avec succès la création d’une structure permanente, le Conseil européen des chefs d’États et de gouvernement, que Monnet considérait comme le gouvernement provisoire européen ; a mis en avant, paradoxalement, les États et renforcé
le rôle décisionnel et symbolique des États dans la structure communautaire.

Monnet a été un banquier jusqu’en 1938, un homme de réseaux bancaires, par définition confidentiels, un homme d’État non conventionnel en effet, un visionnaire pragmatique, un lobbyiste hors pair grâce au Comité d’Action pour les États-Unis d’Europe. Il n’était pas un parlementaire rompu aux charmes des assemblées politiques, ni un philosophe de l’action en dépit des tentatives pour en faire une référence suprême dans l’organisation des relations internationales. Si on se tourne vers la Commission européenne en 2014, on observera qu’elle a réussi à imposer son expertise dans les réunions des Conseils européens, qu’elle est désormais responsable devant le Parlement et que son président est nommé par les gouvernements qui devront tenir compte de la majorité politique du Parlement européen. Mais pas plus qu’en 1973 elle ne décidera de nouveaux élargissements.
These two works are totally different and do not engage with the same project. Michael J. Geary examines the enlargement of the European Union and the place of the Commission at the heart of the European Economic Community (EEC). He is essentially concerned with the question of British, Irish, Danish, and Norwegian membership, and concludes with the British membership, which occurred in 1973. He reveals that the Commission did not always have the role that it wished in this first enlargement of the EU. Why? Because according to the author, it had not always been prepared for the intensive negotiations that followed the membership requests, and because there was no doctrine on membership, except for the “acquis” to be respected. Geary stresses the role of the Council of Ministers and of COREPER in the negotiations. But should one be surprised by this situation which is precisely that which the treaties conferred on the Commission on the Common Market and that Walter Hallstein, the first President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, attempted to modify in April 1965? Thus it was not able to prevent France from blocking the discussion on British membership in January 1963 and in November 1967. In addition, Geary’s book does not accord enough importance to the crisis of the “empty seat” which certainly demonstrated the weakness of the Commission but also its capacity to find the solutions to solve the crisis. In effect, “the Luxemburg arrangement” (and not the compromise) was a transaction between France and its five partners, but it is necessary to also note that it was the result of an initiative of the Secretary General of the Commission, Émile Noël, in conjunction with the Luxemburg representative on the Council, Albert Borschette. The Commission had not been inactive, even if it had not been at the heart of the relaunch of The Hague Conference in November 1969 that authorized a third and final British request for membership. But it had not been part of the original plan of action of the six: achievement, deepening, enlargement.

The act of putting the Commission at the heart of the history of European integration is very interesting in the sense that public opinion accords a large importance to the “technocrats” of Brussels and grants them an influence that they certainly do not hold. The author, in one sense, wishes to know if the Commission of the European Economic Community had a large amount of influence on the doctrine and the membership negotiations. He does not find this influence because the treaties of Rome did not grant the Commission a decisive role in these matters, even if it had the privilege of taking the initiative in Community matters. Nonetheless, a closer study of the archives would have demonstrated the significant changes in the position of the Commission, which was comprised of commissioners and of civil servants capable of conceiving of their policies irrespective of the barriers imposed by the treaties. These senior civil servants and commissioners of the first generation were attached to the success of their mission, as interviews with some of them reveal. They believed themselves to be the bearers of the general European interest, a valuable innovation of political ethics due to Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann, and Konrad Adenauer. They lived in a small European society that was different from that of the nations from which they came. They found in European unity the ideal of their lives. Others saw it as a manner of redemption -- those who had known only
war. They wanted to promote a type of society that was characterized by the equality of the nations of Europe, the forgetting of a past that was warlike and at times barbarous and that, a few years earlier, had characterized inter-European relations. Well versed in the intricacies of European law, somewhat reinforced by the European Community Court of Justice, they used the shadow zones of the treaties to attempt to give the Commission the role of leader on the level of states. They knew, for example, how to use the working groups of the Council to put pressure on the States. Thus they attempted to take responsibilities or initiatives that the uncertain/vague juridical areas concerning the political economy outside of the Community, foreign representation of the Communities and the Commission, the protocol managing the foreign diplomatic representations to the Council and the Commission, and the Association agreements (Greece and Turkey or Morocco). The negotiation of the Helsinki accords from 1970 gave the Commission a role as well as with the European summits, which became the European Council of the Heads of State and of Government in 1975.

These incidents of Commission excesses should have been analyzed and observed during the discussions on membership, all the more so since we have many interviews on these questions (for example, Voices of Europe, a program of interviews for L’histoire de la Commission, 1958-1972)\(^1\). One of the weaknesses of this work is that it pays little attention to the works of historians of the European Union such as Wilfried Loth, Antonio Varsori, Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Gérard Bossuat, Gilbert Trausch, Klaus Schwabe, Michel Dumoulin, Raymond Poidevin, Elena Calandri, Sylvain Schirmann, and Eric Bussière, and makes scant reference to French works.

The author could have found some answers to these questions in the collective work L’expérience européenne, 50 ans de construction de l’Europe, 1957-2007, des historiens en dialogue;\(^2\) or that of Loth and Bitsch (editors), La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne;\(^3\) or Bitsch, Loth, and Poidevin (editors), Institutions europénennes et identités européennes;\(^4\) all of which tackle the same issues as the author, and also in Bossuat, Émile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission européenne, 1958-1987.\(^5\) Geary used the archives of the European Union in Florence, as well as British, Irish, and

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\(^2\) Publié sous la direction de Gérard Bossuat, Eric Bussière, Robert Frank , Wilfried Loth, Antonio Varsori. Bruylant, LGDJ; Nomos Verlag, 2010

\(^3\) Loth et Bitsch (dir. de), \textit{La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne}, Bruylant, 2005

\(^4\) Marie-Thérèse Bitsch, Wilfried Loth, Raymond Poidevin (dir.de), \textit{Institutions européennes et identités européennes}, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998

American archives, but no French archives, nor German ones, even though French President Charles de Gaulle was at the heart of the first years of the EEC Commission and was the principal obstacle to British membership. This book thus offers a limited vision of the action of the Commission of the EEC.

The second work, that of Sherrill Brown Wells, offers a biography of Jean Monnet that is illustrated by photographs. It is intended to reveal the role of Monnet in the fascinating process of European unity. It follows those of d’Eric Roussel and François Duchêne. But it only becomes rich after 1938, leaving unexamined the time of the League of Nations (1919-1923), of the Trans-America banking venture and of China (1929-1938). For those who have are familiar with Monnet or have read his Mémoires, and who, a fortiori, have read that two biographies referred to above, it will not provide new material. In nine chapters Jean Monnet; Unconventional Statesman presents in chronological order Monnet’s life and actions. The final chapter, “Jean Monnet: A Critical Assessment” is the most likely to spark discussion.

This well written book mixes anecdotes by others about Monnet and his thoughts on the political organization of the world after the Second World War. The toughness of President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill towards de Gaulle is frankly displayed. Did not Churchill declare in May 1943 “Is it not time to eliminate de Gaulle as a political force?” (Brown Wells, 80) The author often emphasizes the strategic vision of Monnet, calling him a visionary. She demonstrates that Monnet gained the relative confidence of de Gaulle in 1945, which had not been the case in Algeria in 1943. She reminds us that Monnet method consisted of personally convincing his political interlocutors with the aim of successfully managing the Modernisation plan based on the Marshall Plan or the approval of the Schuman plan. She stresses the role of Monnet, William Tomlinson and David Bruce – the American administrators of the Marshall plan in France (the ECA, European Cooperation Administration) -- in the release of credits for the modernization of France. She puts forth the idea that the Monnet plan was very original since it saved neo-liberal capitalism thanks to the role of the state (121).

The book presents the success of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as the result of a group of original ideas (supranationality) of a highly uncertain but profitable situation for the project when Adenauer, Schuman, and John Jay McCloy (the U.S. High Commissioner and President of the World Bank) were able to support the Schuman Plan. Certainly, Monnet’s loss of influence after the debacle of the CED merited further explication. In effect, Monnet was regularly attached because he embodied the federalism that had failed. Less known is the period 1954 to 1958 during which Monnet acted in the shadow of Spaak to promote another community, Euratom, and more moderately, the Common Market.

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6 François Duchêne, Jean Monnet, the first international Statesman of Interdependence, Norton, 1994; Éric Roussel, Jean Monnet, Fayard, 1996.

7 Jean Monnet, Mémoires (Paris: Fayard, 1976).
We can appreciate the fact that the author demonstrates the isolation of Monnet and that she recalls the words of Max Kohnstamm, a colleague of Monnet’s, during a meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Six at Messina in June 1955: “Mr. Monnet, please, understand. They are not here to make Europe. They are here to bury you!” (191) The American support for many forms of unity, of which Monnet was a faithful craftsman, is obvious. Monnet was so in order to unreservedly reinforce the Cold War front, but also since Europe was ready to unit. President Dwight Eisenhower said that Europe had the human and economic resources to become a global power on the level with to the United States (207).

President John F. Kennedy, in our opinion, poorly understood this frame of mind; President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger totally renounced it. The powerlessness of Monnet after the failure of the European Defence Community (ECD) was in effect barely offset by the creation of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe (ACUSE), a powerful political lobbying center in the United States and Europe.

The final stages in Monnet’s life between 1958 and 1979 were devoted to promoting a closer euro-Atlantic integration. The instrument, along with ACUSE, would be the European research center of Lausanne, financed by the Ford Foundation, which provided 600000 dollars between 1960 and 1965 (215). The inescapable nature relationship between Monnet and de Gaulle leads the author to qualify it as complex. But she is correct to note what de Gaulle owed to Monnet: the unity between ‘gaullists’ and ‘giraudists’ in the Comité français de Libération nationale (CFLN) in May 1943, Lend-Lease in the aid of France, the modernization plan, the support of Monnet for the Firth Republic and the policy of decolonization in Algeric, and the monetary reform of 1959 (219). Brown Wells likes Monnet, his adventures, and knows how to share his enthusiasm, based on the French and English-language scholarly literature and testimony of his contemporaries. What does she want to tell her readers? That Monnet was one of the great leaders of the twentieth century who succeeded in opening a path towards peace in Europe. Monnet knew the importance of the institutions and common law that were indispensable to its foundation (the High Authority of the ECSC, equality of the member states, the European Council of 1974). Monnet intuited the new economic system that was based on the Modernization Plan. He was not opposed to the defense of French interests that were best defended in the framework of European unity (246). Monnet did not support the cult of the state. After all, did he not come from the country of the Girondins, the defenders of federalism in France of 1789?

Is Brown Wells proposing that Monnet was a pragmatic visionary (248)? Was he a man of the Americans? Monnet had many dear and close American friends. He was above all a trans-Atlantic man.

The author demonstrates that Monnet did not always succeed, noting the failure of that EDC, of Euratom, of the principle of equality between the European Community and the United States, of a trans-Atlantic community, the slowness in the creation of a political union. This book allows the author to follow the adventures of a twentieth-century hero in
offering a well-organized and well-written account of the extraordinary destiny of an inventor of the future, whether or not we admire his ideas.

These two works draw us towards current questions about the European Union. Does the Europe of Monnet require institutional reform for the twenty-first century? Is the concept of shared sovereignty now dead and impracticable? Does the Union need a central power for the Eurozone? Is Monnet responsible for the European democratic deficit?

The European institutions of the 28 members do not accord with diversity of each participating country’s political options. Certain states seek less ‘Europe,’ others envision intensified cooperation, which is to say a federalisation of certain policies. The current institutions allow for only minimal compromises. Europe is bogged down; it lacks a common fiscal policy, and had neither a viable foreign nor security policy. Its immigration policy is unable to convince the ‘eurosceptics.’ Will the unification process be boiled down to that of a Eurozone? Is this in fact the Europe of Monnet that the treaties of the end of the twentieth century, from Maastricht to Lisbon, created? Pragmatic and visionary, Monnet wanted a shared sovereignty agreement that would remain in the hands of the Community: Parliament, the Commission, and the Council of States. The European Federation of Nation States of Jacques Delors was based on specifying which policies would be communal and which would remain in the hands of the member states. The concept of shared sovereignty, which was incarnated by the European Commission, would be meaningless if each participating state supported limited its participation based on its own interests. The member states have yet to choose the form of unified Europe that they desire. The complexity of the institutional decision-making process damages the sense of unity. The incapacity of the Union to respond to the essential concerns of the citizens regarding the fight against unemployment or the struggle to prevent the international financial system from raiding the finances of the member states, created a deep malaise that was reflected in the European Parliamentary elections of 25 May 2014. How is it possible to be represented in the European Parliament by parties that exist to destroy the Community system?

The management of the single currency is regarded as insufficiently adapted to the needs of European economic, financial, and policy circles. According to some, a European economic government that is capable of imposing the same fiscal and economic policies in the entire Eurozone is necessary. But how would this be created? The Greeks will likely never agree with the German policy of austerity while the governments of Spain, Greece, Portugal and also France suffer under the policy of the strong euro and the budgetary constraints on public deficits.

In order to reach a common policy, it is essential to involve the European Parliament, which must vote on taxes, as all parliaments do. Central monetary power resets in the hands of the European Central Bank (ECB), independent of the European States and the Commission, and even of the European Parliament. This situation is not satisfactory on a long-term basis. It will last so long as the states are incapable of choosing a monetary policy that the ECB will apply.

There is in the European Union a genuine democratic deficit that the Lisbon Treaty
partially corrected in instituting the policy of ‘co-decision’ for all legislative acts. A dialogue
between Parliament, the Commission, and the European Council on all that concerns the
Community system is compulsory. The relationship of the citizens with their European parliament is weak. Monnet’s history reveals that democratic sanction was not his main
goal. In 1950 Monnet was aided in the creation of the Common Assembly of the ECSC by the
support of French and German socialists in 1950. A Parliament of limited powers, the
European Parliamentary Assembly that was created by the Treaties of Rome, had the
advantage of being composed of parliamentary representatives who had been chosen by
the states in their national parliaments and thus had democratic experience and were able
to inform their home parliaments of the issues of Community politics. Its transformation
into a European Parliament elected on universal suffrage in 1979 did not bring the
European deputies and the citizens closer. This was not Monnet’s fault. It was the leaders of
the states, the creators of the Treaties of Rome, who sharply limited the powers of the
European Parliamentary Assembly, it was they who decided that its election would be
based on universal suffrage, and it was they who prepared the Lisbon treaty which gave it
even more power. Monnet’s insistence in 1974 on successfully promoting the creation of a
permanent structure, the European Council of heads of state and government, which he
considered as a provisional European government, paradoxically elevated the states and
reinforced the decision-making and symbolic role of the states within in the Community
structure.

Monnet was an investment banker until 1938, a man of the banking network, which is by
definition confidential; an unconventional man of the state; in effect a pragmatic visionary,
an unparalleled lobbyist thanks to the Action Committee for the United States of Europe. He
was not a parliamentarian disenchanted with political assemblies, nor a philosopher of
action, despite the attempts to make him an ultimate reference in the organization of
international relations. If in 2014 we are turning towards the European Commission, we
can observe that it succeeded in imposing its expertise in the meetings of the European Councils, that it is from now on accountable before the European Parliament, and that its president is named by the governments which are made up of the political majority of the European Parliament. But as in 1973, it will decide on further enlargements.
The euro crisis, which took off in the wake of the 2007 global economic and financial turmoil, has become an institutional crisis for the European Union (EU). Within the euro area, intergovernmental institutions dominate the decision-making process, while the old Community method still prevails in the setting of common market policies. Moreover, technocrats from the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF as well as pre-meetings between some member states have played a central role in driving strategies and taking decisions. As a result, the unfolding of the euro crisis has exposed the weaknesses of the EU structures and undermined the old Community method in its post-Lisbon format.

Sherrill Brown Wells’s Jean Monnet Unconventional Statesman and Michael J. Geary’s Enlarging the European Union. The Commission Seeking Influence, 1961-1973 offer the opportunity to reflect on how the EU institutions were originally established and how they functioned in the early period. Brown Wells’s book is a compelling and informative biography of Jean Monnet, the Frenchman whom most of the historiography treats as the father or chief architect of the European Union and European integration. Geary’s work is an excellent account of the European Commission’s policies towards the first enlargement of the European Economic Community, from the first British attempt to join in 1961-1963 to 1973, when the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark eventually joined.

Brown Wells wishes to “chronicle how this entrepreneurial genius combined influence and action in tackling complex problems” and show how “the visionary Monnet helped to shape French foreign policy in the postwar period” (xii). Special attention is given to the role that Monnet’s American contacts and friends played in his European and French initiatives. Even if the focus on the United States downplays the importance of the contacts and relationships that Monnet established in Europe, it has the merit of casting light on the origins and limits of Monnet’s influence.

Geary’s book focuses on the British and Irish membership applications and deals with the Commission’s attempt to “secure more influence in the new field of enlargement policy” and use enlargement as “a vehicle to achieve influence at the expense of the Council of Ministers” (2). The book attempts to assess the nature of the Commission’s influence in the decision-making process and the Commission’s ability to steer the Community’s position through its technical and expert advice, and its unique knowledge of the funding treaties and the corpus of the Community legislation, the so-called acquis communautaire. The focus is on inter-institutional relations and, above all, on the interplay between the Commission and the Council of Ministers.

Brown Wells’s book is based, above all, on secondary material. Even if the author consulted U.S. sources, the Jean Monnet Papers in Lausanne and the General Georges Catroux papers in Paris, her book draws heavily on secondary sources – especially on François Duchêne’s biography and Monnet’s memoirs and the author’s interviews with some of the people who collaborated with Monnet in different stage of his life: Robert Bowie, Max Kohnstamm,
Robert Marjolin, W. W. Rostow, John Tuthill and Pierre Uri, among others. Geary’s work is based upon a multi-archival and multi-national research programme involving the consultation of the most relevant documentary collections in three different countries, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and the United States, as well as the historical archives of the European Union in Brussels and Florence.

Both books are of significance for scholars of the EU, contemporary European history, and European studies. Brown Wells’s work is a concise but thoroughly researched biography. Geary’s monograph deals with an extremely important topic from today’s perspective. Enlargement is one of the most important policies that the EU has used in order to stabilise the European continent. Despite the political and economic crisis that the EU is currently experiencing, six countries are currently negotiating or waiting to start negotiations to join, while two others are potential candidates. Geary’s work represents the first detailed historical account of the role of the Commission in the first enlargement of the EU. Most importantly, from their different perspectives and approaches, both books touch on critical themes: the reasons and circumstances which led national governments to pool sovereignty, the role of supranational institutions in the achievements of member states’ objectives, and the influence of the High Authority and the European Commission in the decision-making process of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) respectively.

With verve and humor, Brown Wells steers the reader through the life of Jean Monnet, from his experiences as a sixteen-year-old apprentice in London at a wine and spirit dealer and then as cognac salesman in North America, to his role in the establishment of the ECSC in 1950-52, and then to the years of his declining influence in the 1960s and 1970s. Chapters 1-3 deal with Monnet’s formative years: his experience in the inter-allied executive committees in the First World War, his activities as deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations and then as President of the Committee of Co-operation of the Allied War Effort in the Second World War. The author argues that Monnet’s experiences until the end of the Second World War had a twofold result: they allowed him to establish relationships and contacts, both in London and Washington, consequently increasing his influence in both capitals; and they also convinced him of the importance of pooling resources and accepting a system of shared management to favour international cooperation and economic growth. These chapters are propaedeutic to understanding Monnet’s ideas and policies in the reconstruction of France and Western Europe.

The most valuable parts of the book are chapters 4 to 7, in which Brown Wells illustrates Monnet’s role in the reconstruction of the French economy, the establishment of the first European supranational institution – the ECSC – the failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) and the origins of the (EEC) and Euratom. The author shows how economic modernization and economic growth had become the top priorities and illustrates the key role that Monnet attributed to national, and later to European,

institutions to reach these goals. The author also describes how Monnet prioritised the strengthening of French heavy industry and the need to secure access to Germany's Ruhr Valley coke and coal mines. Brown Wells emphasises Monnet's pragmatic – rather than ideological – approach, his choice to work deliberately outside the political party system, his lack of a political basis to support his action, and the fundamental role that Monnet's U.S. connections played in the implementation of his plans.

Even if the author sometimes slips into a 'hagiography of the European saints', as a famous historian may have put it (see for example 157-158), her account is successful in illustrating how the Monnet and Schuman Plans were conceived and implemented and their importance in the reconstruction of France and Western Europe. The book is also instructive in explaining the advantages that France and West Germany sought to achieve through the pooling of sovereignty and, therefore, the national goals they pursued through the implementation of supranational institutions.

Above all, the book is effective in analysing the limits to the influence of Monnet and the supranational institutions. Brown Wells explains that Monnet viewed the High Authority as an "institutional depository of shared national sovereignty over the coal and steel sectors" and believed that its members would not seek instructions from national governments (144). The High Authority would regulate the coal and steel market "through competition, pricing and investment pooling, and the supervision of wages but would not replace private enterprise" (144). According to Monnet, in this way it would be possible to "make real competition possible in a large market, thereby benefiting workers, producers and consumers alike" (144). Moreover, a Court of Justice to implement the Community legislation would be established. This simple structure emphasized the strong role that the High Authority would play. In the detailed negotiations for the ECSC Treaty, however, the member states made changes to Monnet's scheme. The Dutch successfully suggested the creation of a Council of Ministers as a body of national representatives to "serve as an advisory and intermediary group to the High Authority" (144). Moreover, a common assembly would also be established with the intention of providing to the ECSC an element of direct democratic accountability. Thus the original architecture of the ECSC is indebted not only to Monnet's suggestion for a high authority but also to the desire of the member states to gain control over the actions of the supranational body.

Drawing on John Gillingham's work, Brown Wells illustrates with efficacy how the dominance of the member states also became apparent once the ECSC started its activities. The author makes clear that, "Since Monnet had to work with those chosen by

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their governments, he soon learned the most the High Authority could hope for was to influence the decisionmaking process in the new community" (167). The High Authority was challenged not only by industries but also by “governments reluctant to concede supranational power to the High Authority. [...] Since producers or their governments controlled the prices [...] The High Authority was powerless in the face of their opposition” (172). Without mincing her words, the author argues that “it had become clear very early in its operation that the European Coal and Steel Community failed as a supranational governing body to achieve its goal. It found it was powerless to alter the long-held practices of producers or governments” (179).

Brown Wells’s account of the EDC debacle is nicely connected to the Schuman Plan negotiations and is telling of how Monnet used European integration to enhance French interests. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and increasing U.S. pressure to rearm West Germany led Monnet to hastily put forward the plan for a European army. As the author notes, Monnet’s aims consisted in preventing the wrecking of the Schuman Plan, preserving French military power and precluding the creation of a German national army. Thus, the EDC served the purpose of enhancing French security “within a unified Europe under the jurisdiction of supranational institutions” (143). Brown Wells illustrates the pressure the U.S. had to put on the European allies, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer above all, to have the EDC Treaty signed, as well as the limits to the influence of both the United States and Monnet’s. The refusal of the French National Assembly to ratify the EDC shows that there was no pressure that the Americans could apply to convince the French to pool sovereignty and ratify a treaty considered contrary to French interests.

The section dedicated to the establishment of the EEC could have been stronger had the author mentioned two elements: first, the link between the Organization for the European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the European Payments Union (EPU), on the one hand, and the EEC, on the other; second, the negotiations over trade schemes that had been taking place since 1949, as has been brilliantly illustrated by Wendy Asbeek Bruce. Reference to these two elements would have emphasised that the creation of the EEC was not linked only to the failure of the EDC.

The opposition of the member states to the transfer of competences to the new supranational authority and their action to curtail its activities is a theme also touched on in Geary’s book. The Treaty of Rome was silent on the role of the Commission in the enlargement negotiations. Thus, the Commission hoped to exploit this void and play a significant role by being more than a technical adviser and thus inscribe its preferences onto the final outcome. Yet, as in other areas, member states were reluctant to delegate authority to the supranational level of the Commission and aimed at keeping control of the enlargement policy firmly in their own hands.

Geary vividly describes the efforts of the Commission to carve out a role for itself both in

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the internal EEC negotiations and in the discussions with the applicants, its aims of
influencing the final outcome, and the difficulties that it experienced in reaching its goals.
Geary shows that the Commission did not see its role as limited to that of an honest broker
in Brussels or as a bearer of messages from the Council of Ministers in discussions with the
applicants. First, the Brussels institution had its own preferences and was intent on
structuring its participation in the membership talks in such a way as to enhance them.
Geary argues that the Commission’s aim was “to further the integration process and
promote the Community’s supranational character” (181). Second, the enlargement
process became an environment in which the Commission sought more power in the EEC
decision-making process. As in other policy areas in which the Commission was involved –
such as agriculture, competition, and external trade – the negotiations over the
enlargement were an avenue through which this institution attempted to advance its
cherished policy aims and enhance its role both within and outside the EEC.

Geary makes very clear from the very beginning of his work that the Commission did not
have a “leading role” and was not a “kingmaker in the final decision,” (2) and he repeats
this concept throughout the book. Having set this limit, Geary maintains that the member
states did not “have a complete monopoly over the decision-making process or the
outcome of the negotiations with the applicants” and challenges the view that in the early
1970s the Commission exercised a “purely delegated, administrative function” (2).

The book shows that the Commission eventually played a more significant role than the
member states had formally and initially allotted it. Geary argues that thanks to its
knowledge of the acquis communautaire, technical skills, and innovative thinking for
generating the ideas needed to reach a compromise, the Commission was able to acquire an
important role at the negotiating table both between the Six and between the EEC and the
applicants. As such, even if the power to take any final decision remained solidly in the
hands of the member states, the Commission was not merely a secretariat or a technical
adviser.

The significance and interest of this book go beyond the role of the Commission and the
institutional interplay. By reading it one learns a great deal about the ‘high politics’ of the
EU enlargement, the relations between the applicants and between them and the member
states. Moreover, by reading this book scholars will understand the historical roots of the
problem of enlargement and the clashes over the acquis communautaire between the
member states and the applicants, and will thus be able to put the more recent
enlargements into a historical perspective. In addition, the book provides new insights on
the EEC in the 1960s and early 1970s. The enlargement talks were intertwined with other
elements critical to the EEC, such as the implementation of the Common Agricultural Policy,
the budget question, and the bridge-building talks to smooth the trade division of Western
Europe. By touching on these elements from the perspective of the enlargement, the
narrative reveals new aspects of the development of the Community in the period under
study. Chapter 7 on the EEC-Irish negotiations and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is
particularly valuable. It illustrates the origins of this common policy and reveals the role
that the applicants tried to play in shaping it. The book is written in a lively and compelling
style and is never boring, despite the many technical details presented in it.
While Geary’s analysis is convincing, it could be strengthened. First, Geary takes the negotiations over the British contribution to the EEC budget (chapter 6) and discussions over the CFP between the EEC and Ireland (chapter 7) as case studies to show the influence of the Commission. For both cases, he presents evidence that “the Commission played a significant role” (157) or that the Commission’s “negotiating position certainly shaped the final agreement” (180). However, as Geary himself recognizes in describing the negotiations between the British and the EEC, “the Commission played a role with varying degrees of influence and success in most of the issues discussed between the sides [...]” (133). The author could have explained why in certain areas, its knowledge of the acquis, technical expertise, and mediating skills did not enable the Commission to influence the final outcome. A comparative analysis between two case studies, one in which the Commission influenced the outcome and one in which it did not, may have further illustrated the circumstances and factors under which the Commission could play a meaningful role. Such an analysis would be fruitful, as Brown Wells’s book shows how technical and mediating skills, which the High Authority certainly did not lack, did not suffice for this institution to achieve its goals.

Second, to reinforce his argument, Geary could have provided the book with a stronger Introduction. In this part of his book, the theoretical background for its contents and an account of the major arguments that have taken place in the historical and political science literature are missing. The Introduction mentions only a few historical works and does not fully explain the findings of other scholars who have worked on the role of the Commission in other areas. Moreover, the main scholarly challenge in this field is to identify the factors determining the influence of the Commission and then to demonstrate that the Commission’s actions and preferences dictated a specific outcome, rather than those of member states. In the Introduction, Geary could have defined and explained the issue of influence at greater length and illustrated how one can assess and show the influence of the Commission on the final outcome.

Third – and one minor note –, the stances of all the member states towards the delegation of negotiating authority to the Commission are not always provided (see for example, 20) or fully explained. On pages 130-132 Geary shows that the Commission was given a very marginal role at The Hague summit of 1969. According to the author, “Arguably, the five believed that the Commission’s partial exclusion from the deliberation of the six was a small price to pay if it meant that France would move more quickly on the enlargement issue”. But was this the only or the main reason? After all, the five had also shown hostility towards a negotiating role for the Commission, while the French government had often defended the Commission’s prerogatives in other areas in the course of the 1960s.

The themes touched on in Brown Wells’s and Geary’s books raise another issue: the role of the United States in European integration. The 1961-1973 talks and negotiations to enlarge the EEC occurred in a period when the U.S. influence on the Western European governments had decreased in comparison to the 1945-1954. In effect, in Geary’s account, the United States has a marginal stance.
The United States has, however, a key role in Brown Wells's work. The author abundantly describes how both the design and implementation of Monnet's ideas were due to his U.S. contacts and U.S. leverage on the Europeans. The author also notes how Monnet's influence and power dramatically diminished after the debacle of the EDC: “He never regained the influence and stature he had enjoyed when he embarked upon establishing the ECSC in the summer of 1952” (182). The author cites different reasons to explain this outcome, such as the departure from the French government of Robert Schuman and René Pleven from their respective position of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister, and the failure of the EDC, a breakdown identified with Monnet himself. As U.S. leverage on the European allies also declined after the debacle of the EDC, the reader is left to wonder whether more than the failure of the EDC or the departure of Schuman and Pleven, it was the decline in the influence of the United States that determined Monnet's diminishing influence.
Scholarship on European integration has often been criticized for a progressive rendering of contemporary European history, where the structuring of the narrative has often lauded specific events and actors, while castigating those blocking or obstructing the path of closer economic and political cooperation.\(^1\) The language used to describe post-war European integration is couched in terms of laudatory, often heroic efforts, of specific individuals, seeking to circumvent, advance, or promote the benefits of trade liberalization and commercial opportunities or generate peace and prosperity through making war “not merely unthinkable but materially impossible” (Robert Schuman, former French Foreign Minister and one of the founding fathers of the EU, as quoted in Brown Wells, 131). While the design of Europe has generated widespread academic attention, with different philosophical and epistemological assumptions, historians have often focused on national perspectives regarding the individual motivations and diplomatic efforts of specific states towards European integration,\(^2\) the role and efforts of the United States to support European integration\(^3\) and biographical studies of key individuals in the early process of European integration.\(^4\) Subsequent work has focused on detailed historical studies of key policy areas such as the common agricultural policy, monetary policy, or competition policy,\(^5\) or followed developments in the broader discipline, towards transnational history in which social forces and dynamics are not confined to national boundaries but problematized in new ways.\(^6\)

The sustained effort to expand the direction of European integration history, driven in part by the efforts to engage with the historiography of the other key post war events such as


the Cold War or post colonialism for example, or shift from studies of European level institutions and elites towards understanding domestic reception and resistance to European laws and policies, has widened the ambit of historical research, even as historians seek to consciously draw on political science narratives and concepts to explain the broader pattern of historical developments within the European Union (EU).7

Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman by Sherill Brown Wells and Enlarging the European Union: The Commission Seeking Influence, 1961-1973 by Michael Geary focus on diplomatic relations within the EU as part of a broader international and transnational context in which national diplomacy has evolved to deal with the growth of institutionalized cooperation. Both focus on the institutions and actors involved in European integration, as they seek to explain national policy orientations, highlighting the importance of material interests in shaping decision-making, whether it was Ireland and Britain in arguing for accommodations in their respective enlargement negotiations, or France and Germany in terms of rearmament and non-proliferation policy, debt relief, and financial aid. Both Brown Wells and Geary employ an interpretive and inductive approach, using traditional methods of historical research to understand particular events and outcomes. Both authors focus on the negotiations, deliberations, and concessions that frame the interactions between states, while also highlighting the plethora of actors involved in the European integration process. Part of their respective strengths is that both books use primary and secondary materials from varied sources, including government archives, autobiographies, and private collections that provide a broad context for the transformations underway in Europe. Both situate European integration against the backdrop of broader European developments, in which the social interests and values of states may change across space and time, as disputes over material economic interests, differences in political ideology and party competition, or changing geopolitical circumstances impacted diplomatic strategies and responses.

Both books share some common themes about the dynamics of European integration. One notable theme is the role of policy learning, as both authors document instances of responding to immediate difficulties or changing tack when a particular solution did not marshal sufficient support. For Brown Wells, the formative efforts and setbacks for Jean Monnet with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, Anglo-French economic planning, and negotiations in Algiers to establish the French Committee for National Liberation, provided the groundwork for his subsequent efforts at dealing with international organizations in which he sought to promote “the power of collective action” in the public interest to deter “unchecked nationalism” (39). For Geary, the process of enlargement was one of ‘learning by doing’ in outlining the basic conditions and parameters for membership. The lack of a formal role clearly outlined for the European Commission, and the disagreements over how best to proceed with the negotiations illustrates a process by which all parties involved

sought to respond to how to deal with the breakdown of negotiations with Britain. A similar lack of strategy with the various impasses stemming from neutrality and economic readiness in the case of Ireland, or the British balance of payments problems, and financial contributions to the Community budget highlights the tenuous role played by the European Commission, with deep fissures among political officials as they sought to move beyond the open hostility and divisions that enlargement had caused as “the unity of the EEC was the Commission’s main concern” (64). Clearly, the Commission did not play a major role in the first enlargement, and was often taken aback by the hostility towards its efforts to play a more visible role. However, the Commission strengthened its knowledge of the *acquis communautaire*, the cumulative body of EU law, hoping to steer the process when negotiations resumed, learning that its experience of Community legislation, and its broker role, could pay dividends during fraught negotiations (185).

A second theme is the role of transnational networks, and the informal governance that characterizes European decision-making. Though Monnet is perhaps best known for his extensive American connections, both in the political and financial arena, working to secure loans and credit for European governments, his early experience in the mid-1920s, in securing loans for Bulgaria and Poland, and in fostering investment partnerships between Chinese and Western financiers, through his “innate pragmatism” and “ability to bring disparate economic interests and officials together” laid the foundation for his later role in designing new frameworks and creating new institutions (33). As Brown Wells concludes, throughout his career, Monnet had “a talent for finding persons in positions of influence who could be useful for him” (61). As a public entrepreneur, Monnet sought out supporters who could “look ahead to the moral and material reconstruction of Europe” (71), sometimes armed with a mandate, and a network of influential friends, but equally working outside of power ministries through his Action Committee. He, according to Brown Wells, relied on “powers of persuasion” while fighting to “maintain his independence” (107-108). Geary too emphasizes the role of informal negotiations and discussions as an important element in maintaining support for enlargement, although he clearly highlights the internal divisions within the European Commission over the response to the breakdown of negotiations. Through sustained diplomatic efforts to secure public support for the Irish application (51), the renewal of contacts with the Commission after the collapse of initial negotiations with the Danes, Irish and British (63), and the continuation of “channels of communication” between Brussels and London, the Commission’s interactions with the applicant states, “despite the apparent setbacks” (68), was marked by difficulties due to their own internal divisions about the timing and prospects for membership.

The third theme is the issue of risk, uncertainty, and the politics of adjustment that was an intrinsic part of the process of European integration. Efforts at stabilization or structural adjustment are routinely stymied by domestic political forces. Brown Wells clearly acknowledges the failures, as perceived by Monnet himself, including the European Defense Community (EDC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), as well as the continued promotion of alternative avenues, whether it is the hastily created Pleven Plan or the multinational network of political parties and trade unions, civil servants and government officials that he assembled through the Action Committee to promote continued integration (Brown Wells, 250). Geary’s book illustrates, perhaps more strongly,
the risks, adjustment, and uncertainty that applicant states faced in their efforts to become the first members of an enlarged European Union. In terms of Ireland, the lack of an invitation to join EFTA, the implication that its membership bid was not in “the same league as the British and Danish applications,” and the growing unease about “whether Ireland was a suitable candidate for membership (Geary, 47) illustrate the uncertainty surrounding the Irish application. Coupled with the questions about the compatibility between neutrality and political integration, the perceived risks over the Irish application forced the Commission to address the concerns over neutrality and whether associate membership was an alternative for weaker economies. Geary also focuses on adjustment efforts in Britain to foster a more favorable application, driven by recognition of the changing terms of trade, the implications of currency devaluation on membership, and the risks posed by Britain’s continued efforts to safeguard Commonwealth interests and retain “the possibility of an Atlantic free trade area as an alternative to membership of the EEC” (74-75).

Jean Monnet: Unconventional Statesman is primarily a biographical book about Monnet’s influential career in promoting international cooperation in Europe while gaining support for his initiatives in the United States. Brown Wells weaves together the personal dynamics and diplomatic maneuvering that allows us to comprehend the simultaneous achievements and setbacks that characterized Monnet’s efforts at promoting post war reconciliation. While the ambitions and goals of Monnet are clearly laid out, Brown Wells tells us a great deal about how American policymakers reacted to his overtures, mostly based on diplomatic accounts and memoirs. The substance of the book is divided into three main periods, focusing on the early career of Monnet, his war time experience and its translation into promoting greater economic and political coordination through the early post war institutions of trade and security cooperation, and his declining influence in which his lack of political base made him vulnerable to criticism “as the man in the shadows,” and “being more loyal to the United States” (220). Though she gives credit to other individuals who aided Monnet, Brown Wells conclusions about the American influence on both French and European policy-making, in terms of both their ideational and institutional support, is important, as it underscores the desirability and strategic investment of the U.S. in fostering productivity and growth, as well as the ever-present U.S. pressure in promoting specific outcomes, even contrary to those of its European partners, including Monnet. There is also important recognition that not all the initiatives were shaped by Monnet, as state intervention and planning emerged out of the Vichy regime and the resistance movement, and the Benelux Memorandum on the common market was a product of both Monnet and then-Dutch Foreign Minister Johan Willem Beyen’s different visions and approaches to economic integration (189). Occasionally, there are lapses of impartiality in the subject matter, like when Brown Wells indicates that Schuman “wisely appointed” Monnet to lead the negotiations or suggests that Monnet’s “prestige and reputation in Europe made it an opportune time to fulfil his dream of creating a new community” (136, 163). Though this is an overall sympathetic read of Monnet’s many and varied contributions to shaping the post-war political and economic environment, the central role that Monnet himself played in shaping the archives and overseeing the background and information about European integration is an important part of the narrative. The Ford Foundation, in large part, provided important funding for Monnet’s Action Committee,
which reflects the density of transatlantic ties, but also requires us to think critically about how Monnet’s action holds the power to shape our knowledge about the past.

In *Enlarging the European Union: The Commission Seeking Influence, 1961-1973*, Geary weaves an insightful and instructive narrative about the first enlargement of the European Union through a comparative study of the British and Irish efforts to seek membership, and the corresponding efforts of the European Commission to construct a consistent policy towards applicant states. The book is divided into three sections: the first reviews the first British and Irish application. The second section focuses on the aftermath of the French veto, while the third section focuses on the Irish and British challenge to the *acquis* as they sought accommodations over significant issues, such as financing, fisheries, sugar, sterling, and agricultural prices. A central concern of the book is the ebb and flow of efforts within the European Commission to exert influence over the enlargement negotiations. Geary shows how the interests within the Commission were anything but static or unified, especially after the veto of the British application. Consequently this book follows the travails of the British and the Irish efforts to mobilize support for their application through the management of their relations with different European institutions. At particular moments and faced with specific issues, the British sought accommodation for their commonwealth partners, or the Irish sought to blunt the potential effects of the fledgling common fisheries policy, as Geary documents the shifting sentiments within the Commission towards the thorny issue of enlargement.

The Irish case study is the most valuable contribution, given that both historians and political scientists have written much about the various aspects of the British application for membership. While Geary provides us with an understanding of the organizational dynamics within the early European Commission, the process by which this multinational bureaucracy developed its own identity, defined its goals, objectives, and instruments towards enlargement, and sought autonomy from member states, his book is reminiscent of the earlier work of Coombes. While the slow rationalization of procedures and the advent of conditionality have subsequently emerged in relation to enlargement, Geary implicitly outlines the implications for subsequent enlargements. Although his time-frame is limited to the first enlargement, the conclusion could have drawn upon the broader enlargement literature about the asymmetries of power, unintended consequences, and the costs of exclusion and negative externalities that explains the constant quest for membership. It is a richly documented comparative analysis of an important period of European integration that is especially timely given the on-going discussions of British membership today.

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In providing specific narratives about the European Union, these are political histories about the effects of conflict and bargaining over specific policies, the basic treaties, and the political possibilities and improbabilities in the case of Brown Wells’s book, and the struggles over membership negotiations both the unsuccessful ones in the 1960s, and the subsequent successful later efforts in the 1970s through multi-archival research in the case of Geary’s. Though far less explicit about the theoretical assumptions underpinning their analysis, both books illustrate the complexity of intra-European relations, in terms of managing relations between the growing number of bureaucratic and non-governmental actors, the importance of networks exchanging ideas and information, as well as more traditional lobbying practices, and the emergence of a separate collective agency – that can differ from member state preferences, through the institutions of the European Commission, Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER), and Action Committee. Many specialists of European integration may be familiar with the ‘bataille des chiffres’ that has continued to impact British relations with the European Union, or the collapse of the European Defense Community. However, one might ask how empirical analysis of Europe’s early efforts to transform its relations among states through a new set of institutions, rules, and practices has translated into effective methods and whether these ad hoc approaches are still legitimate ways of working today given concerns about the democratic deficit.

Historians have been somewhat reluctant to interpret their findings using the concepts and theories of European integration. There is a strong effort to move away from the progressive and teleological narrative of European integration that characterized earlier studies and situate that history within a broader historiography of modern Europe. This effort will also allow for a wider dialogue with other disciplines. Rather than studying elites, historians are increasingly turning towards questions of democratic legitimacy and public sentiment through a historical and longitudinal analysis of referendums, elections, and public opinion; and the impact and effects of integration on different groups that have been affected by European decisions such as farmers, students, women, or immigrant groups, as well as non-European states subject to Community aid, currency coordination, or agricultural pricing, thereby allowing us to reconsider EU studies beyond the ‘high level politics.’

10 Ludlow, "History Aplenty: but still too isolated".
These two books could hardly be more diverse in terms of their scholarly approach, methodology, and format. Michael Geary’s *Enlarging the European Union* is a tightly focused research monograph based on multi-archival sources. It explores the long, drawn-out history of the European Community’s (EC) first enlargement to highlight “interinstitutional relations” within the EC, particularly the “overt attempts by the Commission to secure more influence […] at the expense of the Council of Ministers” (2). Sherrill Brown Wells has produced a compact, “short political biography” aimed at emphasizing Jean Monnet’s role “in bringing peace to Europe and transforming the transatlantic relationship” (xii). It is a sympathetic, openly admiring portrait drawn from some interviews and primary documents but mostly derived from existing historical accounts, particularly the biographical literature on the French promoter of European integration and his closest associates.¹

However, both books partly tread on common ground, and not only for the obvious reason that they deal with the early history of the EC. Monnet’s lasting legacy to the pattern of European integration resides in the EC’s partially supranational structure, embodied in a Commission that throughout its history has struggled – with fluctuating success - to promote the ethos of supranationality and in so doing also to expand its own role and reach. Thus, even Geary’s attention to the enlargement negotiations’ procedures and technicalities indirectly enhances the view of Monnet (as well as other founders) as a key maker, since the focus is on his main character’s efforts to promote and strengthen his conceptual innovation. If ‘Europe’ – in the Brussels jargon that would later become standard currency – is supposed to be personified in the European Community\European Union (EU), and conceptualized as a righteous struggle for an “ever-closer union,”² the Commission and its primary architect are then inescapably central.

Yet the EC\EU never was, and it is not today, solely that spirited thrust towards supranational union. Brought into being by international treaties, it conferred supreme decision-making authority to its intergovernmental pole, the Council of Ministers (and later the European Council). Hence the institutional complexity, infighting, and contradictory dynamics that Geary expertly navigates, but also the fragmented, opaque, and eminently technocratic nature of policy-making in a multi-layered polity that lacks in transparency, democracy, and – often enough – effectiveness as well. And this is also part of Monnet’s legacy, as Brown Wells’s portrait makes clear by illuminating Monnet’s quintessentially elitist method pivoted on the close and secluded interaction between experts and ministers.


Monnet was the architect of crucial institutional and policy innovations that shaped European and trans-Atlantic interdependence in the central decades of the twentieth century. If this needed retelling, Brown Wells does it elegantly. Her chapters move swiftly from Monnet’s early twentieth-century traveling to Britain and North America - but also Europe, Egypt and China – in order to expand the marketing reach of the family’s brandy firm to his First World War role in devising and setting up the Allied Maritime Transport Council. Here he foresaw the efficiency of joining across national lines in pursuit of common interests, and experienced the functionality of small teams of competent people with immediate access to decision-makers. From there, it was a relatively short step to joining the Secretariat of the League of Nations, but his vision of international cooperation was soon frustrated by the impossibility of overcoming national interests and he went back to business.

Monnet entered the world of investment banking and throughout the interwar years developed key contacts among the American and European financial and political élites, including John McCloy, Walter Lippman, and John Foster Dulles (who even rescued him from bankruptcy). Monnet worked as a consultant to the Chinese government for foreign purchases and then spearheaded the French rearmament effort, devising a scheme for the purchasing of warplanes in the U.S. and then setting up the Anglo-French coordination of economic war planning. After France’s collapse he worked for the British purchasing commission in Washington and his suggestions contributed to the conception of the United States’ Lend-Lease program. Solidly installed at the centre of governing circles in the U.S., the UK, and France, this “entrepreneurial internationalist” (1) began to envision a post-war European economic unity that was capable of transcending sovereignty (and stripping Germany of exclusive control of its coal and steel resources), and discussed these options with the future Secretary of State Dean Acheson, among others.

Tasked with France’s post-war import programme, he pivoted it on an effort at modernization based on new American equipment, which soon became the central goal of the French Commissariat au Plan that he characteristically set up as a small team of first-rate experts, sheltered from public scrutiny, with direct access not only to data and intellectual resources but, more crucially, to key government figures. With Marshall Plan aid his policy goals came fully into being as his investment strategy for modernization took off, while his network of trans-Atlantic contacts grew wider and ever more central to his way of thinking and operating. It is the key context within which he came to envision the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

His solution of economic integration via joint institutions rescued French (but also American and German) policies from a potentially disruptive and divisive stalemate, facilitated further European reconstruction and growth, and set in motion the process of European integration as we have come to know it. Other initiatives like the Pleven plan for European defence or Monnet’s cherished atomic energy community either failed or remained of secondary importance, but he continued to operate as an untiring lobbyist for further supranational integration and trans-Atlantic cooperation.
Brown Wells’s biographical approach - and obvious empathy with her subject - underscores Monnet’s vision, his pragmatic effectiveness, and his extraordinary ability at crafting and mobilizing networks of influential contacts. She is less interested in discussing the shifting historical context and the other actors, who do not take a life of their own but remain in the background as the mere stage upon which Monnet operated. Thus, the book does not add much to the history of economic policy making or of European integration, which is depicted through the simplified binary of Monnet’s enlightened vision versus national resistances. But it offers a vivid representation of the trans-Atlantic policy-making elite at the height of its historical relevance. Monnet was one of its key linchpins. By focusing on his visionary strategy, pragmatic efficacy, manipulative (sometimes even authoritarian) methods, and quintessentially insider style, Brown Wells’s book highlights some of the defining features of trans-national policy-making in post-war Europe and the Atlantic West.

Geary builds upon Piers Ludlow’s standard works on British accession to the EEC to delve into the specific issue of the Commission’s strategies in, and actual influence on, this first, path-setting enlargement round. In particular, he takes aim at David Coombes’s argument that the Commission had just “purely delegated, administrative functions.” His vast research in the archives of the EC and the relevant national governments tracks with subtlety and insight the Commission’s attempts at using the enlargement negotiations to gain influence and pursue its self-perceived remit to further an ‘ever-closer union’. Measuring influence is a tricky business, and Geary’s own narrative points to several setbacks. If the Commission’s expansive intentions come through very vividly, its actual success seems to me more limited than the author claims.

However, one key conclusion stands out quite persuasively. To the extent that the Commission managed not to be marginalized or relegated to mere administrative functions, this was due to its superior expertise on the growing set of established community policies and rules, the *acquis communautaire*, a corpus of norms and practices whose mastering provided the Commission with the knowledge to demarcate the negotiations’ playing field and broker some of the necessary compromises. On this point – which goes beyond the formal lines of responsibility to look at the intellectual and administrative tools of power - Geary’s research is illuminating and his argument very solid.

The book’s structure follows chronologically the various applications, with chapters alternatively focused on the leading issues concerning Britain’s and Ireland’s negotiations (the connected negotiations with Denmark and Norway are understandably left aside). In

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the first round (1961-62), the Commission was basically shunted aside. Enlargement to Britain being a key strategic issue, relevant to the overall structure of Western political cooperation and trade relations, the six member states maintained close control. The Commission found itself closer to France’s stiffer attitude due to its unwillingness to bend Common Market rules and the priority given to completing the Common Agricultural Policy. In the years that followed French President Charles De Gaulle’s veto, and were dominated by the increasing friction between Paris and its partners, all the way to the empty chair crisis, the Commission grew more favourable to Britain’s (and Ireland’s) accession. The EEC was now more solidly built and enlargement could helpfully “dilute French influence within the EEC” (184), even though there was concern for London’s financial predicament.

The turning point, however, came in 1969. The early accomplishment of the Common Market and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GATT tariff reductions provided the EC with self-confidence and optimism. More crucially, President de Gaulle’s resignation was the real “game-changer for the enlargement question” (185). The Commission went on record for new negotiations and was even prepared to adjustments on Britain’s financial difficulties. The Six, though, kept it once again to the sides, with the firm intention of maintaining full control on the negotiations, a desire shared also by Britain and the other applicants. The Commission, however, was asked to advance technical proposals on specific issues. It is here that Geary sees its influence coming into play. On the thorny issue of the UK budget contribution, the Commission – along with the Six - started with relatively harsh proposals. The negotiations faced a prolonged stalemate (since London’s figures were far from what the EC would like to have seen) that was overcome only when France proposed new GDP-based criteria and found a provisional agreement with the UK in a bilateral meeting. The Commission was then brought in to work out the details of the long-term budgetary plan. Geary argues that this was a “key role – adding flesh to the bones of the French plan” (157), but this was as far the Commission’s influence went.

In a similar vein, the Commission became embroiled in a difficult bargaining with Ireland pivoted on fisheries. As negotiations for access got under way, the EC pushed through its new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that was based, among other things, on the principle of equal access to all the member countries’ fisheries. This could have had potentially devastating consequences for the Irish inshore fishing industry. Besides, all of the four applicants had strong interests on this matter and resented the rushing in of a new Community policy just ahead of their entry. In the end, the applicants’ defiance forced the Six and the Commission to mellow down their insistence on full acceptance of the CFP as part of the acquis. The Commission looked for compromise solutions but eventually it was Britain’s resistance and France’s insistence on a rapid conclusion of the negotiations that “forced the Commission to stretch further its proposal than it otherwise would have liked” (178-9). Ireland got better conditions and the matter was settled in a way that highlighted the Commission key role in managing the acquis but also its substantial subordination to decisions taken by the governments of the Six and the applicants.

Geary’s investigation shows that the inter-governmental logic remained in control, with the Six in command of decisions but not necessarily of timing and conditions. They occasionally
needed bridge-building to attenuate their own frictions, and technical proposals or solutions by the Commission, whose knowledge of the *acquis* provided it with the possibility to shape technical solutions. It was much less than Monnet would have wanted, but it points to a gradual accumulation of expertise and influence.
I would first like to thank, most warmly, H-Diplo and Thomas Maddux for taking time to organise this roundtable that focuses on two books dealing with the early years of the European integration process. I am very happy that four distinguished experts on different aspects of the integration process found time to read and review the book.

My response focuses on the reviews by Gérard Bossuat and Lucia Coppolaro since these two raise a number of important issues that deserve more attention. Enlargement was one of those policy fields where the European Community’s founding treaties made clear that the member states were very much the decision-makers. But there was also a great deal that was vague; for example, which institutional actor would lead the negotiations. What I do in the book is analyse how the European Commission attempted to circumnavigate those treaty restrictions through the formal negotiations and through informal contacts with the applicants. The Commission had no formal power but as the 1960s progressed, and as the *acquis communautaire* expanded, that institution gained more and more influence. It was not a power broker between the six and the applicants; yet at times it did act as an honest broker and its intricate knowledge of the Community’s other policies meant it could not be entirely excluded by the Council of Ministers. While Bossuat alludes to the treaty framework, I argue in the book that this did not hamper the Commission’s ability to exert influence over outcomes, especially during the two rounds of negotiations in 1961-63 and 1970-72. Of course, the book makes clear that the Community’s decision to open its doors was (and still is) a political one that could only be taken by the six, but the results of complex negotiations were shaped by the Commission in its capacity as guardian of the treaties and through the many proposals and counter-proposals it developed during the talks with the four. I agree with Bossuat that the ‘empty-chair’ crisis was important in how it affected the Commission in the mid-1960s, but to give that event too much prominence in the enlargement debate would be to overstate its relative importance. I make clear that it weakened Commission president Walter Hallstein and that Jean Rey, his successor, pursued a less ambitious agenda after 1967. But Bossuat’s review loses sight of the central point I make. Yes, the crisis affected the Commission but not fatally, and yes, the Brussels executive played a minor role at the Hague Summit in 1969, but once the 1970 accession negotiations started it was able to exert influence through its role at the talks.

The book adopts a multi-archival approach in its attempt to answer the main research question, namely what role the Commission played in attempting to influence the first enlargement. The three other reviewers react positively to this approach. The primary focus is on the British and Irish applications with secondary references to Norway’s and Denmark’s bids for membership. I find it strange that Bossuat argues that this archival approach is not sufficient. It is possible to examine the integration process of the 1960s without the need or necessity to delve into the French or German archives. British and Irish archival material is vast and rich in detailed material. My extensive use of the Council of Ministers and the Commission archives in Brussels and the EU archives in Florence provided me with ample scope to deal with the subject that still succeeds in shedding new
light on the role of the Commission as an enlargement actor. The implication in Bossuat’s review on the use of primary and secondary sources is that the book has adopted some kind of Anglo-centric approach which he seems to find unacceptable. By extension, his comment on ‘l’arrangement de Luxembourg’ seems odd if not somewhat pedantic. In the English speaking world, it is referred to as the ‘Luxembourg compromise’, a direct translation of ‘le compromis de Luxembourg’ that is found in most French literature on the subject. \(^1\) It is simply not the case that I exclude French literature. There is no anti-French bias in the use of secondary literature. My approach was guided by citing literature that was, at the time of writing, directly related to the research question(s). Oral history, for example, is an important source and I make use of those where it added value. Moreover, my approach to historical writing has been grounded in exploiting and interpreting archival sources without being bound to or influenced by the existing canon of secondary literature.

This is not a book about the history of the Commission during the 1960s or the role of officials. Katja Seidel has already done an excellent job in examining elites at EEC level during the same period.\(^2\) I was interested more in the political and diplomatic dynamics of enlargement as opposed to the more rigid administrative processes. *Enlarging the European Union* has a specific focus that explores, primarily, the interplay and interrelations between the Commission and two of the four applicants and the ways in which the Commission tried to carve out a meaningful role with a specific focus on a new policy field that developed during the course of the 1960s and early 1970s.

There are two significant points raised in Lucia Coppolaro’s review. There were limits to what the Commission could achieve either during the enlargement negotiations or between applications. Its knowledge of the *acquis* was important, but as I make clear in the conclusions, each Commission president was fully aware that while the executive could affect the Community’s negotiating position, it could not affect the more overtly political decision of opening the EEC’s doors to new members. Second, I disagree with Coppolaro that a comparative approach to chapters six and seven should have been adopted; the same argument could have been made for the earlier chapters on the 1961-63 talks. Instead, those chapters speak for themselves in revealing both the successes and failures of using knowledge to further the institution’s influence at the negotiations. The book makes clear that influence had limits, and each of the chapters dealing with the negotiations exposes the ability or inability of the Commission to influence the Community’s position vis-à-vis the applicants. At the same time, the book highlights how the applicants viewed the Commission and its usefulness as an enlargement actor; it was a source of information but ultimately not a political power broker.


The aim of the introduction was not to present a wide ranging analysis of the existing canon of literature of the Commission’s role and influence in other policy fields during the same period. Of course, I was conscious that the Commission played an important role in the development of the Community’s agriculture and competition policies, but I ultimately decided to focus more on what had been published on the Commission and the enlargement question, notwithstanding the interconnections between enlargement and other policies as the decade progressed. I do agree with Coppolaro that the introduction could have strengthened the focus on defining ‘influence’ and how the book measured it, but it is implicitly mentioned through the methods.

Let me conclude by again thanking Professors Bossuat, Coppolaro, Egan and Romeo for their probing and insightful comments on the book.
I wish to thank these four scholars for their willingness to undertake the time-consuming task of reviewing both Michael Geary’s and my book and for their thoughtful and invaluable critiques. I also wish to thank the translator but especially the editors, Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse.

Federico Romero has provided a very accurate analysis of the main arguments of each book and ably shows where both “partly tread on common ground.” He links Monnet’s legacy to the Commission, the “EC’s partially supranational structure,” described in my book, to Geary’s focus on the Commission’s role in the enlargement negotiations and its effort to promote the “ethos of supranationality” in order to expand its own role. Romero also points out that both books illuminate the “institutional complexity” of the EC in its early history and how the decision-making authority given to the Council of Ministers and its intergovernmental role contrasted with Monnet’s technocratic, elitist method of reaching decisions.

Michele Egan provides a valuable review of the current state of scholarship on European integration and places both Geary’s and my book in the context of the effort to expand the direction of its history. She shows how both books focus on the institutions and actors to explain national policy and decision-making and highlights their common themes. She asserts both authors illustrate “the role of policy learning.” The second theme is the role of transnational networks and “the informal governance that characterizes European decision-making.” She describes her third theme as “the issue of risk, uncertainty, and the politics of adjustment that was an intrinsic part of the process of European integration.” She weaves the common themes of these two “political histories” together in an interesting way and shows how both books “illustrate the complexity of intra-European relations,” and the importance of networks in exchanging ideas and information. Her analysis of these two works is stimulating and provocative and clearly demonstrates as well that she is a political scientist who values history.

Lucia Coppolaro usefully points out that both books deal with common themes including the functioning of the original institutions and structures in the early years and how the Eurocrisis has exposed their inherent weakness. In addition she observes that these two works show why national governments agreed to pool sovereignty and the role of supranational institutions in their decision-making process.

Coppolaro asserts that my discussion of the establishment of the European Economic Community could have been stronger if I had discussed first the “link between the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the European Payments Union” and the European Economic Community and second, the trade negotiations that had ensued since 1949. Her point is well taken. Certainly by 1949, the West European economy was experiencing significant growth. European exports had grown and industrial output of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation nations had increased dramatically between 1948 and 1950. In addition, trade between European countries had grown, overall
output had expanded, and large-scale investment plans were in place. Moreover, the creation of the European Payments Union in 1950 opened the way for liberalization of trade of the 1950s because the European Payments Union provided clearing and credit facilities. The adoption by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation that same year of a code of trade liberalization was also an important step toward a system of free trade and a payments system. Adding the arguments of Wendy Asbeek Bruce would be beneficial in any future analysis.¹

Coppolaro raises two interesting questions about Monnet’s relationships with prominent Americans. First, did my focus on the role of American influence downplay the importance of Monnet’s European relationships and contacts and cast “light on the origins and limits of Monnet’s influence?” And second, did the decline of the influence of the United States “determine Monnet’s diminishing influence” more than “the failure of the European Defense Community or the departure of Schuman and Pleven” after 1954? I think not. It may have been a factor but was not a significant one in either case. And as Romero reminds us, “measuring influence is a tricky business.” Monnet had reasonably good relationships with many Europeans leaders both before and after the European Defense Community. There were always some who disliked him, his ideas, and his authoritarian ways, yet he could not have accomplished what he did before 1954 without the support of these leaders and their representatives. After 1954, his Action Committee for the United States of Europe could not have been as successful a lobby as it was had he not had reasonably good relations with a variety of Europeans. The membership of this Committee had grown from thirty-three founding members in 1955 to one hundred and thirty-three in 1958 and included representatives from all six EC states plus Great Britain. Among them were political party and union members and parliamentarians. Other members who joined at different times were political leaders who became heads of state like Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Edward Heath, and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. Monnet’s loss of influence after 1954 was greatest in France because of Charles de Gaulle’s opposition and generally in Europe because he advocated supranationality. It is true that due to the end of Marshall Plan assistance in 1954, direct U.S. leverage in European economic affairs diminished. But at points where it counted, Monnet received continuing support from President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles throughout the 1950s and support from President John F. Kennedy in the early 1960s.

It is useful to have an appraisal of my book by Gérard Bossuat, the leading French scholar on Jean Monnet. He points out that the book does not provide “new material” for those who “are familiar with Monnet or have read his Memoirs” and who have “read the two biographies” by François Duchêne and Eric Roussel. While I draw heavily on these two excellent lengthy works, neither of them provides a critical and comprehensive assessment of the man’s achievements and failures. Neither systematically analyses the major impact that his close relationships with influential Americans during his whole lifetime had on his successes nor how these relationships transformed the transatlantic partnership. Moreover,

as I state in my introduction, I believe that a short, concise political biography in English will be useful to the global community since Roussel’s and most of Bossuat’s scholarship is only available to French speakers.

Bossuat argues that my book only “becomes rich after 1938.” Because my goal was to write a concise work showing how this entrepreneurial statesman brought peace to Europe, I intentionally condensed the discussion of the key formative events in the early years of his life in order to devote most of the book to the period after 1938 when he accomplished his more important work. While Monnet’s role in helping coordinate Allied supplies during the First World War, his League of Nations work, his failed Trans-America banking venture, and his escapade in China are briefly discussed, I do point out the significance, consequences, and impact of each on his thinking and relationships he made that proved so valuable.

Bossuat contends that Monnet’s loss of influence and his powerlessness after the failure of the European Defense Community “merited further explication.” I agree. But in addition to de Gaulle’s hostility and opposition to Monnet’s schemes such as Euratom and his lobby for integration, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, the French entrepreneur continued to be criticized for the failure of the European Coal and Steel Community, the experimental supernational organization. Being labeled derogatorily “Mr. Supernationality” never bothered him. He ignored the constant Gaullist criticism that he was a traitor to his own country. The Gaullists claimed he was an internationalist, advocating European union and transatlantic relations, which in their eyes meant he was not sufficiently loyal to the French state.

Bossuat appears to agree with some of my main arguments. He notes that the Monnet Plan was a significant achievement and contribution to France. He states that Monnet “intuited the new economic system that was based on the Modernization Plan” and that it was “very original since it saved neo-liberal capitalism thanks to the state.” As the historian Richard Kuisel asserts, the Plan aimed at reestablishing private enterprise and the market and indirectly aided private endeavors and facilitated the exchange of information between public and private sectors. Bossuat points out that I describe Monnet as a Frenchman with a strategic vision. He appears to agree with me by asserting Monnet was indeed “an unconventional man of the state; in effect a pragmatic visionary.”

Bossuat writes that Monnet contemplated “the political organization of the world” after the Second World War and argues that this Frenchman appreciated the importance of “institutions and common law.” I contend that the central element of Monnet’s strategy was the establishment of effective international institutions which were instruments of political and social change and which could transcend national divisions and promote understanding and tolerance among nations. Lastly, Bossuat follows his usual pattern of moderate but qualified praise of the man he has written about extensively and concludes his review of my

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book by stating it allows one to read about the “extraordinary destiny of an inventor of the future, whether or not we admire his ideas.”