

Anti-OPEC or a neutral consumer organisation? The founding of the International Energy Agency in 1973/1974

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1. Introduction

When the oil crisis broke out in October 1973, with its quadrupling of the oil price and the embargo on the Netherlands and the US, there was panic and the countries of the West reacted in a completely uncoordinated way. While the US attempted to increase pressure on the oil-producing countries, Japan and West European countries scrambled to establish bi-lateral agreements with the same oil-producing countries. They were not even able to develop a common stance on this within the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in which the Western industrial countries had been jointly discussing crude oil policy since the 1960s. The established crisis mechanism could not be brought into play due to the unanimity voting rule in the OECD and disagreement amongst Western governments.² Especially the governments of France, Western Germany and Great Britain feared to aggravate the panic of the oil consumers in their countries by officially announcing an oil crisis in the OECD. Additionally, they did not want to provoke the OPEC by closely collaborating with the embargoed US and the Netherlands. There was not even a co-ordinated response within the European Community (EC). Agreement was only found in the joint Middle-East declaration of November 1973, in which the concerns of the Arab countries were considered in a relatively sympathetic way.³ As a consequence, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, saw this as a sign of West Europeans buckling under Arab pressure.

Subsequently, the US took the initiative with regard to the Western position on OPEC; in this connection the US government invited interested parties to a conference of oil-consuming countries to Washington in February 1974. In addition, it dominated the work carried out by the Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) which had been organised by the conference. In the following months, this group set up the statutes and tasks for the central international organisation of oil-consuming countries, the International Energy Agency (IEA), which was founded in November 1974.

Whereas the IEA drew a good deal of attention of political scientists, especially under the perspective of interdependence and regime theory, historians have more or less neglected this organization. In the historiography on the oil crisis the IEA is only a side issue. The founding period of the IEA, in particular, is often described in a few sentences, although the

IEA is one of the main international organisations in the field of energy to this day.⁴ Therefore, I would like to have a closer look at the founding period of the IEA and investigate how the negotiations in the ECG shaped the character of this important multilateral energy organisation. Above all, I would like to illustrate which positions were taken up by the US and EC countries with regard to consumer countries' co-operation in the negotiations. How much influence did these positions have on the founding of the agency and its statutes?

I will answer these questions with the help of previously unpublished sources from the OECD archive⁵ and the West German Chancellery, Economics and Foreign Ministries. In addition, I have evaluated the recently published volumes of files of the "Auswärtige Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" (AAPD), "Foreign Relations of the United States" (FRUS) and the "Documents on British Policy Overseas" (DOBP).

2. The Energy Conference in Washington

The way to the Washington Conference was set in motion by a speech by Kissinger in London on 12th December 1973 in which he suggested the setting up of an Energy Action Group whose aim was to guarantee energy supplies for the West at reasonable prices. To achieve this, the group was to introduce, for example, energy-saving measures and carry out research together.⁶ Subsequently, US President Richard Nixon and his Foreign Minister invited interested parties to an Energy Conference in Washington from 11 to 13 February 1974 to discuss this possibility in greater detail and examine new and improved mechanisms of multi-lateral cooperation.

The EC countries, in particular, reacted cautiously to the conference proposal because the interests of the EC and the US in the oil crisis differed strongly. In contrast to the US, the EC countries were extremely dependent on Arab oil and believed they could not afford a confrontation with the oil producing countries. For this reason, the founding of an Anti-OPEC that Kissinger had in mind seemed unwise for the EC. Instead it favoured co-operation with the oil countries.

Besides, the conference took place in a period during which the tensions between the US and the EC were reaching a climax. The EC countries' search for an independent stance on world politics in the newly founded European Political Cooperation (EPC) challenged the US leadership role and clashed with the aim of the US to underscore its supremacy in international politics.⁷ The Middle East declaration of the EC-9 in November 1973 was

particularly not to Kissinger's liking as he thought it was formulated in too mild a fashion and would seem to be bowing to the tactics of blackmail.⁸ Kissinger therefore attempted to manoeuvre the European position closely in line with America's. He did not want to tolerate Arab countries being able to force through concessions with the embargo. The economy of the West should not be dependent on the moods of a few countries whom he regarded as being under-developed.⁹ In the light of these transatlantic disputes the conference was also an attempt to form a common Western front under American leadership in opposition to the oil-producing countries and therefore underline US hegemony in the Western world.¹⁰

Kissinger's aim to create a common front of consuming countries can be seen particularly clearly when we look at a meeting Kissinger had with his staff a few days before the conference. When the Acting Assistant Secretary of State, Arthur Hummel, pointed out that the other countries wanted the US to make it clear that it did not plan to form a common front against the oil countries, Kissinger lost his cool:

We have said it a hundred times and it's bull... - excuse me for using that language. It is, of course, designed to create a united front. That's the only purpose of a consumer meeting. We can waffle around this and we can say elegant things. And, of course, we should say it – but, for God Sakes, in a senior group here, let's not kid ourselves. The purpose is to create a consumer group that improves the bargaining power of the consumers. [...]

I mean we will say all the appropriate platitudes about this not being a confrontation with producers. The fact of the matter is that the only way the consumers can protect themselves against what is a revolution in international finance, in international economics, is to share a common perception and to organize it.¹¹

It was especially the sceptical French government under President Pompidou and his intransigent foreign minister, Michel Jobert, that suspected the Americans of having a hidden agenda.¹² They saw the danger of being too closely associated with the American position, which would consequently harm their good relations with Arab countries. After all, OAPEC had categorised France as a "friendly state" and given it preferential treatment. Therefore, the French were initially inclined to reject the invitation to the conference. They only accepted it after the EC Council of Ministers had formulated a jointly agreed position for the conference.

In this conference mandate the Foreign Ministers took a critical view of the conference, because they did not want to be identified with the US position in the Middle East conflict for fear OAPEC would extend its embargo to other European countries. They asserted that no far-reaching decisions for international co-operation in the energy sector could be negotiated at the conference because it would only consist of the Western oil consuming countries. Instead, they championed unanimously a follow-up meeting of both the oil consuming and producing countries. The conference should not become a permanent

organisation and should not institutionalise a new framework for international co-operation. It could only give new impetus to the existing institutions like the OECD or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The conference could only consider the introduction of working groups for specialised topics connected to the oil crisis. With regard to EC energy policy, they claimed that the conference results should not predetermine future community decisions on that topic.¹³ All in all, it was a very cautious approach to Kissinger's proposals. Obviously, the EC-ministers tried to avoid any impression of a confrontation with the oil countries.

In the days before the conference, Kissinger applied the thumbscrews on the Europeans so that it would still become possible to make ambitious decisions at the conference. He threatened that there would be far-reaching consequences for the Europeans should the conference turn out to be a failure. In a conversation with the West German Foreign Minister, Walter Scheel, the acting President of the EC-Council of Ministers, Kissinger mentioned a total revision of US-European policy if there should be a confrontation at the conference between the US and the Europeans. He indirectly alluded to a strengthening of the isolationists in the US should the conference fail.¹⁴

Because of this US pressure, nearly all countries accepted the US proposals on the conference. Only French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert openly contradicted the US approach at the conference, calling his European colleagues traitors.¹⁵ Mediation attempts between the French and its eight EC-partners by Council-President Scheel failed miserably. As a consequence, the French refused to sign the most important parts of the communiqué.¹⁶ Inter alia the French declined to participate in a study group that was supposed to work out the details of the conference decisions. Thus, one result of the conference was the isolation of France from its eight EC-partners. When this outcome became apparent, the British, for example, noted that "the issues are so important that we shall have to accept the damage to the community."¹⁷ That Kissinger had intended to attack the common position of the EC-Ministers and the cohesion of the Community becomes clear if one reads his internal judgements about the conference. For example, Kissinger reported triumphantly to Nixon's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft: "We have broken the Community, just as I always thought I wanted to."¹⁸ Nixon and Kissinger agreed that the conference taught the Europeans a lesson.¹⁹ Kissinger crowed that now the Europeans knew "who's got muscle."²⁰ This power play not only burdened the conference, but was also a handicap for the beginning of the follow-up-process.²¹

3. **The follow-up-process: the International Energy Programme and the foundation of the International Energy Agency**

The disagreements and divisions amongst the Europeans at the conference made a number of countries want to postpone the start of the working group established by the conference called the Energy Coordinating Group (ECG). They wanted more time to reflect in order to intensively prepare the first meeting.²² The US was again applying pressure in this context. The US government invited the coordinating group to Washington as early as 25 February for its constituent meeting.²³ Kissinger personally insisted on this early appointment with some of the European Foreign Ministers in order to maintain the momentum of the Energy Conference and carry it on into the new negotiations.²⁴

The first meeting was devoted to formalities. Officials from the countries which took part in the Washington Energy Conference as well as the OECD participated.²⁵ The plan to involve the EC Commission failed as France was not joining in and did not allow the Commission to participate as a representative of the EC.²⁶ The eight EC countries taking part had already agreed before the meeting to move the ECG to Europe and prevent the US from chairing the meeting.²⁷ The ECG therefore decided provisionally to hold the next meeting on March 13/14 in Brussels and that the Belgian OECD envoy, Roger Ockrent would be the chairman there.²⁸ This temporary solution was then adhered to. When Roger Ockrent suddenly passed away, his compatriot Etienne Davignon became his successor.²⁹

A second step aimed to firm up the conference mandate for the ECG. It instructed the group to negotiate the multilateral organisation of the following fields:

- (a) the conservation of energy and restraint of demand;
- (b) a system of allocating oil supplies in times of emergency and severe shortages;
- (c) the acceleration of development of additional energy sources so as to diversify energy supplies;
- (d) the acceleration of energy research and development programmes through international cooperative efforts.³⁰

The group was to make use of existing organisations and where this was not possible, it was to employ ad-hoc working groups. The ECG was also to prepare a conference with the oil-producing countries. Following this, the ECG laid down that the “conservation of energy, the acceleration of development of traditional energy sources and allocating oil supplies in times of crisis”³¹ should be taken care of in the OECD. Economic and currency questions were the responsibilities of the OECD, IMF and the World Bank. Ad-hoc working groups were used for the fields of “Energy research and development, enrichment of uranium and the role of the mineral oil companies.”³² The ECG itself was responsible for the fields such as

relationships to other consumers and oil-producing countries, institutions for the recycling of oil revenues, development of the oil market and socio-economic development in the oil-producing countries.³³ The American idea of employing a permanent group of high-ranking officials to oversee the tasks in between the meetings of the ECG to ensure a tight organisation was dropped, due to European reservations.³⁴

As an alternative to the ECG, the French proposed the idea of a European Energy Agency within the EC. This agency was supposed to be established by a formal decision of the EC's Council of Ministers and to function as a spokesman in the field of energy technology. It should also concern itself with questions of energy conservation and the development of alternative energy sources. This proposal was received sceptically by the European partners.³⁵ Obviously, in the short run, co-operation with the leading country in energy technology, the US, looked more attractive.

The negotiations in the ECG in April and May 1974 clearly revealed the differing positions of the US and West Europeans. The biggest differences in the first phase of negotiations were to be seen on the question of the consumer-producer dialogue. The US warned against going into a meeting without being prepared; they believed it was essential, first of all, to work out a unified front in the ECG for the Western consumer countries. Most of the other countries, like the UK or Belgium, found this approach too confrontational.³⁶ They did not want to provoke the OPEC countries with this stance. For this reason, these countries wanted to first begin with a cautious dialogue in order to ascertain the potential of such a discussion.

When the possibility of making contact with the oil-producing countries presented itself during the special session of the UN General Assembly on 9 April in New York on the subject of raw materials and development, the ECG voted not to approach the producing countries in a united fashion, but to first sound them out bilaterally.³⁷ The results of these discussions were then evaluated in the ECG. The delegations expressed their disappointment at the lack of response. The oil-producing countries were obviously not interested in having a dialogue with the consuming nations. Thus, the ECG participants agreed to pursue officially the aim of starting a dialogue with the consuming nations, but it was clear that this would not be taking place in the near future.³⁸ The subject "Consumer-Producer-Dialogue", which had been up to now a central point on the agenda of the ECG, now rather disappeared into the background.³⁹ This result came at a good time for the US – it was now possible for them to develop a common stance on behalf of the consuming nations.

In the centre of the discussion about a common approach stood a political declaration that the head of the US delegation in the ECG, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, William H. Donaldson, delivered in the meeting on April 3. He made it clear that the most important aim was to bring down the oil price. For this reason, the consuming nations would have to make joint measures to reduce their dependence on oil imports and decide upon a number of measures in times of crisis. If this package was to become reality, the countries involved would have to “see themselves as one unit in energy questions. Any restriction of supplies or discriminating price setting aimed at one country would have to be understood as the same for all other countries.”⁴⁰

This point of view was seen sceptically by the other delegates. The chances of reducing dependence on OPEC oil in the short term were regarded as particularly slim. That was why they naturally wanted to avoid confrontation with the oil cartel. The West German delegation stressed the importance of having to “avoid the impression of creating a very strict consumer cartel.”⁴¹ Concluding, the American delegation made it clear once again that one should not spend too much time studying the situation – instead the time for real commitments had come.

After the head of the US delegation, Donaldson, had resigned due to differences with Kissinger, he was succeeded by Thomas Enders who wanted to firm up the rather general suggestions of the US government. In this way, the negotiations obtained new impetus. The State Department’s planning staff was now working on a proposal for a new integrated emergency programme. This was supposed to be “designed to be strong and plausible,”⁴² and to reduce the vulnerability to an oil embargo of nations taking part. An agreement about this emergency programme in the ECG was judged by the State Department as the key for future cooperation in the field of energy. When the proposal was finally hammered out the State Department believed the suggestions to be so “tight”⁴³ that it was not sure whether the Europeans would accept them. Therefore, the proposals offered the advantage of finding out “how far other countries are going to be able to follow on a U.S. lead to organize a consumers’ group.”⁴⁴

On July 12 the US negotiators presented their paper about an emergency programme to the ECG. The proposals were designed to prepare the oil consuming countries for a next energy crisis. The main suggestions contained in this paper were a reduction of oil consumption during a crisis, an increase in the oil reserves of up to 90 days of average consumption, and an oil sharing system between the participating countries. Additionally, a common research and development programme for alternative energy resources was

envisaged. For the implementation of these points the US government proposed the establishment of a small international organisation. It was to be headed by a governing board, composed of the foreign and energy ministers of the member countries. A crisis was to be managed by a board of high officials.⁴⁵ As an incentive for the other countries to support the US proposals, the US offered to share its own oil production with the members of this institution in a case of emergency.⁴⁶ This offer was very important for the other countries since it meant more security in the oil sector. Of course the eight EC-countries or extremely oil dependent Japan could not reject this.

The following meetings of the ECG were devoted to the possibility of establishing the proposed new institution under the umbrella of the OECD in Paris. At first the US delegation was doubtful, because in its view the envisaged strong co-operation was endangered by the loose mechanisms of the OECD. The discussions paved the way for a compromise solution. The new institution could be integrated into the OECD-framework but was supposed to have its own independent rules. Above all, it should be avoided that a country could block decisions by vetoing them.⁴⁷ This transfer of the new organisation to the OECD was very important for the European countries, because the EC Commission already enjoyed a special status in the OECD that could now also be applied to the new institution.

The eight EC countries also expected a French participation from this construction, so that the new organisation would not endanger the cohesion of the EC.⁴⁸ That seemed to be within the realms of possibility because the settlement of the new organisation within the OECD framework reduced its confrontational character. The OECD already existed and was not known for an aggressive policy. The West German government, in particular, which relied on good relations with both the US and the French, but also the chairman of the ECG, Davignon, went to great lengths to integrate France.⁴⁹ The newly elected French President, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and the West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, agreed upon a meeting of German, American and French high officials with Davignon to discuss the details of French participation.⁵⁰ But in the following weeks France proposed that, as a first step, the French and West German governments should negotiate the accession terms. With this result they could subsequently approach the US government. That was not acceptable for the West German government, which feared being caught in the Franco-American crossfire.⁵¹ After an agreement with the French fell through the eight EC members decided to go on without the French for the time being.

A further important point of negotiation was the cut-off point at which the emergency programme was to be activated. The US pleaded for a low cut-off point which would mean

that the programme would come into operation if there were a drop in oil supplies of 5%. This was too rigorous and too premature for most European governments; they called for a 10% cut-off point. At the end of the day they made a compromise at a 7% drop in supplies.⁵²

Finally, after seven months of work, the ECG approved a draft for an International Energy Programme (IEP) in September 1974. This, among other things, suggested particular measures in cases of crisis, long-term cooperation in developing alternative sources of energy and reduction of oil consumption as well as an information system regarding the development of the oil market. This programme was to be realised through the International Energy Agency. In the following weeks almost all governments taking part in the ECG agreed to the IEP and the foundation of the IEA. In addition, further OECD countries expressed interest in the organisation. The OECD formally established the IEA by a council decision on November 15, 1974 with the French abstaining from voting.⁵³

Members of the IEA became Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, Great Britain, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Japan, Canada, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the US. The structure and the decision-making rules were highly innovative in the field of intergovernmental organisations. The IEA features a strong secretariat that was headed by the West German energy expert Ulf Lantzke during the first ten years. The emergency case is triggered by quantitative thresholds and is thus not dependent on unanimity voting. In addition, agreement on central questions is not decided on the unanimity principle, but according to oil consumption. The rules make it impossible for the US or the EC to force through a decision alone.⁵⁴

4. Conclusion

How should we evaluate the negotiations in the context of the energy crisis? Obviously, there was a divergence between how the US and the European countries perceived the oil crisis and approached policy alternatives, including the creation of an energy consumer organization, after the Washington Energy Conference. The US saw the oil crisis as a political method of a few under-developed countries for economically soaking the industrialized countries and for exercising political influence. The US government was not prepared to accept this and wished to protect consumers' interests by creating some form of consumer organization that would send a signal to the Arab oil producers that consuming countries could co-operate in the face of future supply shortages. The Europeans, on the other hand, saw the oil crisis as an acute

threat to their oil supplies. In view of their great dependence on oil from the Middle East, they attempted to appease the Arab countries and persuade them to maintain good relations with European countries. As they were at the same time politically dependent on the US, they were unable to extricate themselves from the US offer of cooperation that provides the advantage of US participation in the sharing system. Therefore, the European strategy was to obtain an American commitment in times of a future oil crisis with the least amount of conflict as possible with OPEC.

A consequence of this was that the negotiations in the ECG were dominated, content-wise, by the US. It tabled the decisive proposals, and its general approach, which agreed on a crisis mechanism, measures to reduce dependency on oil and to begin a producer-consumer dialogue based on this principle, was the approach which was successful. The US particularly made compromises in the area of procedures, e.g. by transferring the ECG to Brussels and by accepting the Belgian Chair. Another compromise was certainly the setting up of the IEA in the framework of the OECD, a move warmly welcomed by the Europeans. As the organisation was independent of OECD rules, the strict organisation preferred by the US could be guaranteed. The fact that its official founding act was to be organized “business-like” and “low-profile”⁵⁵ and not even TV was allowed, underlines the effort not to provoke OPEC by sabre-rattling.

To conclude, the basic conflict in the negotiations about organizing an anti-OPEC or a neutral consumer organisation led to the creation of an organisation with a clear and important task but which acts in the background to avoid any sign of confrontation. It is a sort of confrontation through the back-door. In the first years of its existence it became obvious that it was not able to force its member countries, particularly the US, to a certain energy policy or to reduce energy consumption but it proved valuable for example in the preparation of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) from 1974 to 1977 or the energy discussions of the G7/G8-summits. It thus helped to coordinate a consumer’s common view on energy and served as a tool to bring about common positions of the Western industrialized countries vis à vis the challenges from “the South” and the globalizing world economy.

¹ This is a slightly shortened version of a paper I presented at the conference “The Energy Crises of the 1970s as Challenges to the Industrialized World” from 26–28 September 2013 at the Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam.

² Richard Scott, *The History of the International Energy Agency – The First Twenty Years. vol. I: Origins and Structures of the IEA* (Paris: OECD Publications, 1994), pp. 33–38.

³ Hans R. Krämer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Ölkrise* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1974), p. 89. The declaration is printed *ibid.*, pp. 210f.

⁴ Even in Fiona Venn's broad chapter about the consumer's reaction to the oil crisis, the IEA only plays a minor role. See Fiona Venn, *The Oil Crisis* (London: Longman, 2002), pp. 113–144. An exception is Rüdiger Graf, "Nationale Souveränität in einer Welt des Öls. Petroknowledge und Energiepolitik in den USA und Westeuropa in den 1970er Jahren," unpublished Habilitationsschrift, (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2012), pp. 324–358, who emphasises the role of the IEA as a collector and provider of oil data. The most important book on the history of the IEA is the very descriptive monograph and collection of documents by Richard Scott. He was the legal counsellor of the IEA and thus delivered the official account of the IEA's history. See Richard Scott, *The History of the International Energy Agency – The First Twenty Years*, 3 vols., (Paris: OECD Publications, 1994).

⁵ I would like to thank the German Historical Institute in Paris for a Karl-Ferdinand-Werner-Fellowship to support my research in the OECD archive in September 2013.

⁶ See the summary of the speech in the editorial note, in: *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969–1976. vol. XXXVI: Energy Crisis, 1969–1974* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2011), pp. 762–764; Fiona Venn, "International Cooperation versus National Self-Interest: The United States and Europe during the 1973–1974 Oil Crisis", in: Kathleen Burke/Melvyn Stokes (eds.), *The United States and the European Alliance since 1945* (Oxford/New York: Berg, 1999), pp. 71–98, here pp. 85–86.

⁷ The role of the EC in the Washington Energy Conference and its repercussions on EPC and the integration process are discussed by Daniel Möckli, *European Foreign Policy during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), pp. 184–300; and Aurélie Élisabeth Gfeller, *Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973–1974* (New York/Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2012), pp. 114–141.

⁸ Henry A. Kissinger, *Memoiren, vol. 2: 1973–1974* (München: Bertelsmann, 1982), pp. 841–842; Venn, "International Cooperation", pp. 80–81.

⁹ Kissinger, *Memoiren*, p. 1048.

¹⁰ David S. Painter, "Oil and the October War", in: Asaf Siniver (ed.), *The Yom Kippur War. Politics, Legacy, Diplomacy* (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 173–194, here p. 186.

¹¹ Minutes of the Secretary of State's Staff Meeting, 31 January 1974, in: *FRUS 1969–1976, vol. XXXVI: Energy Crisis, 1969–1974*, doc. 293, pp. 821–826., here pp. 822–823.

¹² For the French view, see Claudia Hiepel, *Willy Brandt und Georges Pompidou: deutsch-französische Europapolitik zwischen Aufbruch und Krise* (München: Oldenbourg, 2012), pp. 292–300; Katrin Rücker, "What Role for Europe in the International Arena of the Early 1970s? How France and Germany were able to matter", in Carine Germond/Henning Türk (eds.), *A History of Franco-German Relations in Europe. From "Hereditary Enemies" to Partners* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 211–221, here p. 218–219; Gfeller, *Building a European Identity*, 122–130.

¹³ The conference mandate of the EC council of ministers can be found in: *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (AAPD) 1974*, ed. by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte im Auftrag des Auswärtigen Amtes (München: Oldenbourg, 2005), p. 196, fn. 4 and in: Telex 691 UKREP Brussels, 5.2.1974, in *Documents on British Policy Overseas (DBPO), Series III, vol. IV: The year of Europe: America, Europe, and the energy crisis 1972–1974* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), doc. 535. For an account of the council discussions, see: Telex 690 UKREP Brussels, 5.2.1974, in: *Ibid.*, doc. 534.

¹⁴ "Gespräch des Bundesministers Scheel mit dem amerikanischen Außenminister Kissinger in Washington, 10.2.1974", in: *AAPD 1974*, doc. 42, pp. 166–170.

¹⁵ A summary of the conference from a West German point of view is available in: “Aufzeichnung des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Dannenbring”, 15.2.1974, *AAPD 1974*, doc. 49, pp. 196–200.

¹⁶ *Kommuniqué der Energiekonferenz von Washington*, in: *Europa-Archiv 1974*, p. D208.

¹⁷ Telex 574 from Washington, 13.2.1974, DBPO Series III, vol. IV, doc. 549.

¹⁸ Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State, Kissinger and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, 12.2.1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVI, doc. 321, pp. 899–900, here p. 900.

¹⁹ Transcript of a Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon, Washington, 13.2.1974, *FRUS 1969–1974*, vol. XXXVI, doc. 322, pp. 901–902.

²⁰ Transcript of a Telephone Conversation between Secretary of State Kissinger and the White House Chief of Staff (Haig), *FRUS 1969–1974*, vol. XXXVI, doc. 323, pp. 903–904.

²¹ The US government officials already spoke of “power plays” during the conference preparations. See Telegram From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Panama, Washington, 7.2.1974, *FRUS 1969–1974*, vol. XXXVI, doc. 306, pp. 861–863, here p. 863.

²² Aufzeichnung des Referatsleiters Kruse betr. Auswirkungen der Washingtoner Energiekonferenz, hier: Vorbereitung erster Sitzung der Koordinierungsgruppe auf heutiger Ressortbesprechung, Bonn, 22.2.1974, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PAAA), B71, vol. 113893; Aufzeichnung des stellvertretenden Referatsleiters Otto-Kaban Heinichen betr. Kabinettsitzung am 27.2.1974, hier: Sprechzettel für eventuelle Aussprache über Folgearbeiten der Washingtoner Energiekonferenz, Bonn, 26.2.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113893.

²³ Bericht des Ministerialdirektors Lantzke, 25.2.1974, *AAPD 1974*, p. 200, fn. 4.

²⁴ Kissinger an Außenminister Scheel, Washington, 21.2.1974, PAAA, Bestand B71, vol. 113893.

²⁵ Bericht des Ministerialdirektors Lantzke, 25.2.1974, *AAPD 1974*, p. 200, fn. 4.t; Scott, *IEA*, vol. 1, p. 46. See also the justification of the OECD general-secretary Emile van Lennep about his participation in the ECG in: Minutes of the 352nd Meeting of the OECD council on 12th March, 1974, C/M(74)6, OECD archive, vol. 468.

²⁶ Fernschreiben Nr. 659 der Ständigen Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei der EG in Brüssel vom 20.2.1974 an das Auswärtige Amt (AA) betr. konstituierende Sitzung der Koordinierungsgruppe; Fernschreiben Nr. 672 der Ständigen Vertretung der Bundesrepublik bei der EG in Brüssel an AA vom 21.2.1974 betr. Energiefragen, both in Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BaK), Bestand B136 (Bundeskanzleramt), Bd. 8469.

²⁷ Fernschreiben Nr. 633 an das AA betr. Sitzung der Koordinierungsgruppe am 25.2.1974 in Washington, Washington, 26.2.1974, PAAA, B71, Bd. 113893.

²⁸ Bericht des Ministerialdirektors Lantzke, 25.2.1974, *AAPD 1974*, p. 200, fn. 4.

²⁹ Scott, *IEA*, vol. 1, p. 47.

³⁰ Final Communiqué of the Washington Conference (13 February 1974), online available under: http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_washington_conference_13_febbruary_1974-en-96e19fad-6aba-4b79-a791-34624e94acf9.html

³¹ Aufzeichnung des stellvertretenden Referatsleiters Otto-Kaban Heinichen betr. Kabinettsitzung am 27.2.1974, hier: Sprechzettel für eventuelle Aussprache über Folgearbeiten der Washingtoner Energiekonferenz, Bonn, 26.2.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113893.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ On this see also the tabular overview in: Aufzeichnung des Referatsleiters Kruse betr. Organisation der Folgearbeiten der Washingtoner Energiekonferenz, Bonn, 27.3.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113893.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Staatssekretär Rohwedder, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft, an das Bundeskanzleramt betr. Vorschlag der EG-Kommission für die Errichtung einer „Energieagentur“, 17.5.1974, BaK, B136, vol. 8470; Aufzeichnung des Referats 413 des AA, 2.3.1974, AAPD 1974, p. 273, fn. 46.

³⁶ Fernschreiben Nr. 403 der OECD-Gesandtschaft, Brussels, 28.3.1974, betr. Vorbereitung der ECG-Sitzung am 3./4.4.1974, PAAA, B71, Bd. 113893.

³⁷ Vermerk des Referatsleiters Kruse betr. Koordinierungsgruppe der Washingtoner Energiekonferenz, Bonn, 25.3.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113893; Fernschreiben Nr. 1214 von Rohwedder und Lebsanft betr. 3. Sitzung der Energie-Koordinierungsgruppe am 3.-4. April 1974, Brüssel, Delegationsbericht Nr. 1, 3.4.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113895.

³⁸ Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State, Washington, May 1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVI, doc. 352, pp. 997f.

³⁹ Fernschreiben Nr. 1526 von Rohwedder und Lebsanft betr. 4. Sitzung der Energie-Koordinierungsgruppe in Brüssel am 2.–3.5.1974, Delegationsbericht Nr. 2, Brüssel, 3.5.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113895.

⁴⁰ Siehe die Zusammenfassung der Rede Donaldsons, in: Fernschreiben Nr. 1234 von Rohwedder und Lebsanft betr. 3. Sitzung der Energie-Koordinierungsgruppe am 3.–4. April 1974, Brüssel, Delegationsbericht Nr. 2, 4.4.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113895.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Fernschreiben Nr. 1766 von Botschafter Staden, Washington, 13.6.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113895.

⁴³ Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State's Principals and Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, 10.6.1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVI, doc. 355, p. 1007.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Drahtbericht des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Kruse, 19.7.1974, AAPD 1974, p. 861, fn. 8. See also Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State's Principals and Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, 10.6.1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVI *Energy Crisis, 1969–1974*, doc. 355, pp. 1006–1009.

⁴⁶ Ann-Margret Walton, "Atlantic Bargaining over Energy," *International Affairs* 52 (1976), pp. 180–196, here p. 192. In a staff meeting Thomas Enders emphasized that "only in the most extreme emergency, that is to say with almost all of OPEC production out, [...] the United States [would] be called on to share any of its domestic production with the Europeans." This was a very important point for the State Department to get the approval from the other ministries for its proposals. See Minutes of the Acting Secretary of State's Principals and Regional Staff Meeting, Washington, 10.6.1974, *FRUS 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVI *Energy Crisis, 1969–1974*, doc. 355, p. 1007.

⁴⁷ Ministerialdirektor Hermes an das Auswärtige Amt, 11.7.1974, AAPD 1974, p. 894, fn. 4. For Kissinger's approval of this procedure, see the note of Ministerialdirektor van Well, z.Z. München, 6.7.1974, AAPD 1974, doc. 202, p. 894; Vermerk des Vortragenden Legationsrats I. Klasse Kruse, 1.8.1974, AAPD 1974, p. 1085, fn. 7.

⁴⁸ See e.g. Aufzeichnung des Referats 403 des Auswärtigen Amtes betr. Europäische Energiepolitik, 17.7.1974, BaK, B136, vol. 8470.

⁴⁹ See e.g. Vermerk des stellvertretenden Leiters der Abteilung „Auswärtige und innerdeutsche Beziehungen, äußere Sicherheit“ im deutschen Bundeskanzleramt, Per Fischer, betr. belgischer Vermittlungsvorschlag zur Weiterbehandlung des amerikanischen Vorschlags eines integrierten Notstandsprogramms im Energiebereich, 4.7.1974, BaK, B136, vol. 8470.

⁵⁰ Deutsch-französische Konsultationsbesprechung, 9.7.1974, AAPD 1974, vol. 2, doc. 205, pp. 899–917, here pp. 905–906; Aufzeichnung des Referats 403 des Auswärtigen Amtes betr. Europäische Energiepolitik, 17.7.1974, BaK, B136, vol. 8470.

⁵¹ Vermerk des stellvertretenden Leiters der Abteilung „Auswärtige und innerdeutsche Beziehungen, äußere Sicherheit“ im deutschen Bundeskanzleramt, Per Fischer, betr. Beteiligung Frankreichs am Washingtoner Follow-up, Bonn, 18.7.1974, BaK, B136, vol. 8470.

⁵² Fernschreiben Nr. 2195 by Rohwedder and Lebsanft betr. 5. Sitzung der Energiekoordinierungsgruppe am 17./18.6.1974, Brussels, 17.6.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113895; Fernschreiben Nr. 2539 by Lebsanft betr. 6. Sitzung der Energie-Koordinierungsgruppe am 8./9.7.1974, Brussels, 9.7.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113895.

⁵³ On the discussions and the voting in the OECD-Council see the record of the meeting C/M(74)27 (Prov.), OECD archives, vol. 541c.

⁵⁴ Due to its innovative structures the IEA was an attractive study subject for political and legal scientists in the 1970s. See inter alia Robert O. Keohane, “The International Energy Agency: State Influence and Transgovernmental Politics,” *International Organization* 32 (1978), pp. 929–952; Mason Willrich/Melvin A. Conant, “The International Energy Agency: An Interpretation and Assessment,” *American Journal of International Law* 71 (1977), pp. 199–223; Richard Scott, “Innovation in International Organization: The International Energy Agency,” *Hastings International and Comparative Law Review* 1 (1977), pp. 1–56.

⁵⁵ Aufzeichnung des Referatsleiters Kruse betr. Folgearbeiten der Washingtoner Energiekonferenz, hier Sitzung der Energiekoordinierungsgruppe (ECG) am 8.11.74, Bonn, 11.11.1974, PAAA, B71, vol. 113894. Compare also the extremely sober press release by Davignon: Presseerklärung des Vorsitzenden des Verwaltungsrats der Internationalen Energie-Agentur, Vicomte Etienne Davignon, am 18. November 1974, Europa-Archiv 1975, pp. D18–19.