On 2 September 2015, the world celebrated the seventieth anniversary of Imperial Japan’s formal surrender to the Allies aboard the U.S.S. Missouri in Tokyo Bay, marking the official end of World War II. Allied military victory presumably had made it possible for the United States to achieve what President Franklin D. Roosevelt had stated publicly as its objectives in the war. On 14 August 1941, he and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill aboard the U.S.S. Augusta near Argentia, Newfoundland, issued the Atlantic Charter, articulating eight principles. The two nations would seek no territorial aggrandizement, allow no territorial changes against the desires of the people concerned, and guarantee to all people the right of national self-determination. They would act for the reduction of barriers to trade and work to promote global cooperation to improve economic and social conditions and achieve freedom from fear and want for all. Finally, the Atlantic Charter pledged the disarmament of aggressor nations and the abandonment

1 Reprinted in slightly revised form on H-Diplo with the kind permission of James I. Matray, editor of The Journal of American-East Asian Relations.
of the use of force to settle international disputes. Historians have emphasized how these objectives essentially reiterated what Woodrow Wilson had enunciated as U.S. war aims for World War I in his famous Fourteen Points. While the U.S. Senate demolished Wilson’s plan for peace, the United States has sought for seven decades, without success, to implement Roosevelt’s.

Over seventy years of effort has not brought the United States close to fulfilling the lofty principles Roosevelt and Churchill outlined in the Atlantic Charter. To be sure, powerful forces beyond the control of any nation partially explain this failure. However, because of at least three fundamental flaws in its approach, the United States often has been its own worst enemy in trying to remake the world order. The articles in this volume, in reverse order, provide illustrations of each of them. First, U.S. leaders have perceived and portrayed nations emerging from colonial rule as backward and incapable, without American guidance, of determining their own destiny because of defects in character and culture. Rather than building support for its policies, this arrogant, racist, and paternalist approach has caused most developing nations to resist or reject U.S. advice. Second, ethnocentrism has caused U.S. leaders to believe that all nations want to follow the American model for social, economic, and political development. Moreover, they should show acceptance and appreciation to those Americans trying to help them reach this vision, tolerating any acts of misbehavior. Finally, the United States has been self-serving in how it has interpreted the principles outlined in the Atlantic Charter or it has ignored them when doing so advanced American interests. In the first article of this issue, Dayna Barnes demonstrates how this pattern was in place even before U.S. entry into World War II. “Think Tanks and a New Order in East Asia: The Council of Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations During World War II” describes how Americans in non-government organizations advised U.S. leaders on how to ensure that the United States would dominate postwar Asia.

Barnes examines the impact of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) on the development of U.S. policies toward East Asia just before and during World War II. These two non-government organizations became influential because the Great Depression had reduced funding and personnel in the State Department. More so than the IPR, the CFR “collaborated with official U.S. government planners through outsourcing projects, hosted official and unofficial discussion groups and conferences, supported networking, and funded policy-relevant research and publications.” After the Sino-Japanese War began in July 1937, the CFR, with a membership of mostly businessmen, government officials, and academics, worried about Japanese expansionism, but advised that extensive U.S. trade with Japan required abandoning rhetorical support for China. In 1939, the CFR created the War and Peace Studies project that “provided the State Department with recommendations for increasing U.S. control in East Asia,” even “advocating the expansion of American imperialism to replace the crumbling European empires there.” The IPR exerted “more limited and indirect influence” through its “semi-official” hosting of domestic and international conferences “that U.S. officials attended.” “Not only did this indirectly influence U.S. postwar planning,” Barnes emphasizes, but “many participants were or would become actively involved in wartime planning for the occupation of Japan.” Significantly, the CFR and IPR helped define for U.S. planners and politicians options for rebuilding East Asia that minimized creating a regional organization and maximized pursuit of U.S. domination in partnership with either China or Japan.

Not surprisingly, Chinese delegates at an IPR conference in December 1942 raised questions about the sincerity of the U.S. commitment to fulfill the Atlantic Charter. After World War II, doubts about American altruism grew as the United States sought to dictate the process of reconstructing East Asia in ways that benefited itself. One example from the Korean War reflects the mentality behind this approach. Early in April 1951, Sergeant First Class Elverne H. Giltner, while walking the streets of Seoul, spotted a huge leopard-skin rug on a peddler’s cart, which he purchased for 150,000 won, or roughly twenty-five dollars. After he shipped the rug home, his parents advertised it for sale, which brought its existence to the attention of the South Korean embassy in Washington, DC. Ambassador Yang Yu Chang soon announced that the rug was “a priceless national treasure missing from Queen Min’s Palace in Seoul.” Yang wrote to Mrs. Giltner, asking her to surrender the rug voluntarily, but she refused arguing that the rug should “be classed under the spoils of war,” though the property belonged not to an enemy, but to an ally of the United States. After the U.S. government confiscated the rug and returned it to the South Koreans, Mrs. Giltner demanded without success $50,000 as compensation for “loss of time from work and rest, heartache and disappointment in connection with release of the rug to government officials.” As opposed to this incident, East Asians already had experienced firsthand Americans behaving like exploiters rather than liberators. Christopher Aldous describes one example of how this pattern undermined U.S. claims of selflessness in the second essay of this issue titled “A Tale of Two Occupations: Hunting Wildlife in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952.”

Most readers likely will be surprised to learn that U.S. soldiers on occupation duty in postwar Japan spent a good amount of their leisure time hunting. Joining a relatively new group of scholars studying links between diplomacy and environmentalism, Aldous describes how these American hunters, with support from General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (GHQ, SCAP), threatened to destroy Japanese wildlife. In this fascinating essay, he “examines the previously overlooked work of SCAP’s Natural Resources Section, particularly its wildlife branch under its leader Oliver Austin, who clashed with members of the U.S. military over the need to restrict their hunting activities.” Austin wanted to protect the rights of Japanese to net waterfowl on special preserves where shooting was illegal in order to create an effective method of harvesting game to help alleviate the existing crisis of food shortage. But U.S. military personnel considered hunting wildlife a vital recreational outlet. American soldiers continued to shoot in protected areas, ignoring the detrimental impact on local economies. Even Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the U.S. Eighth Army commander, participated. The Japanese appealed to U.S. Occupation authorities to halt this illegal behavior. Austin joined with them in arguments with SCAP over imposing rules to regulate the species and number of birds U.S. soldiers could hunt, as well as their methods and purpose—food or sport. “The behavior of these Americans,” Aldous concludes, “reveals a colonialist mindset that supported the belief that U.S. military control over Japan excused them from complying with Japanese laws.”

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Some might excuse the insensitivity of American military personnel serving in the U.S. Occupation toward the wellbeing of the Japanese people, given their recent wartime view of them as diabolical savages. The United States has a long tradition of demonizing its enemies before and during the wars it has fought, even appearing to resurrect Spain’s “Butcher” Weyler as the “Butcher of Baghdad” twice in Iraq. During World War I, the U.S. government portrayed Kaiser Wilhelm II as the devil incarnate, while depicting Germans as vicious Huns who indiscriminately bayoneted babies and brutalized women. Perhaps more extreme, Americans pictured the Japanese enemy during World War II as subhuman and bestial. Predictably, the U.S. government portrayed the Soviet Union during the Cold War as a sinister and malevolent enemy that was preventing realization of the Atlantic Charter. Americans supported U.S. assistance to nations recovering from World War II, convinced that they never would choose freely to align with evil over good in the Cold War. Instead, support for communism and the Soviet Union rose in underdeveloped nations, climaxing with a Communist government taking power in China. Americans naturally attributed this to a Soviet conspiracy in which its Chinese subordinates had gained control over a passive and uninformed populace. When China intervened in the Korean War, it acted on orders from the Kremlin. In “American Orientalism in Korea,” Charles Kraus demonstrates how identical assumptions dictated American policy toward both Koreas from 1945 to 1950.

“Discursive representations,” Kraus contends, “shaped the U.S.-Korea dynamic and the political landscape on the Korean peninsula during the immediate years after World War II.” Previous scholars have failed to examine how U.S. leaders and other Americans spoke and wrote about postwar Korea, ignoring the presence and power of Orientalism in their perceptions. Beginning with the derogatory remarks that Lieutenant General John R. Hodge made about Koreans early in his tenure as U.S. Occupation Commander in Korea, he demonstrates how the United States established and fortified an unequal relationship with both Koreas as a consequence of the persistently belittling portrayals of these Asian people in government reports and academic writings in the 1940s and 1950s. Rather expressing fleeting responses to frustration, U.S. policy makers exposed deeply held attitudes and assumptions about Koreans with regular references to them as immature and backward. This American Orientalism, Kraus explains, helped to dictate the course of postwar events on the entire peninsula. South of the 38th parallel, “Americans occupiers in the U.S. zone constructed an inverse image of themselves” when they depicted “the Koreans as politically immature, culturally backward, and prone to dictatorship.” When Americans looked north, their fears of Soviet expansion “nourished depictions of North Korea as a docile satellite state,” but Kraus insists that “the paternalistic, derisive, and occasionally racist representations of the Korean people—more so than the Cold War—conditioned how Americans understood the political potential of Korea and, in this case, North Korea’s relationship with Moscow.” He finishes with a plea for scholars “to disentangle American Orientalism and its legacies from the bodies of knowledge about Korea they are producing today.”

With their articles, Barnes, Aldrous, and Kraus have made important contributions to existing knowledge about how the United States attempted to fashion a new order in the Pacific after World War II, further enhancing the positive reputation of the Journal of American-East Asian Relations.

Participants:

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Professor James I. Matray argues in his introduction that there were three main reasons why in the past seventy years, the United States (U.S) failed to implement the ideals of the new world order, which were articulated in the Atlantic Charter. First, the U.S. approach to post-colonial countries has been arrogant, racist, and paternalistic; second, U.S. leaders have held an ethnocentric idea that all nations would want to follow the American model; and third, the U.S. has put American interests first in its efforts to implement the principles outlined in the charter (83–84). The three articles by Dayna Barnes, Christopher Aldous, and Charles Kraus explore these points in the context of wartime and post-war U.S. relations with Northeast Asia. Barnes suggests the priority of U.S. interests among American experts of Northeast Asia at the two think tank organizations, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) towards the end of the Asia Pacific War. Aldous demonstrates the colonial attitude of certain military officers of the U.S. occupation force in Japan. Kraus examines Orientalism towards Korea among key American policy makers during and after the war, and also among certain prominent scholars on Korea.

The two key questions about these contributions are: what was the nature of the knowledge of Northeast Asia among the relevant American experts; and how did it affect American policies towards the region at the end of the war and during the immediate post-war period.

In this brief review essay, I try to locate these two questions in the context of the development of policy-relevant expert knowledge on Asia (mainly Northeast Asia) in international politics in the twentieth century. This is because I believe that American experts and their organizations played a significant part in this development. This perspective will also, I believe, prompt us to think beyond the American context: is what is discussed here an American ‘cultural’ problem, or is it a structural problem, relevant to other cases of a similar structural relationship?

Aldous’s article is about the battle among the American staff of the Allied occupation forces over the restrictions on wildlife hunting in occupied Japan, and it also examines the roles of Japanese interest groups and relevant officials. It supports Matray’s point about the arrogance of the Americans in post-colonial Asia (although Japan was post-imperial, rather than post-colonial).

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At the same time, it also reveals great complexity and diversity in the roles which American experts on Asia had played in defining regional, if not global, governing norms. This process had begun well before the U.S.-led Allied force occupied Japan.

In the 1920s and 1930s, members of various ‘national’ branch offices of the IPR, including the American Council, were not only experts of Asia and the Pacific (and trans-Pacific relations): many were also regarded as ‘internationalist’ (non-socialist or ‘liberal’ internationalist). Their ‘liberal internationalism’ did not challenge the legitimacy of imperial rule in Asia, which had been established before 1919. Furthermore, leading members of the American Council of the IPR began to advocate an American-led regional order, centred on the East Coast of the U.S. from the mid-1930s, and this then became the base of their vision for the post-war global order during the wartime.3

Within these ideological and political confines, however, many non-Asian IPR members, including the Americans, began to understand the problems the people in Asia were facing, and developed a profound empathy with them.4 Furthermore, the IPR was not the only platform for American experts of Asia. Other American experts were actively involved in, and led, the region-wide expert organizations, such as the Far Eastern Association of Tropical Medicine (FEATM, 1910–1939), the Pan Pacific Science Congress (PPSC, 1921–present), and the Pan Pacific Women’s Conference (1928–present), as well as the Rockefeller Foundation which funded some of these organizations. They took complex, but still leading roles in defining regional governing norms in the fields of public health, other sciences, and issues relevant to women.5 They did so in the period when U.S. foreign policy was characterized as diplomatic ‘isolationism.’ They did not escape the Orientalism and colonial paternalism of the time. Nonetheless, it was from these expert organizations, often funded by American philanthropic monies, that more voices of Asian experts, and strong support for anti-colonialism and nationalism emerged.6

The “indefatigable Oliver Austin Jr.” (122), the head of the wildlife branch of the Natural Resource Section (NRS) of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was not exactly one of these experts who

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focused on and/or resided in Asia. He was not an ‘Asia specialist.’ At the same time, he developed his expertise in a broader context of the American scientific community of his field, ornithology, just as American scientists of the PPSC did in the 1920s and 1930s. As Aldous details, Austin joined the U.S. Navy in 1942, then was selected to work for the occupation administration as an expert on ornithology, and was trained in the history, culture, and language of Japan before his arrival (124–125). By 1945, the U.S. had a long history of wildlife conservation, and the idea had been one of the important agendas at the conferences of the PPSC from the very beginning of 1921.7 Austin applied this expert knowledge, on which his belief in wildlife conservation was based, to Japan.

The “most modern ideals of conservation” which Austin’s contemporaries observed (134), however, were probably slightly different from our present ideas of conservation. To be sure, PPSC scientists were concerned with the conservation of the rare species in the region,8 as Austin was. At the same time, these PPSC scientists understood that the other natural sources were there for full utilization for human use, and they were especially keen to use fish stocks in the Pacific Ocean for human consumption.9 As well as conserving the rare and endangered species, Austin also had to deal with the other pressing issue of the time, food shortage. Accordingly, his logic of conservation demonstrated a similar line of thinking as those at the PPSC: conserve the non-rare species in order to secure sustainable food reproduction for the Japanese people (127, 134).

Although it is unclear whether Austin compromised his principles because of the pressing food shortage in the aftermath of the war, PPSC scientists and Austin still put the needs and interests of the human beings over those of the wildlife. Yet, while they were ultimately acting for metropolitan big powers’ shared concern for food shortage and its broader implication, they were also considering the welfare of the people in the region. Aldous’ piece suggests, therefore, that the actions of the American experts were more complex than Professor Matray argues.

Aldous’ piece also suggests a few new aspects of the American occupation in Japan. First, while the tension over the policies towards Japan within the occupation force is not new in the existing scholarship, so far the conflict has been explained by the emergence of the Cold War (e.g. New Dealers versus Republican conservatism, Soviet-China camp versus U.S. camp, Australia’s stronger stance against the emperor indictment versus American political consideration). Here, Aldous introduces the strong gun culture in the American military force as a new factor in occupation politics. Second, his piece illuminates the local governing mechanism of the occupation administration, the scholarship on which so far has focused mostly on Tokyo. It also highlights complex interactions of Japanese actors with the occupation administration at the local level. Third, it brings a major pressing global issue for the post-war reconstruction, food shortages, and shows how U.S. policy towards Japan fit in this big picture. Fourth, Aldous also reinforces the nature of the occupation which John Dower has also illuminated:10 although it aimed at democratic reforms especially in its

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8 Akami, “Beyond,” 123.


initial period, it was a military occupation. In this sense, the attitude of those military officers, who opposed
the restriction of their ‘leisure sports’ (shooting animals) and claimed their ‘extra-legal’ status, was ‘colonial,’
not only because they were asserting their cultural supremacy and/or arrogance (137, 139), but also because
they were stating their legal status as military occupiers.

Along with London-based Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs, RIIA) and its branch
offices in the British empire, the IPR (its ‘national’ branches on the Pacific rim countries, and in the U.S.S.R.
and relevant European countries of Britain, France and the Netherlands) had developed expert knowledge of
Asia since its foundation in 1925. The IPR promoted the knowledge, distinct from the earlier Oriental
Studies that had focused on language, classics, history, and literature. Rather, the IPR advanced a prototype of
policy-relevant area studies. This new scholarship on Asia combined trainings in languages and in the newly
developing social sciences in order to examine policy-relevant current issues in the region.11

The IPR, however, did not develop a strong expertise on Korea. Korea was a colony, and the IPR denied its
‘national’ representation at its international conferences after 1929, arguing that Korea should be represented
as a part of the Japanese nation (empire).12 While the Philippines group was represented, it endorsed a
positive American influence and patronage, and most American members remained paternalistic towards the
Philippines.13 This IPR stance towards Korea and the Philippines reinforces the point that the IPR was largely
an organization of inter-imperial cooperation, at least until the end of the Asia Pacific War. As a result,
expertise on Korean remained weak at the IPR.14

In this context of the institutional lack of expertise in the U.S., Kraus addresses a crucial issue: what
knowledge of Korea key American policy makers held, and how this affected their policies. Here Kraus
stresses Orientalism among the policy makers, and asserts its detrimental effect on their policies towards
Korea. As we know, one of the most powerful studies on the impact of race and other prejudices on American
policies to Northeast Asia is John Dower’s War without Mercy. It demonstrated this very connection—how
the prejudice among American policy makers affected U.S. dealings with the Japanese soldiers during the Asia

11 The IPR chose themes for its biennial conferences and international research schemes which were topical, and
at times controversial topics. The principle of the IPR was to provide a forum for relevant experts to discuss the issues,
independent from their countries’ foreign policies. Akami, Internationalizing, 57, 92. Cotton provides an insight on the
nature of this scholarship from the perspective of Australia. See the chapters on the interwar period in James Cotton, The
Australian School of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

12 Akami, Internationalizing, 142–144.

13 Akami, Internationalizing, 100–101.

14 This, of course, was not the case for all IRP member countries. Independently from the Japanese Council of
the IPR, the Japanese developed Korean studies. Some of these experts were also China (especially Manchuria) experts.
The bulk of the Japanese works on Korea was inevitably for Japan’s colonial governing. Inoue Naoki, Teikoku Nihon to
“Man-sen shi”: Tairiku seisaku to Choisen/Manshu ninshiki (Tokyo: Hanawa shobo, 2013). I thank Andrew De Lyle for
this point and reference. On the development of Asian studies in Japan, see Hara’s pioneering work, which also discusses
the role of the Japanese Council of the IPR. Hara Kakuten, Gendai Ajia kenkyu seiritsu shiron (Tokyo: Keisō shobo,
1984).
Kraus’s article could also have elaborated further how Orientalism manifested in specific U.S. policies (158).

Orientalism had a structural base. Stephan Tanaka’s classic, Japan’s Orient, reminds us that Orientalism was evident among not only the American (and European) experts of Asia, but also Japanese specialists of China. The materials that Japanese propaganda organizations and think tanks produced on Southeast Asia during the war also showed various Orientalist traits. They demonstrate how Orientalist rhetoric was used in order to justify Japan’s superior position in China, or Japan’s role as a new ruler in Southeast Asia. These cases suggest, therefore, that the rhetoric represented the projected (or established) power hierarchy, not only a specific cultural trait.

Kraus’s article goes beyond the issue of expert knowledge and policy, and into the main scholarship on Korea in the post-war period. Here, too, one can see a strong parallel in the Japanese studies in which Orientalism (in the scholarship and popular discourse) has been well criticized for some time. Similarly, Kraus argues that Orientalism still remains a problem in English-language-based Korean studies in the U.S. and beyond. Academics like us, who work in the fields of Northeast Asia (and beyond), need to take his reminder seriously and continue to make efforts to develop and implement a strategy to deal with the issue in our teaching and writing.

The influence of American experts on Japan and China at the IPR during the war, in the post-war reconstruction plan, and during the Allied-Occupation of Japan has been well documented. What has not been clear, however, is the relationship between the IPR and other think tank organizations, and the CFR was

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16 Stefan Tanaka, Japan’s Orient: Rendering Pasts into History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).


19 I feel, nonetheless, Kraus’ point on Andrei Lankov’s work may miss the point of Lankov’s structural analysis (Kraus, 162).

20 For this teaching strategy, the interview of John Dower by Kathleen Krauth is very useful. Here Dower stresses the significance of emphasizing diverse actions on both sides (the Japanese and the Americans) during the occupation period. This, he suggests, challenges the stereotypes, and a simplistic dichotomy, while humanizing the people’s experiences on both sides. Kathleen Krauth and Lynn Parisi, “Teaching from Embracing Defeat: An interview with John Dower,” Education from Asia, 5 (3) (2000): 25–35.

one of the most influential among them during the war. Barnes’s article examines the experts on Northeast Asia at the CFR and the IPR, their knowledge, and its impact on the policy making at the State Department.

It was this wartime policy influence that made the IPR a main target of the Senator Joseph McCarthyist attacks. These attacks accused the IPR as a “communist sympathizer organization”, and as being responsible for the ‘U.S. loss of China’ to communists. They virtually expelled IPR key figures, such as Owen Lattimore, from public and academic positions in the U.S.\(^\text{22}\) While Barnes’s article demonstrates wartime close networks among State Department officials, and CFR and IPR experts, it would have been interesting to know whether there was a substantial difference in the expert knowledge on Northeast Asia, especially China, between the CFR and the IPR; and, if so, whether this shaped their different post-war regional visions; and whether this explains the different fates for the CFR and the IPR in the 1950s. Or did the CFR, a think tank focused not only on Asia, and with a closer relationship with the RIIA, distinguish itself from the IPR, and escape its demise?

Barnes’s article also reinforces Matray’s point on the priority of American interests (103, 108). Considering the focus of the article on the American Council of the IPR (and the CFR is the American organization) at the time of wartime mobilization, however, this priority is not surprising. Rather, what Barnes’s point illuminates is a structural change in international politics in Asia and the Pacific, namely from the multipolar system to the bipolar system, and the adjustment of American experts and the U.S. policy to this new reality.

This was a major departure from the previous approach. The U.S. was one of the multiple empires in the region in the first half of the twentieth century. In the 1900s, when the U.S. emerged as a Pacific power, President Theodore Roosevelt demonstrated its new naval power, sending the White Fleet across the region (and beyond). Its approach as a new empire, entering into the region where the European empires had established their colonies, however, was multilateral: it mobilized other empires’ consensus in order to challenge the most dominant one, the British empire. This was evident in the U.S. approach to cable network deals, news distribution deals, and wireless wave allocation deals in the 1900s and 1910s.\(^\text{23}\) The Washington Conference of 1921–1922, and the resulting treaties were also based on a multilateral cooperative framework for trading and naval arms control, as well as checking Japan’s expansion.\(^\text{24}\) Accordingly, the dominant regional vision among American IPR members in the 1920s was the Pacific Community, the community of relatively equal powers on the Pacific rim.\(^\text{25}\) American experts on current affairs in Asia also worked in various


\(^{25}\) Akami, Internationalizing, 34–38, 87–97. While the IPR did not deal with the colonial governments in Southeast Asia or the experts stationed in these administrations, the FEATM did. See Akami, ‘A quest’. Foster also examines U.S. government’s direct communication with the colonial governments in Southeast Asia in the 1920s and
multilateral organizations, including the League of Nations as well as the above-mentioned regional non-governmental organizations, for promoting inter-imperial or inter-colonial cooperation in the region, and not American hegemony.

With U.S. leadership in the victory against Japan in Asia and the Pacific, and the decline of the European empires in the region, the system shifted from the multipolar to the monopolar, dominated by the U.S, while the U.S.S.R. emerged as its main opponent in the region and beyond. American experts understood this geopolitical shift. They adjusted their expert knowledge to this context, as did the U.S. policy. The American dominance in post-war Asia, which American experts of Asia expressed, therefore, could be understood as their reflection of this structural change, rather than their cultural assertion.

We are now moving into another multipolar era in Asia. If Matray’s three points, which he argues have resulted in the failed U.S. foreign policy, have been embedded in the geopolitical structure, rather than being inherent in American culture, this new stage will provide an opportunity for American experts to reshape our knowledge of the region. This could prompt a readjustment of the U.S. policy towards the region, and the U.S.’s greater use of multilateral mechanisms, as it did earlier in the first half of the twentieth century. The existence of a forum like this, which critically evaluates U.S. foreign policies in the past, the present, and the future, is vital for such a readjustment. A similar process, however, needs to occur in its counterparts across the Pacific. Whether the latest development between Japan and South Korea could indicate a new dynamic or not, as historians, we are here to examine the meaning of such a change in a long term.

1930s, as they shared common interests in trade, and security concerns against communism and Japan. Anne L. Foster, *Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
The three articles in this special issue of the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* all deal with U.S. policy towards East Asia in the years centering on World War II and its aftermath.¹ A stimulating introduction by James I. Matray, the journal’s editor and a distinguished historian of the Korean War, suggests that U.S. policy has often failed to live up to the high ideals and principles first put forward by President Woodrow Wilson and then enshrined in the Atlantic Charter of 1941. The reasons why the United States has fallen so short of these aspirations include, in Matray’s view, an “arrogant, racist, and paternalist approach” that “has caused most developing nations to resist or reject U.S. advice;” unwarranted ethnocentric assumptions that all nations wish “to follow the American model for social, economic, and political development;” and the “self-serving” behavior of the United States in interpreting the Atlantic Charter’s principles to its own advantage and even ignoring them should this best serve U.S. interests (84). The three articles included here, Matray argues, illustrate these tendencies.²

While all deal with U.S. policies toward East Asia, each is very different in emphasis. Dayna Barnes gives an overview of how two major private U.S. organizations, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), undertook initiatives of various kinds—often in collaboration with the U.S. government—to develop and shape policy planning for postwar East Asia. The various blueprints did not always share the same approach, with postwar treatment of Japan a particularly explosive and divisive issue, not just at the level of American domestic politics, but also in terms of relations between the United States and its assorted wartime allies. All, however, envisaged that the United States would be actively engaged in shaping postwar East Asia and establishing a new or greatly modified international order there.³ Numerous factors—including both the domestic and international balance of forces and the local scene in the countries involved—undoubtedly greatly affected precisely how and whether such plans were implemented in practice. Prominent among them were the attitudes of those Americans charged with introducing new policies and administering them on the ground. In both Japan and Korea, this meant primarily the U.S. military occupation forces. On specific issues, Americans within the military were by no means always in agreement. Christopher Aldous explores in great detail internecine divisions over the conservation and hunting of Japanese water fowl, an issue on which American officers drawn from various branches of the occupation forces differed greatly, as some sought to respect local sensitivities and practices while others came close to priding themselves on ignoring these. From late 1945, Korea—though ostensibly liberated—was also in practice an occupied nation, with Soviet forces controlling the North and U.S. troops taking over in the South.⁴ Charles Kraus highlights the prevalence among many of those American officials, military men, and scholars who dealt with Koreans of derogatory rhetoric that characterized the Koreans as “backward,”

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¹ In the interests of full disclosure, I should mention that I recently joined the Editorial Board of the *Journal of American-East Asian Relations*.


“immature,” (149) and in sore need of American guidance and tutelage. From late 1945 onward, American advisers also believed that Koreans in the north, in a process resembling that already in progress in the nations of Eastern Europe, were likely to be “Sovietized”⁵ (153).

Dayna Barnes’s article is based on extensive archival research in the papers of two very different private organizations established in the wake of World War I at the initiative of private American citizens interested in international affairs: the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Council tended to be predominantly Eurocentric in outlook, but from its inception, when one of its earliest meetings in 1922 discussed the Washington Treaties that had recently sought to provide a framework for stability in the Pacific, it also devoted significant attention to Asian affairs. Walter H. Mallory, its executive director from 1927 to 1959, had previously served as secretary to the International China Famine Relief Commission, and in 1926 published a report, China: Land of Famine.⁶ An elite organization, the Council had a small and exclusive membership, drawn from the business, academic, media, and policy communities. Every year from 1924 onward, the Council normally organized one study group of members that focused upon the “Far East.”⁷ The Council provided a focus and discreet meeting place for elite Americans who believed, in the aftermath of World War I, that the United States should assume a far greater role in world affairs. Its meetings and study groups deliberated in conditions of strict confidentiality, while its publications—the journal Foreign Affairs and various book-length studies of critical international issues—disseminated the views of members and other prominent American and foreign individuals (92-93).

As Barnes points out, the IPR was a more complicated organization. Founded in 1925 by a group based in Hawaii, many of whom were closely associated with the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA), it was an unofficial international federation of nationally based councils, groups of academics, businessmen, and others from around the Pacific Rim with an interest in Asian affairs. Asian nations, including China, Japan, and the Philippines, and eventually India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia, were represented; so too were European colonial powers with Pacific interests, Britain, France, the Netherlands; as well as Western nations from around the region: the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and, briefly, the Soviet Union. The IPR mounted an impressive research and publications programme, sponsoring numerous studies by individuals and groups drawn from the constituent member countries, as well as publishing two journals, Pacific Affairs and Far Eastern Survey. In addition, every two to three years it held a major conference, attended by one to two hundred members from the assorted nations included under its umbrella, as well as outside observers from other countries and from international organizations, notably the League of Nations and International Labor Organization. Between the world wars, the IPR was decidedly more high profile than the small, select CFR. (94-95) In many respects, the two were seen as complementing each other, with a certain degree of overlapping membership among their directors and officers as well as ordinary members, while both obtained substantial funding from the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations and from such wealthy patrons as the banker Thomas W. Lamont of J. P. Morgan and Company. Yet the two organizations

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themselves recognized that significant differences existed between them. Five years after the IPR came into being, J. Merle Davis, its first secretary general, told Jack B. Condliffe, its research secretary: “Our Institute is dealing with a very much wider constituency than the Council on Foreign Relations, and our aim and policy are much more democratic...”

Whatever their differences, in the early 1940s both groups, as Barnes recounts, soon became involved in planning for postwar East Asia. Most leading specialists on Asian affairs, a relatively small community in the United States and beyond, had some kind of association with the IPR. The IPR claimed to be apolitical, but throughout the 1920s and 1930s found it almost impossible to ignore the bitter disputes between Japan and China, matters on which members of both the Japanese and Chinese IPR organizations felt extremely strongly. Barnes could perhaps bring out more than she does the degree to which strong sympathies for China affected the outlook of most leading American—though not British—IPR officers. This was decidedly true of Owen Lattimore, whose primary affiliation was with the IPR rather than, as she suggests, with the CFR. Lattimore, the second editor of Pacific Affairs, identified extremely strongly with China’s cause, leanings that probably affected his choice of materials for publication. (Ironically, he would ultimately become one of the top targets of the McCarran Committee’s investigation of the IPR, accused of being a fellow traveler who had tried to undermine the Nationalist government.) In the mid-1930s, moreover, the IPR had launched an extensive publication program known as the Inquiry that eventually commissioned 28 substantial studies covering every aspect of the ongoing Sino-Japanese conflicts that developed into open warfare in 1937. The hope was that these volumes would provide data and insights that would be useful in the negotiation of the eventual peace settlement. The Japanese IPR objected strongly and at some length to this undertaking, but failed to abort it. In the late 1930s, the IPR also held a series of conferences within the United States, where influential Americans and others came together to discuss policy options on Asia. At this point, the IPR offered an overworked and underfunded U.S. State Department, where the Far East was very much a low priority, a reservoir of expertise on Asia that was considered extremely valuable, especially given the predominantly Eurocentric outlook of most American foreign policy elites, whether official or private (95-97).

It was the CFR, however, that undertook the most detailed planning for the postwar world, East Asia included. As early as September 1939, as war began in Europe, top Council leaders reached an agreement with the State Department to produce in secret a wide range of studies and policy recommendations, an initiative christened the War and Peace Studies Project, that would help to guide the United States—which would not enter the war for over two more years—in developing policies for the postwar world. Divided into several different working groups, on Political, Territorial, and Economic-Financial Affairs, project personnel, largely drawn from among Council members, drafted papers that covered the entire world, Asia included. These reports and memoranda envisaged enhanced American control over East Asia, possibly in collaboration with the British Empire or alternatively in conjunction with China. The Council tended to be the locus for the relatively hard-nosed pursuit of American interests. Before Pearl Harbor, the CFR’s Far East Study Group discussed whether reaching an accommodation with Japan that would leave Indochina and Manchuria as Japanese protectorates might best serve the United States, suggestions that were opposed by Lattimore and also by Stanley K. Hornbeck of the State Department, both of whom were members of this group. Businessmen opposed the imposition of an embargo on Japan. Once the United States was at war with

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8 J. Merle Davis to J. B. Condliffe, February 21, 1930, Folder 20, Box E-12a, Institute of Pacific Relations Papers, University of Hawaii-Manoa.
Japan, the Far East Study Group envisaged postwar arrangements whereby the United States might maintain a balance between Japan and China, keeping Japan sufficiently weak so that it could no longer threaten China. Another alternative was the creation of a new U.S.-backed regional security organization in Asia. CFR planning also envisaged that the United States would acquire territorial bases in the Pacific (97-109).

Wartime CFR planning gave priority to the promotion of U.S. interests in Asia, and was characterized by efforts to create a new balance of power, one that would ultimately be dependent on military force. The American IPR—though it too sought to work with official policymakers—was less directly involved in producing blueprints for the postwar world. (For the duration of the war it did, however, open a Washington office, headed by the youthful Robert W. Barnett, son of a China missionary, who almost thirty years later would come full circle by opening the Asia Society’s new Washington office.) The IPR worked closely with the U.S. government on public education, producing a series of short pamphlets on topical Asian issues that were produced in bulk, distributed not just to the general public but also to the millions of recruits who joined the U.S. armed forces. The IPR conferences also changed their character. With so many IPR members in every country now holding government posts of some kind, excluding officials from these meetings would have ensured a rather thin roster of attendees. (The Japanese, of course, were absent, and had in fact declined to attend even the 1939 conference.) To a considerable degree, the 1942 conference, held in Mont Tremblant in Canada’s Quebec province, and its 1945 successor in Hot Springs, Virginia, became opportunities for representatives of countries other than the United States (and perhaps Britain) to express their own views on the peace settlement, which were often ignored in official U.S. policymaking circles. With encouragement from American and Canadian IPR leaders, these gatherings also became forums where Asian delegates could express their discontent with Western colonialism and demand an end not just to outside rule, but also to foreign concessions and extraterritoriality. Those who distrusted Japan and were alarmed by Anglo-American proposals that envisaged rebuilding Japanese power could likewise make their sentiments known. Barnes is extremely perceptive in noting how these IPR meetings served to supplement formal U.S. diplomacy and planning efforts in Asia by providing an opportunity for non-Americans to state their own views and positions. CFR debates took place in conditions of strict confidentiality, whereas the IPR opened the conversation to representatives of other states, including those then under enemy occupation (109-117).

Were U.S. wartime planners ‘self-serving,’ (84) in terms of sometimes promoting U.S. interests at the expense of the principles enunciated in the Atlantic Charter? One must remember that, despite their undoubted links to official circles of power, the CFR and IPR were not quite part of the existing policy apparatus. The somewhat divergent wartime enterprises of the two organizations rather suggest the existence of at least two strands of thinking on East Asian policy: one, embodied by the CFR, that perceived the international system largely in terms of the power relations among states and viewed the Asia-Pacific situation primarily through the prism of U.S. national interests and security considerations; and a second, more liberal approach that laid greater emphasis on a more multilateral and inclusive outlook, soliciting input from a wider variety of parties and national perspectives. How these approaches would translate into actual practice, of course, was yet to be seen.

In “A Tale of Two Occupations,” Christopher Aldous highlights how, even in a defeated enemy country under occupation, insensitivity on the part of U.S. military personnel had the potential to undermine stated American goals and exacerbate tensions between victor and vanquished. Despite the expectations of some in the CFR Far East Study Group that the United States might work closely with British imperial power in the Pacific, officially the United States purportedly deplored colonialism and endorsed national self-determination as the inherent right of all peoples. Yet in practice Americans abroad were often accused of
behavior that was effectively colonial and racist in nature. This was indeed the theme of the mid-1950s bestselling novel, *The Ugly American.*

Aldous describes in considerable detail how American military personnel in Japan during the occupation years were determined to enjoy the privilege of hunting Japanese wildfowl, regardless of the ecological consequences. In 1947 Oliver Austin, head of the Natural Resources Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), sought to bring in new game laws, developed in collaboration with leading Japanese conservationists, that—besides curtailing Japanese netting of small birds—would have restricted hunting by members of the U.S. armed forces, thereby protecting endangered species as well as the breeding grounds of various waterbirds. Austin quickly discovered that top U.S. military leaders deeply resented his efforts to regulate the leisure pursuits of American military personnel, in blithe disregard of how their trigger-happy invasion of Japanese animal and bird sanctuaries and fishing preserves brought bad publicity on the American forces. Even when SCAP announced firm policies on the subject in 1949, to the embarrassment of American officials, occupation troops often simply disregarded these. There was, Aldous points out, a serious “disconnect . . . between the reformers in Tokyo and the U.S. military in the field. The latter often exhibited a colonial attitude towards the Japanese people and seemed to act with impunity” (143). When U.S. Senator Wayne Morse received allegations in 1947 that American servicemen in Japan had disregarded local game laws, the U.S. military authorities simply denied these—perfectly accurate—charges (120-146).

Conquering armies occupying defeated nations are perhaps particularly prone to such behavior. The contemporaneous Soviet occupation of East Germany, supposedly a fraternal liberation, was particularly brutal in nature. The Western allies, if somewhat less harsh in their sector of Germany, used prisoners-of-war effectively as slave labor and acquiesced in Russian policies. Somewhat ironically, however, in occupied Germany they were more respectful of local hunting practices and, even though there was no set hunting season, Allied military personnel were always accompanied by an official German guide. This suggests that American forces often found it easier to observe the accepted customs in a European country than was the case in Asia. For many Americans Korea, supposedly a liberated ally rather than a defeated enemy, perhaps proved even more problematic and also more alien than Japan. Charles Kraus suggests that ‘Orientalist’ perspectives pervaded the way in which many influential Americans perceived Koreans in the 1940s and 1950s. General John R. Hodge, commander of U.S. forces in post-war Korea, together with many of his military colleagues, viewed Koreans in both the Soviet and U.S. occupation zones established in 1945 as “politically immature, culturally backward, and prone to dictatorship.” (150) [Kraus’s words] These perceptions, Kraus argues, made it easier for American policymakers to believe that North Korea was simply a satellite state under complete Soviet control. Numerous influential scholars likewise accepted this interpretation, as did American officials. The U.S. State Department argued in 1961 that North Korea’s pre-modern society and customs and low level of technology had predisposed its people “to become the passive victims to Moscow’s expansionist tendencies” (155) [Kraus’s words]. The influential scholar David Dallin, a white Russian émigré, expressed similar views in his 1948 book *Soviet Russia and the Far East.* Other academics and writers took the same approach. Such attitudes were far from novel. In 1944, the U.S. State Department and President Franklin D. Roosevelt—despite his purported anticolonial views—had each

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suggested that the Koreans were so politically backward that it would require twenty, thirty, or even forty years of tutelage before they were ready to govern themselves. General Douglas MacArthur, heading SCAP in Japan, likewise found the Koreans profoundly difficult, immature, and unreasonable, as did other top leaders of the U.S. occupation forces and their political advisers. Diplomats feared that the Koreans, used to ‘oriental’ despotic rule, had no understanding of democracy and would, in the words of one State Department official, automatically “gravitate toward a highly centralized government” run on Soviet lines (147-165, quotation from 158).

MacArthur, Hodge, and others were essentially complaining that Koreans appeared unwilling or unprepared to abandon their own traditional governmental practices in favor of American-style democracy, a reluctance that convinced these Americans that Koreans were unsuited to self-government. Here, they were certainly demonstrating what Matray characterizes as the “ethnocentrism” of American leaders in “believ[ing] that all nations want to follow the American model for social, economic, and political development” (84). Or, at any rate, they ought to want to do so, and were deeply misguided insofar as they rejected American guidance. Their failure to conform to U.S. expectations was in itself taken as evidence of immaturity and unsuitability for self-government. Yet their own experiences with Korean leaders should perhaps have taught American officials that Koreans in both north and south intended to do things their own way, and would demonstrate a stubborn determination in their efforts to attain this end, regardless of their patrons’ preferences. Syngman Rhee, the elderly Korean independence activist whom the United States ultimately backed as its candidate for power in Korea, quickly proved to be a difficult ally-cum-client. Rhee was a shrewd political operator. When it became clear in 1946 that the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective Korean allies were unlikely to come to any agreement on how to establish a unified Korea under one government, he began lobbying for the creation of a separate U.S.-backed south Korean state, under his own rule. After this had occurred, with Rhee elected president in July 1948 and taking office the next month, he rapidly instituted a program to repress political dissent, including the assassination of his most prominent rival, Kim Ku, and the brutal suppression of a communist uprising on Jeju Island. North Korean and radical elements were subjected to fierce persecution. Fearing that Rhee might launch an attack on the north, until mid-1950, the United States would only supply Rhee’s forces with defensive weapons, not the heavy equipment that would have been needed to launch such an invasion. After Kim Il-sung, the North’s communist president, began a full-scale campaign in June 1950 to take over the south, a move that brought U.S. intervention, albeit under the auspices of the United Nations, Rhee sought to keep the war going indefinitely, sabotaging peace negotiations in the hope that ultimately both Koreas would be united under his own leadership. By 1953 his relations with the United States had deteriorated to the point that American officials seriously considered sanctioning his assassination. But eventually, they negotiated a compromise, whereby an armistice settlement was reached, and the United States signed a bilateral security treaty with South Korea and continued to station a sizable contingent of troops on the Korean peninsula. Rhee remained in power until 1960, with his eventual overthrow the result of domestic political dissent rather than American pressure.

Given their own experiences with an obdurate Korean leader, one wonders why—if Kraus’s interpretation is correct—American officials and scholars should have assumed that patron-client relations were so much easier within the communist camp. The much younger Kim Il-sung apparently shared many characteristics with his rival below the demilitarized zone. He was just as determined as Rhee to unify Korea, repeatedly demanding military assistance from the initially cautious Josef Stalin, the Soviet leader, to back such an invasion. Once the tides of war changed and Kim faced the prospect of total defeat in late 1950, Stalin refused to send Soviet ground forces to Kim’s rescue, merely urging Mao Zedong’s new communist government of China to intervene in Korea. Stalin, while quite willing to fight to the last communist Chinese soldier, had no desire to
risk a full-scale Soviet war with the United States. Once Chinese and Soviet leaders finally decided to accept armistice terms in 1953, Kim had little alternative but to acquiesce in this arrangement. Yet he sedulously continued to disregard the advice of both his neighboring large communist patrons, purging existing and potential political opponents and instituting radical domestic policies of rapid industrialization and agricultural collectivization, even when his Soviet advisers recommended greater moderation. Nikita Khrushchev, the new Soviet leader, even urged a reluctant Kim to tone down his personality cult and accept ‘peaceful coexistence’ with South Korea. By 1956 Kim’s relations with both Communist big powers were so poor that China and the Soviet Union contemplated joint action to remove him from power. Ultimately, though, Kim maneuvered his way to safety, benefiting from the overriding Sino-Soviet preoccupation with anti-communist movements in Hungary and Poland, and subsequently exploiting growing tensions between China and the Soviet Union as he purged pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet groups within the ruling Korean Workers Party and consolidated his own power. Given this history, it was perhaps not entirely surprising that Kim embraced national self-reliance as a guiding principle for the North Korean state.11

As Frank Costigliola, Robert Dean, and others have pointed out, American Cold War rhetoric—and indeed, the language policymakers employed to characterize overall U.S. foreign policy—often characterized those foreigners perceived as needing U.S. protection as feminized, effete, weak, and sexually ambivalent or androgynous, while suggesting that vigorous engagement in war represented a test and demonstration of American masculinity and virility.12 Asian men, especially those from East and Southeast Asia, who were often shorter, slighter, and less hirsute than Westerners, were perhaps particularly liable to be perceived as emasculated, effeminate, and epicene. In addition, comparisons between ardent, rough-hewn American youth and strength and decadent older nations were not uncommon. One well-known example of the latter was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s proclamation to a British friend in 1939: “What the British need today is a good stiff grog, inducing not only the desire to save civilization but the belief that they can do it.”13 Roosevelt himself believed that the British were suffering from the deleterious and debilitating effects of their class


society and “too much Eton and Oxford.” The comparison of older, weak, degenerate nations with younger, strong, vigorous ones that were unafraid to use military force in war was reiterated in January 2003 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who claimed that, unlike the recently liberated former Soviet satellites of ‘New Europe’ in the East, the tired, weary states of ‘Old Europe’ to the West could no longer muster the energy and determination to join in the American-led war against Iraq. Kraus might have strengthened his arguments by engaging directly with additional literature on the use of such gendered rhetoric in American foreign policy.

When considering U.S. dealings with East Asia, it is easy to highlight instances of crashing American cultural insensitivity at both the individual and institutional level. Yet one wonders whether in reality the American performance was dramatically worse than that of any other nation. Gregg Brazinsky suggests that those Americans in South Korea who sought to promote the country’s modernization did not insist on imposing one particular model, were generally relatively flexible in allowing Koreans to modify not just American but also Japanese models to suit specific Korean circumstances. But the greatest credit, in his view, should go to the South Koreans themselves, thanks in large part to their long history of “adapting religions and philosophies imposed by outside forces.” Given the ever-present menace from the north, South Koreans themselves clearly perceived real advantages in an alliance with the United States, however fraught that arrangement might be at times. They also showed a certain skill in managing the Americans. Did it greatly matter that prominent American military men, diplomats, politicians, and authors often viewed South Koreans—and probably other Asians—through an ‘Orientalist’ prism? Perhaps one might even ask whether Soviet and Chinese advisers showed any greater cultural sensitivity in their dealings with Asian nations. The record suggests not. As mentioned above, Chinese and Soviets alike encountered great frustrations when dealing with Kim Il Sung. Deborah Kaple highlights the degree to which Soviet experts sent to China in the 1950s were poorly prepared and tended to look down on the Chinese as backward and uncivilized. On both sides, moreover, close personal contacts were not encouraged. During the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split became a paramount object lesson in the difficulties of maintaining what might have appeared a mutually beneficial alliance relationship. Socialist Vietnam was another fraternal communist ally with whom China—despite an early history of warm relations between Ho Chi Minh and top Chinese leaders—and the Soviets alike often found dealings extremely difficult. And on the other side, American officials often found

14 Quoted in Andrew J. Whitfield, *Hong Kong, Empire, and the Anglo-American Alliance at War, 1941-1945* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001), 57.


working with the leaders of South Vietnam exceptionally trying and frustrating, to the point that in 1963 top figures in the U.S. State and Defense Departments and the White House acquiesced in an internal military coup against South Vietnam’s unpopular President Ngo Dinh Diem and his even more controversial brother, an exercise that rather predictably left both men dead.

One can quite readily find much to criticize in both the formulation and implementation of post-World War II U.S. policies in East Asia. American officials undoubtedly broadly sought to further what they saw as their country’s national interests in the region, in the process importing their burgeoning anti-communist crusade into post-colonial situations in which this framework was by no means always particularly relevant. They did not necessarily possess a deep understanding of the situation on the ground in Asia. Despite recruiting such personnel as were available as government advisers, the post-1945 United States suffered from a serious deficit in Asian expertise, one that would continue for many years. From the early 1970s to the mid-1990s, for example, those contemporary China specialists based in think tanks, government, or acade in the Washington, DC area habitually met once a month, to discuss Chinese affairs. Their numbers were still small enough that they could foregather in turn in each other’s living rooms. As the American century moved into full gear, the pool of Asian experts of every kind was decidedly shallow, with accurate knowledge and information hard to come by.

It seems inevitable that when occupying or even allied armies are stationed in a country not their own, problems will ensue. High-spirited and generally freespending young men far from home, often bored, sometimes under pre- or post-combat stress, usually demand entertainment and amusement. In World War II Britain, the boisterous American servicemen who massed on the island in preparation for the invasion of Europe were notoriously described as ‘over paid, over fed, over sexed, and over here.’ Their ability to attract British girls by offering lavish gifts from the military PX stores that their young British male rivals simply could not afford sometimes provoked considerable resentment. Another issue that provoked significant public controversy was the fact that American courts martial rather than the British justice system would be responsible for handling any criminal charges brought against U.S. military personnel in Britain. Wherever U.S. soldiers were based, in Asia, Europe, or elsewhere, almost invariably there would be at least occasional episodes involving assaults on local women or rowdy misbehavior. Such events—which have continued sporadically to the present day—had great potential to inflame nationalist opposition to the presence of


American troops and bases. The arrogation of special privileges could be equally problematic. Aldous has graphically described how all levels of the occupying U.S. military forces, from the top downwards, felt no obligation to respect Japanese regulations restricting hunting or protecting wildlife. Eventually, close to 50,000 Japanese women married American servicemen stationed in their country. But many in the occupation forces seem to have enjoyed a quasi-colonial lifestyle in which their contacts with Japanese were limited to professional, work-related, or commercial situations.

Yet when one looks closely at American-East Asian relations, one wonders just how significant insensitivity, arrogance, and quasi-colonial behavior on the part of Americans really were. In his Introduction, Matray describes how during the Korean War one American serviceman sent home a spectacular leopard-skin rug he had bought from a peddler’s stall. When his parents offered it for sale, the South Korean government demanded its return on the grounds that it was a missing “national treasure” looted from the royal palace. The U.S. government then confiscated the rug, returned it to the South Koreans, and declined to satisfy the demands of the serviceman’s family for $50,000 in compensation (85). Deplorable as the initial looting of the Korean national heritage may have been, this does not seem to have been the work of American troops. Surely one lesson of this episode was that American officials, when alerted to the rug’s presence in the United States and the potential impact on Korean-American relations, took swift and effective action to defuse the situation.

Perhaps even more to the point, in a number of Asian countries, in practice post-1945 elites were prepared to tolerate a certain level of undesirable, quasi-imperial social behavior and implicit condescension and racism from their American allies, in exchange for military protection and economic aid. In Japan, South Korea, and for a while the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand, not to mention Singapore and Taiwan, pragmatic bargains were very much the order of the day. The British in Cold-War Hong Kong also reached accommodations with the United States that left their implicit working relationship with the communist Chinese mainland comfortably in place. Some U.S. alliances and security ties in East Asia relationships endured for decades, effectively nurtured by both sides, at times facing down domestic popular opposition to American bases or Asian imports. So long as the American military presence was perceived as a guarantor of regional stability, little local difficulties arising from crude or insensitive behavior by rambunctious Americans could be smoothed over and negotiated. These arrangements were perhaps comparable to those in Europe that the historian Geir Lundestad has described as an American “empire by invitation.”

Many Americans like to believe that their own country’s social, political, and economic values are so alluring and exceptional that other countries cannot but seek to emulate them. At least in East Asia, since 1945 the reality has perhaps been less flattering. At the level of movies, music, food, clothes, and lifestyle, American popular culture is undoubtedly very appealing to many Asians, especially the young. American educational institutions are likewise much admired. And some Asians have found in the United States a model of civic society and community activism that they wish to adapt to their own circumstances. But Asian leaders and peoples have been drawn to supporting the United States first and foremost by the tangible advantages they derive from its presence in the region. After the 1975 communist takeover of South Vietnam, one of the greatest fears of many East and Southeast Asian leaders was that the United States would withdraw entirely from the Western Pacific. South Koreans were deeply alarmed by early proposals from Jimmy Carter, the

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successful Democratic presidential candidate in 1976, to remove U.S. troops from the Korean peninsula. At present, many Asian states view the United States as the only available counterbalance to China’s growing military and economic strength. Those who subscribe to this outlook are predisposed to ignore or at least tolerate paternalist, self-serving, or ethnocentric American behavior while glossing over and resolving unpleasant or divisive incidents. Americans may regard their country as unique in the values and principles it propounds and seeks to disseminate, an exceptional nation that can and should provide a model for the rest of the world. But Asian leaders—and often their people—apparently prefer to regard the United States rather unsentimentally, as a great power that operates very much as do other great powers, and should be treated commensurately.

What is perhaps worth noting is that in both East Asia and Europe, the United States has usually been seen as the least bad alternative. It is all too easy to point out how often the U.S. government and individual Americans have fallen short of the high ideals and liberal aspirations that the United States claims to represent. Yet, even if their application has been tainted by self-interest, selectivity, and inconsistencies, that does not make the expression of these principles unimportant. They represented international and domestic objectives that many around the world found broadly appealing, however flawed and partial their implementation. Having articulated ambitious and idealistic goals, the United States is often expected to demonstrate higher standards than other nations, attracting appreciably fiercer criticism when it fails to live up to these aspirations. Arrogance, parochialism, and cultural incomprehension are easily identified and equally readily resented. The occasions when the United States—whether at the official or non-governmental level—gets it right are often less heralded. Aldous’s article describes divisions among the U.S. military and civilian administrators governing occupied Japan. The dedicated conservationist Oliver Austin, head of the wildlife branch of the Natural Resources Section of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, worked closely with leading Japanese figures in his field. His experience was not unique. In a wide range of fields, professional experts have often succeeded in collaborating and forging alliances across national boundaries, with their special interests in many cases trumping other loyalties.

When put in perspective, moreover, in much of the world American imperial methods were decidedly less brutal than those favored by Japan, Germany, or the Soviet Union. The post-1945 American empire was one that was driven not just by a U.S. search for global power, but also by the eagerness of smaller nations around the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to find external protection against neighbors whom they found decidedly more alarming. In Europe and East Asia, the United States government did not proclaim its own version of a Brezhnev Doctrine. As a rule, U.S. forces left should host nations ask them to withdraw. This was the case in France in 1964, Thailand in the early 1970s, and the Philippines in 1992. (In the Middle East and Latin America, the story was admittedly rather different. And since 2001, the War on Terror has too often exemplified many of the worst practices of U.S. international policy.) When the Soviet empire collapsed, so did the Warsaw Pact, with most of the former Soviet satellites applying to join the rival North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a move they saw as a safeguard against any resurgence of Russian power. Existing NATO member states, by contrast, far from wishing to dismantle that organization as obsolescent, instead sought new missions to justify its continuing existence. ‘Yanks, Go Home’ was not an option that appealed to them. In the Asia Pacific region, the situation was similar. The United States was and is seen as a valuable counterweight to China, Japan, and Russia, considerably less threatening than either of the other three. Its undoubted shortcomings notwithstanding, as hegemonic powers go, the United States could have been a great deal worse.
Unexplored Aspects of U.S.-East Asian Relations in the 1940s and 1950

I

n “Think Tanks and a New Order in East Asia: The Council of [sic] Foreign Relations and the Institute of Pacific Relations During World War II,” Dayna Barnes analyzes the lasting effects of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), two highly influential non-governmental think tanks, on United States postwar planning for East Asia, especially Japan. This article is thoroughly researched and well structured. Barnes argues that both think tanks directly contributed to postwar planning through cooperation with U.S. government agencies. Because there were not many experts on Asia in general and Japan in particular within and outside the State Department, the CFR and the IPR with their Asian experts emerged as important sources of information in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward Asia. This article makes an important contribution to analyzing the importance of these two think tanks.

Barnes concludes that both think tanks “exerted direct and indirect influence on official postwar planning between 1937 and 1945” (118). She explains how they did so. The CFR’s Far East Study Group exerted indirect influence on developing U.S. postwar planning for Japan by providing opportunities for exchanging opinions between government officials and experts. The IPR’s most important contribution was to hold conferences where officials of different countries could informally exchange views, a difficult thing to do in official settings. Barnes claims that “attending officials brought information back to their home governments and drew on discussions while developing policy” (110). She asserts that both the CFR and the IPR derived their strengths from these networks of government officials and think tank experts.

Barnes is careful not to claim that the recommendations that had been made by the CFR and the IPR were adopted as official U.S. policy. It was important to provide a forum for discussions between State Department officials and experts; however, that did not mean that the officials accepted the experts’ recommendations. Even if they did, whether the president and the top circle of decision makers also did is another matter. Many officials from various countries have attended IPR conferences and taken information back to their home countries; however, it is necessary to prove that the information taken back to their home countries was critically important to formulating those countries’ foreign policies. Officials and diplomats read a variety of newspapers and journals, attend many kinds of meetings and conferences, and talk with various types of people to collect information. That is their job. The IPR conferences may have been exceptionally important. If so, that has to be demonstrated with historical evidence. Human connections are certainly important, but the U.S. government has a complex network of human connections. It would have been worthwhile to detail how the actual human connections that the CFR and the IPR helped establish resulted in specific official U.S. policies toward East Asia.


There are thousands of research monographs on SCAP but very few studies on the activities of AFPAC and the more than 100,000 members of its armed forces throughout Japan. Because of differences in values and roles to play in occupied Japan, the dual structure of SCAP and AFPAC could lead to clashes. Taking wildlife hunting as a case study, Aldous analyzes the actual clash and derives its historical significance. Aldous concludes that “the disputes that arose turned on the essence of the U.S. Occupation itself, which was the tension between reforming ambitions and colonial presumptions—whether Japan was a democratic partner or military subordinate” (122). SCAP prescribed more restrictive hunting rules to preserve Japanese wildlife and expected AFPAC soldiers to observe Japanese regulations. The members of AFPAC, however, had no intention of doing so, which reflected their tendency to act above the law and their “colonial mentality towards the Japanese” (136).

Aldous has analyzed a previously unexplored aspect of the Allied occupation of Japan, but his view of SCAP and AFPAC is dichotomic. Emphasizing the colonial mindset of the AFPAC personnel, he suggests that SCAP had less of a colonial mindset, was more humane, and treated the Japanese on an equal basis. However, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (SCAP) famously compared the Japanese to a twelve-year-old boy and the allegedly more mature ‘Anglo-Saxon’ nations to a 45-year-old adult as “measured by the standards of modern civilization.” With this mindset, he ruled over Japan. Not only AFPAC personnel, as Aldous demonstrates in his article, but also SCAP personnel had a colonial mindset.

Even today, it seems, many American elites still harbor similar feelings. Former Assistant Secretary of Defence Joseph S. Nye, Jr. wrote in 1995 that, “Security is like oxygen—you tend not to notice it until you begin to lose it, but once that occurs there is nothing else that you think about.” To American policymakers, Asians are so immature that they cannot supply even their own oxygen. The U.S. is the only mature nation that can do so, which justifies its view that “the United States must remain engaged in Asia, committed to peace in the region, and dedicated to strengthening alliances and friendships.”

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5 Ibid., 103.
As for colonial mindsets, in “American Orientalism in Korea,” Charles Kraus argues that words are sometimes mightier than swords and American rhetoric contributed to the development of an unequal U.S.-Korean power relationship. He further argues that the derogatory rhetoric about Koreans was derived from the beliefs of American policymakers as well as scholars. Kraus concludes that, in the U.S., “negative discourses about Koreans, as expressions of American Orientalism, had important implications for U.S. policy in Korea and for the post-war trajectory of developments on the entire Korean peninsula” (147).

Kraus claims that Orientalism, as well as the Cold War, dominated the ways in which American policymakers discussed, analyzed, and developed policies toward both North and South Korea in the 1940s and 1950s. His article is well organized and well documented. Indeed, the combination of American Orientalism and American anti-communism may explain why the U.S. flexed its muscles in Asia. Americans feared that communism would spread like a virus to vulnerable parts of the globe, and they instinctively regarded Asia as a region where communism could easily make inroads. As Kraus argues, the U.S. fear of communism fostered an anti-communist outlook. Kraus stops his analysis there, but just as interesting is the fact that this anti-communism can be partly attributed to the historical development of American society.

America had begun the modern age without a prior history of feudalism. Americans believed that their country was exceptional, a ‘city upon a hill.’ Consequently, it was difficult for Americans to appreciate the diverse routes that could lead to social development (e.g., feudalism, absolutism, and socialism). As a result, Americans became disdainful of other belief systems, valorizing liberal society as an absolute universal good. Orientalism, combined with Americans’ sense of exceptionalism, led Americans to a condescending view of Asia as a premodern society and a passive entity that desired the strong leadership of the U.S. Accordingly, Americans did not trust that Asians would or could voluntarily adopt liberal capitalism, democracy, or human rights because of what Americans believed was the traditional Asian respect for power, authority, and prestige.

In contrast to the 1930s, when it was difficult to find anyone in the U.S. with expertise in Asian affairs, today there are many scholars and intellectuals who are familiar with or have deep expertise in Asia. More and more scholarship on, and knowledge of, Asia is being accumulated. Barnes, Aldous, and Kraus have made important contributions to our existing knowledge of Asia by analyzing fields that prior scholarship had little explored. It is important to analyze niche fields that not many researchers have previously tackled; however, we should not forget the old proverb about not seeing the forest for the trees. “Think Tanks and a New Order in East Asia” demonstrates the importance of the CFR and the IPR, but it is necessary to place their importance in the hierarchy of the U.S. decision-making process and analyze exactly how their recommendations did or did not become actual U.S. policies. “A Tale of Two Occupations” discusses a previously unexplored field, but it is still necessary to learn whether the AFPAC personnel were distinctive and to place the historical meaning and importance of Aldous’ findings in the larger context of the Allied occupation of Japan. “American Orientalism in Korea” makes an important point that words may be more powerful than deeds. Kraus takes the Koreas as a case study, but his line of argument may well apply to other

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parts of Asia also. Overall, these three articles are so intellectually stimulating that they should be read by anyone seeking to understand U.S.-East Asian relations in the 1940s and 1950s.

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