As is so often the case, the war over a war was underway before the conflict was over. William Langer, professor of history at Harvard and the Director of the Research and Analysis Section of the Office of Strategic Services, spent the second half of 1945 going through his contacts in the foreign policy establishment, urging them to support an ambitious history of the world war that had just been won. The lesson of the first war was a guide to how the legacy of the second should be molded. Langer, who had written on European imperial diplomacy, made something more than a scholarly case when he claimed (rather inaccurately as contributors herein remind) that after “the First World War it was fully a decade before active discussion of American participation” occurred and then, regrettably “the lead was taken by journalists.” The result was a policy and geopolitical burden as:

the result was a very effective debunking campaign which . . . contributed to the disillusionment and general deflation not only of the American public but particularly of American youth with respect to almost all aspects of American
participation in international affairs. It is urgently necessary that this situation should not be repeated.

Because the issue was so stark he could rightly claim this was “a matter of national interest that such a history be written.”

Others shared the concern and quickly offered massive support. The Council on Foreign Relations assented to host the project and the Rockefeller Foundation showered an initial sum of $168,000 on Langer and his collaborator, S. Everett Gleason, justifying their largess by agreeing that “the debunking journalistic campaign following World War I should not be repeated.” Unfortunately, the great ambitions for a full history of the conflagration would not be met. The road to war and the conflict itself were simply too big and the two authors (and a detachment of research assistants) could not complete the full history they planned. Still, two influential and enduring works did emerge, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (1952) and *The Undeclared War, 1940-1941* (1953).

The agenda driving the books assured that controversy found them before they were even completed. Vehement attacks came from those whose “revisionist” views on World War I assured their suspicion of U.S. policies leading to World War II. Giving lie to Langer’s talk of journalists, these were established and professional historians. The venerable Charles Beard inveighed against the extensive access Langer’s crew was given to government documents, seeing it as favoring “subsidized” historians who would not be too critical of the actions of the U.S. government. Other scholars, such as Harry Elmer Barnes and Charles Callan Tansill whose critical work on the U.S. entry into and the received wisdom on the Great War dismissed the books as product of “court historians” and offered up their own analysis as counterpoints.

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5 Charles A. Beard, “Who’s to Write the History of the War?” *Saturday Evening Post*, October 4, 1947. See also Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941: A Study in Appearances and Realities* (New Haven, 1948).

6 Harry Elmer Barnes, “The Court Historians Versus Revisionism: An Examination of Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940,*” (1952); Henry Regnery Company, Publicity Materials for Backdoor to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941, 1952, HUG (FP) 19.12, box 2, HUA. See also Harry
Langer’s attempt to quickly entrench a distinct historical interpretation of World War II reflected the reality that the history of World War I was deeply controversial in the United States and globally during the interwar period. Indeed, it was debated almost from the start of the Great War itself. Historical controversy had informed public and elite opinion on the crisis that became World War II. The particular American debate had been instrumental to broad feeling in the United States that intervention in the conflict had been a mistake, a cause not worth repeating. Langer understood that if the critical posture generated by the legacy of World War I was imported into the historiography of its sequel the new global commitment—and with it the Cold War—the United States was stepping into might come under a similar sustained challenge. Lines for some of the poitons and terms that would dominate the historiographical battles of the Cold War were already being laid out. In this sense, some of the foundational historical debates over the post–1945 world were a direct response to the legacies of World War I.

That Langer was moved to initiate his scholarly preemptive strike is a reminder just how extensive, invasive, and persistent World War I’s legacies have been. Yet, the legacies of the Great War have hardly been academic or remote, having been felt from the moment the conflict began. They have shifted and been reinterpreted constantly over what has been a tumultuous century. From the war’s opening phases, diplomats struggled with the political repercussions of the war. Humanitarians wrestled with the hard choices swarming around the diseased, displaced, and dispossessed. Soldiers grappled with each other and with new and terrible kinds of warfare. Revolutions sundered empires, remapped the landscape, and altered how people acted in and conceived of the globe. Individuals made their way in a world where basic assumptions about race, gender, citizenship, and rights had been thrown into flux. As a great swath of humanity struggled with the inheritances of the war, these immediate legacies decided how many lived or died. From its inception there has been no one legacy of the war but a shifting set of lessons, interpretations, and costs left by an unparalleled global war.

This has all meant that perhaps no conflict’s legacies remain more apparent than those of World War I. Scars remain visible on all sorts of terrain—and not all are physical. Whole regions of the world still retain boundaries forced on them by the conflict and its aftermath. Numerous societies still hallow the battles, sacrifices, and the dead from the conflict. Everyday lingo in a set of languages is dotted by terms minted or given currency by the conflict. Even the desire for and the variety of remembrances are legacies. The centenary of the outbreak of the war has set a legion of scholarship on the march—ranks this issue hastens to join—demonstrating that an enduring legacy of the war is a vigorous debate about the cause, course, conclusion, and consequences of the conflict.

Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World War; an Introduction to the Problem of War Guilt, rev. ed. (New York, 1929); Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938).
For historians, critical themes, even the structure of patterns of inquiry in the broader scholarship of international and global history cannot escape the influence of the Great War. Its historiography is monumental in its scope and extent. Langer’s early scholarly work on European imperial rivalries segued into the perennial question of what missteps caused the war. The mirror image of this is the debate on the consequences of an epoch of upheaval that is often cast as the hinge of the twentieth century. The importance of these questions is demonstrated by the continued debates over Versailles and the settlements that followed as well as the continued resonance of the image of Woodrow Wilson and the ideas and institutions credited to him. These have existed with a rich and shifting military history of the conflict. But these themes have been fleshed out over time with increasing emphasis on the profound and far-reaching political, economic, and cultural impact of the war. As historians have widened their interpretive lenses many facets of society including many subordinate and subaltern groups have been included in narratives about the conflict from which they had been exempted. Empire has returned as a central feature of analysis and with it a fresh and more inclusive view of the war as a global event.

Today, even as the experience of war is passing from living memory, the war’s legacies remain living things in the world today. The desire to take stock of these legacies drew together an international roster of contributors to explore the conflict’s historical legacies. It should be noted that William Langer’s name was mentioned by several of the participants (albeit in different contexts) at the conference on “Legacies of the Great War: A Centennial Commemoration” that was graciously hosted by the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy at Williams College. The issue was never planned as a full accounting of the war and its impact. Rather it is an attempt to demonstrate the reach of the conflict both in history and on it. Despite that nation’s current ambivalent memory of the conflict, United States in the world is this issue’s conceptual hub, with the

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understanding that there are a myriad other ways of exploring what the conflict wrought around the globe and across time. One hundred years have demonstrated how the Great War’s legacies shift with the movement of history but it has also made clear that what one comrade in the current campaign of scholarly commemoration calls the “long shadow” of the war never recedes.⁹

Participants:


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and the Future United Nations. (Routledge, 2015); Diplomats at War: The American Experience, with Andrew Stewart (eds.) (Dordrecht, 2013); The Embassy in Grosvenor Square - US Ambassadors to the United Kingdom 1938-2008, with Alison Holmes (Palgrave, 2012); International History and International Relations, with Andrew Williams and Amelia Hadfield (Routledge, 2012); and Franklin Roosevelt’s Foreign Policy and the Welles Mission (Palgrave, 2007).
This special volume of *Diplomatic History* emerged from papers prepared for a conference, titled “Legacies of the Great War: A Centennial Commemoration,” hosted by the Stanley Kaplan Program in American Foreign Policy at Williams College. The volume’s goal is to register the historical and historiographical legacies of the First World War, and assess how the war revealed and intensified America’s interactions with the broader world. In this experience, the United States was little different than other protagonist societies, all of which became ever more interconnected, if unevenly, through the war and its many reverberations. The First World War has long been seen as a historical watershed. It accelerated modernist developments in the arts which had begun earlier in the century. It forced protagonist societies to confront mass trauma, and to deal with the pall of a ‘lost generation.’ The experience of trench warfare was a crucible which came to define the lives of many of its survivors, as Robert Graves memorably described in his autobiography *Goodbye to All That.*

The war also had explosive political consequences, some of which are still evident in modern geopolitics. In the diplomat George Kennan’s oft-cited words, the war was “the great catastrophe of Western civilization in the present century.” The competing political visions of Russian revolutionary Vladimir I. Lenin and American President Woodrow Wilson anticipated the global Cold War to come, as Lloyd Gardner argues in his essay on “The Geopolitics of Revolution” in this volume, while the postwar territorial settlements created the conditions which have shaped more recent conflicts, from the former Yugoslavia to Syria. Just as the war’s causes can appear overdetermined, so too have its consequences grown exponentially over the past century. Historians, especially in the Western world, have used it as a conventional point of demarcation between a long nineteenth century and the ‘age of extremes’ of the ‘short’ twentieth century. As but one example of the war’s Janus-

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faced nature, it was a conflict that featured both cavalry charges and the use of chemical warfare and aerial bombardment. How then to make sense of the legacies of a catastrophic war whose very nature was contested and fissiparous when it took place?

Historians and the general public alike have returned to the war with renewed interest in recent years. The primary cause of this renewed interest has been the centenary in 2014 of the war’s outbreak, which has occasioned great activity amongst historians,16 commemorative actors, and social media.17 Beyond the centenary there are other reasons for this “return to 1914.” First, the war has only recently made the ambiguous transition from ‘memory’ to ‘history.’ While studies of the collective memory of the war have proliferated over the past few decades,18 the conflict has now passed beyond living memory. There are no more survivors of the war, a fact which has meant strikingly different things to different national communities. The death in 2009 of the war’s last surviving British soldier, Harry Patch, was covered intensively by the British media, and Patch published a memoir in the years before his death.19 In Germany, by contrast, the death of Erich Kaestner, possibly the last surviving German combatant from the war, went largely unremarked in a country where authentication is made difficult by a dearth of records for war veterans.20


17 See for instance the Imperial War Museum’s crowd-sourced project, “Digital Lives of the First World War” (https://livesofthefirstworldwar.org/) and the University of Luxembourg Master in European Contemporary History Program’s Tweets from WW1 project (@RealTimeWW1).


These examples reveal the obvious but significant point that the war has different legacies in different national contexts. In Britain, it has long accrued the memorial patina of sacrifice and martyrdom. This is in part the result of the campaign of memorialization during the interwar years which created rituals of remembrance. These include the moment of silence on 11 November, the Cenotaph in Whitehall, the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and the poppy as a commemorative symbol inspired by the Canadian surgeon John McCrae’s poem “In Flanders Fields.” These rituals and symbols continue to shape war remembrance observance in Britain and the former Dominions today, as demonstrated vividly by the striking poppy memorial in the fall of 2014 at the Tower of London.21

To many Germans, such intensive commemorative efforts suggest “war nostalgia.”22 Apart from some official events, such as German President Joachim Gauck’s speech denouncing Germany’s invasion of Belgium in 1914 at a commemorative ceremony in Liege, the German response to the centenary of the war’s outbreak has been muted.23 This reticence is unsurprising, given that Germany lost the war despite not having been defeated militarily. As Klaus Schwabe observes in his volume essay “World War I and the Rise of Hitler,”24 the war’s legacy became poisoned immediately in Germany. Domestic debates about the “stab in the back” and the “war guilt lie” helped create a “culture of political abstinence” (879), where the war’s origins and conduct were either willfully forgotten or repurposed by various actors, not all on the political right, in the interest of national unity. In this sense, as Walter Benjamin observed, Germany ‘lost’ the war twice, first in 1918, and then during the 1930s when its legacies were eclipsed by the rise of Nazism. The First World War’s legacies are even further marginal in Austria, the centre of the former Habsburg Empire whose Archduke’s assassination precipitated the conflict and which collapsed at the war’s end. There the centenary of 1914 has been greeted with apathy. The Austrian media gave as much attention during the last week of June 2014 to new lyrics for the national anthem and the centenary of the death of the Austrian writer and peace activist Bertha von Suttner than it did to the First World War.25

Observances of the centenary of the war’s outbreak have also been muted in the United States, which had of course remained neutral in 1914. Yet even there, as many of the essays in this volume demonstrate, the war brought America’s historical relationship with the world into sharper focus. The United States was already by 1914 an imperial power, as Emily Rosenberg reminds us in her essay on “World War I, Wilsonianism, and Challenges to U.S. Empire.”26 It was also tied to the war experience through historical networks of immigration, its growing international financial clout, and the active role taken by American lawyers in debates about war and international law, as demonstrated respectively by Christopher Capozzola’s “Legacies for Citizenship: Pinpointing Americans during and after World War I,” Dietmar Rothermund’s “War-Depression-War: The Fatal Sequence in a Global Perspective,” and Hatsue Shinohara’s “International Law and WWI.”27 Indeed, the First World War left a deep imprint on the domestic societies of both protagonist and neutral states alike. The strength of this special volume of Diplomatic History is its collective assessment of these legacies in a comparative international framework.

As this volume reveals, attempts to make sense of the war’s meanings and legacies began even before it had ended. In his insightful and incisive introduction, David Ekbladh describes the war’s legacies as “extensive, invasive, and persistent” (697). As John Milton Cooper Jr. indicates in the title of his volume essay, “The World War and American Memory,” Americans perceived the war at the time as a world conflict.28 The United States’ smaller-scale military involvement in the war made the conflict ill-fitted for subsequent American historical nostalgic purposes, especially when compared to the Second World War experience of the ‘Greatest Generation.’ This is further understandable given that American participation in the First World War was opposed at home more strongly than were the Vietnam or Iraq wars. A 1937 Gallup public opinion poll found that 70% of American respondents thought their country’s participation in the First World War had been a mistake (732). For Americans, as Cooper makes clear, the war’s legacies were instead tied tightly to President Woodrow Wilson’s shifting posthumous reputation (732-3). American participation in the war itself thus came to be seen by Americans as less historically significant than the debate


over Wilson’s League of Nations, the broader question of American engagement with the world, and the retrospectively labelled “first great debate” in the new discipline of international relations between ostensible “realists” and “idealists.”

Twenty years on, the First World War’s legacies became permanently intertwined with those of the Second World War. Ekbladh points to the historian William Langer’s decision to write a history of the Second World War as it was unfolding because he felt the First World War had been improperly narrated at the time by ‘journalists.’ While Langer’s concern was American, the two most prominent English-language contemporary accounts of the war came from Britain, where two extraordinary publishing projects provided a ‘first draft’ of the war’s history in close to real time. The writer, politician, and head of the government’s new Ministry of Information, John Buchan, wrote the monumental Nelson’s History of the War. The first of an eventual twenty-three parts appeared in February, 1915. Its counterpart, The Times History of the War, eventually ran to twenty-two volumes encompassing over six million words.

Academic historians and state governments quickly followed suit after the war. The end of secret diplomacy as official practice was a major spur to historians and others who wished to write the war’s history, setting off an interwar battle of “preemptive historiography” (831). There was now more information (not always complete) from which writers could fashion histories. The various protagonist state governments produced official histories of the war, based largely on their own archival records and often, as Schwabe argues in the case of Germany’s forty volume project, designed for diplomatic reasons to place their national war effort in a favourable light (872). Other publishing efforts came from non-governmental actors. Here the key example is the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Economic and Social History of the World War, the subject of Katharina Rietzler’s “The War as History: Writing the Economic and Social History of the First World War.”

Begun before the war in part to test the British journalist Norman Angell’s ideas about economic interdependence and international peace, after the war the project was reconfigured as a ‘laboratory of history,’ drawing on primary material collected from official sources and private collections to analyze empirically the conflict’s economic and social impact.

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Historians’ such as Columbia University’s James Shotwell, one of the project’s editors, believed that “the past had to be made useful to the present” (829). The Carnegie History was strikingly modern, covering many subjects which have only in the last two decades attracted sustained attention from international historians. These include economic production, industrial organization, public health, the war experiences of women, and the problem of statelessness.  

The essays in this volume are all attuned in various ways to this interpretive shift within the field to transnational history. Akira Iriye argues in his essay “The Historiographic Impact of the Great War” that historians interpreted the First World War primarily through the framework of geopolitics into the 1980s. As demonstrated in key earlier treatments of the war by historians such as Langer and A.J.P. Taylor, this historiography was also exclusively Eurocentric. In contrast, Ekbladh notes that empire has returned as an interpretive framework for the war (698), reflecting broader shifts in the historical landscape. Many of the war’s legacies are also only apparent when one retreats from ‘short past’ perspectives. As Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela write in their essay, “The Great War as a Global War: Imperial Conflict and the Reconfiguration of World Order, 1911–1923,” one of the volume’s significant *longue durée* arguments, World War I was the beginning of the end of an international system dominated by empires, soon to be replaced by a ‘Westphalian’ international system of nation-states (787). Understanding how and why this transition occurred as it did is a key question for international historians, but also for international relations specialists, for whom the etymology of sovereignty is a key theoretical consideration.

The volume’s fifteen essays are organized alphabetically by author, rather than by theme. Considered collectively, however, they address three main questions

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concerning the war’s legacy. First, how global was the First World War? Second, what was the war’s impact on domestic society, primarily in the United States but also from a comparative perspective? Third, how did the war change the structure and norms of the international system? In the balance of this essay, I will assess each of these questions in turn, before returning to the war’s legacies as a whole.

A key element in the globalization of the war was the military participation of the United States. This included both the naval convoy system, which Michael Adas describes in his essay “Ambivalent Ally: American Military Intervention and the Endgame and Legacy of World War I” as “arguably the most decisive U.S. contribution to Allied victory” (703-4), and the arrival of US troops in Europe in 1918. Historians have long debated whether the American entry into the war precipitated its ultimate end – Adas suggests it did, if due less to the performance of American soldiers in Europe than the promise of more to come. In the event, American deaths paled in comparison to those suffered by other protagonists, especially in Europe - 114,000 as compared to 200,000 from the British Empire, 723,000 from Britain, 1.1 million from the Habsburg Empire, 1.4 million from France, 1.8 million from Russia, and over 2 million in Germany. America’s late entry into the war, moreover, combined with the overseas location of battle, meant that the physical and psychological scars which indelibly marked postwar European societies were much less pronounced in the United States.

The epicentre of the First World War was in Europe, with mass armed confrontations in close quarters along the western front, and flowing back and forth across vast spaces of the eastern front. The war, however, was also global in nature. The European powers’ imperial interests also precipitated armed combat in eastern, western, and southern Africa, in the Middle East, and on a small scale in Asia. Britain attacked German colonies in Africa before hostilities commenced in Europe, the German General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck led a campaign across vast stretches of east Africa which continued for two weeks after the armistice in Europe in November 1918, and South Africa seized the German protectorate of South West Africa in 1915, to which it clung tenaciously until Namibia’s independence in 1990. In the Middle East, Allied forces confronted Turkish armies at Gallipoli, Kut, and in Arabia, before finally turning the tide in 1917-18. In Asia, Japan joined the war against Germany in August 1914. Acting on the terms of its naval alliance with Britain, it occupied most of Germany’s Asian colonies and leased territories, including the Chinese port of Qingdao. In 1915 Japan presented its Twenty-One Demands to China, asserting claims

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to greater territorial and economic concessions from China in mainland Asia. Despite the internal disarray it faced at home, and the growing threat of Japanese imperialism, the republican government of China also saw the war as an opportunity to expand its presence in the international system. Over 100,000 Chinese labourers were recruited by the British and the French to work on the western front, and China declared war on Germany in 1917. In these ways the war drew both Japan and China more tightly into the international system, a process which had begun in the later nineteenth century.

Despite its European locus, then, the war was also global. Gerwarth and Manela argue that historians thus need to expand both their spatial and temporal understanding of the war. It is true that the war destabilized colonial rule, and that the upsurge in anti-colonial uprisings and the violence used to suppress them after 1919 were results of the war, but the argument that “the organized mass violence of the war had not ended; it had only shifted its modes and focal points” (791) is more accurate for Eastern Europe and the Middle East than it is for the wider colonial world. Colonial violence in the interwar period was carried out on a large scale, and was organized systematically, but it paled in comparison to the violence of WWI itself. The war led to a rise in anti-colonial resistance and colonial repression immediately after the war, as Manela has detailed elsewhere. Such resistance was part of longer patterns of resistance dating to the nineteenth century, however, and remained episodic, rather than revolutionary, until after the Second World War. The impact of the First World War throughout the colonized world, as Michael Adas has argued, was much more discursive than material. This is not to minimize the repressive postwar violence employed by the British at Amritsar or the French in North Africa, to mention just two examples, but to suggest that it was less a result of the First World War than the manifestation of longer-term patterns of state violence in the colonial world. Indeed, the argument can be turned on its head, with colonial state violence, whether extreme as in King Leopold’s Congo Free State or German South West Africa, or more systemic as in

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British India or French Indo-China, appearing as an antecedent to the mass organized killing of the First World War rather than the other way around. Such a comparative perspective helps explain why there are striking similarities in twentieth century popular memories in European societies of organized violence in colonial settings and in Europe itself during the war. Such mnemonic intersections are further understandable given the presence in Europe during the war of large numbers of colonial troops, including sepoys from British India and tirailleurs sénégalais fighting for the French.

Most interwar colonial nationalists did not experience the First World War directly, and there is much debate amongst historians of decolonization as to whether even the Second World War, a much more global conflict, was a direct catalyst to nationalist uprisings. That said, drawing on the work of colonial historians such as Martin Thomas, Gerwarth and Manela make the important point that while the First World War did encourage colonial nationalist sentiment amongst some colonies who experienced it, leading to an increase in postwar anti-colonial action and a deepening of inter-colonial liberationist activism, the majority of veterans, while not necessarily supporters of colonialism, were often both invested in its continuation for practical considerations and frustrated with its perpetuation, as its racist and hierarchical structure contrasted with the comparatively more open societies they had encountered while serving in Europe. There are also no clear causal connections between the war and the postwar process of ‘de-dominionization.’ The populations of both Canada, whose soldiers fought under British command on the Western front, and South Africa were split over participation in the war, and were the strongest proponents of dominion autonomy after 1918. By contrast, while the deaths of over 78,000 ANZAC soldiers at Gallipoli led to the establishment of Anzac Day in Australia and New Zealand as a national day of war commemoration, both countries nonetheless retained comparatively stronger connections to the ‘British World’ throughout the interwar period.

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Gerwarth and Manela also give fresh reading to the long-standing argument that our temporal conceptualization of WWI should be expanded. This argument is persuasive. The war that began with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 was in essence the Third Balkan war, different from its predecessors in that it pulled in the great powers and led to world war. This is why the Yugoslavian Monument to the Unknown Hero in Belgrade is dated 1912-1918.\(^{47}\) Fighting also continued after the armistice in the west on 11 November, 1918. \(^{47}\) Gerwarth and Manela place particular emphasis on the ‘shatter zones’ created in Eastern and Central Europe by the collapse of the German, Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg empires.\(^{48}\) Mass violence in these regions after 1918 entailed a combination of struggles of national determination and social revolutions about land, property, and economic order. Roughly four million people died in these conflicts between 1918 and 1923 (793). While these civils wars, such as in Russia or Hungary, or violent state-sanctioned population transfers, such as that between Greece and Turkey, had both domestic and longer-term causes in addition to the war, the war was a proximate cause of all of them, and as such they can be seen as its continuation. The war’s periodization is thus a matter of geographical perspective, with 1914-1918 capturing the chronology of the war in the west, but more fluid periodizations needed to understand comprehensively the war’s nature and legacies elsewhere.

The latter framework applies also to the Middle East, as Matthew Jacobs shows implicitly in “World War I: A War (and Peace?) for the Middle East.”\(^{49}\) Perhaps even more so than in Europe, the war fundamentally reconfigured the Middle East, a seismic change Jacobs argues has been overshadowed in western historiography by the popular focus on Gallipoli and Lawrence of Arabia (776). In an apt comparison, he likens the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Allied reconfiguration of the region after 1918 to the European scramble for Africa in the 1880s (785). As Rosenberg also illustrates with reference to American imperial territories in the Caribbean and Pacific, the First World War both exacerbated the impact of imperial rule on those living in the Middle East and encouraged anti-imperialist sentiment.

The war’s impact on domestic populations and societies is the focus of several other essays in the volume, primarily with an American focus. The advent of total war meant that governments became invested in mobilizing their populations. Thus the ‘pinpointing’ of citizenship, as Capozzola illustrates in reference to the United States.

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\(^{47}\) Reynolds, 425.

\(^{48}\) See Omer Bartov and Eric Weitz, eds., *Shatterzone of Empires: Coexistence and Violence in the German, Habsburg, Russian and Ottoman Borderlands* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2013), 6-11 and passim.

There the war upended migration flows, with Mexican immigration and internal African American migration overtaking European arrivals as the dominant features of American population movement. The government also monitored its population more closely, implementing draft registration cards and passport controls, and tracking aliens. After the war, the government moved to clarify citizenship, culminating in the 1924 Immigration Act. The 19th Amendment implemented female suffrage, American colonial subjects were made ‘U.S. nationals,’ and American Indians were granted citizenship. As many of the latter in particular illustrated through their dissent, however, the expansion of citizenship, in the United States as elsewhere, was not always welcomed by its new recipients.

One of the war’s international legacies has thus been a more interventionist state. One element of such increased interventionism was propaganda, which proliferated during the war as governments sought to convince their citizens of war aims, or, in the case of the United States before 1917, the merits of neutrality. In “Blinking Eyes Began to Open: Legacies from America’s Road to the Great War, 1914–1917,” Michael Neiberg argues that most Americans were sympathetic to the Allied cause from the war’s outset.\(^5\) The prevailing American view of Germany was of a nation of cultured and civilized people governed by an autocratic and militaristic government. The sinking of the Lusitania in May 1915 only confirmed these perceptions, and tilted Americans ever closer to the Allied side. As the war unfolded, American fears of potential German, Mexican, and Japanese aggression grew, especially as the nation had limited military capacity of its own. These fears intensified in the aftermath of the Zimmermann telegram incident. It thus took several non-military initiatives to preserve national security. While the war did provoke nativist responses from a minority of Americans, and as Capozzola shows, efforts by immigrants to become more ‘American,’ these assimilationist currents actually encouraged deeper immigrant attachments to the broader war effort. There were 65,000 Italian-Americans, for instance, who returned to Europe to fight for Italy (810).

Religion provided Americans with a moral framework for understanding the war (815), as Andrew Preston argues in his expansive “To Make the World Saved: American Religion and the Great War.”\(^6\) While liberal Protestants (such as those attached to Andrew Carnegie’s Church Peace Union) supported Wilson, the “ecumenist-in-chief” (821), and hoped religious tolerance could provide the basis for world peace, many fundamentalist Protestants believed the war presaged a reckoning. Catholics and Jews, meanwhile, supported the war in part to signal their patriotism. The spiritual


crisis brought on by the war left a mark on postwar American society. Religion did not decline in later decades; it was privatized. In the political sphere, fundamentalist Protestants’ wartime attack on ‘modern’ Protestants for their pacifism anticipated the patriotic anti-statism of the present conservative religious movement. Preston gives more space to assessing the war’s longer-term legacies than some of the other contributions in this volume, and in doing so reveals how these legacies were often not apparent or realized until decades later.

Finally, the war had a tremendous impact on the international system. The conduct of the war, and the peace treaties which followed, reshaped the structure and composition of international relations. The war also created new or augmented patterns of interaction amongst states and non-state actors. The most familiar legacy might be the ideological divide which opened up during the war between Bolshevism and the liberal capitalist Western states. Lenin and Wilson would become key avatars in the global war of ideas to come, but also important, as Gardner writes, were Wilson’s political decisions regarding Russia during and immediately after the war. Wilson was equivocal in his response to the Bolshevik revolution. He wanted to protect American interests, support the supposedly democratic spirit of ordinary Russians, oppose socialism, and prevent the United States from becoming entangled in foreign alliances such as it had in during the anti-Boxer expedition at the turn of the century. Ultimately, however, American military intervention in the Russian Civil War precluded any possibility of normalizing relations with the new Soviet Union. Like Jacobs does in his essay regarding American wartime policy in the Middle East, Gardner concludes by pondering a counterfactual, whether a different American policy towards Russia at the war’s end would have led to different political outcomes.

Of more immediate and lasting effect was the legacy of “transnational humanity and compassion” (763) established by international humanitarian aid workers during and immediately after the war. Julia Irwin’s insightful contribution, “Taming Total War: Great War–Era American Humanitarianism and its Legacies,” assesses the work of American relief workers in Europe from 1914-1923. Aid was driven by both altruistic and strategic interests, a combination of motivations which would mark humanitarian aid down to the present. Although facilitated by the American government, which itself also provided aid through the Army Medical Department, much of this wartime aid was funded and provided privately by actors such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the American Red Cross. As with the Carnegie Project detailed by Rietzler, Irwin demonstrates how the war opened up greater space for private actors to become governance actors. Like Gerwarth and Manela, Irwin also persuasively extends our

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53 See also Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918–1924 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and the essays in Branden Little, ed., “Special Issue:
historical periodization of the war. American aid, continued until 1923, focused after the war primarily on settlement relief and the provision of food. Here it comprised part of an emerging international aid network that united national aid organizations, international organizations (notably the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization), and private bodies such as the newly founded Service International, which organized its first relief work camp near Verdun in 1920. Paralleling Gardner’s political focus, Irwin demonstrates how humanitarian aid was conceived by the American government as a means of preventing the spread of revolutionary ideas in Europe. Her essay above all shows how American aid workers contributed to the safety of non-combatants in war as an international norm, providing empirical historical evidence to support the now-pervasive International-Relations concept of “norm cascade.”

As Shinohara observes, the First World War also led to both normative and structural shifts in international law. Following Martti Koskenniemi’s definition of international law as both the set of positivist legal rules and state practices, and the normative aspirations of international lawyers, Shinohara details how it was used at cross purposes (881). Some legal scholars used international law to justify imperialism, while others conceived of it as a tool of international peace. These debates predated the war, as evidenced in the Hague Conventions on the laws of war and the work of the International Law Association (founded in 1873), but intensified during the conflict itself. American lawyers especially debated the laws of neutrality. After the war, the international legal implications of the peace treaties, particularly Versailles, dominated debate. The implementation of the peace treaties relied on the political will of statesmen, the support of public opinion, and the interpretive skills of jurists. Some of the latter, such as Hersch Lauterpacht, believed that the League of Nations Covenant constituted ‘higher law,’ a normative commitment which superseded treaties and state agreements. Others, such as the Americans Quincy Wright and Manley Hudson, argued for the ‘enlargement of law’ as a means of preserving international equilibrium. The League of Nations itself also became an international legal actor, with a committee on the codification of international law, and several committees (such as on opium or the traffic in women and children) crafting the legal structure of future international agreements. Finally, jurists at the Permanent Court of International Justice adjudicated various international disputes in the interwar decades, an early antecedent of the networked global regulators Anne-Marie Slaughter has identified in recent times. While not all international legal scholars believed law


was a sufficient means for maintaining international security, a growing number believed that the League’s Covenant could constitute a prospective “constitution for international society.” (893) To the degree that the League’s legal infrastructure formed part of the foundation of the United Nations after the Second World War, they were proved correct.

Read together, the essays in this special volume of Diplomatic History illustrate how historians are considering, and in some cases reconsidering, the war’s legacies at its centenary. Some of these arguments parallel the themes of the broader centenary of the war noted above, but in many other ways, they chart new courses of interpretation. Alongside long-standing and still central facets of the war and its legacies – its connections to the Second World War, issues of war and society, the peace settlements and the war’s diplomatic fallout, the war and modernity – many of the essays here incorporate and implement ideas and inspiration from work in the broader discipline. These include the war as both a manifestation of, and cause for further, globalization; the war’s role in the reconfiguration of the individual as both a subject and object of international relations and international law in subsequent decades; and the role of private, non-state organizations and individuals as autonomous actors on both the micro and macro level.

Finally, the volume collectively encourages historians to reconsider how the First World War is conceptualized. Iriye’s essay asks a key historiographical question which frames most of the other contributions: “Is the First World War to be understood as part of contemporary history?” Invoking arguments he has made at greater length elsewhere, Iriye argues that it should not. He instead sees the war as “ancient history,” inasmuch as it is an anachronism. It emerged from a world defined by inter-state war, and racial, ethnic, and gender divisions, dynamics Iriye argues have now been overtaken, though obviously not eradicated, by an interconnected world brought about by globalization. It is true, as Susan Strange argued in the 1990s, that states have become less significant in international politics than they once were, but the earlier period of state hegemony against which such now-commonplace observations are contrasted (often by assertion) was itself short-lived. We can date ‘the age of the state’ to the Cold War. It was then that the Westphalian system came closest to being realized in actual international relations; when state governments, partly as a result of the mass mobilization required to fight the Second World War, took on evermore social, economic, and political functions.

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and capacities; and when decolonization globalized the model of national identities harnessed for state interests.

While states were also the primary foreign policy decision makers before, during, and immediately after the First World War, they could, and did, do comparatively less than did their Cold-War descendants. What was different in 1914 was not the nature of the state or globalization, but that nationalism was then the dominant discourse of international relations. Nationalism continued to be a significant feature of the increasingly internationalized world of the twentieth century, but its influence, in 1914 at an apogee, subsequently became one among several competing discourses. As the forms of international interconnectedness, which many of the authors in this volume identify as one of the war’s primary legacies, intensified later in the century, nationalism’s discursive influence fragmented. Iriye’s view of the First World War as a conflict defined by nationalist and racial antagonisms is convincing, but we should remain cautious of not recycling the older internationalist argument of Norman Angell and other pre-1914 internationalists that interconnectivity attenuates conflict. As many of the articles in this volume demonstrate, interconnectivity can, and during the First World War did, also create networks for the globalization of violence. The mass violence of the war is the ghost at the feast in this volume, absent as a subject of direct analysis for the most part, but determining the scale and scope of all of the essays. Interstate war may have declined in frequency since 1945, but intra-state and other forms of ‘networked’ violence have continued to be a feature of international politics to the present day. In this sense, the legacies of the First World War are profoundly contemporary.

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This special issue of *Diplomatic History* commemorates the centenary anniversary of the beginning of World War I by examining the legacies of the war in terms of the "United States in the World" (699). The collection consists of fifteen articles, plus a brief introduction by David Ekbladh. As is often the case with special issues like this, some papers are stronger than others and they differ quite a bit in style and approach to their respective topics. What is most striking about this collection, though, is how little attention is paid to strategic, geopolitical issues; few articles directly concern themselves with the war’s legacy for U.S. relations with the other major powers in the international system (761). Indeed, the editors seem to have gone out of their way to avoid this subject. In so doing, they miss an opportunity to expose readers to some of the issues and scholarly debates that are vital to understanding the trajectory of U.S. foreign policy after World War I. Their editorial choices also reveal something about the state of First World War Studies today and where future scholarship should be directed.

Roughly speaking, the papers in the collection fall into four groups. Three articles, by Akira Iriye, John Milton Cooper, Jr., and Katharina Rietzler, address historiography, although in quite different ways.60 Iriye outlines broad trends in international history scholarship since 1920; Cooper sketches out “The World War and American Memory,” emphasizing evolving views of President Woodrow Wilson; and Rietzler gives an overview of the Carnegie ‘History of the War’ produced in the 1920s and 1930s, which examined the social and economic costs of the conflict. None of the three discuss the historiography of issues such as U.S. war aims, U.S. relations with the Allies, or the U.S. and the Versailles Treaty – diplomatic topics that make up quite a lot of the scholarship concerning the United States and World War I.

A second group of articles deals with U.S. foreign relations during and after the war, broadly defined. This group includes some excellent papers, among the best in the collection: Christopher Capozzola on “Legacies for Citizenship,” Julia F. Irwin on “Great-War American Humanitarianism,” Andrew Preston on “American Religion and the Great War,” Emily S. Rosenberg on “Challenges to U.S. Empire,” and Michael Neiberg on U.S. public opinion toward the war during the neutrality period.61 Irwin

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and Neiberg at times relate their topics to U.S policy toward the other great powers, as does Preston in the general sense of suggesting that religious beliefs led Americans to view U.S. intervention in the war as a “spiritual crusade” (825). The U.S. and great-power politics, though, is not really the central focus of their papers. Cappozola, for his part, is interested in “the institutional history of U.S. citizenship” while Rosenberg is concerned with the war’s impact on America’s “own imperial backyard” (713, 854).

Five other articles, in contrast, deal less with U.S. foreign relations per se, although some of them touch on that topic, than on the war and its legacy as a global event. Matthew Jacobs looks at the war’s impact on the Middle East while Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela examine it as a clash between empires. Both papers are informative and interesting, but they discuss the European powers and regions outside of Europe much more than they do the United States. Dietmar Rothermund and Hatsue Shinohara also have a global perspective in their papers, as they examine, respectively, international economics and law in the interwar period. Rothermund’s piece has little to say about reparations, however, which was central to great-power relations in the twenties, while the paper on international law confines itself to describing the interwar legal system. Klaus Schwabe, finally, provides a close, cogent analysis of the war’s relationship to Hitler’s rise to power; the United States is not part of his discussion.

Only two articles in the collection of fifteen, then, actually directly concern themselves with the United States and great power politics during or after the war. In one, Michael Adas analyzes how U.S. intervention in the war affected the Allied war effort and Germany’s decision to launch an offensive in the west in March 1918; in the other, Lloyd Gardner argues that concerns about revolutionary Russia lay behind much of Wilson’s diplomacy during the war. Like other papers in the collection, these papers are engaging and well-written. What mostly makes them stand out, though, is that they, unlike the others, very much focus on the war as an episode of power politics between the world’s major states.

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The collection’s lack of attention to strategic issues is surprising. For one thing, World War I was central to the evolution of U.S. strategy for the rest of the twentieth century and beyond. It brought to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy debates on key ideas such as collective security, arms control, and what we would call today democratic peace theory; it led to new military structures and strategies involving especially air power that had a profound impact on how America fought (and fights) its wars; and it generated a lasting and direct U.S. involvement in European great-power diplomacy. Moreover, it is not as if historians – or, for that matter, students or the public or politicians – have suddenly lost interest in such topics. Over the last twenty years, with the end of the Cold War and the approach of the First World War centennial, the question of why the international system created after World War I collapsed has looked more important than ever. As is evident in recent major works by Patrick Cohrs, G. John Ikenberry, and Adam Tooze, it is not possible to arrive at an answer to that question without considering the role in post-World War I great power politics played by the United States. Yet this special issue of *Diplomatic History* barely touches on that story.

It is also curious that the collection largely ignores this topic at a time when there is a fruitful and fascinating interdisciplinary dialogue going on between historians and international relations theorists. The H-Diplo-International Security Studies Forum (ISSF), founded in 2010, for example, has produced a series of roundtables, forums, and essays on strategic issues, historical and contemporary, that allow historians and political scientists to engage each other’s ideas and approaches. These consistently high-quality exchanges, often involving major scholars such as Robert Jervis, Geir Lundestad, and Fredrik Logevall, focus on new research concerning, for example, the nature of alliances, war termination, and American grand strategy – subjects directly relevant to World War I and its aftermath. One would think, then, that an example of this interdisciplinary work would have been a worthwhile contribution to this commemorative *Diplomatic History* issue.

The editors’ choice of topics for their collection suggests, I think, a desire to demonstrate that U.S diplomatic history, and First World War studies in the United States, is a broad enterprise – that “historians of U.S. foreign relations,” as *Diplomatic History* editor Thomas Zeiler wrote in 2009, “are, in many ways, an advance guard driving the bandwagon of internationalization, riding along with those who study mentalités and culture.” To be sure, Zeiler also asserted that diplomatic historians remain concerned with “power” and try to “mesh” that concern with the “cultural

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Ekbladh, though, seems less interested in that approach, as he suggests in his introduction to the collection that scholarship on World War I has moved away from military and political issues focused on Europe. “As historians have widened their interpretive lenses,” he asserts, “many facets of society including many subordinate and subaltern groups have been included in narratives about the conflict from which they have been exempted,” and “empire has returned as a central feature of analysis” (698). Iriye, in his interpretation of the historiography of international history since 1920, likewise applauds what he sees as a shift away from “the framework of the never-ending story of the ‘rise and fall of the great powers’” and toward “nongeopolitical themes, such as globalization, human rights, environmental issues, cultural exchange, and migrations” (754).

Examining such an array of topics is a laudable turn in the historiography of World War I and of international history in general. But this development does not render the study of strategic issues unimportant. Actually, the two lines of inquiry – the lines of strategic studies and what Iriye sees as research concerning “global interconnectedness” – have much to offer one another (762). In an interesting collection of papers on history and neorealism edited by Ernest May, Richard Rosecrance, and Zara Steiner, for example, Paul W. Schroeder argues that the anarchical structure of the international system compels states not only to compete for power, as emphasized by neorealists, but to pursue order too. “The two imperatives of power and order,” asserts Schroeder, “are equally important and necessary; the two broad responses, springing from the same source, . . . are so inextricably intertwined and interacting that it is almost impossible to separate them entirely in practice.” The task of the historian of international relations is to understand this interaction, to trace over time the “dialectical relationship” between the “struggle for power and the quest for order.” The legacy of World War I would seem to be the perfect subject for such an endeavor. Clearly, the war provided a major boost to the impulse for order, as it led, among other things, to the creation of the League of Nations. At the same time, though, power politics persisted, as seen in the jockeying for advantage between the Allies and the United States during the war and after and in the peace terms imposed upon Germany. The international history of the interwar period is the story of how the emboldened search for order (or, to use Iriye’s term, the developing web of “interconnectedness”) and the persistent competition for


power together played out, with the United States very much a key actor in the process. To understand that story, and to gain insight into international relations today, both sides of the dialectical relationship between order and power need to be examined, not just one. *Diplomatic History’s* commemorative issue on the legacies of World War I makes some attempt to do this, but not much. One hopes that editors of other such collections will do more to recognize that the historiography of “nongeopolitical themes” and the historiography of power relations complement one another – and that trying to understand the interplay between their respective topics should be at the center of future research.
The centennial of World War I has precipitated an explosion of academic and popular publications on the history and experiences of the conflict. Many continue to adopt a geopolitical approach, arguing about the balance of power and who bears responsibility for starting the war. Others are focused on the social experiences of the war and bringing the specific feelings and reminiscences of participants to light. This special issue of *Diplomatic History* is rather different. Contributors to the volume were asked to comment on the legacies of the war, and especially the legacies of the war for the United States; the results are therefore far removed from European power politics and life in the trenches. While many of the essays are excellent and thought-provoking in their own right, the volume as a whole offers an opportunity to reconsider the periodization of both the war itself and the longer twentieth century.

Contributors to the volume generally agree that the war and American involvement in it are not adequately captured in the traditional 1914-1917-1918 legal-military timeline. There remains disagreement about what the proper periodization should be, but the general trend is an extension on both ends. In their framing of World War I as a global war, Robert Gerwarth and Erez Manela point to the 1911 Italian invasion of Libya as the start of the war and the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne with the Turkish Republic as its endpoint.70 Focusing on American humanitarian participation in the war, Julia Irwin dates the American start of the war to September 1914 and its conclusion to 1923, when members of the American Relief Agency finally left Europe.71 In focusing on U.S. citizenship and migration, Christopher Capozzola makes the Immigration Act of 1924 the end of the story.72 Taken together, the contributions suggest that scholars researching aspects of World War I should think very seriously about the temporal frames they choose, rather than defaulting to points on the legal-military timeline. For teaching, we should stress American involvement in the war in various capacities before the legal U.S. entry into the conflict—Emily Rosenberg’s contribution is of particular use here—and the persistence of the war into the 1920s.73


Cooper’s essay provides valuable insights for connecting American experiences of World War I to those of World War II.  

For periodizing the century itself, the two provocative essays by Gerwarth and Manela and Akira Iriye provide satisfying food for thought. Both ask whether World War I was a turning point in global history, and reconciling their answers suggests the existence of a ‘short twentieth century’ that is very short indeed. Gerwarth and Manela argue that World War I was a war fought by empires—definitely including an imperial United States—that resulted in an international system in which the legitimate actors were nation-states. For them, World War I is most definitely a turning point, ushering in a period of considerable instability as nationalist leaders attempted to secure independence from colonial empires or to create homogeneous populations in existing states.

Iriye poses a different question: is World War I part of ‘contemporary history’? That is, is World War I part of the same period in which we live today, or is it of another age? (751) He concludes that World War I is not contemporary, as it did not fundamentally alter leaders’—or historians’—focus on geopolitics, the salience of the state, or the general segregation of the world’s population. Instead, he directs us to the 1970s as the start of contemporary history, when, he argues, transnational connections and interdependence altered international politics and provoked “the diminishing role of the state in human affairs” (762). Regardless of whether one agrees with Iriye on the specific content of 1970s changes, the basic point that the 1970s are a turning point is in keeping with a wide range of recent historical scholarship that downplays both 1945 and 1989/91 as the century’s most definitive breaks.

While Iriye’s interpretation appears to contradict that of Gerwarth and Manela, it is possible to accept them both, taking World War I and the 1970s as the century’s key turning points in international politics. Even though Iriye downplays World War I as a transition, both nation-states and empires are consistent with geopolitical concerns, segregation, and state power, which are the elements of his non-contemporary

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system. What the lumping of empires and nation-states obscures are the divergent ways in which social difference and political participation operated, or were supposed to operate.

If we do accept both turning points, then the period in which the nation-state was the normative actor in international politics was a relatively short half century. That presents problems for the field of International Relations and certain social science theories that take the nation-state as given, and especially for those theories that posit timeless rules for international interactions; constructivist theories that can accommodate change seem more plausible. These turning points also suggest that 1945 is less of a rupture than our commonly employed notion of ‘post-1945’ would suggest. U.S., global, and even European survey courses may be well served by framing the years from World War I to the 1970s as a single period, with U.S. assertiveness and relative economic prosperity as its defining features, along with the quest for recognition of racial equality. (The realization of such equality in practice is likely more a feature of the post-1970s world, though there is obviously still much to be achieved.) In the U.S. survey, such a periodization would also align well with current scholarly narratives on partisan politics, the trajectory of the federal government, mass culture, environmentalism, and even the Cold War.

It was the Cold War—or, more generally, the U.S.-Soviet antagonism—that dominated the historiography of American involvement in World War I from the outset. Reassessments since the end of the Cold War have benefitted not only from a changed international political climate, but also from the explosion of identity-related historiography in the 1990s and, even more recently, transnational approaches. While concerns about the spread of communism did dominate the attention of many key players as World War I reached its conclusion, the effects of the war were much more varied and far-reaching. The contributors to this special issue of *Diplomatic History* clearly demonstrate that, much to their readers’ benefit.
As 2014 draws to a close and the Armistice of November 11th passes, the opportunity presents itself to reflect upon a raft of World War One centenary commemorations in the United Kingdom, from the ‘Blood Swept Land and Seas of Red’ installation of 888,246 ceramic poppies at the Tower of London (one representing each British or Colonial serviceman killed) to the ‘Football Remembers’ campaign commemorating matches played on the Western Front during the Christmas Truce of 1914. These national events were mirrored at the local level across the country as the First World War was seemingly never far from the agenda in 2014.

It is in this environment that I sat down to read the Commemorative Issue on the “Legacies of World War I” brought together by Tufts University’s David Ekbladh and the Diplomatic History’s former editor, Thomas Zeiler. It is well worth taking the time to do that. Much else has been published in 2014, and no doubt will continue to be in through to 2018 with a World War One motif, but this special forum should be earmarked as it ‘joins’ those ranks.

As one might expect in an edited collection of this sort, the broad-ranging coverage is not ‘comprehensive’ in the sense of covering every aspect of the First World War. Indeed, how could it be in the two hundred odd-pages of a journal dedicated to the study of American Foreign Relations; there will always be an angle that might have been covered. Credit must therefore go to the editors for achieving the requisite balance: one which does not feign coherence (nor will this review) while allowing the sixteen individual articles ‘room to stand’ in their own right.

This reviewer will point to three main reasons for commending the volume. The first thing to note is that discussion of the First World War remains an active field of academic debate. Having been the catalyst to a new academic discipline, International Relations, the fact that the war still provides the epistemological starting point for a slew of discussions should come as little surprise. The special forum illustrates, if nothing else, the range of questions that are still worth asking a century after the conflict began. Ekbladh’s introduction rightly highlights the multiple legacies of the conflict that prompt these questions. “From its inception there has been no one legacy of the war,” Ekbladh writes, “but a shifting set of lessons, interpretations, and costs left


by an unparalleled global war” (698). That the legacies are still with us is clear from the global commemoratory efforts in 2014, but also from the transitions in ‘remembering’ that began in 1919 and have evolved ever since.79

The second point of commendation follows on and focuses upon the broad-ranging nature of the sixteen articles included. The breadth of subject matter within an American context is impressive from consideration of citizenship to memory; and humanitarianism to religion. Of the other articles I want to point to just a couple that caught this reviewer’s eye. As a scholar who has written on the influence of U.S. Admiral and strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan on presidents Theodore, and Franklin Roosevelt, I found Michael Adas’s assertion that the U.S. Navy’s “operations were arguably the most decisive US contribution to Allied victory” (703-4) noteworthy. This was not just because I agree with the point that Theodore’s foresight in supporting sea power served American interests on a global plain – something one suspects that must have added to the vehemence of the wartime quarrel between President Woodrow Wilson and Roosevelt– but because Adas’s point also illustrates how the conduct of the First World War was influenced by decision-makers of an earlier era.80 This was a lesson not lost on Wilson’s own Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Roosevelt.

Lessons drawn from the First World War are also clear in Matthew F. Jacobs’s article addressing the legacy of the conflict to the Middle East. On this canvas Jacobs paints a picture of four interrelated issues that have shaped the region through to the present day. Most telling is his analysis of change in the region brought about by the War; “foreign control over much of the Middle East had been formalised through the League of Nations mandate system, the political boundaries and broader political system of the region had completely changed, the internal political dynamics were moving toward an explicitly more nationalist phase, and the Middle East would assume an increasingly significant role in a rapidly expanding international oil industry” (777). Jacobs’s analysis includes, for it would be conspicuous by its absence, discussion of empire in the Middle East in a way that makes clear it was influenced fundamentally by the War. Jacobs is not alone in this forum in making this point; and it is one of a pleasing number that incorporates consideration of empire as a lens on the study of history.

An alternate lens is provided by Katharina Reitzler,81 in her article “The War as History: Writing the Economic and Society History of the First World War”. Reitzler’s

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79 In addition see See David Reynolds’s *The Long Shadow: The Great War and the Twentieth Century* (New York, 2013) for insight into how the conflict has been remembered.


81 Katharina Reitzler, “The War as History: Writing the Economic and Social History of the First
article focuses on the study of the writing of the Carnegie History of the conflict, explaining the ‘battles’ of interpretation that begin as historians sought to provide a meaningful account of the War. The article’s great value is that it should resonate with historians of any era who are tempted to provide comprehensive ‘lessons from the past’ to contemporaneous society.

Comprising a further reason for recommending the volume, beyond its overall range of subject matter, is a pleasing breadth in methodological terms. It is perhaps an unintended consequence, but nonetheless a welcome one, that the volume provides a wonderful resource to accompany the teaching of research methods in history. By virtue of having the same core subject matter and theme, the volume allows teachers to concisely illustrate to students, particularly graduate students, the breadth of scholarly approaches in a reflective fashion. These factors are evident in Akira Iriye’s essay “The Historiographic Impact of the Great War” which explicitly questions the way in which the First World War has been written about by scholars, by describing the conflict (and also the conflict of 1939-1945) as ‘anachronistic’ – of another, ‘ancient’ history – given its focus on inter-state war at a time when “global interdependence and transnational nexus” (762) were challenging the nation-state. Equally, Robert Gerwath’s and Erez Manela’s essay tackles the mode of history that dates the conflict in euro-centric state terms from August 1914 to November 1918. In identifying a ‘long’ World War One of sorts they argue that the war needs to be considered as spatially as well as temporally broad. The recurring influence of empire in the volume is evident here as they argue that “[i]f we are to take seriously as a world war, we must ... do justice more fully to the millions of imperial subjects” who were involved “globally” (788).

If it is incumbent of a reviewer to find reason to fault the volume, I would point to the absence of a greater number of non-American perspectives in the forum. Recognising the publication, and overlooking the passport of any particular author, one of the unanswered but potentially most interesting questions arising is the balance in considering what constitutes ‘American’ history, and what constitutes International, Global or Transnational history. Rietzler addresses the matter skilfully as the subject of her work, particularly with the phrase “transnationally constituted American internationalism” (827), but there is more that could be done here throughout in conceptual and analytical terms.


82 Particularly useful also is the analytical framework by Jacobs in drawing together four strands of analysis, and some reflexivity; a useful illustration for students.

Also, and although it might well have been an impossible task, I would have welcomed evidence of more discussion between the authors in the collection: Iriye, Gerwath-Manela and Rietzler spring to mind, as does Christopher Capozzola and Andrew Preston in addressing matters of American society and identity. In each case they would seem to have much to offer to each other to enrich their analyses, but perhaps that is too much to ask? An editor's role is never an easy one, so the task performed by Ekbladh and Zeiler in bringing together the forum’s sixteen articles deserves praise. The poise and reflexive qualities of the writing make the reading of this volume a rewarding experience. In short, I learnt a great deal in reading these sixteen articles.

Memories of the First World War like Edwin Lutyens’s Cenotaph in Whitehall, once a temporary structure with the façade of permanence that was then made permanent, and replicated globally, have in many regards become permanent. This collection and the questions it poses directly, and for further scholarly endeavour, remind us that nothing is permanent. The First World War, for all of the words written about it – these included – remains worthy of attention, for its legacies will continue for another hundred years at least.

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