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Seeking chapter proposals for an upcoming edited volume of historical essays on the theme of the many means by which naval forces are employed outside of, or on the fringes of, the usually-accepted roles of sea control and power projection. An academic book publisher has expressed interest in the topic, and requires a list of chapters and authors before proceeding.
Why? Naval forces, from those of ancient Athens to the fleets and personnel of modern America, exist to control the seas and project power, frequently through the use of violence. This reason for being, however, does not include everything they have done or can do. In December 2020 U.S. Navy medical personnel deployed to the Navajo Reservation in Arizona and New Mexico, very far from contested shores or sea lines of communication, to vaccinate Native Americans against COVID 19. And last summer several U.S. Navy commands hosted STEM education camps for school children, and Navy musicians played hundreds of concerts for civilian communities and at ceremonial functions. And of course the most-recent highest-profile uses of contemporary U.S. Navy platforms are its bases housing thousands of refugees from Afghanistan and U.S. Navy ships and aircraft providing humanitarian assistance to Haiti…soft power projection, certainly, but somewhere to the left of the Battle of Midway on the ROMO chart.
This is not a new phenomenon. Throughout U.S. history, the U.S. Navy has spent a significant part of its time and resources doing what Samuel Huntington called a Navy’s “ subordinate and collateral responsibilities…” – something they do, but not what they were actually provided and maintained to do. Those responsibilities have at times may have contributed more to American security, prosperity, and identity than more traditional roles, and also at times have perhaps been due to what a recent critical report called the Navy’s “lack of emphasis on actually fighting and winning wars.” Whatever the reason, these activities and units are more common and persistent than grand battles and great ships, but they receive far less attention than their frequency merits. This collection shall help correct that oversight, serve as a catalyst and stepping stone for further exploration in this aspect of naval history, and inform what may be planned or expected for the future.
Who? Contributors will come from across the spectrum of those who study or work in naval or maritime operations. We seek inputs from across nations and backgrounds, from professional scholars to naval practitioners to amateur historians.
How? For chapter proposals, please submit an approximately 250-word abstract and a one-page resume or CV, highlighting your experience and/or expertise with the subject on which you wish to write. Subjects should be related naval forces - in whatever form, from any point in history - being used effectively either in a non-combat/kinetic role or in that way apart from the maritime domain. Ideally, they should also explore the broader global context of their use – rise and decline of states and empires, revolutions in military affairs, great power competition - and inform decision making. Send CV and abstract in Word Documents attachments, subject line reading “SUBMISSION – [Title or Subject you’re proposing] – to SeapowerBOM@gmail.com by Jan. 15, 2022.
What’s next? Authors will be notified of their proposal’s status by Mar. 9, 2022, at which time the editor will submit the full work’s proposal, with chapters and author list, to the potential publisher. Once that holistic proposal is accepted, authors will be notified of their essay submission deadline and all other requirements. Expect final works to be between 2,500-5,000 words, Chicago Manual of Style, with open-source imagery submitted by the author, due sometime in late Spring 2022.