Date: Thu, 8 Feb 1996 14:59:41 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Thu, 8 Feb 96 10:12:18 +0100
From: Thomas Diez (tdiez@mzes.sowi.uni-mannheim.de)
Dear Gilbert Larochelle:
With your description of ideology leading to the assigning of an identity, of a prescription of an identity, a determination of time and the establishment of knowledge, I wonder whether - from a constructivist perspective - this could not be said of every discourse, of which ideology I would say is only a specific form. Or, put differently: What is it that differentiates ideology form discourse in general, if one could make such a distinction? Unfortunately, I can't read French either - is there a chance of an English translation at some point?
Best wishes,
Thomas Diez
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Thomas Diez
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research
Mannheimer Zentrum fuer Europaeische Sozialforschung
Steubenstrasse
D-68131 Mannheim
Tel. ++49-(0)621-292-8465
Fax. ++49-(0)621-292-8435
tdiez@mzes.sowi.uni-mannheim.de
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Date: Fri, 9 Feb 1996 13:18:11 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Fri, 09 Feb 1996 10:15:17 -0600 (CST)
From: GILDRIER@LYNX.APSU.EDU
Professor Diez is wise to note that ideology is "a specific form" of the more general category, "discourse, "which is the essence of culture. The distinquishing mark of ideology, I believe, is the subject matter of the discourse: social, economic, and political arrangements, or the distribution of power in a society. The distinctions can become blurred. For instance, aesthetics may at times be relatively free of ideological reference but, as in Soviet Realism, aesthetic sense may be nearly totally absorbed into an ideological frame.
Richard P. Gildrie
Austin Peay State University
Clarksville, Tenn.
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 1996 13:01:23 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 96 16:34:30 +0100
From: Thomas Diez (tdiez@mzes.sowi.uni-mannheim.de)
Professor Gildrie wrote, responding to my last week's posting:
The distinquishing mark of ideology,
"I believe, is the subject matter of the discourse: social, economic, and political arrangements, or the distribution of power in a society."
I am not sure. My whole question was rather guided by the idea that what Gilbert Larochelle labelled "ideology" I would label discourse, doubting whether there indeed is a distinction between the two besides the labelling of specific modes of discourse as "ideology" in other discourses. (This, of course, might have to do with the problem of naming something "political": If the subject matter of a discourse is the decisive factor and it is the characteristic of the subject matter being (among others) political that makes discourse an ideology, the question of distinction is, in my view, only deferred, because it then centers around what to name political.)
The example of the aesthetic influence in Soviet Realism by Gildrie is illustrative in this respect, because it designates the Other as ideologist. Once the Western liberal-democratic system is regarded as a discourse/ideology in the same vein, though, the Washington Mall or Rambo movies or, if you will, the meanings constructed around the wrapping of the German Reichstag last summer might as well be seen as the aesthetics of ideology/discourse. On the move from ideology to discourse, I think Michel Foucault's arguments against the "notion of ideology" are very convincing. Speaking of which: I've just read parts of Michele Barrett's "The Politics of Truth. From Marx to Foucault", Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991 - I found the chapter on Foucault very helpful in this respect.
best wishes,
Thomas Diez
************************************************************************
Thomas Diez
Mannheim Centre for European Social Research
Mannheimer Zentrum fuer Europaeische Sozialforschung
Steubenstrasse
D-68131 Mannheim
Tel. ++49-(0)621-292-8465
Fax. ++49-(0)621-292-8435
tdiez@mzes.sowi.uni-mannheim.de
************************************************************************
Date: Tue, 13 Feb 1996 14:21:36 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 1996 15:40:01 -0600 (CST)
From: GILDRIER@LYNX.APSU.EDU
At risk of driving Prof. Diez nuts and annoying all others, I will say that he and I are getting closer to a useful definition of ideology as discourse. At least I think we are. If we say ideology is defined by object of the discourse whether political, social, or economic, then he is right that we need to define "political," etc. But that is not hard, unless I am even more naive than I think I am. Political refers to governmental or state institutions and practices. Ideology is used to explain, justify, or criticize them. We follow the same process for "social" or "economic" institutions and practices.
I agree that the aesthetics of the Washington Mall and Rambo movies can be interpreted ideologically, just as Soviet Realism can. I see no reason why the word "ideology" must have pejorative implications. On this, I agree with Clifford Geertz, among others.
Richard Gildrie
Austin Peay State University
Gildrier@lynx.apsu.edu
Date: Thu, 15 Feb 1996 11:06:20 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Wed, 14 Feb 96 22:41:08 -0500
From: Hughie Lawson (a06432f@msumusik.mursuky.edu)
Richard Gildrie writes:
"I agree that the aesthetics of the Washington Mall and Rambo movies can be interpreted ideologically, just as Soviet Realism can. I see no reason why the word "ideology" must have pejorative implications. On this, I agree with Clifford Geertz, among others."
An interesting treatment of this question appears in John B. Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture, Stanford UP, 1990. Thompson distinguishes between the pejorative or critical defn of I and the neutral defn (which Gildrie seems to favor); Thompson favors the critical defn. As he puts it "to study ideology is to study the ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination." (p. 56) For Thompson a symbolic form (discourse, meaning) is ideological to the degree that it does establish and sustain such relations. His book is exceptionally clear for so theoretical a work, and I recommend it to readers seeking a defense of the pejorative use of "ideology."
Richard Gildrie is correct that nothing requires us to accept the critical use. Still, for study of symbolic expression or discourse in the neutral sense we have other terms: political theory, polemics, myth, symbol, the generic terms that label the discourse in question, and terms derived from art criticism.
The pejorative use has a long history beginning with Marx, who emphasized the false and deceptive character of ideology. Thompson demurs here, insisting that ideology (in his preferred sense) need not be untrue; it need only serve to establish and sustain relations of domination.
For Thompson, whether a meaning is ideological is an empirical question, to be discovered by studying its use in context. I'm not sure that I want to consent to Thompson's view, and I'm certainly not attacking Richard Gildrie, whose views also enjoy strong support.
Thompson's book is an expression of what Stanley Fish calls "theory hope": it seeks an academic consensus for a use of "ideology" that Thompson hopes will make academic work more revealing of the role of meaning in supporting domination, esp. in the study of mass communication, which is his field.
Hughie Lawson, Murray State
a06432f@msumusik.mursuky.edu
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 16:20:21 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 96 12:47:10 EST
From: Chris Suggs (JCSJJ%CUNYVM@UICVM.UIC.EDU)
Responding to Lawson on Thompson: It would seem good to think of what a thing is, i.e., the category to which it belongs, before pursuing its differentia. In the case of ideology, it appears to be a system. From there I think it is a system of thought. From there it would follow that any given ideology will have a content of its own, and at the same time is also directed at everything else in the world such that it explains or accounts for as much of the world as it can and [and this is crucial] enables the ideologue to subjugate the contradictions made visible by the presence of those things it cannot explain or account for.
It's in this way that ideologies are totalizing systems, perhaps. And may- be in this way seem to be constructed to sustain patterns of dominance. That is, a) less-than-total systems of dominance seem not to be very useful and so ideologies are useful tools to accompany them, and b) it might be that we are more aware of contradictions in systems of dominance and so have more need to apply the functions of ideology to them than to systems of subordination.
What interests me, among other aspects of this problem, is "how" ideologies as systems of thought enable participants to negotiate contradictions in their experiences with the world. Specifically, how does an ideology enable its holder to continue to act in a manner consistent with the ideological pre- suppositions she has adopted, in the face of irrefutable contradictions to those suppositions?
Jon-Christian Suggs
Professor, English
John Jay College/CUNY
New York, New York 10019
jcsjj@cunyvm.cuny.edu
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 1996 16:20:42 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Fri, 16 Feb 96 13:13:04 EST
From: Chris Suggs (JCSJJ%CUNYVM@UICVM.UIC.EDU)
Excuse me, but I wanted to add a note to my previous post re Lawson on Thompson: Lawson reports Thompson as positing that an idea is ideological "in context," or existentially. I don't think we can work with the adjectival form that way. It seems to me that "ideological" can only be used to mean "belonging to an ideology" and not, as Thompson (via Lawson?) would have it, "having the characteristics of an ideology."
Thanks,
Jon-Christian Suggs
Professor, English
John Jay College/CUNY
New York, New York 10019
jcsjj@cunyvm.cuny.edu
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 1996 14:08:18 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Sat, 17 Feb 96 10:15:17 -0500
From: Hughie Lawson (a06432f@msumusik.mursuky.edu)
On Feb 16, 1996, Chris Suggs wrote:
"Responding to Lawson on Thompson: It would seem good to think of what a thing is, i.e., the category to which it belongs, before pursuing its differentia. In the case of ideology, it appears to be a system."
For Thompson, ideology belongs to the category of qualities of meaning. A meaning possesses the quality of ideology to the degree that the meaning serves to establish or advance domination.
Whether a meaning is ideological is an empirical question, to be answered by studying the function of the meaning in its use.
This is Thompson's preferred use of ideology. For him, ideology may be a quality of any symbolic expression, whether it be a system or not. This is a distinct usage from the "neutral" notion of ideology.
Date: Wed, 21 Feb 1996 13:32:37 -0500
From: "H-Ideas Co-Editor (David Bailey)" (idea@hs1.hst.msu.edu)
Subject: Re: Ideology(discourse)
Date: Tue, 20 Feb 96 19:07:12 -0500
From: Hughie Lawson (a06432f@msumusik.mursuky.edu)
Jon-Christian Suggs writes:
"Hi--here it is. Re your later points: 1) I just disagree with Thompson because it seems not useful to claim everything that supports dominance is ideo logical or ideology. Circumstance, empirically, may support a period or system of dominance, may it not? I'd have to hold outfor an ideology being a system of thought rather than a contextual effect;"
There's much about this that attracts me too, for it it makes possible the establishment of ideology as a genre of literature. Besides that the now-maligned structuralists in US sociology used to distinguish between manifest and latent functions of social entities. This nice distinction would make possible I think what Thompson wants to do; it also sets up a basis for unmasking (by employing the idea of latent function). Thompson does limit his application to symbolic expression.
2) lexically, ""to belong to an ideology"is not the same as "to have the characteristics of an ideology" in the same way that that a mule that belongs to Hank Smith is not presumed to have the characteristics of a Hank Smith.The mule may function in the systemic approach to farming that Mr. Smith employs but may do so without having either the goals or the design or Mr. Smith's good looks."
I see your point here. I think you would agree that this is an application of your preference for ideology as a class of literature recognizable by its subject matter content. I have decided not to choose yet between the Suggs and Thompson views. Thank you for responding to my query. I think your views are consistent and sensibly held.
Hughie Lawson (a06432f@msumusik.mursuky.edu)
Murray State U.
Hughie Lawson, Murray State University
a06432f@msumusik.mursuky.edu