Secessionism and Separatism Monthly Series: "Secession and Secessionism" by Alexandar Pavković

A very useful and pertinent introduction to the series. I am most interested in understanding secessionist movements when they fail to garner the majority support of their own constituency (as in Scotland or Quebec) or if they do (as in Catalonia or East Pakistan/Bangladesh). This leads to some interesting argumentative notions: a. the imagination of the host-state as an oppressor is contested amongst the oppressed nation; b. the host-state does well to co-opt (some) ethnic elites of the dominated nation who then play the role of spoilers in the secessionist project; c. secession and its aftermath is deeply contested within the oppressed nation with respect to bringing perceived socio-economic and political benefits after independence is achieved; despite cultural homogeneity, the heterogeneity of political views (separatist, secessionist) is manifest within the oppressed nation. For Catalonia or East Pakistan/Bangladesh, the obverse is true where the imagination of the host state develops through stages to become more oppositional and less conciliatory leading to a majority clamouring for secession. It is interesting to note whether the same tendencies will play out through a stage-development theory in Scotland or Quebec.

Second, the discourse on nationalist secession should of necessity exclude Islamic Jihad or enitites such as ISIS. First, the Islamist discourse privileges the community (Umma) of like-minded believers which comprise different nations and nationalities. Second, the concept of the Umma does not recognise any political frontiers or boundaries rather a transnational community organised under a Caliphate. Third, as the phenomenon of ISIS makes clear, different nations and nationalities comprise the organisation with a territorial conception which stretches from Syria to South Asia. This territorial conception is, furthermore, not bent on seceding from an existing territory but capturing existing territories through brute use of power and coercion.

On Separatism and Secession: some questions for discussion Alexander Pavković’s recent contribution prompts some important questions in respect of secession, international law and the nature of nationalist movements in the twenty first century (as does the comment by Don Doyle). Is there, for example, a clear distinction between secessionism and separatism in theory or in practice? For the most part case studies tend to use the terms interchangeably. In Don Doyle’s excellent edited volume, Secession as an International phenomenon (2010) the entry in the index under separatism refers the reader to secession. Likewise, in the introduction to Secessionism and Separatism in Europe and Asia: To Have a State of One’s Own (Routledge, 2013) Alexander Pavković and his co-editor Jean-Pierre Cabestan note the blurred nature of the overlap between the two concepts and the way they are used by scholars in the field. Do we need a more analytically nuanced distinction between the two concepts or do they really address the same issue? There are forms of separatism that do not entail separation from the existing state and indeed have no relationship to nationalism or the demand for political independence. In the historical literature ‘separatism’ has been used for various religious movements (to separate from the existing church) and in respect of demands for denominational education outside a state system. This is not what is normally intended when scholars concerned with self-determination are discussing demands for secession and/or separatism.

It is also important to appreciate that, as Alexander Pavković reminds us, not all secessionist/separatist movements demand an independent state. This may be strategic rather than principled. For a considerable amount of time Catalan nationalists argued for greater autonomy from Spain which would provide for separate development in the Catalan region short of establishing an independent state. This is no longer the case and it is arguable that achieving high levels of autonomy increases the demand for independence rather than dilute it. The contributory factor in this shift seems to be the presence of a sense of nationality and national attachment, which is often not present in regional movements. The essence of the nationalist project remains the establishment of independent states; otherwise would they be nationalists? It may be that co-nationals do not embrace this objective, and this was the case in Scotland in 2014, but this does not change the objective of the nationalist movement there or elsewhere. There are special cases where this does not occur, as in Crimea, but these cases tend to be exceptional.

One interesting by product of the Scottish referendum on independence is that many of those who supported political independence denied that they were either secessionists or separatists. I was taken to task on a number of occasions for using the word secessionist to describe those in favour of an independent Scotland. I am at a loss to know what to describe such a campaign in the absence of either of these terms. I am less inclined than Alexander Pavković to accept the United Nations position on the self-determination of colonial peoples. The UN position reflects the dominant view of states in the post war world and ignores the fact that for many hundreds of years imperial states were considered legitimate in the world system (until the 1950s). As an organisation that represents the state system and the states themselves, the UN had to make the case that decolonisation was qualitatively different from the claims made by nations within existing states or in the newly independent states. If decolonisation had been considered an act of secession, then it would have been possible for sub-state nations within a newly established state to demand secession and independence for themselves.

By drawing the line and insisting that decolonisation was not an act of secession the UN maintained the Westphalian consensus that territorial integrity was the primary focus for international law. This has had disastrous consequences for, as Walker Connor regularly reminded his readers, most states are not ‘nation-states’ but are in fact multinational states (or at the very least they are states within which there are distinct ethnic groups with distinctive histories and cultures). Alexander Pavković has outlined the concerns that states have in respect of fragmentation, but perhaps it is time to reconsider this matter.

There are now approximately 200 states in the world, a significant increase on the number in 1945. Most are members of an exclusive club: the United Nations. Yet this is a club of states not one that includes the 500 or more nations that can be identified around the world (this is probably an underestimate). Not all nations seek independence but many do and the nature of the state system is strongly biased against these demands. The United Kingdom and Canada seem to be the exceptions; both acknowledge a right to secede on the part of the sub-state nations within the state’s territory. This is not the case elsewhere in Europe (Spain for example) and secessionist/separatist demands are normally met with overwhelming force by the existing state. States such as India, China and Turkey have become imperial powers in respect of their distinctive sub-state nations (the same case might be made for Spain).

The fact that these nations are contiguous rather than overseas changes little; the similarity between these cases and that of the British state and Ireland 1800-1921 or the Austro-Hungarian Empire may provide a basis for comparison. Indeed, a case can be made that the attitude of India, Turkey and China to Kashmir, the Kurds and Tibet is a colonial one. Each of these states are occupying powers in an area where distinctive nationalities are predominant and treat the indigenous population as subordinate if not inferior. In each case there is substantial evidence that the state has committed crimes against humanity against these nationalities.

In this respect Don Doyle draws our attention to some significant issues in the contemporary world. States tend to deny that sub-states nations have the right to self-determination that includes secession (and are supported in this by the UN). The current Spanish government makes this explicit in the context of Catalonia on narrow legalistic grounds but there is widespread support for this view. India has a law which explicitly makes it illegal to support secession from India (the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act), while other states resort to intimidation or worse to subdue such demands. Don Doyle highlights the many secessionist movements which have failed and is rightly concerned at the consequences of secession for those who are not part of the ‘nation’ which seeks independence.

It is possible now to identify ‘we’ and ‘them’ in sub-state regions if the international community is willing to do so. While it is complicated, it is certainly possible to hold a census in contested areas and limit independence to areas where those seeking independence are predominant. This would limit the territorial claim of both the state and the secessionist movement. The Irish case offers some historical evidence – nationalists claimed the whole island but a sizeable group in the north-east wished to remain with the existing state. In turn the extent of the territory controlled by the Unionist majority in the north east included a significant minority of nationalists who did not wish to remain in the UK. This anomaly was never addressed by nationalists or unionists. The re-partition of Northern Ireland in the 1920s would have reduced the percentage of nationalists within the region considerably and possibly prevented the type of polarisation that ensued. Furthermore, a bill or rights for everyone in Northern Ireland would have undermined the legitimacy of Unionist dominance, but this was never put in place.

Could this case be applied more generally today? It is now possible through opinion polls and other surveys to provide exact numbers for ethnicity, nationality and religion; it is also acceptable to have internationally monitored referendums on the possibility of independence; and it is surely possible to insist that independence should involve internationally supported safeguards for minorities within the new state. We can learn from the disaster of the inter-war period when new states ignored the commitments they made to the League of Nations and the international community to secure the rights of national groupings within the new state.

I would argue that international agreements to secure secession in a stable and peaceful manner can serve world peace. The refusal of the state system to acknowledge the right of nations to political independence has probably contributed more to international instability since the end of the Second World War than anything else. Thus, it may be the time to reconsider the dominance of the state in discussions on secession and to bring the nation back in. One way forward might be to discuss the possibility of a constitutional right to secede that would become an international charter.

I welcome Alexandar’s (if I may use the familiar) comments on my post and his question in respect of the normative foundations of a right to self-determination for a national community that allows for the establishment of a new state. I share his view that such a claim is not self-evident, though I draw rather different conclusions for this than he does. It is also the case that both the normative political claim to a state are widely contested within the literature and most scholars reject them, except under quite stringent conditions. This involves a remedial right to self-determination when the existing state has committed egregious human rights violations in respect of the national community. It might be said that for these theorists, it is the violation of human rights and not the claim to be a distinctive national community that justifies secession and political independence.

I adopt both a normative and a political/historical analysis in respect of the right to establish a new state. The most persuasive case for reconfiguring international politics in this way has been provided by Margaret Moore, Harry Beran and Kai Nielsen among others. Moore in particular provides a satisfactory explanation for why all nations should receive equal recognition even when (particularly when?) they do not have states of their own. Moore recognises the serious practical problems in this and discusses the question of indeterminacy, problems of instability and the challenge of overlapping nationalities. What she offers is an alternative viewpoint for addressing the place of the nation within the international system. The most sustained treatment of this appears in The Ethics of Nationalism which challenges the existing normative principles of international order and offers strong reasons for bringing the nation to the centre of the system.

It should be added that none of these alternative models support an absolute right to self-determination or independence. Indeed some (including myself) would argue that reconfiguring international politics to take account of nationality does not imply support for political independence in all or indeed most cases. Thus, to take a recent example, there are those who support the right of Scotland to have a referendum on independence, but would not vote in favour of it (as seems also to be the case in Catalonia). If the normative case to be made is should all nations be states, then the answer is probably no. But if the normative case is should all nations have the right to self-determination which might include political independence under certain conditions established and agreed by the international community, then the answer is yes. I will return to this question in more detail in my contribution later in the series.

However, I consider the political/historical argument to be the main justification for supporting a right to secession and statehood. I would follow John Stuart Mill’s view that ‘Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart’. Mill does not make this absolute and questions why certain nations would wish to lose the benefits of remaining within the existing state. However, the balance of his argument is that if a political case can be sustained by a nationality within a state for self-government then that should be respected. The same point can be made against this position as Alexsandar does, ‘why should nations, and no other groups, have this particular right?’. In principle it would be difficult to make the case that other groups who make such a demand should be denied it, but the political reality is that most claims for self-determination and secession are based on some notion of nationality. I am currently examining the history of political independence since the French Revolution and in virtually every case those promoting secession employ nationalist arguments in support of their claim.

Indeed, the westphalian state system is built around such a notion of identity; but the identity is religious and not national. The state system that we inherit is a response to the religious wars of the 15th and 16th centuries and to stabilise the system there was a de facto acknowledgement that the religion of the people would be the religion of the ruler. Membership of the state was thus privileged in terms of the religion adopted by the monarch, though of course minorities continued to live within that territory. However, the nature of the state reflected this religious identity and this was not restricted to European States: the Ottoman Empire and Czarist Russia employed very similar norms in respect of religion. What has happened is that nationality has replaced religion in defining the state in the 19th and 20th centuries. Increasingly, communities everywhere identified with a nationality and each nation defined itself in respect of other nations (especially within multinational states). Nationalism, democracy and sovereignty have become closely identified since the American and French Revolutions and alternative political systems have not been able to compete with this powerful mix.

Furthermore, the state remains the most significant political institution in the international system, despite globalisation and multi-level governance. Politically, having one’s own state remains attractive because of the authority, legitimacy and power attached to it. The other reason why having a state is attractive is that the existing states remain very reluctant to seriously engage with demands based on nationality and this often leaves the sub-state nation with little option except to demand a state of its own. A further reason why nation and nationality may be attractive is that in practice the international community gives greater legitimacy to self-determination based on nationality than it does for religion, race or other considerations.

The paradox here is that the very strength of the state system and the normative values attached to it (especially territorial integrity) made alternative solutions less attractive both to the state (usually until it is too late) and to the sub-state nation. The existing state system rests on pre-democratic and pre-modern foundations and seems unable to address the instability that democracy, nationality and sovereignty brings to the international order. In the absence of a realistic alternative, sub-state nationalisms, whether oppressed or not, will continue to seek an independent state.

Many thanks to Alexander, Brian, Cristian, Farhan, and Don for these excellent comments on Alexander's original post!  Please feel welcome to continue debating and discussing these issues on this thread, and to join in on the conversation if you have something to say. On Nov. 20 we will be circulating our second monthly post in the series, giving us even more to think about. 

Best,

David Prior
H-Nationalism