H-Diplo Article Review Forum 940
27 March 2020
“Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?” International Journal 74:1 (March 2019): 5-134. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019827050.
Editors: Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii
- Introduction by David Webster, Bishop’s University.. 1
- Review by Caroline Dunton, University of Ottawa.. 4
- Review by Anders Wivel, University of Copenhagen.. 9
Introduction by David Webster, Bishop’s University
What happens to liberal internationalism when the big beasts that built the system start to kick the legs out from under it? Does it reinvent itself—and if so, how?
In March 2019 the International Journal ran a special issue on the future of the liberal world order. As our reviewers Caroline Dunton and Anders Wivel note, the answer of the contributors is to re-tool the existing order, while still saving it from critics within and without. Both praise the essays for being thoughtful, pragmatic and relevant.
The forum’s title boldly references nationalist critics of “globalism” with the words “Making liberal internationalism great again,” but ends with the inevitable academic question mark. The future of that order seems under threat from the nationalist swagger of critics who are running some of the states that formed this world order, and from critics outside who can see its negative effects on other parts of the world.
Dunton’s review highlights “key dichotomies” in international relations scholarship that inform the forum’s authors, underlining the contributors’ points that the threats to liberal internationalism are as much from within as from without. The domestic threats are not only from fair-haired populists in the leading Western powers, but also from the middle powers that Wivel calls the “knights and squires” of liberal internationalism.
This journal is published in Canada, which has posed as one of the bastions of a liberal world order, a sponsor (with Britain, France, Germany, and Japan) of a new “Alliance for Multilateralism” and other groups that seek to meld the liberal middle powers. Former Canadian Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland, who spelled this argument out in a series of speeches, won plaudits in U.S. liberal circles for doing so, and even a diplomat-of-the-year award from the journal Foreign Policy. Her acceptance speech could form part of the current liberal internationalist canon, with its evoking of “a rules-based international order,” its acceptance that the 1990s belief in liberal internationalism’s inevitability was an act of hubris, its lamenting of America’s retreat from a U.S.-created world order, and its fevered dread towards “homegrown anti-democratic movements” and “sophisticated, well-financed propaganda and espionage operations” from abroad.
At greater length and with greater depth of study, the authors of this International Journal forum evoke similar themes and similar worries, positioned as they are in the home of the idea of ‘middlepowermanship.’ From Russian intel to Toronto incels, everything seems to indicate that the centre cannot hold. Yet, like the political leaders who praise liberal internationalism, the authors seem to strike an optimistic, even defiant, note.
Reviewing their work, Dunton questions the existential nature of the threat, declaring herself unconvinced “that this particular political moment is one of deep threat to a rules-based international order from the ‘rise of the rest’ [but rather that] traditional liberal democracies are being met with challenges that should be cause for deep reflection.” That reflection might lead to “a liberal-less internationalism” rather than to a resurrection of past liberal internationalist glories.
Wivel concurs with praise for the forum’s efforts to “balance the alarmism of much public (and some academic) debate on the demise of the liberal international order” but is more sympathetic than Dunton to the authors’ “shared belief that the liberal international order is worth preserving.” Both reviewers implicitly pose the question of which countries liberal internationalism benefits. That may be the existing middle powers themselves. Even in internationalist thought, self-interest may dominate.
David Webster is a History professor at Bishop’s University. His next book is Challenge the Strong Wind: Canada and East Timor 1975-99 (University of British Columbia Press, 2020).
Caroline Dunton is a Ph.D. student at the University of Ottawa and a research assistant the Centre for International Policy Studies. She is the former Cadieux-Léger Fellow at Global Affairs Canada.
Anders Wivel is Professor with special responsibilities in the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research interests include power politics, small state foreign policy, and European and Scandinavian politics. His recent publications include articles in European Security, International Studies Review and Global Affairs as well as two books, The Routledge Handbook of Scandinavian Politics (Routledge 2018, co-edited with Peter Nedergaard) and International Institutions and Power Politics: Bridging the Divide (Georgetown University Press 2019, co-edited with T.V. Paul).
Review by Caroline Dunton, University of Ottawa
Scholars and practitioners of International Relations (IR) are preoccupied by two general debates in this ever-confusing year of international politics. First, many are concerned with whether the current liberal, multilateral, and/or rules-based international order is under threat, and if so, from whom. Second, they are concerned with the difficult question of what to do about it. In this special issue of International Journal, eight essays, including an introduction, grapple with these questions from the perspective of middle powers. The authors examine, “to what extent [middle powers’] investment in a rules-bound world order may constitute a pivotal factor in its continuation and reconstitution”. In their introduction, Rita Abrahamsen, Louise Riis Andersen, and Ole Jacob Sending argue that going forward, the largest challenge at hand for those middle powers who advocate for liberal internationalism is “not to double-down on its normative virtues, but critically to reflect on how it can be retooled to respond to new challenges” (5).
The authors of the articles discuss current structures and rules and their resilience, examine ways to defend and improve the current order, explore the tangled relationship between the domestic and the international, and interrogate the myths surrounding the roots of the current order (5-8). They invoke key dichotomies in IR while examining the key issues of liberal internationalism and international order. With these key dichotomies, they interrogate contradictions, complexities, and contestations, including concepts of domestic/international, responsible/irresponsible, liberal/illiberal, inside/outside, partial/impartial, and order/disorder.
My goal in this review essay is to highlight the discussion of these dichotomies and illuminate further points of tension within them that may have otherwise been obscured or overlooked in this special issue. I seek to build on the strong and much-needed work of the authors with further open-ended reflections that take into account their understanding of foreign policy as multifaceted and of liberal internationalism as flexible. The authors opt for a “minimalist understanding of middle power liberal internationalism as a strategy that revolves around the building of multilateral institutions and global rule of law as a tool to advance key political, economic, and security interests, while at the same time strengthening a set of normative ideals” (6-7). A review essay does not allow for the space to discuss the normative implications of the use of a term like “liberal internationalism,” but I too acknowledge its self-serving use in both scholarly and practitioner circles. As such, I follow this minimalist understanding as well.
Most notably, multiple articles discuss the problems inherent in assuming that threats to the liberal international order come from outside the borders of Western, liberal democracies. As these authors point out, threats to the international order come from both the domestic and the international. In contrast to what many commentators claim, threats to the international order are not simply a product of ‘elsewhere’; they have domestic roots. Further, not only do they come from inside and outside Western liberal democracies, but they also come from inside and outside of key multilateral bodies.
Jean-François Drolet and Michael Williams argue that those concerned about international order need to take much more seriously the “ideological claims and strategic vision of today’s far right”. They warn that these dangerous forms of conservatism do not arise in an anti-intellectual vacuum, and argue rather that they have a particular sociological and political foundation in the American paleo-conservative movement. They are racist and xenophobic and embedded in an ideological vision that is frighteningly coherent. Those who hold these views are supporters of President Trump and are indeed related to the bold, far-right political organizing that is spreading across Europe and Canada.
Similarly, threats to international order also come from within the community of middle powers and their traditionally “liberal” allies. Alexandra Gheciu brings to our attention the construction of Western security communities, in particular NATO. Contrary to accounts of NATO as united around liberal-democratic norms and values, Gheciu argues that “NATO has always been involved in constructing ‘the West’”. This constant imagination and reimagination of the Western world as liberal-democratic is now rife with difference, in particular from far right and other radical, anti-democratic governments that occupy the governments of member states. Like Drolet and Williams, Gheciu provides us with a view of threats to liberal internationalism as internal to liberal internationalist states, but also their institutions. Nina Graeger argues that contestation of the liberal order challenges ‘middle powers’ traditional sheltering policies” in security. Middle powers are thus forced to put their security first, as opposed to seeking protection through sheltering policies that support a rules-based order and multilateralism. New approaches to protection will be forced to undermine these previous approaches. This is especially the case as larger powers pull away from the existing order and commitments to organizations such as NATO. Graeger writes,
To have meaning and relevance, however, liberal internationalism and multilateralism must be practiced. Today, the ideas and practices of organizations like the UN, NATO, and the EU are being contested by illiberal and anti-integrationist forces internally as well as externally. Contestation, however, may not necessarily take the form of bold statements of withdrawal or boycott, but may happen incrementally, with states and especially great powers shortening down or cancelling their attendance at multilateral meetings, postponing or refusing to sign declarations or treaties, downsizing permanent staff, or reducing resources from multilateral organizations (100).
In the context of the United Nations, Louise Riis Andersen argues that the UN is a key case for understanding the crisis of liberal internationalism, noting that liberal internationalism’s creation of the a multilateral and rules-based order had pragmatic, and even realist, roots. Thus, according to Andersen, it is up to middle powers to act independently from larger powers to revise and sustain organizations like the United Nations from the inside going forward. Andersen reminds us, as does Gheciu, that the term ‘middle power’ should not just be reserved for traditional, Western middle powers. For her, mid-sized states in the Global South should be increasingly legitimized as leading middle powers, as the distinction between traditional and non-traditional middle powers becomes “increasingly unhelpful” (47). For Gheciu, states like Turkey and Poland are indeed middle powers within NATO, but are increasingly illiberal members of the organization, rather than resembling traditionally liberal internationalist states.
Andersen suggests that labeling international order as being “in crisis” is “better understood as shorthand for an interregnum of uncharted spaces where new orders are possible but not yet materialized…” (61). Subsequently, she argues that these uncharted spaces and possibilities for disorder can be navigated by a reinvigorated United Nations, as its charter is much more flexible and adaptable to growing change than others may cynically suggest.
Looking beyond regimes, David Petrasek examines the liberal/illiberal divide from the perspective of human rights. For him, liberal and illiberal are a false dichotomy, as traditional liberal internationalists have consistently been illiberal when it comes to human rights. In fact, Western liberal commitments to human rights have been inconsistent at best. On the other hand, human rights have never been dependent on the commitment of these Western countries; rather, states in the Global South have established and maintained human rights on the global agenda and have at times supported them internationally when Western states have sought to step away. This conclusion stands strongly in contrast to the fear that human rights are in troubled times because of the liberal international order’s decline. By decoupling human rights from the realm of only Western states, Petrasek provides the opportunity to clearly see the contradictions and challenges that have always existed amongst these Western states. This is not to say that human rights are not in danger in this political moment. They are, but not because of a commonly feared ‘Western decline.’
Canada is a key example of inconsistent commitments to human rights. Like many of its allies, Canada has sold itself as a bastion of human rights and responsibility. Petrasek writes,
In fact, Canada played almost no role at all in the drafting of the UDHR, and largely ignored the UN’s human rights efforts until the late 1960s. Its active human rights foreign policy only took off in the late 1970s. True, a Canadian, John Humphrey, was a main author of the UDHR [Universal Declaration of Human Rights], and from 1947 until 1966 headed the small UN human rights department. But he was not a seconded Canadian diplomat, nor did his appointment result from Canadian government efforts on his behalf. Canada was in fact the only Western country to abstain in the first UN vote on the adoption of the UDHR, a decision which was quickly, although reluctantly, reversed because it placed Canada alongside the Soviet Union and its allies, and Saudi Arabia. While the promotion of human rights found its way into the stated foreign policy priorities of successive Canadian governments from the 1980s onwards, different governments paid more or less attention to human rights in practice (107).
Canada’s inconsistency and lack of support for human rights in the international arena may surprise some, but it comes as no surprise when one considers its violent history in terms of the territory it occupies. Again, the domestic and the international become interconnected when considering liberalism and illiberalism. Drolet and Williams caution that threats to international order come from illiberal, far right movements on the inside of liberal states, but in the context of human rights, threats to the liberal concept of human rights have also come from within liberal states themselves. In fact, for states like Canada, their mere liberal existence is predicated upon generations of violence, devastation, and indeed genocide with respect to the many Indigenous nations whose land Canada now occupies. For Western states like Canada to fully grapple with the challenges of illiberalism abroad, they must be willing to grapple with illiberalism at home, both from far-right movements and from their own ongoing histories embedded and entangled in a liberal order. Only with this can they become part of what Petrasek offers as an optimistic opportunity. He argues that the “demise of the human rights regime is far from inevitable, and, indeed, the upheaval created by new power dynamics will in itself create new opportunities” (105).
With this in mind, what does it then mean to be a responsible state? Many middle powers, including Canada and many northern European states, consider themselves to be responsible. To be responsible often means to uphold rules, multilateral organizations, human rights, and to contribute constructively to global peace and security. To be responsible is to do liberal internationalism well. To be irresponsible is to undermine the liberal international vision and project. John Karlsrund argues though that traditional liberal international conceptions of responsible or ‘good’ activities, such as contributions to peacekeeping, may not be as they seem. He examines the UN stabilization in Mali, titled MINUSMA, and argues that ‘good’ and ‘responsible’ middle powers use peacekeeping opportunities as status seeking tools, making them instrumental in a broader project of national enhancement. This allows them to appear responsible but with “limited regard for the potential liberal or illiberal effects of their contribution” (67). By moving much of this peacekeeping activity to counterterrorism activity, middle powers which are engaged in peacekeeping continue to further undermine any attempts to use multilateral approaches for peace and security initiatives.
Beyond peacekeeping, some middle powers are engaged in other peace activities, including mediation and conflict resolution. Peter Jones analyzes Canada’s desire to reclaim a role in this field, as a quintessential liberal internationalist foreign policy tool. The dichotomy present here is one of impartial and partial and it is one full of contradiction. Current Canadian policy has rendered it unable to fully engage with mediation, as it seeks to be a champion of norms, an active impartial actor, and an actor full of domestic constraints. Like responsible/irresponsible and the problem of being a ‘good state,’ Canada’s efforts are stagnant.
So, what to make of the liberal international order and its threats and contradictions? Returning to the introduction, that the editors are correct when they ask for critical reflection on responding to new challenges. The authors have also effectively demonstrated that these new challenges come from many sources and, as such, problematize traditional dichotomies in IR. Liberal internationalism is deeply flawed, but perhaps some of its parts and its tools can be used in these times of change. I am not convinced that this particular political moment is one of deep threat to a rules-based international order from the “rise of the rest.” What does convince me is that traditional liberal democracies are being met with challenges that should be cause for deep reflection both in terms of actual foreign policy and in terms of domestic politics.
Middle powers of all types have a number of challenges ahead and these should be deeply driven by introspection. Bentley Allan, Srdjan Vucetic, and Ted Hopf provide a unique analysis of the potential for a Chinese, rather than American-led, future international order. I do not seek to predict whether another sustained order will rise from what is arguably American decline, but I do aim to highlight an important point that they make. They do not believe that a hegemonic transition is likely, partly because an aspiring hegemon would have to provide an “appealing ideology” for others to follow in a long-term manner. With no such emerging ideology, middle powers are actually left with an opportunity to write their own and stake out ground as creators of rules, collaborators in multilateralism, and states that could potentially be deeply committed to deep introspection, as echoed by authors in this issue. Liberal internationalism is rife with contradiction. It has provided a stable ordering principle but it has both sustained and supported mass suffering (i.e. genocide of Indigenous peoples) and it has supported the dominance of Western states at the expense of the Global South. Perhaps then, given much of liberalism’s foundation in domination and oppression, we should move toward a liberal-less internationalism. As with Petrasek’s pairing of a pessimistic understanding of human rights with an optimistic hope for the future, I provide a pessimistic understanding of liberal internationalism paired with an optimistic hope for a cooperative future. Key principles such as diplomacy, equality, multilateralism, peace, stability, cooperation, human rights, and rules should be supported by middle powers. That said, the old liberal ways of doing so are not the way to go forward, but it is the middle powers that have the flexibility and freedom to make change. Middle powers have the opportunity to create new rules, build new relationships and relations of power, enhance mediation initiatives, enforce norms and consequences for human rights violations, and reinvigorate international organizations, especially as larger powers pull away.
Review by Anders Wivel, University of Copenhagen
The future of the liberal international order has been subject of considerable debate in recent years. Contributions in leading media outlets and policy journals such as Foreign Affairs have discussed the resilience and changing role of international institutions and the likely stickiness of the order (and its liberal characteristics) in the absence of U.S. hegemony. Analyses of the future role of old and new great powers in maintaining and redefining global and regional orders have figured prominently in the debate, but much less attention has been given to the role of middle powers.
This special issue of International Journal on middle-power diplomacy seeks to fill this lacuna. Western middle powers have defended the principles of the liberal international order (although occasionally straying from these principles in practice) and even sought to expand it beyond the wishes and interests of the United States. The Achilles’s heel of this effort is their lack of material (in particular military) power to back up good intentions. However, strengthening the liberal international order is itself a remedy for this limitation. Western middle powers are both believers in the normative value of liberal internationalism (to some extent mirroring the liberalism of their domestic societies) and among the main beneficiaries of this order underpinning peaceful conflict resolution and providing ample opportunities for influence for wealthy states with effective administrations and diplomacies. If the United States is the king of the liberal international order, then Western middle powers are its knights and squires. They are, in the words of the special issue editors, the “loyal supporters and helpful fixers” of a U.S. hegemonic order serving their interests and defending ideas they believe in (13).
The analyses all begin from what the editors characterize as a “minimalist understanding” of middle-power diplomacy. In this understanding, middle-power diplomacy is “a strategy that revolves around the building of multilateral institutions and global rule of law as a tool to advance key political, economic, and security interests, while at the same time strengthening a set of normative ideals” (6-7). These normative ideals include longtime support to free trade and development assistance as well as institutional and diplomatic solutions to international challenges. From this shared starting point, the contributions approach the issues of middle-power diplomacy and the liberal international order from various angles. In general, the contributions are effective in identifying challenges and opportunities to both the liberal international order and middle-power diplomacy. The analyses are nuanced and balanced, and the authors avoid the celebratory rhetoric, which too often accompany middle-power analysis. However, they could have been better at showing how the middle-power approach to international affairs is itself a civilizational position with these rich, safe and privileged countries too often portraying themselves as the enlightened vanguard of international development.
The special issue analyzes both the changing conditions for middle-power diplomacy and how middle powers have so far responded to the challenges to the liberal international order. To a lesser extent, they chart the way forward in the form of more or less concrete policy advice. Jean-Francois Drolet and Michael Williams show how the current revolt against the liberal international order, including important aspects of the policies of US President Trump, is grounded in radical conservative thought that is both more sophisticated and more deeply grounded, in particular in US society, than mostly recognized in discussions on contemporary populism. Overlapping with neo-Marxist and neo-Gramscian critiques of American hegemony and dominance, paleo-Conservatives argue that liberal managerial networks of global governance undermine traditional cultures and modes of social organization in the West as well as in the Global South. Alexandra Gheciu argues that the constitutive narrative about Western community is changing. In NATO, the United States seconded by other alliance members such as Poland and Hungary now see the community less in liberal-democratic and more in civilizational terms. This creates a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the nature of the Western community and the identification of the most important threats to this community. Thus, a future international order backed by the West is not necessarily liberal and members of the Western community will not necessarily agree on which threats and challenges are the most important and what instruments are appropriate in meeting these threats and challenges.
However, as shown in the articles by David Petrasek and Louise Riis Andersen, post-Western order is not necessarily post-liberal. Internationalism and global governance is no longer a speciality of the West. Petrasek points out that non-Western countries have played, and continue to play, a central role in promoting human rights, and that Western support for human rights has waxed and waned. Moreover, while we see a decline of the West, the institutions, norms and rules governing the human rights regime are strengthened. Consequently, middle powers need not retrench to a strategy of salvaging the pieces of the human rights regime as US hegemony and Western dominance decline. Instead, they should work with countries from the Global South and others finding a common ground of human and social rights and meeting the human right challenges of e.g. climate change and technological innovation. According to Andersen, the crisis of the liberal international order is at least partly the result of UN overstretch resulting from the unrealistic ambitions of the West. Taking a step back from a liberal ambition of ever-expanding global governance gradually undermining sovereignty and national autonomy will not undermine the liberal international order. In contrast, returning to a more modest agenda of seeking to nudge sovereign nations to adapt pragmatically is the best route to a peaceful and (fairly) liberal order. Luckily, pragmatic supporters of the liberal international order from North and South are learning from the first decades of the post-Cold War era and returning to the original rationale of the UN as an arena for compromise and peaceful conflict resolution among sovereign states, not a liberal world government delivering human rights and democracy across the globe.
One way for Western middle powers to influence the future direction of the UN would be to reignite their enthusiasm for UN military operations, which has dampened considerably since the 1990s. During the Cold War and in the early post-Cold War era middle powers played an active role in framing, training for and implementing these operations. From the late 1990s, NATO replaced the UN as the most important institutional framework for Western middle-power military activism, although often acting as the ‘operator’ legitimized by UN Security Council resolutions. John Kalsrud explains why a stronger middle power engagement in UN peacekeeping may not equal promoting or even defending a liberal international order. Using UN peacekeeping mission in Mali as his case, Karlsrud shows that national status seeking intended to strengthen bids for non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council and gaining recognition from the United States helped drive middle-power action. Moreover, by attempting to retool the UN into an instrument against counterterrorism for reasons of national security, they may undermine UN legitimacy as well as their own security.
The liberal international order provides multiple platforms for influence for small and middle powers, but just as important the increased institutionalization and interdependency of international politics and security, provides multiple “shelters” against economic and military instability and insecurity. Using Norway as a case, Nina Græger shows how the unravelling of the liberal international order challenges the traditional role of these shelters – formal and informal – in particular, since part of the unravelling comes from within the West. For Western small and middle powers, the United States was the most important bilateral security shelter as well as the indispensable actor in the most important multilateral security shelter NATO. Therefore, a parallel challenge to the liberal international order from both the United States and Russia is particularly worrying and necessitates a rethink of their liberal internationalism, while maintaining vital shelters from the United States and NATO.
This is not an easy task. Canada (like Norway and other middle powers), is a country that prides itself of acting as an impartial mediator in international affairs, but also of being a norm entrepreneur of liberal internationalism. The underlying tension between these two ambitions is not always articulated in middle-power political discourse, but Peter Jones illustrates how it has played a role in the debate on Canadian foreign policy. He argues that the tension need not be a dilemma. Sticking to general principles such a non-acceptance of terrorism can be combined with a mediator role and by sponsoring unofficial negotiations and mediation middle powers can create an action space for norm entrepreneurship.
Three common threads run through the eight essays. First, perhaps unsurprising, the authors start from a shared belief that the liberal international order is worth preserving. It is imperfect and even in some ways repressive towards states outside the West, but it is in many ways as good as it gets international affairs, not least for small and middle powers. The norms and institutions of the liberal order shelter these states against instability and provide institutional platforms for voice and influence. Moreover, the economic and military muscles of the United States continue to guarantee the solidity and stability of this order, even in the face of conservative nationalism in both the United States and Europe. The contributors point out why and how middle powers need to rethink and repair the liberal order, but they see no attractive or realistic alternative.
Second, they advocate a pragmatic approach combining defensive and offensive measures. They warn against middle-power complacency and urge policy-makers to continue liberal activism, while remembering the pragmatic origins of both the liberal order and middle-power diplomacy. Overall, they advocate what one might term a neoclassical approach to middle-power diplomacy: doing away with the hubris of the early post-Cold War period and acknowledging the continuous co-existence of power politics and liberal internationalism. The “rise of the Rest” need not be the end of the liberal international order if middle powers are willing to work with new partners and compromise on the small stuff, while staunchly defending the fundamental principles of liberal democracy, human rights and peaceful conflict resolution.
Finally, and consistent, with this pragmatic approach, they provide a remarkably balanced account of the current challenges and opportunities of the liberal international order. Change in – even a transformation of – the liberal international order, they remind us, is not a fight of good (the West) against evil (the Rest). Western and non-Western states seek to defend their national security interests, while promoting the ideas and values they believe in. They do so from very different positions in terms of security, prosperity historical experience and societal development. Typically, their foreign policies include an incoherent mix of promoting the greater good of humankind, protecting civilizational peculiarities and catering to the strong and influential in return for security shelter and economic opportunities. Like other states, Western middle powers are imperfect actors with incoherent foreign policies. However, they are also privileged and prosperous actors benefitting from 70 years of peaceful rise under NATO’s security shelter, accountability and effectiveness of domestic institutions and social cohesion. The contributors to this special issue are right to balance the alarmism of much public (and some academic) debate on the demise of the liberal international order and provide a guardedly optimistic account of the future of middle-power diplomacy in what promises to be a post-American, but not necessarily post-liberal international order.
 See for instance Doug Saunders, “Justin Trudeau vs. the world: How the next government can reclaim Canada’s place on the international stage,” The Globe and Mail, 29 June 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-justin-trudeau-vs-the-world-how-the-next-government-can-reclaim/
 “Address by Minister Freeland when receiving Foreign Policy’s Diplomat of the Year Award,” Washington, D.C., 13 June 2018, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/06/address-by-minister-freeland-when-receiving-foreign-policys-diplomat-of-the-year-award.html
 The contents of the special issue are as follows: Rita Abrahamsen, Louise Riis Andersen, and Ole Jacob Sending, “Introduction: Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 5-14; Jean-Francois Drolet and Michael Williams. “The View from MARS: US Paleoconservatism and Ideological Challenges to the Liberal World Order,” 15-31; Alexandra Gheciu, “NATO, Liberal Internationalism, and the Politics of Imagining the Western Security Community,” 32-46; David Petrasek, “Not Dead Yet: Human Rights in an Illiberal World Order,” 103-118; Louise Riis Andersen, “Curb Your Enthusiasm: Middle-Power Liberal Internationalism and the Future of the United Nations,” 47-64; John Karlsrud, “For the Greater Good?:“Good States” Turning UN Peacekeeping Towards Counterterrorism,” 65-83; Nina Græger, “Illiberalism, Geopolitics, and Middle Power Security: Lessons from the Norwegian Case,” 84-102; and Peter Jones, “Middle Power Liberal Internationalism and Mediation in Messy Places: The Canadian Dilemma,” 119-134.
 Rita Abrahamsen, Louise Riis Andersen, and Ole Jacob Sending, “Introduction: Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?,” International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 74:1 (March 2019) [Hereafter IJ 74:1]: 5-14, here 6, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019827050.
 Jean-Francois Drolet and Michael Williams, “The View from MARS: US Paleoconservatism and Ideological Challenges to the Liberal World Order,” IJ 74:1: 15-31, here 19, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702019834716.
 Commissioners of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, “Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,” June 2019, https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Final_Report_Vol_1b.pdf; Commissioners of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, “Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls,” June 2019, https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Final_Report_Vol_1a.pdf.
 See also the source of the term “rise of the rest”: Ayşe Zarakol, “‘Rise of the Rest’: As Hype and Reality,” International Relations 33:2 (June 2019): 213-228, https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117819840793.
 Bentley B. Allan, Srdjan Vucetic, and Ted Hopf, “The Distribution of Identity and the Future of International Order: China’s Hegemonic Prospects,” International Organization 72:4 (2018): 839-869, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818318000267.
 Rita Abrahamsen, Louise Riis Andersen, and Ole Jacob Sending, “Introduction: Making Liberal Internationalism Great Again?” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 5-14.
 Jean-Francois Drolet and Michael Williams. “The View from MARS: US Paleoconservatism and Ideological Challenges to the Liberal World Order,” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 15-31.
 Alexandra Gheciu, “NATO, Liberal Internationalism, and the Politics of Imagining the Western Security Community,” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 32-46.
 David Petrasek, “Not Dead Yet: Human Rights in an Illiberal World Order,” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 103-118.
 Louise Riis Andersen, “Curb Your Enthusiasm: Middle-Power Liberal Internationalism and the Future of the United Nations,” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 47-64.
 John Karlsrud, “For the Greater Good?:“Good States” Turning UN Peacekeeping Towards Counterterrorism,” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 65-83.
 Nina Græger, “Illiberalism, Geopolitics, and Middle Power Security: Lessons from the Norwegian Case,” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 84-102.
 Peter Jones, “Middle Power Liberal Internationalism and Mediation in Messy Places: The Canadian Dilemma,” International Journal 74:1 (2019): 119-134.