H-Diplo Article Review Forum 614 on “Beyond and Between the Cold War Blocs,” Special Issue of The International History Review 37:5

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H-Diplo Article Reviews
No. 614
An H-Diplo Article Review Forum
Published on 16 May 2016

H-Diplo Article Review Editors:  Thomas Maddux and Diane Labrosse
Web and Production Editor: George Fujii
Commissioned for H-Diplo by Thomas Maddux

H-Diplo Forum on “Beyond and Between the Cold War Blocs,” Special Issue of The International History Review 37:5 (December 2015): 901-1013.

Introduction by Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, University of Lausanne; Sandra Bott University of Lausanne; Jussi Hanhimäki, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies; and Marco Wyss, University of Chichester

Reviewed by:

Anne Deighton, The University of Oxford
Juergen Dinkel, Justus-Liebig-University
Wen-Qing Ngoei, Northwestern University
Johanna Rainio-Niemi, University of Helsinki, Finland

URL:      http://tiny.cc/AR614

Introduction[1] by Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Marco Wyss[2]

“Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War”

In his recollection of recent events such as the Bandung Conference, the Soviet proposals for a unified and neutralised Germany, and the signing of the Austrian Treaty, veteran journalist Hanson W. Baldwin wrote in the New York Times in May 1955 that these ‘and half a dozen other developments in Europe and Asia have stimulated the growth of what has been called variously neutralism, “the third force”, national- ism, fence-sitting, or the restoration of a balance of power’.[3] Baldwin made this assessment of a ‘rise of neutralism’, based on a very encompassing picture of international policies, ranging from Iran’s unstable ties to the West, to the ‘growth of neutralist sentiment in numerous Western countries incident to the threat of nuclear weapons’, and to the deterioration of relations between Yugoslavia and the United States. Such elision was quite typical of the period, as in the 1950s the terms neutralism and non-alignment were widely used by the Press, politicians, or scholars to designate an extensive array of strategies and actions on the global stage.[4]

The five European states that had by then opted for a status of official neutrality - Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, and Austria - were just one expression of the panoply of national and regional policies followed after the First World War, which aimed at achieving partial independence from East-West rivalry. Other initiatives with the partial aim of preserving some latitude in the Cold War power struggle included the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), but also international arrangements with less clearly defined contours, some- times in the framework of bilateral relations, at other times in the form of alternative coalitions including members of the main Cold War alliances. The broad range of these courses of action points to the vast complexity of international initiatives during this period that did not easily fit into binary East-West dynamics.

For some time now, scholars have pointed to the importance of not limiting Cold War studies to the interactions between the superpowers. Matthew Connelly was one of the first explicitly to make the case for ‘taking off the Cold War lens’ and adding the North-South dimension to the analysis of the Cold War by focusing on the agency of Third World actors.[5]  Odd Arne Westad’s seminal work on the Global Cold War significantly contributed to shifting scholarly attention to the colonial and post-colonial world, notably by arguing that the United States’ and Soviet Union’s military interventions in these countries, as well as their resistance to these intrusions, were crucial dynamics in shaping the Third World. Tony Smith in an noteworthy contribution to this debate introduced the analytical framework of pericentrism, pointing to the significant role played by what he called ‘junior members in the international system’ - ranging from Israel or Cuba to movements such as the Sandinistas - in blocking, moderating, expanding, or intensifying the conflict.[6] Attention has thus for some time been called to the agency of less central or powerful states in the Cold War’s periphery.

Frederick Cooper had already pointed out a further shortcoming of Cold War historiography, even if it did take into account the role of peripheral actors.  He insisted that historians should transcend what he termed the ‘resistance concept’, which by focusing solely on the post-colonial actors’ capacity to resist or utilise pressure stemming from Cold War relations, tends to sanitise the ‘struggle within the colonized population’.[7] Following up on this plea, Gerard McCann recently highlighted the need to take more interest in dynamism and agency within the Global South itself.  He suggested that the Cold War merely provided the ‘background music, rather than the lyrics’ to certain aspects of decolonisation or South-South relations, and argued that these dynamics were ‘in the Cold War, but not of it’.[8]

By asking the question if and to what extent independent agency was possible on the margins of the Eastern and Western blocs, this special issue of The International History Review focuses on the leeway that existed for smaller states, independence movements, or regional alliances to find pathways that were ‘in the Cold War, but not of it’.  Recently, scholarship has taken an increased interest in the role of non- alignment and neutralism in the East-West contest[9], thus offering a welcome consolidation of this field of research introduced by earlier publications.[10]  Comparative studies on neutralism and neutrality in the Cold War are still rare[11], and literature that deals with the general role of the European neutrals in the East-West conflict, transcending individual case studies, have tended to concentrate solely on the European theatre of the conflict.[12]  Over all, existing literature has approached neutralism and neutrality in the Cold War with the analytical framework of whether the states following these policies managed to find a third way in between the two power blocs. This collection of papers in contrast aims to explore more generally what independent pathways were possible within the Cold War system that were not directly subjected to the East-West confrontation: not only paying attention to the NAM or the neutrals, but also to countries like Albania or networks such as the like-minded group.

The Afro-Asian movement, neutralism, and non-alignment

It was the Bandung Conference of the Afro-Asian movement which symbolised the emergence of the Third World as a motive force in international relations.[13] The Afro-Asian Conference organised in the Indonesian city of Bandung in April 1955, and formally convened by the governments of Indonesia, India, Burma, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan, brought together the leaders of twenty-nine newly independent Asian and African states. Bandung tentatively shaped the outlines of an alternative international alliance made up by former colonial Asian and African states. Although strongly divided on a number of subjects, the political leaders of these states shared a common preoccupation with economic and social justice in post- colonial states and support for the on-going struggles for decolonisation as well as for the promotion of world peace. Bandung was not, however, as often wrongly claimed, the starting point of the NAM.[14]

As argued by Jeffrey Byrne in his contribution, which examines ‘Third Worldism’ as a political project from 1955 to 1965, the ideas of neutralism and non-alignment[15] were nevertheless discussed during the Bandung Conference and presented, above all by Indian Premier Jawaharlal Nehru, as a pacifist contribution to the stability of international relations. This concept of non-alignment shifted over the next six years which led up to the founding of the NAM. During this period, with more and more countries having achieved independence in Africa, Third World internationalism’s centre of gravity moved away from Asia towards the Middle East and Africa. Furthermore, the Suez Crisis of 1956 played a significant role in promoting the idea, not least with Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser, that the competition between the Soviet Union, the United States, and the European imperialist powers could actually provide an opportunity for Third World actors.

When the NAM was launched in Belgrade in 1961, the Conference’s agenda was driven by radical leaders of countries such as Ghana, Cuba, Indonesia, and Mali, and very much influenced by Nasser and Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito.[16]  The Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the rebel Congolese government in Sharpeville attended the meeting with the status of sovereign governments, which further demonstrated its strong anti-colonial bias. The Conference committed NAM members to support actively movements for national liberation, pursue peaceful coexistence, and refuse to enter into multilateral/bilateral alliances or regional defence pacts if they were concluded in the context of Cold War superpower policies.[17] The NAM thus represented a different geopolitical project than the Afro- Asian solidarity movement with non-alignment now being understood in more political terms. It was seen as a means for smaller countries and non-state national liberation movements to participate in the Cold War, rather than keep out of it, and to exploit Cold War tensions for Third World objectives, be it politically or economically (by encouraging competition between US and Soviet economic aid). As mentioned, Nasser and Tito had played a decisive role in this shift towards what Byrne calls ‘insurgent neutralism’, while Nehru was more ambivalent. The Premier of the much more powerful post-colonial state was exhibiting a more measured approach to anti-colonial struggles, as demonstrated by his government’s attitude in the Algerian War, as well as during the Congo crisis, as we will see.

The Indian government’s transitioning role in the Afro-Asian movement is also at the heart of Jayita Sarkar’s contribution, which analyses the deliberations about nuclear weapons that took place in India in the mid-1960s, and eventually led to the country’s first nuclear-weapons test in May 1974. The author raises the interesting question of how the New Delhi government, which had played such a crucial role in the rise of non-alignment, and had presented itself as a leading force in peace-building and the struggle for economic and social justice in the post-colonial world, transitioned to becoming a nuclear power.

The decision to develop nuclear weapons was directly related to the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) nuclear-weapons test in October 1964, as well as to India’s on-going border tensions with its Communist neighbour. The Indian leaders were alarmed at the neutralist countries’ absence of disapproval of - and even admiration for - the Chinese test. The government’s decision to make India a nuclear power was incident to the politically very unstable period that followed Nehru’s death, the country’s strained relations with the other non-aligned states, and its precarious security environment with the Indo-Pakistani War in the summer of 1965. The case of India’s political trajectory after 1964 highlights the important divisions and differences that existed among the NAM states, owing to national security strategies, but also to the pursuit of diverging political projects, such as Arab and African nationalism.

Arab nationalism, Pan-Africanism, non-alignment: the Congo Crisis as a turning point

The development of ‘nationalist’ movements striving for political or cultural unity, such as Pan-Arabism and Pan-Africanism, was partially linked to non-alignment, but promoted an independent dynamic, which it is important to take into account.

The Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s radical programme of economic nationalism and his challenge of British control of the Suez Canal in 1956 probably preoccupied Washington even more than the Bandung Conference.[18]  The fear of Moscow gaining regional influence by supporting Nasser was an important driving force in Eisenhower’s opposition to the French-British-Israeli offensive. The growing influence of Pan-Arabism also led the US government to support economically and militarily pro-Western leaders in the Middle East, notably in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Iraq, and Jordan.[19]  Meanwhile, the Soviet threat was not as acute as imagined by Washington, since the Kremlin’s attitude towards Nasser’s Pan-Arabism was marked by distrust and the fear that Arab nationalism might prove to be irreconcilable with Soviet Communism.[20]  What is noteworthy in this context is that Nasser, as well as other regional politicians, such as Tunisia’s Ben Bella, positioned themselves on the crossroads of Pan-Arabism and Third World internationalism or non- alignment.

This was also the case for nationalist leaders in Africa, most notably of the Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, staunch defender of the project of a Pan-African union and the principles of non-alignment. At the beginning of the 1960s, there were three competing nationalist movements in post-colonial Africa: the Brazzaville Group, the Monrovia Group, and the Casablanca Group, named after the cities in which they were formally constituted.[21] The Brazzaville Group, formed in 1960 and comprised of some fifteen former French and Belgian colonies, strove for the integration of francophone Africa and wanted to remain closely allied to the West and France; it notably sided with Paris on the Algerian conflict. The Monrovia Group, relatively close to the Brazzaville group, was constituted in 1961 by Liberia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and other English-speaking African countries. Established that same year, the Casablanca Group, included Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Mali, and Morocco, states led by radical or left-wing leaders, which called for the formation of a Pan-African government along socialist lines. There thus appeared to be a political cleavage between the Casablanca group on the one hand, and the rest of independent Africa on the other, the Portuguese colonies on the continent still being under the control of Lisbon.  During the Addis Ababa Conference in May 1963, the three groups merged, and thirty-two member states created the Organization of African Unity. The OAU, which was thus partly a brainchild of the Pan-African movement, requested all its members to be non-aligned.[22]

Frank Gerits explores the intersection between the Pan-African and the Non- Aligned Movement. Specifically, his article analyses how the Congo crisis, which erupted in June 1960, impacted Nkrumah’s foreign policy, and whether the claim that it led him to doubt the viability of strict non-alignment is valid. Based on newly released Ghanaian archives, the author shows that there was indeed a shift in the country’s foreign diplomacy after 1960. Nkrumah strongly supported Patrice Lumumba during the tensions in the Congo, since he counted on the Prime Minister to help him realise his project of a Pan-African union. In the aftermath of Lumumba’s assassination in January 1961, the Ghanaian President increasingly opted for a more emotional, strongly anti-colonial discourse and propaganda campaign. This led certain observers, such as the US Secretary of State Christian Herter, to worry that Nkrumah might be leaning towards the Eastern bloc. As Gerits argues, this interpretation was erroneous, as the Ghanaian leader remained strongly commit- ted to non-alignment, which in his interpretation was more closely connected to a Pan-African worldview than to Cold War imperatives: non-alignment in his eyes was primarily supposed to avoid Soviet, US, or neo-colonial intrusion into African affairs and thereby help foster continental unity.

The Ghanaian leader’s role during the Congo Crisis is also at the heart of Alanna O’Malley’s contribution. She compares his actions to those of another prominent NAM leader, Nehru. In her view, the crisis represented an opportunity for Third World leaders who were actively preparing the official creation of the NAM in Belgrade a year later, to strengthen their influence in the UN. The Congo Crisis, which seemed to exemplify the NAM principles of anti-racism, anti-imperialism, and anti- colonialism, was seen by Nkrumah and Nehru as an opportunity to capitalise on this attention and contribute to shaping the UN’s Congo policy in a neutralist direction. The conflict immediately focused on the UN, since Lumumba reacted to the dispatch of Belgian troops to the country by appealing to the international organisation for assistance, which led to the vote of a Security Council resolution on 14 July 1960 and the creation of the Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC). Both Ghana and India committed a substantial number of troops to ONUC and helped shape the UN’s Congo policy, denouncing the neo-colonial Belgian intervention and the secession of the wealthy province of Katanga. There was, however, an important dissimilarity between Nehru and Nkrumah, since the latter adopted a more radical stance after the assassination of Lumumba. Nehru’s more measured approach is consistent with the growing divergence of the NAM leaders’ interpretation of non-alignment discussed above. Still, through their interventions both politicians contributed to propagating the idea of keeping the West and the USSR out of the Congo Crisis, and thus strengthened the position of neutralist ideas and the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN.

The very beginning of the 1960s was thus a turning point for the ideas of non- alignment and neutralism. With the independence of seventeen African states in 1960, the Sharpeville massacre in South Africa in March and, especially, the conflict in the Congo, African politics had entered the stage of worldwide attention. The Belgrade Conference that took place a year after the outbreak of the Congo crisis saw the triumph of ‘insurgent neutralism’, as discussed above. From 1962 to 1965, NAM was to some degree a competitive geopolitical project to the Afro-Asian solidarity movement, as argued in Jeffrey Byrne’s article. After the Sino-Soviet split, the Chinese leadership worried that the NAM might serve the interests of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia, and therefore actively supported the Afro-Asian movement, emphasising an implicitly racial interpretation of anti-imperialism. Soviet authorities on the other hand promoted anti-neo-colonialism as a political project open to Whites and Europeans. Byrne demonstrates that the two interpretations basically opposed a lecture of the Third World as the expression of a (non-White, post-colonial) identity, to that of the Third World as a political project, a ‘third way’ to follow anti-imperial objectives. The organisation of a second Afro-Asian summit in Algeria in 1965 failed, which left the NAM in the position of representing the primary organising principle in Third World international relations.

In the superpowers’ shadow: mediation and economic ties

As pointed out in the contribution of Jayita Sarkar, New Delhi’s decision to develop its nuclear armament had also been encouraged by its difficult relations with the Johnson administration. Washington’s hopes of making the large Asian democracy a Cold War ally were countered by India’s non-aligned status and its consequential refusal to support US policy towards the PRC, even if the Communist state was its long-time military adversary. The discrepancy, owing much to India’s prominent position in the NAM, had embittered relations between the United States and India. This raises the more general question of how the superpowers’ attitudes towards neutralism and non- alignment factored into potential independent moves in the Cold War system.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union had a different attitude towards the European States’ official neutrality[23] and forms of neutralism linked to the NAM and Third World solidarity. Concerning neutrality, after having been very critical of the neutrals in the immediate post-war period because of their war-time collaboration with the Axis, the two superpowers came to appreciate potential benefits they could gain from these countries’ status: for instance, the security advantages Austria’s neutrality brought Moscow, their international mediation activities, or the five states’ pro-Western political and economic choices that benefited Washington.[24] For the US government, neutralism was an altogether different cup of tea. From the beginning it was hostile towards the Bandung conference, worrying that Nehru might be successful in imposing a non-aligned agenda, which could lead to a dynamic among the participating countries that opposed US leadership in the Cold War.[25] After a brief thaw in Washington’s policy towards the non-aligned states during the Kennedy administration, relations soured again after 1963.[26]

Washington’s sceptical attitude toward the NAM is clearly illustrated in Robert B. Rakove’s contribution in this issue. He analyses the diplomatic initiatives of non- aligned states (not necessarily acting under the auspices of the NAM) to alleviate and resolve Cold War conflicts during the 1960s, in particular in terms of the United States’ reaction to these efforts at mediation. As we have seen, the political aim of peace-keeping was closely associated with neutralism by early protagonists of non- alignment, such as Nehru. The first concrete effort of non-aligned mediation took place in October 1963, when Mali’s President Modibo Keïta and Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie achieved a ceasefire agreement in the border war between Morocco and Algeria, before passing long-term mediation efforts to the OAU.

The main emphasis of Rakove’s article is on the non-aligned states’ efforts to play a mediating role in the Congo Crisis. During the summer of 1964, in the context of the taking of Western and US hostages by Simba rebels in Stanleyville and the US- backed Congolese government’s growing reliance on white mercenaries, the OAU leaders tried to play a role in crafting a peace accord between the parties at war in the Congo. This effort did not meet US approval, since the Johnson administration considered the disputed new Prime Minister of Congo, Moise Tshombe, as the legitimate leader of the country, attacked by externally assisted insurrection. Consequently, Washington resented the OAU’s call for an end to US support for the Tshombe government.  The Belgian-US hostage-rescue operation Dragon Rouge that had, together with South African mercenaries, put an end to the Simba rebel- lion, left relations between the OAU and Washington strained.

The final instance of non-aligned mediation analysed by Rakove took place in the context of the Vietnam War. The first effort was the ‘Seventeen Nation Appeal’ calling for immediate negotiations without preconditions. It was issued in an ambassadorial-level Conference in Belgrade in March 1965 that had been convened by Tito. He was worried about the proposed ‘Bandung II’ meeting of the Afro-Asian movement in Algiers and wished to promote the mediating role of NAM in world politics. During the following two years, other non-aligned leaders from Mali, Algeria, Ghana, and India engaged in various mediation efforts, but were either not taken seriously by the US government, or by the PRC or North Vietnam. These failed attempts were motivated by the hope that they would improve relations with the US government, along with the idea that the non-aligned states had a special moral responsibility regarding conflict resolution.

Just like the NAM, the European neutrals also unsuccessfully attempted to play a part in the Vietnam peace negotiations, as is revealed in the contribution by Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss, and Sandra Bott. The authors analyse how European neutrals, above all Switzerland, but also Sweden and Austria, dealt with an important Cold War trouble spot: diplomatic relations with the divided states of Korea and Vietnam. All three European powers interpreted the obligations concomitant with the status of neutrality in a highly pragmatic manner, by cultivating official diplomatic relations with the Western-oriented and not the Communist halves of both Asian countries until the beginning of the 1970s. It was this one-sidedness, which prevented the Austrian and Swiss political leaders from being accepted as potential mediators by North Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Swedes were excluded by Washington because of their vocal criticism of the US Vietnam policy. Swiss and Swedish diplomacy had, however, earlier earned a peace-keeping position in the Korean conflict, representing the United Nations Command in the ‘Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission’, alongside with Polish and Czech representatives chosen by Pyongyang. Remarkably, this position seemed to illustrate that they were generally considered to be ‘Western Neutrals’, all the more so since they had not recognised the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The most important reason for the neutrals’ choice of the biased diplomatic recognition of the non-Communist parts of Korea and Vietnam was due to the close security, political, ideological, and economic ties they maintained with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) countries, especially with West Germany and the United States. Their decisive trade and financial relations with Bonn made the Swedish, Swiss, and Austrian leaders fear that the recognition of the Communist Asian countries might lead the German Democratic Republic to claim the same treatment, which would endanger these close relations with West Germany. But it was also their preoccupation with Washington’s reaction that kept them from applying an actual policy of neutrality, up until détente and the growing power of Third World internationalism changed the situation.

The United States’ attitude towards states choosing alternative pathways in the East-West confrontation thus directly influenced the options these states were presented with, be it their efforts at playing a mediating role in conflict resolution, their diplomatic policies, or their economic ties. This dependency towards one of the Cold War superpowers was also a determining factor for countries that explored such pathways on the margins of the Eastern bloc.

Until the 1970s at least, Moscow conceived of neutralism and non-alignment as transitional phenomena, as a movement by the Third World countries away from the West in the short term, and in the long term as a process, which would lead these states to an ever-closer association with the Eastern bloc.[27]  In his article, Elidor Mëhilli sheds light on the interesting cases of two states on the edges of the Communist world: Albania and North Korea. He notes the shared perceived post-war insecurity in both states that developed out of the common experience of wartime mobilisation, the necessity of construction, and economic dependency on outside powers. Confronted with Khrushchev’s 1956 reforms, both regimes clung to leader cults and Stalinist methods and developed a shared narrative, one that focused on internal conspiracy fuelled by foreign interference (Yugoslav meddling in the case of Albania; Chinese and Soviet interference for North Korea). They both succeeded in avoiding any reformism from taking hold within the party establishments.

The Sino-Soviet split had different consequences for the two states, although it inspired a rhetoric of self-reliance in both Pyongyang and Tirana. Enver Hoxha’s Albanian regime broke off relations with Moscow and threw itself into the PRC’s embrace, Mao stepping in for the intense economic and technical assistance that Moscow had previously provided. Kim Il Sung’s dictatorship, in spite of sharing Albania’s criticism of Khrushchev’s methods, took a stance it saw as ‘neutralist’: although neither trusting China or the USSR as long-term reliable partners, it avoided breaking off relations with either. North Korea’s path towards self-reliance led the state to join the NAM in 1975, and, in its attempt to achieve international recognition, to intensify trade relations with Western European and Japanese companies. The Yugoslav leader Tito’s capital role in the NAM kept the Albanian regime at a distance from the non-aligned and, ultimately, after relations with the PRC broke off during the 1970s, Albania found itself in a position of autarchy and actual non-alignment. Both regimes’ attempts of pursuing paths of self-reliance dramatically failed, but their discourse of independence from the superpowers and North Korea’s Third World diplomacy brought notable advantages to both dictatorships.

Strategies of independence overlying Cold War alliances

North Korea’s participation in the NAM highlights the overlay that existed between the coalition of non-aligned states and close bilateral security and political relations of certain of these states with the Soviet Union. The same was true for several NAM member-states, which - as pointed out by Roy Allison - entertained strong military ties with the United States or Great Britain.[28] This was the reason for which the Belgrade Conference limited the ban on participation in multilateral alliances or regional-defence pacts to those concluded in a Cold War context. There were also a series of states that were actual members of the main Cold War military coalition, NATO, and still participated in international networks which aimed at a certain independence from the two Cold War power blocs.

One such group is analysed in this special issue by Sue Onslow. Her article sheds light on the Commonwealth’s role in the Cold War context as a diplomatic actor with a neutral and non-aligned bias. The intra-governmental organisation, a direct product of British decolonisation, came to include forty-eight member-states between its creation in 1949 and 1990. It promoted paths to modernity for its newly independent African and Asian members, and Pacific and Caribbean small island states that did not conform entirely to either Western or Soviet models of development. Several Commonwealth members were part of military alliances, such as NATO (Britain and Canada), the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) (Pakistan), or the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). Still, Onslow argues that neutralism was practised by the organisation not as a doctrine but as a general policy. According to Joseph Nye’s famous definition, she sees the Commonwealth as having exerted ‘smart power’, a combination of ‘soft power’ and ‘hard power’ strategies, notably in its support for anti-apartheid and liberation movements in Southern Africa, in its promotion of nuclear disarmament, and its determination not to be involved in Cold War issues. There was a remarkable overlapping with the non-aligned movement, as twenty-two Commonwealth members were part of the NAM by the late 1970s, and such prominent non-aligned states as India and Ghana participated in both organisations. During the Cold War, the Commonwealth functioned as a global sub-system with a quintessential identity as a West-South Association. Onslow argues that after the demise of the NAM in the 1980s, the Commonwealth was increasingly seen as a sort of English-speaking non-aligned movement.

Another expression of organised independence in the context of the Cold War is analysed by Kevin O’Sullivan: the ‘like-minded’ group (LMG), a loosely organised collective of small and middling-sized Northern states, created in 1974. Its founding was a reaction to the Third World countries’ call, at the General Assembly of the UN, for a New International Economic Order (NIEC), more favourable to their interests, which would replace the Bretton Woods order. The author shows, by focusing on the group’s smallest state, Ireland, that the member-states of the LGM, eventually including Canada and Australia, the Nordic States, the Netherlands and France, had the ambition to attain a form of independence in the East-West struggle, to create an ‘alternative diplomatic space’.

Three characteristics made up the core of the LGM’s call for economic justice: a social-democratic and welfare-inspired understanding of the need for equality on a global scale; a Christian worldview; and a broadly defined anti-colonialism. In terms of the Cold War, the ‘like-minded’ states did not raise a claim of neutrality or of non-alignment, several of them also being members of NATO. Their aim was rather to develop an alternative voice on economic development and global justice to that of the major industrial powers (Britain, West Germany, and the United States), and to create a badge of identity based on a certain independence from Washington and Moscow. The like-minded states’ participation in diplomatic mediation in particular offered a way of engaging in the project of constructing a more stable international order, based on the UN, more protected from Cold War confrontation and nuclear proliferation. However, O’Sullivan demonstrates that despite its rhetoric of an inter- dependent and solidary world economy, the ‘like-minded’ states still were firmly rooted in the Northern-dominated international order and did not break with a hierarchical and interventionist narrative presenting the South as being in need of North- ern-inspired development assistance.

Overall the authors of this special issue explore a myriad of different diplomatic strategies, international networks, and political actions aimed at breaking ground on the outskirts of the two superpower blocs. What these different initiatives seem to have had in common was the overlapping of memberships and identities on the one hand, and of political campaigns on the other. In terms of overlying identities, we can note that participation in bilateral or regional alliances with one of the superpowers did not exclude signing up for a group with neutralist aspirations, and that official proclamation of neutrality went hand in hand with informal but intimate relations with Cold War security alliances. When it came to the political aims diplomatic leaders went after under the banner of non-alignment, the striving for national interests co-existed with pan-African ideals, anti-colonialism with neutralism, and military ambitions with a discourse on world peace. Neutralism, the third force, or non-alignment thus represented multiple, intersecting pathways explored by political leaders who shared a determination to escape, and be it partially and temporarily, the binary logic of the Cold War.

H-Diplo Forum Participants:

Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl is an Assistant Professor of the History of International Relations at the University of Lausanne. Her current research interests focus on Cold War history and transatlantic diplomatic and business relations after 1945. Her books include La France et la Suisse ou la force du petit: Evasion fiscale, relations commerciales et financières (1940-1954) (Presses de Sciences Po, 2009); Schwarze Gesch€afte: Die Beteiligung von Schweizern an Sklaverei und Sklavenhandel im 18. Und 19. Jahrhundert (with Th. David and B. Etemad; Limmat, 2006). She has published articles in the following journals: European History Quarterly, Business History Review, and Vingtième Siècle.

Sandra Bott is a Research Associate at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland and is currently based in Singapore, pursuing her current research project on the political and economic role of Neutrals in the Cold War. Her research interests include the history of the Cold War, the economic relations between Switzerland and South Africa during the 20th Century, and the history of gold markets and financial centres. She has published widely, including La Suisse et l’Afrique du Sud, 1945-1990: commerce, finance et achats d’or durant l’apartheid (Chronos Verlag, 2013), and holds a Ph.D. in History from the University of Lausanne.

Jussi M. Hanhimäki is Professor of International at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. An editor of Cold War History, he is the author of numerous books, including The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy (2004) and The Rise and Fall of Détente: American Foreign Policy and the Transformation of the Cold War (2013). Professor Hanhimäki is currently at work on a general history of the Cold War and a joint biography of Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Marco Wyss is Senior Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History     at the University of Chichester, and Senior Researcher at the University of Lausanne. Marco gained his PhD from the Universities of Nottingham and Neuchatel. He is the Scientific Editor of the International Bibliography of Military History (Brill), the author of Un Suisse au Service de la SS (Presses universitaires suisses, 2010), and Arms Transfers, Neutrality and Britain’s Role in the Cold War (Brill, 2013), as well as co-editor of Peacekeeping in Africa (Routledge, 2014), and Between or Within the Blocs? (Routledge, 2016).

Anne Deighton is Professor of European International Politics, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Wolfson College, Oxford OX2 6UD. She has written extensively on the Cold War, European integration and security, and on British foreign policy during the Cold War. She is currently working on the UK and the European neutrals in the Cold War for Rowman & Littlefield's Harvard Cold War Studies series.

Jürgen Dinkel is a research and teaching associate at the Chair for Contemporary History at the Justus-Liebig-University in Giessen. He has published on the history of the Third World, cosmopolitanism, the Non-Aligned Movement and decolonization. Currently I am organizing a workshop on the North-South conflict during the 1970s. Furthermore I am developing a new project on the history of familiy and kinship in the 19th and 20th century, with an special focus on inheritance practices in Germany and the United States. Selected Publications include Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten. Genese, Organisation und Politik, 1927-1992, Studien zur Internationalen Geschichte, Vol. 37, Berlin: Oldenbourg DeGruyter 2015; „Third World Begins to Flex its Muscles’ – The Non-Aligned Movement and the North-South-Conflict during the 1970s“, in Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimaki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss (Eds.), Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement in the East-West Conflict (Routledge 2016,) 108-123; and „Non-Aligned Summits as International Media Events“ in Nada Boškovska, Harald Fischer-Tiné, Nataša Mišković (eds.), The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade (Routledge Asian Studies 2014), 207-225.

Wen-Qing Ngoei is a postdoctoral fellow with the Nicholas D. Chabraja Center for Historical Studies at Northwestern University. His research examines the history of U.S. foreign relations with Southeast Asia from the Pacific War through the Cold War. He has received research fellowships from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) and the Rajawali Foundation. In 2014, his article “The Domino Logic of the Darkest Moment,” Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Volume 21, Issue 3 (2014): 215 – 245, won the Frank W. Gibney Award. His first book, The Arc of Containment: Britain, Malaya, Singapore, and the Rise of American Hegemony in Southeast Asia, 1941-1976 (under contract with Cornell University Press) examines how Southeast Asian nationalism intertwined with British decolonization to shape U.S. Cold War policies and power in Asia.

Johanna Rainio-Niemi is Senior Research Fellow at the University of Helsinki and Associate Professor of Modern International and European Political History. She is the author of The Ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland (Routledge, 2014) that examines European Cold War histories of neutrality in a comparative and cross-national perspective with the focus on the entanglements between the ideological Cold War tensions and the neutrals' state-, nation-, and democracy-building processes.

Review by Anne Deighton, Wolfson College, The University of Oxford

When they revisit the past, scholars of every generation will obviously and necessarily inform their research with new insights and new perspectives drawn from their own lives and experiences. During the Cold War, the interplay between narrative, analysis, and what we may call blame-allocation was perhaps inevitably weighted in favour of trying to answer the classic ‘who started it’, and ‘why did they start it’ types of questions. Yet by the 1980s, the dominant, bipolar view of the Cold War that drove most American and Western scholarship on the post 1945 period was long due for a dose of what was called post-revisionism. So, even as the bipolar structure itself was starting to creak, bilateral sparring was at last nuanced with scholarship that sought to examine more extensively, first the roles of West European powers, and then, as the Iron Curtain came down (and the archives began to open), that of East European powers.

Today, as the editors of this special issue remind us, we have at least three more alternative visions and interpretations of the Cold-War period. The first is set in the context of transnational history. This set of literature, sometimes overlapping with the new global history approaches, helps to break down traditional power-centred state structures, looking in from the outside, looking across borders and through different lenses – of non-state actors, economic forces, psychology, and culture. The second set privileges the place of ‘end of empire’ and the different preoccupations of those managing this change, as well as ‘Third-World’ perspectives, thus obliging all Cold-War scholars to think about the relative weight and significance (and to whom?) of these different but often overlapping narratives of the second half of the twentieth century.

In the third set of new literature, we find a return, not so much to micro-history, but to new perspectives, and interrogations of the roles of actors other than the main Cold-War protagonists (as with Patricia Clavin’s work).[29] If the Cold-War neutralism of the European neutral powers – and here we are talking particularly about Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Ireland (this list is not exhaustive) had evaporated as quickly as the Berlin Wall came down, then perhaps there would be no compelling questions to ask. Cold-War neutralism would have been just that, at least in Europe: a political and cultural phenomenon and side show to the bigger Cold-War story. But of course, this is not the case.  Apart from Yugoslavia, these countries have, somehow, clung tenaciously to neutralism, in all its various guises.  Indeed European neutralism long predates the Cold War.  Likewise, the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) also could be seen as a fascinating Cold War corollary to the end of empire, and yet it still survives, (and has generated a vast amount of secondary literature), though, as a Movement it has struggled rather more since the end of the Cold War. Likewise, there were many other international organisations and groupings which were not solely created and shaped by the Cold War. The continuing presence of these disparate organisations over the twenty-five years since the Cold War requires historians to ask questions about their different roles, and how they did, or did, not fit in to the dominant ‘binary’ view of the Cold-War period. This last set of literature forms the starting point for this special issue of International History Review, here under consideration.

The editors sought to explore what we might informally call the ‘wiggle room’ that existed for the neutrals and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members in the decades after 1945, as well as for other Non-aAligned or ‘peripheral’ groups and states. So researchers were not asked to examine the roles of these groups as Cold-War actors – a topic which is interesting enough in itself – but their roles as international actors more generally. No doubt, understanding this better would give at least in part some basis for an explanation for the survival of the neutrals/NAM. To do so, we have also to understand the nature of the neutral/NAM/ non-binary beasts during the Cold War. The project is fascinating, although it seems that, ultimately, it is very hard to do serious research on this subject without reference back to Cold-War politics and in particular, crisis resolution, as the Cold-War dimension had clearly percolated into almost every dimension of international politics.[30]

The articles under consideration cover European and extra-European politics, and together they provide genuinely new, thoroughly researched, and refreshing insights into the period. Perhaps the most traditional article is that of Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss and Sandra Bott, in that it deals with the rather better-known inherent problems of being a European neutral – in this case Switzerland – given the unspoken acceptance that the West European neutrals were, au fond, still Western in orientation.[31]  Using what became the dilemma of recognition or non-recognition brings out very nicely the practical constraints the neutrals experienced. Jeffrey James Byrne’s article is a splendid example of the opportunities that scholars now have to work with new sets of archives: those of Yugoslavia and Algeria are used to show that the relative size and influence of non-aligned actors really mattered, and that NAM was never a homogeneous movement, but had its own hierarchies.[32] Hierarchy in the international system is also dealt with by Kevin O’Sullivan, whose piece on the ‘Like Minded Group’ is a real eye-opener, although many members of this Group were in fact firmly in the Western camp (and briefly included France and even the UK for a while).[33]

The Congo crisis provides a focus for the articles by Robert Rakove, Alanna O’Malley and Frank Gerits. The overall value of this trio of articles is to remind not only of the importance of the crisis, but also the agency of Ghana, India, India, and of course the UN, as well as of the traditional representatives of the Cold-War players.[34] Collectively, the articles bring out very well the convergence of domestic and international politics that extended well beyond classic Cold-War paradigms. Jayita Sarkar’s very thoughtful contribution reminds us of the ongoing importance of nuclear weaponry – the tool with which powers, even the Non-Aligned, saw as the access point to the top table of international politics – hierarchy again?[35] Elidor Mëhilli’s article on Albania and North Korea offers new perspectives regarding two outliers, though both countries were more peripheral than some of the alternative perspectives observed in this compilation.[36]

It must be admitted that the overall effect of the collection gives a somewhat haphazard view of the Cold-War world, but then shaking the kaleidoscope is perhaps essential to a serious re-thinking of our perspectives. In sum, it was not always easy for this reader to identify how the editors wished each of their authors to answer the research questions that they must have been set.  Did the authors accept that the Cold War remained the overarching force in international politics for half a century? Presumably so, if they talk of independent agency on the “margins of Eastern and Western blocs,” and “independent pathways within the Cold War system” implying a Cold War structure (902).[37] Or do they rather suggest that there were genuinely separate levels of international politics in play that were not touched by the Cold War? At what level of analysis should we examine this, and how do domestic politics and cultures fit in? By and large, perhaps with the exception of Rakove and Sue Onslow, the scholars’ analyses revert to the level of the state as an actor, and the specifics of the chapters by and large relate to individual states’ attempts at Cold War crisis management and mediation. Yet the focus of the editors’ introductory remarks have reminded us about not only European neutrals as some kind of category, but also of the NAM, the Afro-Asian Movement, as well as more exotic groupings, thus tilting our attention to non-state activity, a theme that might have been further developed in the context of new work on transnational, non-state actors.

Let me give one more developed example. Onslow’s article, “The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism and Non-Alignment” reveals the difficulty of pinning down a genuinely new approach to how we can understand the Cold War period, especially in its global dimensions.[38] Onslow’s work is well-known and much respected, and this article draws from her innovative research project to interview and record those who have been active players in the Commonwealth. Despite this innovation, it would seem that Onslow’s findings do not dovetail to this particular Cold-War project. Indeed, the term ‘neutralism’ is reinvented for the purposes of the article, based on a seasoned book of the early 1960s by Peter Lyon.[39] Onslow explains the flexibility and diversity of the Commonwealth, but, while concluding that national confidence-boosting was really the main achievement of the Commonwealth, surely overstates its independence from Cold War politics. Further, her point that the Commonwealth was not in fact a values-based organisation until 1991 undermines the earlier argument that the Commonwealth was about confronting racial and social issues armed with an ideological middle way during the Cold War. The article shows how dominant the Cold-War structures in fact were, whether we examine the Commonwealth as a “soft-power role multiplier,” New Zealand’s efforts for a nuclear free Pacific Rim (1074), or Commonwealth crisis-mediation efforts. The role of the UK is played down, although Onslow very nicely observes that for Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, the Commonwealth was indeed intended to be “a magnet for newly independent African states to resist the siren call of Soviet-led socialism, as well as to underpin Britain’s Great Power standing in the international community” (1063). Yet there is only one reference to the Commonwealth-based ‘Five-Eyes’ group. This group was and continues to be of considerable importance to the Western intelligence community. Onslow’s chapter must be one of the most authoritative summaries around on the international role of the Commonwealth over time. To this reader, it, like many of the other articles, also shows that the methodological tools that historians possess to disentangle the Cold War from other international politics, so as to better help us see the histories of international organisations as well as of states and transnational groupings through genuinely fresh lenses, still have some way to go. No doubt this publication will help that process.

Review by Juergen Dinkel, Justus-Liebig-University

For many years, International Relations Studies and historians specializing in the Cold War and decolonization failed to take the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) seriously. It was considered a phenomenon with a short history and marginal impact. But recently, as the editors of this Special Issue rightly state, “scholarship has taken an increased interest in the role of non-alignment and neutralism in the East-West contest” (902), and, one might add, in the North-South conflict. The December 2015 edition of The International History Review is both a product of this increased interest as well as an attempt to highlight new perspectives. In their introduction the editors provide an admirably concise, problem-oriented overview that sets forth current research controversies that are picked up and enlarged upon in subsequent chapters. In this Special Edition, historians who have spent considerable time researching the NAM pool their findings, while at the same time other experts examine the Non-Alignment phenomenon from the vantage point of their studies of individual countries, regions, and organizations. Hence these contributions provide up-to-date, nuanced insights into current research projects whose methodology and findings will be addressed in the following. At this point it must be expressly stated that this critique –by reason of the author’s own field of expertise – will exclusively address the Special Edition articles dealing with Non-Alignment and not the equally thought-provoking ones on European neutrality.

The history of NAM is often closely linked with the ‘founding fathers’ of non-alignment, i.e. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Yugoslavian President Josip Broz Tito and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who conceived the idea in the 1950s. These statesmen have doubtless contributed to the emergence and dissemination of the non-alignment concept, which is why older studies have repeatedly addressed the interests and policies of the aforementioned heads of state. On the one hand the articles in the Special Edition pick up on this theme by analyzing and defining the significance of non-alignment for the politics of these nations; using India’s atomic weapons program as an example, Jayita Sarkar shows that in spite of all the protestations of mutual solidarity voiced by Asian, African, and Non-Aligned countries, and especially in the wake of the wars with China and Pakistan during the early 1960s, a shift occurred in foreign policy that moved the focus of defense strategy away from multilateral alliances and agreements and towards military power.[40]

On the other hand, other papers deal with more recent study findings which proceed from the premise that the ‘founding fathers’ did not disseminate the Non-Alignment concept worldwide as an article of faith, but rather that politicians and heads of state developed their own ideas about Non-Alignment policies during the 1950s and 1960s under the influence of the global Cold War, decolonization, and regional conflicts. A great asset of the Special Edition is that in their studies the authors focus on a number of actors who have been ignored or marginalized in older publications dealing with Non-Alignment: For example, Sue Onslow’s article mentions an aspect of non-alignment networking previously neglected by researchers.[41] She illustrates the fact that many Non-Aligned states joined the Commonwealth because such membership was attractive for newly independent states. As a network it was similar to NAM in that it provided them with the opportunity to communicate informally and enter the stage of international politics, but on top of this, Commonwealth membership also provided an opportunity to parley with some industrial powers. Another of her thought-provoking hypotheses is that during the 1980s, English-speaking Non-Aligned nations ascribed greater weight to the Commonwealth (‘West-South-association’) as an international forum than to the Conferences of Non-Aligned States (1073). In light of the numerous internal conflicts plaguing the NAM in the 1980s, this seems eminently plausible. Here it would have been helpful to have provided a systematic analysis questioning whether non-aligned nations deliberately chose to join a given international organization based on whether it could advance specific interests, and to pose the question as to which organizations were perceived as having what kind of significance at which particular time to fulfill this aim. Frank Gerits analyzes the importance of Non-Alignment for Kwame Nkrumah’s policies and demonstrates that the latter espoused it primarily as a means of blocking the intervention of the super powers in Africa.[42] Allany O’Malley also examines the foreign policies of Ghana and India in connection with the Congo crisis, albeit more within the context of the United Nations (UN).[43] In so doing she points to an early example of the strategy later used by the NAM: setting agendas and pushing through its interests at the UN. She also looks at the close links between both organizations, an aspect that merits closer scrutiny in future. Using the example of two small states, North Korea and Albania, Elidor Mëhilli concludes that the former joined the movement of non-aligned states in order to avoid being isolated internationally, whereas the latter saw isolation as the key to non-alignment.[44] Jeffrey James Byrne examines the foreign policy activity of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and the Algerian government in the South-South relationship, which despite its importance for this connection is seldom taken into account by NAM researchers.[45]

Taken together the individual contributions make a convincing case that Non-Alignment was not merely a reaction to the Cold War but that completely disparate interests caused countries to opt for such a policy and, moreover, to interpret it differently according to context. If one sums up the findings contained in the Special Edition as well as the results of earlier studies,[46] one can find at least nine reasons that motivated governments to espouse a policy of non-alignment: the desire of ‘small’ states for international standing and influence; the (regional) striving for hegemony and super power status on the part of the ‘big’ non-aligned states; the confirmation of statehood for small states and micro-states; demonstration of legitimacy and the right to sovereign statehood aimed at both the international community as well as the local populace; as a proxy for a superpower; expectation of improved conditions in the matter of foreign (development) aid; separation from a Cold War super power’s sphere of influence; support in regional or local conflicts; and avoidance of isolation in regional or global groups and alliances.

Foreign policy considerations of a given government usually reveal a jumble or conglomeration of various motives, which tend to be of more or less moment at various times and require further study if we are to achieve a more nuanced understanding of Non-Alignment. This becomes all the more clear if one considers the fact that the articles in the Special Edition primarily train their sights on the actions of heads of government. Little is known about the numerous foreign ministers, ambassadors and diplomats who participated in the networking of Non-Aligned states, prepared their conferences and later organized the Movement of Non-Aligned States. Clearly the history of non-alignment and NAM continues to be a drama without ‘supporting actors.’

This enlarged spectrum of actors is bound up with the greater amount of source material used. In addition to files from India and Yugoslavia, the authors cite archival files from the United Nations, Algeria and Ghana. Onslow also cites numerous interviews that were part of an extensive oral history project on the story of the Commonwealth.[47] Using these sources as a base, most of the papers analyze the early phases of Non-Alignment policy from the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung to the failed second Bandung Conference at Algiers in 1965, with special focus on the Conference of Non-Aligned States at Belgrade in 1961. The increased insight gained by focusing on the early phase of Non-Alignment becomes clear when the articles use individual examples – like the Congo crisis and non-aligned mediation – to illustrate the interests, operational radius and actions of non-aligned states. Robert B. Rakove’s article is informative and persuasive; it is essentially based on the results of his empirically dense, well-founded study Kennedy, Johnson and the Non-Aligned World.[48] Using the example of non-aligned mediation, Rakove unravels the sundry diplomatic strategies applied by these countries, strategies which covered a wide spectrum that included dispatching communiqués, appointing emissaries, organizing their own conferences and cooperating with other Non-Aligned states at the United Nations.[49]  I would have welcomed a bit more information about how the Non-Aligned states themselves assessed their strategies and also about the extent to which these experiences influenced their later organization and actions. A study on Presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter and the Non-Aligned would be extremely welcome, as would a greater recognition of cultural-diplomacy approaches in the analysis of bargaining strategies[50]

Byrnes’s article demonstrates the strengths of concentrating research on a ‘short’ time period. Byrnes gives a nuanced and convincing analysis of the dissensions and rivalries that existed between the Afro-Asian movement (based on geographical affiliation and common political interests) and the Non-Aligned Movement (based on common political interests). He then points out changes within the Non-Aligned group of states that was dominated mainly by India during the 1950s, but by smaller and more radical African states as well as Egypt and Yugoslavia starting in 1961, which caused a shift in the geographical focus and policies of the group. While the general rejection of the Cold War’s bipolar logic diminished in importance, decolonization processes and North-South negotiations gained in significance. In like fashion, he crystallizes the struggle for Third-World leadership within Asian and African nations, which in the 1960s contributed towards preventing a second Bandung Conference and caused the activities of the non-aligned states to dwindle greatly. The only point that failed to convince is his assumption that the NAM was formally founded in Belgrade in 1961. (913) On the contrary – and this is my theory – the NAM did not become institutionalized until the 1970s. It had its heyday in the context of the North-South conflict, when it emerged as an important actor in international politics.[51] According to Mark Mazower, during that decade the NAM, together with the G77, posed the greatest challenge to the United States’s claim to leadership since the Second World War.[52] Kevin O’Sullivan argues along similar lines. His article demonstrates that the 1970s marked the high point of the North-South conflict, opening up new fields of activity and influence at the UN and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) as well as facilitating other forms of multilateral and bilateral negotiations for the Non-Aligned states, which were now more strongly organized in the NAM.[53] For this reason and in view of the existing information, it would be desirable for future studies to focus on a longer time span and examine the policies of the NAM up to the present in order to have a fuller picture. For despite the uneven success of its politics, and despite differences in how it is judged, with 120 member states the NAM currently represents one of the largest international organizations next to the UN. Therefore future studies should address not only its beginnings, but examine its uneven development up to the present

To sum up, this Special Edition quite accurately reflects the state of research and current debate: On the one hand some articles tend to cling to older views about the NAM, a detail which is reflected in their focus on India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt as the preeminent nations in the movement, and the fact that most of them concentrate on the 1950s and 1960s. The powerful influence exerted by older, entrenched interpretations is also evident in the circumstance that, even in this Special Edition, the myth that Nkrumah took part in the Bandung Conference is repeated. (973) On the other hand, several articles disprove this same myth when they cite Robert Vitalis’s impressive study (913,993).[54] Furthermore, especially in connection with the 1950s and 1960s, this Special Edition provides illuminating, nuanced insights when it hones our perceptions of cooperation and competition in South-South relationships. The Asia-Africa Movement, the Conference of Non-Aligned States and the various shades of Pan-Africanism appear from this perspective not so much as reactions to the Cold War but in a greater sense as the products of local and regional affiliations and conflicts. Last, the larger spectrum of actors deserves to be warmly acknowledged, as it contributes to a more differentiated understanding of non-alignment policy. Hence the Special Edition breaks away from older narratives, takes some initial steps towards a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of non-alignment and the Non-Aligned-Movement and in so doing encourages further research in this field. The Special Edition can be highly recommended to anyone interested in the history of the Cold War, decolonization, South-South relations and Non-Alignment.

Review by Wen-Qing Ngoei, Northwestern University

In their introduction to this special issue of The International History Review, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimaki and Marco Wyss state that this collection of papers examines “what independent pathways” existed for peripheral states, independence movements, or regional alliances “within the Cold War system that were not directly subjected to the East-West confrontation” (902).[55] And there is, in principle, much to recommend this endeavor. As the introduction rightly points out, there is abundant evidence of middle and smaller powers as well as non-state actors who pursued their objectives through “an extensive array of strategies” that “did not easily fit into binary” Cold-War dynamics (901). Though the big powers exerted preponderant influence upon world affairs, the history of the global Cold War remains incomplete without acknowledging the agency of those who operated “in the Cold War, but not of it,” those who escaped the gravity of the superpowers’ agenda to achieve their own goals.[56]

Thus, this collection of papers aspires to “take off the Cold War lens” and go beyond simply showcasing those historical actors of the Third World who resisted the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, or influenced the dimensions of the global conflict.[57] Indeed, several of these papers delve into the rivalries and alliances within the Third World, comparing the agendas and actions of Non-Aligned and neutral states (be they European, Asian, or African) that departed from the Cold-War rivalry; others shed light on under-studied multinational networks such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Commonwealth that at times intersected with the Cold War but at others secured what the introduction describes as the “leeway” to chart their own paths (902).[58]

To render visible the “independent pathways” that historical actors eked out within the Cold War and, most importantly, show that these “pathways” were not of the Cold War, most of these papers hold the “independent pathways” up against East-West dynamics, using the ostensible contrast to make their case. This approach seems conceptually sound but there are perils in the execution. In several papers, the Cold-War conflict looms so large and irresistible, that what limited or short-lived ‘leeway’ the smaller powers achieve seems to pale in its significance.[59]

Indeed, as Sue Onslow concludes her insightful essay on the Commonwealth as a “global sub-system” with sufficient (and underappreciated) heft to maintain a “determined stance of non-involvement in Cold War issues,” she cautions that the Commonwealth’s “influence and activities should not be over-stated.”[60] To be sure, her paper argues that the Commonwealth has an admirable record of successful diplomatic efforts not directly subject to the Cold War, including its support for negotiations to end the Nigerian civil war as well as transition Bangladesh and Mozambique to independence. But Onslow concedes that in the face of “‘hard power’ calculations of the Cold War,” the Commonwealth’s “report card [was] much less impressive” (1076). When President Ronald Reagan authorized the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, for example, an intervention intertwined with the escalating U.S.-Soviet rivalry, Onslow reveals that the Commonwealth Secretary-General’s “intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy” failed to forestall the American military intervention and could do little more than encourage Commonwealth members “not to endorse it” after the fact. The Commonwealth, Onslow argues, could only “exploit its filigree of formal and informal networks” with effectiveness when the superpowers were not directly invested in incorporating a particular theater of conflict into their rivalry (1076). Put another way, the Commonwealth’s “partial independence” appears to have bloomed neither of, nor within, the Cold War.

Likewise, when Schaufelbuehl, Wyss and Bott compare the under-studied recognition policies undertaken by the European neutrals Switzerland, Austria, and Sweden, it is the tremendous gravity of the American Cold War agenda and U.S. political and economic power that (unfortunately) makes the deepest impression.[61] Again, this arises from using a contrast to reveal the ‘leeway’ that these European neutrals possessed to recognize North Korea or North Vietnam. The authors first remind us that the “cold war was a global conflict, in which all participants were confronted with either/or choices,” that even the neutrals and Non-Aligned countries “could not shy away from choosing sides” (1014). The paper goes on to demonstrate why, “in the wake of the escalation of the cold war in the Third World,” the neutrals did not and, in their own geopolitical calculations, could not recognize either Pyongyang or Hanoi. Switzerland, Austria and Sweden’s freedom to be genuinely neutral in their recognition policy was hamstrung by their “massive financial and commercial interests at play with West Germany” (1029), which was a function of the economic component of the U.S. Cold War containment strategy toward West Germany and Europe. As the authors point out, the European neutrals would not even “re-evaluate their recognition policy” toward the divided Asian states until East-West rapprochement occurred in the early 1970s (1029). Even then, the European neutrals only felt emboldened to dilute their Western-orientation and forge relations with Pyongyang and Hanoi after the U.S. State Department indicated, and in the case of Sweden explicitly telegrammed, that it did not “attach too much importance” to the issue (1028). If “independent pathways” such as this only emerged when the United States chose not train its Cold-War lens upon the issue, then was this ‘leeway’—conceptually and practically—truly within the Cold War?

To be fair, Schaufelbuehl et al. in their introduction have taken utmost care in defining the spirit of their project. And by definition, sporadic gaps in the United States’ Cold-War fixations, lapses in Soviet and Chinese attention, or the perceived lack of strategic import to the big powers, certainly ensured that some local and regional questions during the Cold War were “not directly subject to the East-West confrontation” (902). Robert B. Rakove’s compelling study of Non-Aligned mediation (he notes that he uses the term “non-aligned… expansively”) makes the most of this definition to showcase the agency of middle and smaller powers of the Third World (993).[62] His paper underscores how Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru imbued Non-Alignment with a “peace-making mission” as a direct retort to the “on-going fragmentation of the post-war world into blocs” of the Cold War (994). Mali and Ethiopia’s successful mediation of a “short but bitter border war” between Morocco and Algeria in October 1963 certainly resembles an “independent pathway” after the style that Schaufelbeuhl et al. have established. Paying close attention to the agency of post-colonial actors, Rakove succeeds in demonstrating their “energy, morality, and creativity” in striving to make peace while the “industrial North” and its communist rivals waged their destructive Cold War (1009).

But again, can one take for granted that all events—like the Morocco-Algeria dispute—from the end of World War II until 1991 fell within the Cold-War conflict? After all, Rakove shows that the Kennedy administration “possessed neither experience nor insight” into the Morocco-Algeria standoff of October 1963 that Mali and Ethiopia so ably resolved. And in words that signaled the absence of American strategic investment in the standoff, similar to the State Department telegram to Sweden mentioned above, National Security Council official Robert Komer “mused” that the Morocco-Algeria conflict remained “a pretty obscure situation.” Indeed, the U.S. leadership seemed content to exclude this troublesome “oasis” from their Cold War concerns. Mali and Ethiopia’s diplomatic efforts, what Rakove calls the “high water-mark” of non-aligned mediation, therefore unfolded outside of the Cold War context (997).

On the flipside, when Mali and Egypt attempted to mediate the Vietnam War, a conflict decidedly embedded within the East-West confrontation, the two Non-Aligned nations predictably encountered overwhelming resistance from Beijing, Washington, and even Hanoi (1008). The stark difference between the minor triumphs and major failures of Non-Aligned mediation, like the Commonwealth’s diplomatic initiatives being frequently a ‘victim’ of ‘hard power’ Cold-War calculations, and the European neutrals’ sustained inability to diplomatically recognize Hanoi and Pyongyang, underscores a crucial problem for the study of “independent pathways” as conceived by Schaufelbeuhl et al. (1076). It seems that the middle-to-smaller powers found only fleeting and narrow “leeway” to accomplish whatever aims they harbored that were “within but not of the Cold War.” Worse, when the Cold War powers were determined, they usually ran roughshod over these “independent pathways.” Ultimately, this gives the troubling impression that the middle and smaller powers’ exercised all but a diminished and doomed agency within the Cold War. Of course, the primary goal of this study is to add to—and not supplant—what scholars have already shown of how peripheral actors effectively resisted and influenced the superpowers so as to “block, moderate, expand, or intensify” the global Cold War (902). And alongside the considerable ability of the middle and smaller powers to “utilize pressure stemming from Cold War relations,” this study of the “independent pathways” enriches our understanding of the myriad ways that less central or powerful states managed for a time to slip the surly bonds of the Cold-War logic.

Review by Johanna Rainio-Niemi, University of Helsinki, Finland

A traditionally overlooked topic in mainstream Cold War and international-relations literature, neutrality in the Cold War world has been the subject of the rising international scholarly interest in recent years.  The International History Review Special Issue: Beyond and Between the Cold War Blocs edited by Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Marco Wyss is one of the most recent examples.  It presents an introduction and nine articles originating from the conference “The Role of Neutrals and Non-Aligned in the Global Cold War, 1949-1989” (Lausanne, March 2014) that has provided the basis also for another recent edited volume by the same quarter of editors.[63]

Considering the amount of new research perspectives and topics that ‘new’ Cold-War studies have brought onto historians’ agendas in the past ten to fifteen years, the recent rise of interest in attempts to stay away and keep distance from the confrontation does not surprise.  While certainly not the policy of the numerically biggest and the most powerful, various neutral, Non-Aligned, and uncommitted nations nevertheless by 1960 constituted the numerical majority in the United Nations General Assembly. In more qualitative terms, David Engerman’s conception of the Cold War as a “story of boundaries, establishing of the outer limits of the each sphere of influence and competing for those who had not yet pitched their tents in one camp or the other”[64] captures the relevance neutrality has as an insight into the dynamics of the conflict itself. In terms of understanding how the Cold War resonated globally – across regions, countries, and other spaces beyond, outside and between the blocs – the viewpoint of neutrality is even more important Aspirations to stay at a distance from the Cold War confrontation emerged in many places and in many forms as the essays of the Special Issue show.

Illustrative of this scope is also the Introduction, which opens with a quotation from a New York Times article from May 1955 in which veteran journalist Hanson W. Baldwin records the recent rise of “what has been called variously neutralism, the third force, nationalism, fence-sitting, or the restoration of a balance of power.”[65] As the editors note, by describing these “neutralist sentiments,” Baldwin paints an encompassing picture of contemporary international policies ranging in the mid-1950s from Western Europe to the Mediterranean, Middle-East, and Asia, and with the rapid advance of decolonisation further to Africa and the Far-East. The need to acknowledge this wider global context – in the vein opened in Cold War studies by Arne O. Westad’s The Global Cold War[66]  – is the theme that binds together the Special Issue articles. Another collective aim is to shed light on the agency of the less central or powerful states in the Cold War’s peripheries in line with Tony Smith’s idea of pericentrism by which he highlights the neglected yet central roles played by many ‘junior members’ in the blocking, moderating, expanding, or intensifying Cold-War conflicts.[67]  Third, the Special Issue wishes to examine the “leeway that existed for smaller states, independence movements, or regional alliances to find pathways that were ‘in the Cold War but not of it’” by asking “if and to what extent independent agency was possible on the margins of the Eastern and Western blocs” and by exploring “more generally what independent pathways were possible within the Cold-War system that were not directly subjected to the East-West confrontation” (902). The last extension proves warranted because, in a closer reading, only part of the articles included in the Special Issue discusses the phenomenon varyingly addressed as neutralism, non-alignment, or neutrality. Instead, the essays bring to the fore a much more heterogeneous set of topics, thoughts, and practices that have fallen out of scope of the dichotomous East-West frameworks of the Cold-War research.

In regard to the new insights, the essays included in the Special Issue represent two types. The first type introduces new perspectives mainly by exploring less-explored topics by means of document-based diplomatic history. The second type opens new insights also, or primarily, through the employment of novel methodological approaches that seem to go back especially to post-colonial and intercultural studies, to new global, and transnational history. Such approaches have been used in Third World’ studies but less in more traditionally orientated international relations (IR) and Cold-War history studies.  Also the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as many of the authors note, has been studied in the ‘Third World’ context, but less within the Cold War or IR history framework.  Yet, as the Special Issue in itself proves, also within Cold-War studies the new approaches have grown popular especially there where the global Cold War and Third World themes come under scrutiny.  My review of the Special Issue essays starts with widest global perspectives and moves through the few more pronouncedly European case studies on to the Afro-Asian and concludes with the true outsiders’ perspectives of Albania and North Korea.             

There are two articles - Jeffrey James Byrne’s essay on the ‘dynamic historicity of ‘Third Worldism’ from the 1950s to the 1970s, and Sue Onslow’s text on the Commonwealth neutralism- that open up the broader global contexts of the Special Issue themes in a particularly insightful manner. [68] Eloquently weaving together multiple contexts ranging from national leaders to regional and the broader global and international perspectives, Byrne opens a rich and layered view to the multiplicity of meanings, uses, and intentions out of which the ‘Third Worldism’ (as a political framework created by political elites to achieve political goals) emerged. He pays attention to the ways in which these many ingredients were entangling and competing with one another in three successive stages from the 1950s to 1970s, and, especially, to how the ideas of non-alignment were intertwining with those of Afro-Asian solidarity. On the way there, three key developments took place: first, the more moderate and status quo-orientated interpretations of non-alignment lost the battle for the most visible place within the framework of Third Worldism as well as non-alignment as an institutionalized movement.  By the late-1960s, the more pronouncedly geographical contents drawn from the Afro-Asian solidarity ideas lost their ground too, leaving the politically active, even ‘agitational’ or ‘provocative’ forms of non-alignment as the main symbol of Third Worldism since the mid-1960s.

This last line of thinking Byrne calls “insurgent neutralism” (913).  It was promoted by countries such as Yugoslavia and Egypt and gained its first victory in Belgrade in 1961 when the Non-Aligned Movement was formally founded. In the 1950s this victory was far from self-evident. In contrast to the more moderate line, the insurgent neutralists envisioned non-alignment as a way for weaker countries and liberation movements to join forces to fight the Cold War, colonialism, and imperialism instead of abstaining from these key battles. The next phase, circa 1962-1965, saw the attempts of China, the Soviet Union, and, also, India to “hijack Third Worldist diplomatic functions” (921) that were gaining higher profile in international affairs. Here Byrne (perhaps because of his focus on South-South axis) looks especially at China and its active propagation of the racial (non-white) and geographical (non-European) readings of the Third Worldism – also as a way to derail Yugoslavian and Algerian as well as the Soviet versions of non-alignment whereby the NAM ought to be open to all who shared its political goals. However, with the failure of the second Afro-Asian summit in Algeria in 1965, the Non-Aligned Movement in this active and inclusive form became the prime manifestation of Third World mobilization. While China’s role seems to have faded away, it remains open whether the victory of the insurgent neutralism meant the victory of the Yugoslav model or the strengthening influence of the Soviet model, or some combination of these with some possible new elements too. From a Cold War perspective, this question would be highly interesting. As to the 1970s, however, Byrne notes a powerful shift of focus within Third Worldism and non-alignment from the political to the economic. At this point, argues Byrne, the appeal of the movement was not, as is often claimed, due to any new-found credibility within the détente. Rather, it was due to an anti-systemic rebellion against détente and especially détente’s economic East-West dimensions that seemed to be erecting higher trade barriers between the poor South and the industrialized North. The main symbol for the 1970s Third Worldism was to be the New International Economic Order.  

A different but equally insightful broader-term contribution is offered by Onslow’s discussion of neutralism and the Commonwealth.  By looking at how the rise of the Third World mirrored the agendas of this unique organization with inherently ‘imperial’ and ‘colonial’ past, Onslow opens an interesting, also more generally illustrative view to the less-known sides in the histories of the various forms of neutrality in the context of the Cold War. The concept of neutralism was used and practiced by the Commonwealth “not as a doctrine but as a general policy” that was seen to allow “for flexibility and initiative” (1061) in the organization’s world-wide activities.[69] In response, as Onslow shows, the Commonwealth – a conglomerate of very differently aligned and orientated countries – adopted the role of a diplomatic actor “with a determinedly neutral and non-aligned bias” (1060). Neutralism was understood in the meaning of ‘non-involvement in the Cold War’ and was a conscious attempt to circumvent the Cold War superpower politics and find more ‘neutral’ ways of communication and dialogue within the community. In the 1960s and 1970s, a significant minority (22/87) of the Commonwealth countries were members in the NAM but also the ‘Western’ members – Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand – made use of the Commonwealth formulations of neutralism in order to indicate that on certain matters they did not view global geo-politics, geo-economics, or transcultural contacts through Cold War lenses only. Within this flexible “smart power” framework, as Onslow (1075) calls it, it was possible to the western leaders to be conservative on East/West issues but showing support to radical liberalism on North/South matters.

Onslow’s essay conveys a two-fold message that is relevant beyond the case of the Commonwealth.  It first demonstrates how the structure, forms, and norms of the international system in 1965-90 were much more multipolar and multidimensional than the mainstream Cold War IR theory leads one to assume. Yet, as Onslow also stresses, the Cold War as a broader political, economic, social, and cultural-ideological context was nevertheless absolutely central to the reconfiguration of the Commonwealth mission and its conceptions of neutralism. As Onslow writes, “the ideological battle of systems and ideas gave the Commonwealth a particular purpose in its pursuit and support of decolonization and post-independence nation/state construction” (1060). The Commonwealth thus aimed to be a determined enabler of “extra-European paths to modernity that did not conform entirely to Western liberal-democratic capitalism led by the US nor Soviet-led socialism and central command economies” (1060) while, simultaneously, the Cold War in itself became remarkable enabler for the Commonwealth, giving it a sense of rationale that dissipated after1989-91.  

But how influential was the Commonwealth? According to Onslow, it was a subsidiary diplomatic global actor that skillfully exploited its “filigree of formal and informal networks” and helped spread ideas and attitudes through its “intersection with other international meetings and bilateral summits” (1076). Leaders and officials of the Commonwealth wanted to and did believe in this type of power that facilitated discussion, understanding, and contacts. Yet, citing U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger according to whom a policy initiative is not important, only its outcome is, Onslow concludes that by this criteria the Commonwealth’s record remains much less impressive. While Onslow ends her discussion with the remark of the Commonwealth as a victim to the hard-power calculations of the Cold War era, it would be interesting to read more about the Commonwealth experiences at the intersection of the hard, the soft, and the smart-power elements of the Cold War world.               

Partly overlapping with the themes raised by Byrnes and Onslow, but from a more pronouncedly European perspective, Kevin O’Sullivan’s article discusses the Like-Minded Group (LMG) as an example of the dynamics and alliances that the rise of the Third World themes to international affairs agendas generated among the more ‘advanced’ nations of the North (the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland as initiators, subsequently joined by Canada, Austria, Ireland, Australia, and, in 1981, also France).[70] A quite targeted response to the Third World countries’ call for a New International Economic Order at the United Nations (UN) in 1974, LMG cooperation aimed to bridge the North-South gaps and address the concerns of the South on a platform free from East-West tensions, Cold War superpower politics, and the issues of nuclear proliferation. Asking how this initiative came about and what ideational, political, and social inspirations underpinned it, O´Sullivan opens an inherently transnational view of the range of European and Western lines of political thought that were particularly responsive to the rise of the Third World themes. He distinguishes between the traditions of social democracy, Christian justice (close to Christian Democracy) and examines the ways in which they intertwined with the varying versions of anti-colonial, as well as internationalist thinking as promoted through the UN in particular. These lines of thinking shaped the LMG agenda towards the global South and were reflected also on the LMG’s internal debates, especially on the tensions between the radical interventionists (Dutch/Nordic) and the proponents of a more conservative model of the welfare state (Austria, Belgium, and Canada). Particular attention is given to the smallest member, Ireland, and to the ways in which the more collective, transnationally orientated LMG activities were fused with the making of its national foreign policies.

At a more general analytical level, O’Sullivan’s conclusions side with Matthew Connelly’s and Erez Manela’s readings of the Cold War as a demonstration of a Northern world order[71]. In the context of the 1970s, the loosening of the ideological orthodoxy of the Cold War and of the U.S. dominance of international economic organizations allowed new space for collaboration and re-shaping of the international orders beyond the Cold-War binary codes. The LMG is a case point. Yet, while the escaping of the East-West dichotomies was relatively easy within this framework the same did not apply to the complexity of the historically deep-seated North-South gaps. Finally, with the Latin-American debt crisis and the re-culmination of the Cold War in the early 1980s, options for any more radical reforms of the economic world order closed down and the way started to be effectively paved for a new neo-liberal international economic order that is with us still today.

Another text discussing the European responses to Third-World matters is Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl’s, Marco Wyss’s, and Sandra Bott’s contribution on the policies of the European neutrals, and especially Switzerland, towards the two divided countries of the Third World, Korea and Vietnam.[72] In particular, the authors focus on how the policies of Switzerland’s small, neutral, peer-group countries – Sweden but also Austria – shaped the Swiss policies on the question of divided states. Through this angle, the authors assess “the credibility of neutrality in the global Cold War” (1014, 1029), the main criteria for this credibility being defined in quite distinctively Swiss terms. As the authors note, the issue of recognition was particularly problematic for Switzerland because of the two “maxims” that were introduced to re-legitimize Swiss neutrality after the end of the Second World War: the maxim of “universality” and “solidarity” (1016).  According to the first maxim Bern ought to recognize all states as long as the main conditions for statehood – a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter onto relations with other states – were met.  Without discussing whether the divided states in question did meet these criteria for statehood, the authors argue that the requirements of the maxim of universality were not equally and impartially met by Switzerland (or Sweden or Austria) in the cases of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. Instead the maxim was applied “pragmatically”, meaning that the three European neutrals - from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s – had relations with only the non-communist halves of these countries. This, the authors argue, compromised the credibility of the European neutrals’ neutrality – revealing its westward-bias. Simultaneously, this compromise was a signal of pragmatism: the neutrals did not wish to irritate the U.S. or provoke calls for the recognition of East-Germany. Respectively, when the U.S. position changed and the significance of the Third-World issues grew in the 1960s, the three European neutrals’ changed their stances. This change, as the authors illustrate through the Swiss sources, happened through a constant monitoring of and informal coordination with other the European neutrals. Here the Swiss at least, were aware of also “the limits of solidarity” between the neutrals, all of them seen to be competing with one another not wishing to lose the potential public diplomacy gains as the first-come mediator to the other neutrals (1022). The Swiss were looking at Sweden in particular.

The question of how the Cold-War tensions influenced the recognition of the divided states is highly relevant and would benefit from a wider contextualization beyond the question of credibility of the Swiss or any other European neutrals’ neutrality. As Schaufelbuehl, Wyss, and Bott interestingly note, the shadow of Washington was looming larger in the case of Korea than in Vietnam. While the temporal context of the two conflicts and the change of the U.S. attitudes definitely played a role here, another variable that the authors point to but do not discuss in detail concerns Sweden’s and Switzerland’s institutionalized participation in the Neutral Nations’ Supervisory Commission (NNSC). How did the Commission membership shape their stances on the question of Korea either from the viewpoint of the international law or in comparison to Vietnam[73]?

Another interesting question concerns the ’the shadow of Europe’ and its influence on Swiss or, more widely, European policies towards the divided states outside Europe. For all the eurocentrism that this question may involve, it is relevant and, in fact, indicative also of the very interconnectedness between the key questions of the Cold War confrontation whether in Europe or elsewhere. The landmark years in this question date between the late 1960s and the mid-1970s and are reflected also in the Swedish (1969) and the Swiss (1971) recognition of North Vietnam and their recognitions of North Korea in 1973 (Sweden) and 1974 (Switzerland). Looking at what else was going on in these critical years, the most rewarding further questions would need to address what seems to be an entire wave of international recognitions that followed the July 1972 agreement on the preconditions on the reunification of the two Korean states and, in Europe, the treaty between the two German states in December 1972 (Grundlagenverlag).  In the question of North-Vietnam Switzerland and especially Sweden seem to have been among the international fore-runners but not so much in the questions of Korea and Germany that – after the 1972 agreements – rapidly lost their earlier Cold War baggage. In Europea, the Grundlagenverlag interestingly overlapped with the preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). All European neutrals had relatively central roles within the CSCE process and Finland’s role as the host of the Final Conference had initially been promoted also by references to the fact that Finland – unlike Austria, Sweden, or Switzerland – did not have relations with either one of the two German states. This non-recognition was the line that Finland, this unarguably most fragile among those European neutrals, followed in its relations also with Korea and Vietnam. Consequently, right after the 1972 treaties between the halves of Germany and Korea, Finland initiated official diplomatic relations with all of Germany, Korea, and also the North-Vietnamese state in the first half of 1973.  In the criteria applied by Schaufelbuehl, Wyss, and Bott, Finland’s policy in the question of the divided states would need to be considered as the most credibly neutral of all European neutral states. The issue is more complex than that, however.

The only one-country case study among the Special Issue articles is Frank Gerits’s essay on Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, 1957-1966.[74] Gerits approaches the national-policy formulation from the viewpoint of public diplomacy and examines the ways in which Nkrumah used and fused the elements from the wider-than-the-nation discourses of non-alignment and pan-Africanism to shape the national-policy profile in the international and Pan-African Cold War context. In reference to the tendency of traditional Cold War studies to treat post-colonial diplomats as actors with very limited room for maneuver, with no ideological aspirations of their own but as acting – at best – ‘pragmatically’ to resist and/or utilize the Cold War pressures, Gerits plainly states that, in Ghana “the symbolic and the pragmatic were intertwined” (953).  The same entwinement, it is safe to say, applies beyond Ghana. Yet – just like in the case of Ghana – it has almost patently fallen out of the scope of attention in the ‘realistically’ attuned Cold War international-relations and foreign-policy history. Gerits’s re-examination of the Ghanaian documents from a new angle sustains the earlier notions that Ghanaian diplomacy after 1960 became more assertive, but this alteration, argues Gerits, did not stem from an increased “Cold War pragmatism.” (952). It emerged out of a new public diplomacy strategy whereby non-alignment – rather than being a form of window-dressing, a diplomatic manoeuvre, or an unrealistic dream – was consciously seen as a key part of a pan-African worldview and, also, as the safest route to African unity which, in turn, was in the best interest of Ghana. Ghanaian national policy was constructed in a Cold War context whereby the Pan-African collective considerations were of primary relevance and not just pragmatic but also ideologically inspired.

Ghana, together with the pioneer Non-Aligned India, figures centrally also in Alanna O’Malley’s article on the ‘transnational dynamics’ of the Congo Crisis, 1960-61.[75] As O’Malley notes, the Congo Crisis was one of the first and of the few cases where African, Afro-Asian, and Non-Aligned countries’ joint pressure was able to shape the UN’s decision to send a separate peace-keeping force (Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, ONUC) to Congo. Examining especially Indian Premier Jawaharlar Nehru’s and President of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah’s policies at the UN, O’Malley shows how both made use of the (emergent) Non-Aligned Movement as well as the Afro-Asian bloc within the UN to influence the Secretary-General and former colonial powers. The greatest contribution of the former was the making of the latter aware of how problems of de-colonialization in one country could explode into an international conflict.  At the same time, both Nkrumah and Nehru worked to keep the principles of the UN intervention as Africanized as possible. At a wider level, the UN’s activity was seen to signal the internationalization and a formal legitimization of the end of colonialism, symbolizing the UN’s support for the sovereignty and integrity of the newly independent states. In Africa, the overall Afro-Asian success in the re-orientation of ‘the sense of geopolitics’ in regard to the Congo Crisis remarkably strengthened non-alignment’s support among the continent’s many new states. Whereas O´Malley’s contribution opens important Afro-Asian angles to the early stages of the Congo Crisis, the very short time span of the analysis leaves out many of the more complex and controversial, Cold War ‘proxy-war’ sides of this crisis – ranging from the disagreements amongst the Afro-Asian players to the U.S. and Soviet interventions to the Western powers’ criticism of the UN and the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld’s fatal plane accident in September 18, 1961.  The shadows left behind by the crisis were, at many levels of the international system, long.

A more pronounced Cold-War perspective – though from the U.S. perspective – is opened by Robert B. Rakove in his analysis of the U.S. attitudes towards Non-Aligned mediation efforts from the Congo Crisis to Vietnam War.[76] As Rakove notes, the general U.S. image of “a movement of neutrals” remained fixed in place starting from “the peculiar timing” of the Bandung (1955) and Belgrade (1961) Conferences that overlapped with the severe international nuclear crises (991). Consequently, the U.S. never stopped suspecting the sincerity of the Non-Aligned commitment to neutrality which all too often, in its view, seemed to be siding with the Soviet stances. The more openly anti-colonial and anti-imperialist the NAM turned, the more doubtful the U.S. grew. What Rakove bluntly calls the American “antipathy toward the Third World” started with the Cold War and was reflected on the notions of the Third World leaders’ “irrationally” anti-Western attitudes and the unprincipled and opportunistic nature of their claims for neutrality: in the US view, the countries of the post-colonial world wished to be subject to neither bloc yet able to derive every possible advantage from both (992, 995, 1000). These “infantilizing” official positions towards non-alignment also shaped the U.S. attitudes towards the Non-Aligned countries’ mediation efforts that many non-aligned leaders thought of as being both a moral responsibility and human necessity (995).

Rakove’s discussion of the Congo crisis opens a view to the Non-Aligned leaders’ diplomatic efforts and stresses the primary rile of the Non-Aligned members of the Organization of African Unity, not the NAM itself. This discussion brings out actors such as Modibo Keita of Mali who had his own grand design for Congo. This was not perfectly in line with the policy of Nkrumah, whom Washington, according to Rakove, did not trust because of his “anti-U.S. and pro-communist bias” (1006).  Here Rakove’s analysis comes so close to the themes that are discussed by O’Malley’s and, also, Gerits that from a reader’s perspective, some cross-references or any indication of the awareness of what the other contributors argued would have been to the benefit of the individual as well as the collective contribution. This feature marks all articles on equal grounds (it seems to have been the editorial line) but there are many places where cross-references or at least an awareness of what the others write would have helped to decrease the sense of mixed messages that a reader cannot avoid – not so much when reading the individual essays but especially when reading them as a series, many of which touch upon same issue but in a disconnected manner. Besides, there are also many interesting linkages that evoke new questions and could have inspired the authors as well. 

One such linkage opens from Rakove’s notion that the emphasis of the Non-Aligned mediation mission served as a counterweight to the rise of the more militant model of non-alignment solidarity within the NAM (cf. Byrne’s article). The 1960s conception of Non-Alignment as active and dynamic force in world politics perhaps boded initially ill for sustained efforts at mediation that would have required a more distanced and impartial take, Rakove argues. The mediation path, in all cases, remained weak: it was tested in the crises of the 1960s but by the time of détente, its opportunities were lost because of the “bitter disputes between non-aligned states and Washington over US policy in Congo and, later, in South-East Asia” (993). The consolidation of the more militant line within the NAM diminished the U.S. interest in the Non-Aligned countries’ mediation services and disinclined the latter from offering them. In this way, the fate of the Non-Aligned mediation mission in the Cold War also depended on how this mission was received in the leading capitals of the Cold War era.  The U.S., as Rakove shows, never ceased to doubt the sincerity and impact of the efforts and it would have been certainly interesting to read a similar type of analysis from the Soviet perspective. 

Another big power perspective – at a regional level – is opened by Jayita Sarkar in her essay on India’s nuclear option policy.[77] Regardless of the US pressure on India to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), India’s security environment was perceived as too insecure, its relations with the U.S. too strained, and its capacity to produce fissile material too certain for it not to proceed towards an own nuclear weapon in the 1960s and 1970s. This, too, was an ‘independent pathway,’ but how did it fit together and influenced with India’s earlier investment in non-alignment? Sarkar does not address the question to any great extent, but some hints can be gathered from the beginning of her article where she describes how the first Chinese nuclear test in late 1964 was received in India and how the lack of criticism among Non-Aligned states was taken as evidence that the Non-Alignment Movement was not be mobilized against this issue. Combined with India’s dwindling position in the NAM’s leadership India’s interest started turning to the most vital questions of its national hard security.

At first sight, the idea of ‘independent pathways’ seems to be the main link through which Elidor Mehilli’s article on the two true outsiders of the post-1945 world, Albania and North Korea, connects with the other overall themes of the Special Issue.[78] On a closer reading, however, a few, more connections open up. First, the analysis of Albania and North-Korea makes the reader think about the contents and limits of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘independent pathways’ in international affairs in general and in the Cold War in particular. Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, Mehilli’s text is in fact the only one among the Special Issue essays that touches upon – via rather extreme cases, though –  internal dynamics, the boundaries of belonging, and the spaces for ‘independent pathways’ within the communist part of the Cold War world. As a basis for Albania’s and North-Korea’s model of self-reliance, Mehilli points out the model of the inter-war Soviet Union where “rapid industrialization through self-reliance” had been expected to lead to an ability to stand up to imperialist powers (1049). After the Sino-Soviet split, this initially Soviet idea was interpreted in Albania and North-Korea in increasingly anti-Soviet terms. Further, while in the case of China or North-Korea, self-reliance did not mean the rejection of all outside help – North-Korea signed trade agreements with a number of Western European and Japanese actors in the early 1970s (cf. also the essay by Schaufenbuehl et al.) – Albania by the 1970s, after the breakdown of its relations with China, drifted into autarky that had little to do with self-reliance. Though in different ways, both countries continued to probe the opportunities for outside help – also by utilizing the shifting relations between China and the Soviet Union and, to an extent, Yugoslavia – and, simultaneously, were quite cynically used as the most marginal instruments in the power battles between the bigger players of the Communist world. The autarky-prone self-reliance proved disastrous for both countries but, to an extent, the reader remains wondering to what extent the isolation of these two ‘rebels’ was also a somewhat secondary consequence of and thus epiphenomenal to the clashes between the bigger Communist players.

The major contribution by The International History Review Special Issue: Beyond and Between the Cold War Blocs is the nuanced view it opens to the many ways and forms in which the ‘Global South’ rose and started shaping the international-affairs agendas throughout the globe.  The process was intertwined with de-colonialization and many types of regional, intercultural, and national processes including the rise of the Non-Aligned, Pan-African, and Afro-Asian solidarity movements. The North-South gap gained new visibility and started to intersect and compete with the East-West divide as the main cleavage of the Cold War era in the mid-1960s at latest. 

Altogether, the essays in the IHR Special Issue cover mostly the 1960s and 1970s history with a geographical focus on especially Africa, Asia, and parts of Europe. Much else could have been added, of course, but the limits to what can be reasonably included in one volume are understandable. Yet, the consequences of the focus on the 1960s/1970s to the broader analytical questions could have been addressed in some more detail in the introduction. Secondly, it is the relatively weak overall presence of the Cold War blocs and superpowers in many of the essays – not as a focal point but as contextual factors – that stands out, contributing to a from time-to-time feeling that the discussion, in the end, is more about the Third World than about the Cold War. While U.S. policies are usefully opened up in one of the essays (Rakove), the ‘other side’ and especially the Soviet Union with its rather keen interest in the themes of Non-Alignment and the Third World remains missing. With regard to possible future avenues of research, it would be interesting to read also about other Eastern bloc countries’ connections – within and beyond the blocs – with the global South of the Cold War world   

All in all, the story that is told through the essays of the IHR Special Issue tells perhaps more about dependence, interdependence, and connections than about independent pathways or agency in the Cold War world. These connections were in many ways asymmetrical yet open in both directions. They were in themselves global and transnational, and are basically applicable to historical analysis regardless of whether we speak of Europe, the West, the East, South, North, or some individual countries. Here the Special Issue articles make many welcome openings by showing how rewarding results can be achieved by looking at the topics of neutrality, neutralism and non-alignment, colonialism, imperialism, and the Cold War in new analytical contexts - whether in terms of time, geography, research material, or methods. It is actually not the recent revival of interest in neutrality but the relatively long-lasting neglect of it as a topic of international relations and Cold War history that should be seen as remarkable. The IHR Special Issue plausibly indicates that a change is under way. Already the sheer volume of this contribution, together with its sister publication by the same editors, and other recent contributions looking for new veins of analysis[79] will make it ever more unjustified to simply by-pass the phenomenon of neutrality in the future Cold War international history textbooks whether with a local, regional or global focus. A true ‘internationalisation’ of neutrality history would not only mean a re-thinking of the global ‘Third World’ histories of non-alignment and neutralism but also of the well-established European country-based histories of neutrality beyond the official state policies and the national historical contexts, across the binary codes of the East /West, North/ South as well as European/global, national/international. Finally, corresponding to the fragmentation of the previous monolithic images of the Cold War in result of the introduction of new, wider Cold-War Studies perspectives, also the images of Cold War neutrality can be expected to fragment and diversify in result of the more varied and nuanced takes to the topic. The conceptual and historical diversification calls for new type of constructivist or conceptual historical attention to the manifold uses and meanings of the ideas and practices of neutrality, also beyond the established analytical framework of the Cold War itself.


© 2016 The Authors

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[1] H-Diplo would like to thanks Professor Andrew Williams, editor of IHR, and the four authors of this introduction, for granting us permission to publish this review.  It original appeared as “Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Marco Wyss, “Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War.” The International History Review 37:5 (December 2015):  901-911. 

[2] The editors of this IHR special issue would sincerely like to thank all participants of the ‘The Role of the Neutrals and Non-Aligned in the Global Cold War, 1949-1989’ conference at the University of Lausanne, March 2014, where early versions of most of the articles were presented, as well as The International History Review’s anonymous reviewers for their exceedingly helpful comments.  Our gratitude also goes to the Swiss National Science Foundation, the University of Lausanne, the International History Department of the Graduate Institute in Geneva, and the Pierre du Bois Foundation for Current History for their generous support.

[3] H.W. Baldwin, ‘Rise of Neutralism May Alter U.S. Plans. Power of “Third Force” Political and Moral Rather than Military’, New York Times, The News of the Week in Review, 22 May 1955, 5E.

[4] See D.C. Thomas, The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity (Westport, 2001), 73.

[5] M. Connelly, ‘Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During the Algerian War for Independence’, American Historical Review, cv (2000), 739-69.

[6] T. Smith, ‘New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, xxiv (2000), 567-91.

[7] F. Cooper, ‘Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History’, The American Historical Review, xcic (1994), 1516-45, 1533.

[8] G. McCann, ‘From Diaspora to Third Worldism and the United Nations: India and the Politics of Decolonizing Africa’, Past and Present, ccxviii (2013), 258-80.

[9] Notably J. Dinkel, Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten. Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927-1992), Studien zur Internationalen Geschichte 37 (Berlin, 2015); R.B. Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World (New York, 2013); N. Mišković, H. Fischer-Tiné, and N. Boškovska (eds), The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Delhi-Bandung-Belgrade (Abingdon, 2014); R. Kullaa, Non-Alignment and Its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge (London, 2012); I. Abraham, ‘From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65,’ Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, xlvi (2008), 195-219.

[10] See M.S. Rajan, Nonalignment & Nonaligned Movement: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi, 1990); A.W. Singham and S. Hune, Non-Alignment in an Age of Alignments (Westport, CT, 1986); U.S. Bajpai (ed), Non-Alignment: Perspectives and Prospects (New Delhi, 1983); R.L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers (New York, 1983); P. Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London, 1978); G.H. Jansen, Nonalignment and the Afro-Asian States (New York, 1966).

[11] An exception is the forthcoming volume of S. Bott, J. M. Hanhimäki, J.M. Schaufelbuehl, and M. Wyss (eds), Between or Within the Blocs? Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War (Abingdon, 2016), or works that do not primarily focus on the comparative aspect of neutrality and neutralism: Kullaa, Non-Alignment; T. Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE: The NCN States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975 (Baden, 2009); F. Halliday, European Neutralism and Cold War Politics: A Harder Look (Sheffield, 1990).

[12] M. Nilsson and M. Wyss, ‘The Armed Neutrality Paradox: Sweden and Switzerland in US Cold War Armaments Policy’, Journal of Contemporary History (forthcoming); J. Rainio-Niemi, The Ideological Cold War: The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland (New York, 2014); J.M. Hanhimäki, ‘The First Line of Defence or a Springboard for Disintegration? European Neutrals in American Foreign and Security Policy’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, vii (1996), 378-403; H. Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality (New York, 1988).

[13] See M.P. Bradley, ‘Decolonization, the Global South, and the Cold War, 1919-1962’ in M.P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. I. Origins (Cambridge 2010), 464-85; D.C. Thomas, The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity (Westport 2001), 56; R. Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955 (Singapore, 1981).

[14] This point was again recently emphasised by Kullaa, Non-Alignment, 15-17, or R. Vitalis, ‘The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Bandoong)’, Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, iv (2013), 261-88.

[15] The concepts of Neutralism and non-alignment owe much to earlier developments such as internationalist, anti-imperialist movements, the Pan-African Congress, or the Asian People’s Conferences, see N. Mišković, ‘Introduction’ in Mišković et al., The Non-Aligned Movement, 1-2.

[16] On Yugoslavia’s role in the founding of the NAM, see S. Rajak, ‘No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment’, Journal of Cold War Studies, xvi (2014), 146-79 and R. Niebuhr, ‘Nonalignment as Yugoslavia’s Answer to Bloc Politics’, Journal of Cold War Studies, xiii, no. 1 (2011), 146-79.

[17] See R. Allison, The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment in the Third World (Cambridge, 1988), 4-5.

[18] This point is made by Bradley, ‘Decolonization’, 480-1.

[19] See S. Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (Chapel Hill, 2004), passim.

[20] See D. Little, ‘The Cold War in the Middle East: Suez crisis to Camp David Accords’ in M. P. Leffler and O.A. Westad (eds), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, vol. II. Crises and Détente (Cambridge 2010), 305-26; on the USSR’s policy toward Arab nationalism, also see K. Dawisha (ed), The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives (New York, 1983).

[21] G.N. Uzoigwe, ‘Pan Africanism in World Politics; the Geopolitics of the Pan-African Movement, 1900-2000’ in T. Falola and K. Essien (eds), Pan-Africanism, and the Politics of African Citizenship and Identity (Abingdon, 2014), 215-46; I.N. Endeley, Bloc Politics at the United Nations: the African Group (Lanham, 2009), 3-13; S. M. Makinda and F. Wafula Okumu, The African Union: Challenges of Globalization, Security and Governance (Abingdon, 2008), 21-7.

[22] For a comprehensive bibliography on Pan-Africanism and the Organization of African Unity, see: G. Harris, The Organization of African Unity (Oxford, 1994).

[23] This status was codified by The Hague Conventions of 1907, see St. C. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History (Manchester, 2000), 191-217.

[24] On this question see for example: Nilsson and Wyss, ‘The Armed’; J.M. Gabriel, The American Conception of Neutrality After 1941 (Basingstoke, 2002); V. Zubok, ‘The Soviet Attitude towards the European Neutrals during the Cold War’ in M. Gehler and R. Steininger (eds), Die Neutralen und die europäische Integration 1945-1995 (Vienna, 2000), 29-43; Hanhimäki, ‘The First Line’; Hakovirta, East-West Conflict.

[25] See E.D. Pullin, ‘The Bandung Conference: Ideological Conflict and the Limitations of US Propaganda’ in Bott et al. (eds), Between or Within.

[26] On the United States’ position on neutralism, see Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, passim; H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960 (New York, 1989), passim.

[27] See Allison, The Soviet Union, passim.

[28] Allison, The Soviet Union, 4-5.

[29] Most recently, Patricia Clavin, Securing the World Economy: the Reinvention of the League of Nations, 1920-1946, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

[30] A new volume, Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or within the Blocs? edited by the same team of scholars who prepared this special issue, is due out with Taylor Francis this year.

[31] Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss and Sandra Bott, “Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War: Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam,” The International History Review (IHR) 37:5 (December 2015): 1014-1036.

[32] Jeffrey James Byrne, “Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment,” IHR: 912-932

[33] Kevin O’Sullivan, “Between Internationalism and Empire:  Ireland, the ‘Like-Minded’ Group, and the Search for a New International Order, 1974-82,” IHR: 1083-1101.

[34] Robert B. Rakove, “The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961–6,IHR: 991-1013; Alanna O’Malley, “Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960-1,” IHR: 970-990.; Frank Gerits, “’When the Bull Elephants Fight’:  Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957-66),” IHR: 951-969.

[35] Jayita Sarkar, “The Making of a Non-Aligned Nuclear Power: India’s Proliferation Drift, 1964-8,” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015): 933-950.

[36] Elidor Mëhilli, “States of Insecurity,” IHR: 1037-1058.

[37] Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Marco Wyss, “Indroduction: Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War.” The International History Review 37:5 (December 2015):  901-911.

[38] Sue Onslow, “The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism and Non-Alignment” IHR: 1059-1082.

[39] Peter Lyon, Neutralism, (Leister: Leicester University Press, 1963).

[40] Jayita Sarkar, “The Making of a Non-Aligned Nuclear Power: India’s Proliferation Drift, 1964-8,” The International History Review (IHR), 37:5 (December 2015): 933-950.

[41] Sue Onslow, “ The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism and Non-Alignment” IHR: 1059-1082.

[42] Frank Gerits, “‘When the Bull Elephants Fight’:  Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957-66),” IHR: 951-969.

[43] Alanna O’Malley, “Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960-1,” IHR: 970-990.

[44] Elidor Mëhilli, “States of Insecurity,” IHR: 1037-1058.

[45] Jeffrey James Byrne, “Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment,” IHR: 912-932Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution. Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the post-Cold War Era (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2002). Assassi Lassassi, Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988).

[46] Jürgen Dinkel, Die Bewegung Bündnisfreier Staaten. Genese, Organisation und Politik (1927-1992) (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2015), 159-160; Rami Ginat, Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism. From Independence to Dependence (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005); Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned and the UN and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger, 1983); W. M. Karundasa, Sri Lanka and Non-Alignment. A Study of Foreign Policy from 1948 to 1982 (Dehiwala: Image Lanka, 1997).

[48] Robert B. Rakove, Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

[49] Robert B. Rakove, “The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6,IHR: 991-1013.

[50] Naoko Shimazu, “‘Diplomacy as Theatre’: Recasting the Bandung Conference of 1955 as Cultural History,” in: Asia Research Institute Working Paper Series (2011), H. 164, 1–19.

[51] Jürgen Dinkel, “‘Third World begins to flex its muscles’: the Non-Aligned Movement and the North-South conflict during the 1970s,” in Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss, Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War. Between or within the Blocs (London: Routledge 2016), 108-124.

[52] Mark Mazower, Governing the World. The History of an Idea (London, New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 304.

[53] Kevin O’Sullivan, “Between Internationalism and Empire:  Ireland, the ‘Like-Minded’ Group, and the Search for a New International Order, 1974-82,” IHR: 1083-1101.

[54] Robert Vitalis, “The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables of Bandung (Ban-doong),” Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarism and Development 4 (2013), H. 2.

[55] Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Marco Wyss, “Introduction: Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War.” The International History Review (IHR) 37:5 (December 2015):  901-911.

[56] G. McCann, “From Diaspora to Third Worldism and the United Nations: India and the Politics of Decolonizing Africa,” Past and Present, ccxviii (2013), 258-80.

[57] M. Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” American Historical Review, 105(3) (May 2000): 739-69.

[58] For studies of the agendas, actions, rivalries and alliances of Third World neutrals and Non-Aligned states, see Jeffrey James Byrne, “Beyond Continents, Colors, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment,” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015): 912-932, and Frank Gerits, “‘When the Bull Elephants Fight’: Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957-66),” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015), 951-969. For an examination of the OAU and the Commonwealth, see Robert B. Rakove, “The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6,” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015): 991-1013, and Sue Onslow, “The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism and Non-Alignment,” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015), 1059-1082, respectively.

[59] In addition to Rakove, “The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6,” and Onslow, “The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism and Non-Alignment,” see Jayita Sarkar, “The Making of a Non-Aligned Nuclear Power: India’s Proliferation Drift, 1964-8,” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015), 933-950; Janick Marina Schaufelbeuhl, Marco Wyss & Sandra Bott, “Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War: Switzerland, Neutrality and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam,” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015), 1014-1036; and Elidor Mehilli, “States of Insecurity,” IHR, 37:5 (December 2015), 1037-1058.

[60] Chief Emeka Anyoaku (Commonwealth Secretary-General 1990-2000) interview with Sue Onslow, www.commonwealthoralhistories.org. Citation reproduced from Onslow “The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism and Non-Alignment,” n11.

[61] Schaufelbeuhl, Wyss & Bott, “Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War.”

[62] Rakove, “The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6.”

[63] Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss, eds., Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War. Between or Within the Blocs? (Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2015).

[64] David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962.” In Melvyn P. Leffler and Arne O. Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20–43, 33.

[65] Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Marco Wyss, “Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War.” The International History Review 37:5 (December 2015):  901-911. The quotation is from page 901.

[66] Arne O. Westad The Global Cold War, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[67] Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War”, Diplomatic History, xxiv (2000), 567-591.

[68] Jeffrey James Byrne, “Beyond Continents, Colours, and the Cold War: Yugoslavia, Algeria, and the Struggle for Non-Alignment,” The International History Review (IHR)37:5 (December 2015): 912-932;  Sue Onslow, “ The Commonwealth and the Cold War, Neutralism and Non-Alignment,” IHR: 1059-1082.

[69] An extensive conglomerate of countries bound together by a colonial past under the British Empire, the Commonwealth countries differed in their affiliations with the Cold War East-West divide, including such core NATO members as Britain and Canada, ‘pioneer neutralists’ such as India and an expanding group of other Afro-Asian ‘new-state neutralists’ Commonwealth countries.

[70] Kevin O’Sullivan, “Between Internationalism and Empire:  Ireland, the ‘Like-Minded’ Group, and the Search for a New International Order, 1974-82,” IHR: 1083-1101.

[71] Matthew Connelly “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict During the Algerian War for Independence,” American Historical Review, cv (2000), 739_769; Erez Manela “A Pox on your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History,” Diplomatic History, xxxiv (2010), 299-323.

[72] Janick Marina Schaufelbuehl, Marco Wyss and Sandra Bott, “Choosing Sides in the Global Cold War: Switzerland, Neutrality, and the Divided States of Korea and Vietnam,” IHR: 1014-1036

[73] In connection with Sweden’s recognition of North-Vietnam (1969) the Foreign Minister of Sweden vehemently denied any possible further implications for the questions of Germany or Korea. Sweden’s stance in the Korean question was justified by an explicit reference to Sweden’s role in the NNSC: a change of posture vis-à-vis North-Korea would undermine Sweden’s position and the Commission as a whole.

[74] Frank Gerits, “’When the Bull Elephants Fight’:  Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and Pan Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957-66),” IHR: 951-969.

[75] Alanna O’Malley, “Ghana, India, and the Transnational Dynamics of the Congo Crisis at the United Nations, 1960-1,” IHR: 970-990.

[76] Robert B. Rakove, “The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961–6,” IHR: 991-1013.

[77] Jayita Sarkar, “The Making of a Non-Aligned Nuclear Power: India’s Proliferation Drift, 1964-8,” IHR: 933-950.

[78] Elidor Mëhilli, “States of Insecurity,” IHR: 1037-1058.

[79] Besides the other publications of the authors involved in the two volumes edited by Bott, Hanhimäki, Schaufelbuehl, and Wyss, recent monographs and edited volumes with interest in new perspectives in neutrality, neutralism, or non-alignment in an explicit Cold War context whether outside or in/across Europe include Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska, eds., The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War. Delhi – Bandung – Belgrade. (London: Routledge, 2014); Rainio-Niemi, Johanna The Ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland. (New York: Routledge, 2014); Thomas C. Fischer, Aryo Makko, and Juhana Aunesluoma, eds.,“Special Issue: Neutrality and World Politics during the Cold War” in Journal of Cold War Studies, 18:3, June 2016 (forthcoming).