(This issue was originally published on the Global Taiwan Institute's website and the full articles are available at: https://globaltaiwan.org/2022/06/vol-7-issue-13/)
Beijing Ramps Up Its Rhetoric over Taiwan and Maritime Sovereignty
By: John Dotson
In the month of June, multiple spokespeople of the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) made statements about Taiwan that were unusually provocative, even by the standards of the angry and uncompromising rhetoric leveled against Taiwan on a regular basis. Two of the most prominent examples of this were provided by official spokespeople—speaking in fora directed at international audiences—that forcefully asserted ownership over Taiwan, angrily denounced the United States, and asserted maritime sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait that greatly exceed the scope of international law and generally recognized maritime customs. These measures are part of a larger pattern of gradually escalating rhetoric regarding the PRC’s claims over not only Taiwan, but also the surrounding maritime commons—as well as hostility directed towards the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
Building a Silicon Bulwark: How the United States and Taiwan Can Retain Joint Leadership of the Global Semiconductor Industry
By: Ryan Fedasiuk
In March of this year, the Taiwan Ministry of Justice’s Investigation Bureau (法務部調查局) launched probes into more than 100 companies suspected of trying to woo the island’s semiconductor engineers to work for mainland Chinese companies. Two months later, it raided the offices of 10 more semiconductor companies and summoned their owners for questioning about talent poaching.
Parsing Taiwanese Skepticism about the Chinese Invasion Threat
By: Timothy Rich
In 2021, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) stated that the threat from China grew “every day.” The combination of China’s increased military capabilities, incursions into the Taiwanese air defense identification zone (ADIZ), and continued rhetoric from Beijing about unification has led some analysts to believe that China could invade the country by 2027, if not sooner. Meanwhile, public opinion polls in Japan and South Korea have found that nearly three quarters of respondents believe that China will try to invade Taiwan, while the limited number of Taiwanese polls show conflicting results regarding the public’s willingness to fight if invaded.
Building Bridges: An Overdue Update on Taiwan’s ODA Policy
By: Zoe Weaver-Lee
Following its transition from aid recipient to donor in the 1960s, Taiwan, which is formally known as the Republic of China (ROC), faced a severe diplomatic challenge after Chiang Kai-shek’s representatives withdrew from the United Nations (UN) in 1971. The competition with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for diplomatic allies subsequently took on even greater urgency for Taipei’s foreign policy, and many official relationships developed and withered alongside the level of economic aid. In 1988, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA, 中華民國經濟部) set up the International Economic Cooperation Development Fund (IECDF)—which later became the International Cooperation Development Fund (ICDF)—with the intention of streamlining development loans and technical assistance to “developing nations.” Since then, Taiwan’s official development assistance (ODA) policy has slowly transformed to include both diplomatic partners and non-official allies, while also focusing increasingly on longer-term oriented projects.
* The views and opinions expressed in these articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Global Taiwan Institute.
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