Miller on Hastings, 'Nationalism in Modern Europe: Politics, Identity, and Belonging since the French Revolution'
Derek Hastings. Nationalism in Modern Europe: Politics, Identity, and Belonging since the French Revolution. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018. vii + 345 pp. $26.95 (paper), ISBN 978-1-4742-1339-4; $88.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-4742-1338-7.
Reviewed by Alexey Miller (European University at St. Petersburg) Published on HABSBURG (September, 2018) Commissioned by Borislav Chernev
Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=52050
Derek Hastings intriguingly formulates his intentions in the book under review: “The text at hand approaches nationalism from a specifically historical perspective, emphasizing context and prioritizing descriptive narrative. In that sense it differs not only from theoretical approaches in social sciences more generally, but also from many accounts written by historians” (p. 2). One has to admit that this study really does differ from others. But it differs in negative ways.
The book discusses the development of nationalism in Europe from the French Revolution to the aftermath of the Cold War in 260 pages. Twenty pages are devoted to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era; 30 pages explore the restoration period and Romanticism (1815-50); just shy of 40 pages examine the period 1850-90, which the author describes as an age of industrialization, ideological radicalization, and imperialism; another 30 pages deal with the period 1890-1920; 35 pages address the period 1920-45; another 40 pages look at nationalism in divided Europe, 1945-85; and, finally, 30 pages explore the politics of belonging in Europe after the Cold War. Narratives of this type, where the author attempts to cover the history of nationalism in Europe over the course of two and a half centuries in only 260 pages, could be the outcome of a painstaking selection of important facts and themes, with particular attention to how much emphasis should be put on each of them. However, this is not the case in the book under review. For example, the author devotes half a page to Emperor Alexander I’s passion for mysticism at the time of the Congress of Vienna, whereas the Crimean War is mentioned in a single phrase; he devotes a whole page to the character and personal quirks of Kaiser Wilhelm II, while the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich is barely worth a mention.
Hastings’s narrative eschews social history. The book does not analyze the social processes of industrialization, urbanization, alphabetization, and communication—the very same contextualizing factors the author refers to in the introduction. The Eurocentric approach is rather striking; Hastings genuinely believes that one can explain the history of nationalism in Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without leaving the continent’s boundaries. Only the explosion of European imperialism during the second half of the nineteenth century receives a brief discussion. Hastings makes an exception to this approach in the postscript, where he addresses President Donald Trump’s populism, adding that a discussion of this topic might appear out of place in a book on Europe.
Already in the context of the nineteenth century, the author refers to nation-states instead of the metropoles of large empires. However, empire remained the dominant form of political organization in Europe right up to World War I, and there is a rich literature on the complicated relations between empire and nationalism with which Hastings does not engage. The list of missing works on this subject includes important recent studies by Jürgen Osterhammel and Dominic Lieven. Furthermore, the book does not explore different typologies of nationalism apart from the well-known dichotomy of Hans Kohn, which pitted western European civic nationalism firmly against eastern European ethnic nationalism. An important omission here is the work of Miroslav Hroch, which distinguishes the processes of national development among groups with a complete social structure, who had retained their aristocracy, and so-called small peoples, whose aristocracies had been assimilated. In general, the issue of the complicated and uneven process of national development is missing, as is the work of Jeremy King and Tara Zahra on national indifference. Even the books of Tony Judt, including the famous Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (2005), did not attract the author’s attention.
In general, the book’s bibliography deserves special attention, as it is a reflection of a broader problem. In recent years it has become quite common to see books on European history (and even on wider themes) that use only English-language literature. It remains a mystery to me how the authors of these books have come to the conclusion that all important works dealing with their chosen topic have been published in English. Is this due to the belief that such books are only ever written in English, or to the belief that English-language publishers promptly publish English translations of works that originally appear in other languages? Both of these suggestions are incredibly naïve. For example, Andreas Kappeler’s classic book on the Russian Empire appeared in English translation only fifteen years after its original publication, while Jürgen Osterhammel’s magnum opus, perhaps the most important book on world history to appear in the last decade—Die Verwandlung der Welt: Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts (2009)—was published in English after several years’ delay. (Characteristically, neither work is listed in the bibliography.) Naturally, one cannot expect present-day historians to be proficient in all European languages; however, familiarity with the relevant studies in German and French should be a necessary minimum for any exploration of European history. In my opinion, the suggestion that the entire academic world will switch in the near future to publishing in English as a lingua franca is somewhat simplistic.
The reviewer of such a book usually checks the author’s accuracy quite simply by paying close attention to the topics she or he is most familiar with. I did exactly the same and was rather surprised to discover that Grand Duke Constantine was viceroy of the Kingdom of Poland for over ten years (it was actually the Polish general Józef Zajonczek who held this post from 1815 until his death in 1826); that Adam Mickiewicz was imprisoned for several years in 1824 (he was actually behind bars for six months); and that eighty thousand Poles were exiled to Siberia after the suppression of the Polish uprising (the actual figure was around ten thousand, while most of the soldiers who had participated in the uprising—still well short of eighty thousand—were posted with the active army in the Caucasus). Hastings also asserts that by creating the Congress Kingdom of Poland in 1815, Alexander I “allowed the continuation of the parliamentary Sejm and tolerated the creation of a constitution” (pp. 70-71), whereas it was precisely the emperor who granted this constitution, which he edited himself. All these errors appear in the space of two pages. And earlier in the book, the author states that four Decembrists were executed, whereas the actual number was five (p. 60). I have no reason to suspect that this lack of accuracy is limited to matters pertaining to the Russian Empire.
Hasting states in the introduction that he hopes his study will be useful “not only to history students and interested lay readers, but also to students in more theoretically inclined disciplines who, against an introductory backdrop provided here, can proceed to engage in more analytical and schematic pursuits with a firmer empirical grounding” (p. 2). In my opinion, this book might be useful only to undergraduates in community colleges in the United States who have no prior exposure to European history. And even then it may well not be the best choice.
Review Editor Note: Review was translated from Russian by Borislav Chernev, HABSBURG review editor. The original is below.
Derek Hastings интригующе формулирует свои намерения в этой книге: “The text at hand approaches nationalism from a specifically historical perspective, emphasizing context and prioritizing descriptive narrative. In that sense it differs not only from theoretical approaches in social sciences more generally, but also from many accounts written by historians” (p. 2). Следует признать, что этот текст действительно выделяется на фоне других. Но выделяется он в негативном плане.
На 260 страницах текста обсуждает развитие национализма в Европе начиная от Французской революции и заканчивая ситуацией после Холодной войны. 20 страниц уделено Французской революции и эпохе Наполеона, 30 – эпохе реставрации и романтизма (1815-1850), чуть менее 40 периоду 1850-1890, который автор характеризует как время индустриализации, идеологической радикализации и империализма, еще 30 страниц посвящены периоду 1890-1920, 35 страниц периоду 1920-1945, еще 40 – национализму в разделенной Европе 1945-1989 гг., и, наконец, 30 страниц “politics of belonging in Europe after the Cold War.”
Нарративы такого рода, когда автор пытается на 260 страницах охватить историю национализма в Европе за два с половиной века, могут быть результатом мучительного отбора значимых фактов и сюжетов, тщательного соблюдения баланса внимания, уделяемого тем или иным темам. Но в рецензируемой книге дело обстоит иначе. Автор может уделить полстраницы анекдотам о мистических увлечениях Александра 1 в период Венского конгресса и в 1 фразе упомянуть Крымскую войну, он может посвятить целую страницу личным качествам Вильгельма 2 и в одной фразе упомянуть Ausgleich.
Нарратив Hastings практически не касается социальной истории. В книге нет анализа социальных процессов, индустриализации, урбанизации, алфабетизации, развития средств коммуникации, то есть всех тех контекстуальных факторов, о подчеркнутом внимании к которым заявлено автором во Введении.
Европоцентризм этого нарратива поражает – Хастингс действительно считает, что историю национализма в Европе в 19 и 20 веке можно рассказать, не выходя за рамки Европы. Коротко обсуждается только взрыв европейского империализма во второй половине 19 в. Лишь в Postscript Hastings изменяет своему принципу, чтобы поговорить о популизме Трампа, простодушно добавляя, что обсуждение этой темы выглядит, возможно, странно, для книги о Европе.
Уже применительно к 19 в. Автор запросто говорит о национальных государствах там, где речь идет о метрополиях крупных империй. Между тем империя была доминирующей формой политической организации в самой Европе, вплоть до 1 Мировой войны, и о сложных взаимоотношениях империй и национализма существует богатая, но проигнорированная автором литература. В списке литературы отсутствуют и Jurgen Osterhammel, и Dominic Lieven, посвятившие этой проблематике важные и совсем недавно опубликованные работы. В книге нет обсуждения типологий национализма, за исключением известной дихотомии Ханса Кона, противопоставляющей гражданский национализм, якобы присущий западной части Европы, и этнический национализм Восточной части континента. Нет, в том числе и в списке литературы, Myroslav Hroch, и его различения процессов формирования наций среди групп с полной социальной структурой, то есть сохранивших дворянство, и так называемых «малых» народов, дворянство которых было ассимилировано. Вообще проблематика утверждения национальной идентичности, неравномерности и сложности этого процесса в книге отсутствует, как отсутствуют работы Jeremy King and Tara Zahra, в которых обсуждается концепция “national indifference.” Даже книги Tony Judt, включая знаменитую Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945 (2005), не привлекли внимания автора.
Вообще, список литературы заслуживает особого разговора, и является отражением более общей проблемы. В последнее время все чаще приходится видеть книги по истории Европы или даже более широкой проблематике, в которых используется только литература на английском языке. Для меня остается загадкой, откуда у авторов этих книг берется уверенность, что все важные работы по их теме опубликованы на английском? Является ли это плодом веры в то, что важные работы пишутся только по-английски, или уверенности в том, что англоязычные издательства оперативно переводят на английский все достойные внимания новинки, опубликованные на других языках? Оба предположения крайне наивны. Классическая книга Андреаса Каппелера о Российской империи оставалась не переведенной на английский 15 лет, а самая, наверное, значимая книга по всемирной истории последнего десятилетия, опус магнум Юргена Остерхаммеля, ждала перевода на английский 8 лет. (Обе, конечно, отсутствуют в списке литературы.) Конечно, речь не идет о максималистских требованиях к лингвистической подготовке современных историков, но в работе по истории Европы знакомство с книгами на немецком и французском, это, все-таки, необходимый минимум. Мне кажется, что предположение, согласно которому весь академический мир скоро перейдет на английский как лингва франка публикаций, несколько упрощает картину ближайшего будущего.
Аккуратность автора при обращении с фактами в таких сочинениях рецензенты обычно проверяют довольно просто – выборочно смотрят те фрагменты, которые относятся к хорошо им знакомым темам. Я поступил так же, и выяснил, что великий князь Константин Павлович был вице-королем Царства Польского более 10 лет (в действительности, с 1815 г. и до своей смерти в 1826 г. наместником (вице-королем) был польский генерал Jozef Zajonczek); что Адам Мицкевич в 1824 г. был посажен в тюрьму на несколько лет (в действительности он провел в заключении 6 месяцев), после чего отправился в ссылку в Петербург и Одессу; что после польского восстания 80 тыс. поляков были сосланы в Сибирь (в действительности около 10 тыс., а большая часть военнослужащих – участников восстания, - все равно намного меньше, чем 80 тыс., - были сосланы в действующую армию на Кавказ). Hastings также полагает что, создавая the Congress Kingdom of Poland in 1815, Alexander I “allowed the continuation of the parliamentary Sejm and tolerated the creation of a constitution,” в то время как в действительности именно он и даровал Царству эту конституцию, и лично ее редактировал. Все эти ошибки уместились на двух страницах (pp. 70-71). А чуть ранее автор утверждает, что казненных декабристов было четверо, хотя в действительности их было пятеро (р. 60). У меня нет причин предполагать, что такое неаккуратное обращение с фактами касается только Российской империи.
Hastings заявляет во введении, что надеется, что его текст будет полезен “not only to history students and interested lay readers, but also to students in more theoretically inclined disciplines who, against an introductory backdrop provided here, can proceed to engage in more analytical and schematic pursuits with a firmer empirical grounding” (p. 2). На мой взгляд, эту книгу можно вообразить как полезную разве что для undergraduates во второсортных провинциальных колледжах в США, для которых она будет первой прочитанной ими книгой по истории Европы. Впрочем, даже в этом случае это будет не лучший выбор.
Citation: Alexey Miller. Review of Hastings, Derek, Nationalism in Modern Europe: Politics, Identity, and Belonging since the French Revolution. HABSBURG, H-Net Reviews. September, 2018. URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=52050
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
1 Replies
Derek Hastings
Author's response: I find myself in the unusual position of admiring aspects of Alexey Miller's negative review of my book on nationalism in modern Europe. His criticisms are, I have to admit, formulated with verve and are rendered fluidly in Borislav Chernev's translation from the Russian original. I respect Prof. Miller's work and therefore his perspective on my book. Yet in light of the vehemence of some of his comments, I feel the need to respond at least briefly. I should state at the outset that while I solicited input from colleagues and specialists in a variety of fields, I take full responsibility for whatever errors may persist in the text. As Prof. Miller notes, it was indeed Józef Zajonczek, rather than Grand Duke Constantine, who held the official title of viceroy of the Kingdom of Poland starting in 1815, although mine is far from the only account to characterize Constantine's extensive influence as approximating the role of viceroy in practical terms. The number executed in the Decembrist revolt was indeed five (including Pavel Pestel) rather than four, and my suggestion that Adam Mickiewicz was somehow imprisoned "for several years" in 1824, rather than for several months, is an obvious error that I should have caught in proofreading. While not characteristic of the text as a whole, such points are certainly fair game for criticism.
In regard to Prof. Miller's broader comments, however, I think it is especially important to keep in mind the book's stated intent and scope. It was not written primarily for specialists, nor was it envisioned as a novel intervention in the field of nationalism studies. It is intended mainly as an introductory text for a student readership that often, sadly, lacks a basic understanding of the narrative flow of modern European history. The book attempts to locate the emergence and development of nationalist ideas and movements within that broader narrative. The nature of the book's intended readership contributed to the decision to emphasize English-language works in the notes and bibliography, as stated clearly in the introduction. This should not be seen in any way as an indication that I believe, as Prof. Miller puts it, that "all important works … have been published in English." It is instead the result of a practical decision about where best to steer English-language students for further reading. As Prof. Miller also notes, the book addresses an incredibly expansive topic in a limited amount of space, attempting to cover more than two centuries – from the French Revolution to Brexit – and much of the geographic expanse of Europe in some 330 pages (including notes). That scope brings with it the potential for a number of omissions, including some important recent work on empire and on global entanglements outside of Europe, as well as temporal and geographic imbalances within Europe. Certain readers could perhaps argue that too much attention is given to France, Germany, Spain, and Italy; others, conversely, might take issue with the extended discussions of Scandinavia, Belgium, or the Balkans. Relative imbalances and omissions are not, of course, desirable virtues. But in a text like this, they are difficult to avoid entirely.
Ultimately, I respect Prof. Miller's perspective, and many of his criticisms are well-taken. But it is my hope that, despite the book's imperfections, its intended readership will find its narrative approach at least somewhat more useful than he did.