Would like to indicate these two passages descriptions are quite easily recognized as historical experiences and practices. The Review and Reviewer has touched upon a historical Anglo-Irish history that could just as well describe the known American practice, at least during the 1960s era[and suspect true of other history periods as well].
Perhaps the problem he mention in this first passage of rational models is due to defining of rational in terms of organizational charts, whose pyramid construction forms obscure much function of govt., civil-military relationships and business that takes place. A better definition for rational might be in order.
The intertwining mention in his second repost passage does follow along these less formal lines of organizational charts, the business of military decisions and command being more interactive with civil authority, as the volume indicates. Guidelines by civil authority charged with oversight, may not be called direct orders, as mentioned, but they quite often to have the same consequences as direct orders, when given by civil officials charged with overseeing
military functions. There are examples found in the relation of Congressional Committees to Armed Services[one in particular determining the building of Navy LHA's in late 60s at behest of L. Mendell Rivers, Chair of House Armed Services].
This Review and volume does a considerable service by demonstrating Britain and Ireland are examples of a more complex relationship between civil and military authority charged with govt. and its decisions.
'Charters concludes his introduction suggesting that all civil-military command and armed forces control defies rational models or a single theory. Decision-making practices were not linear. They did not descend from the prime minister to the cabinet to the military leaders and further on down the chain of command. Decisions were “interactive and dynamic, involving constant, often prolonged, negotiation, compromise, and consensus building” (p. 38). CRM in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1974 reveals the nature of British command and control of armed forces. Multiple loci of controls, the prime minister, the defense minister, cabinet committees, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, all impacted on defense policy and decision-making. To say the Westminster government was powerless to intervene removes culpability and shifts blame solely onto to the British military command. This argument has major implications for military action in Northern Ireland. It highlights the importance of individuals, “not just systems and structures” (p. 38). Charters acknowledges “personalities mattered, and some were more influential than others” (p. 39). However once the British Army entered the conflict directly after the “Battle of the Bogside” in August 1969, military command and control issues “entailed complex, protracted infra- and interdepartmental ... negotiations and difficult decisions that would put civil-military relations to the test” (p. 39).'
'Charters challenges the previous historiography, championed by Peter Neumann in Britain’s Long War (2003), which argues that politics and the military were less intertwined. Sir Frank Cooper, a former deputy undersecretary at the MOD and later permanent undersecretary at the NIO, claimed in a 1992 interview Charters cites in this study that “in the early days there wasn’t any political system of control of the military.” Charters uses Cooper’s own words to contradict this viewpoint that “no politician can give the military an order. It can give them a direction” (p. 32). This attention to the nuance of language benefits Charters’s work throughout.'