Couple of points about this Review and its observations:
First, the question of war or peace, which governed all considerations for the Allies. US would have kept the airlift up for as long as it required to back the Sovs down. Clay may or may not have assessed the Sovs willingness to engage in WW II at the time, but he was quite accurate in being willing to face it and the consequences.
Truman would have had to declare war had the Sovs attempted to take over Berlin. That would have been the trip wire for WW III right then and there. Both the US and Britain, under Churchill had previously as the war moved to a close taken stronger anti-Communist positions, such was the political circumstances surrounding war's end. Morganthau, among FDR's advisors had advocated strongly for reduction of Germany to an agricultural society and stripping all industry. The policymakers did not want a 3rd war with Germany and were dedicated to avoid those mistakes made at the end of WW I which would revive Germany and its ability to wage war. FDR did not go quite as far, as remembered, as Morganthau but shared the views Germany should not be able to start a 3rd war. Anti-Communist sentiments would however, have been provoked to war with Soviet Union in Europe.
Second, by 48-49, anti-Communism was higher on the political/mil agenda. Geo. Kennan's famous X policy statement for the State Dept., was or had become the Truman foundation for Europe and dealing with Soviets and their political futures...………..this the base of Cold War.