Operational History

John Kuehn Blog Post

A sudden loft, from the trench, for the December 2017 Handgrenade

Operational History

Okay, listen, or rather, read, up.  Or down.

Operational history, you know, the kind of stuff Jon House and Rob Citino write, is fabulously successful with readers, yet disesteemed by academic critics, not just inside the tribe of military history, but by the larger historical community.    My evidence, a review of the table of contents of Journal of Military History.

Why is this so?

 

Best, John T. Kuehn,Platte City, Missouri

Also on Twitter @jkuehn50  

14 Replies

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I don't know, but I am keen to hear responses from others on this.

Darryl Myers (amateur, but interested follower of the thread)
darrylmyers01@gmail.com

John, should we blame the creeping influence of the Annales School?

There were plenty of giants in the field, not all that long ago. House and Citino as you mention, also Weigley, Showalter, Murray, the ever-productive Glantz, and so many across the water -- Parker, Strachan, et. al. from Jolly Old, Herwig and Frieser.

Maybe John Keegan threw the switch, seeking to understand the experience of battle rather than the battle itself. Can a straight line be drawn from Keegan to, say, Simon Ball, who's execrable entry in the otherwise laudable Oxford Great Battles series, Alamein, was all about "narratives" with precious little (much of it only semi-accurate) about the battle itself?

Increasing specialization has often been tossed out as the trend in academia that is progressively paralyzing the broad field of history. Can this be extended down to our cherished operational history?

As usual, too many questions, not enough answers.

I have less an answer than a guess: do those histories generally rely more on surveys of other historical works, rather than on their own newly-generated research of contemporary sources? If so, maybe they're viewed as a "lazier" form of history.

Or, I wonder, does this go back to the old divide between military history and other historical disciplines writ large? Were military historians accepted into the fold by writing the type of highly-specific articles that generally appear in professional journals? The type of articles that don't really lend themselves to broader operational histories of whole armies? Does every historical sub-discipline need a black sheep that they can kick around?

Also, I have to ask whether House or Citino are disesteemed by the JMH; both often appear as book reviewers, and/or have their books reviewed. That seems evidence to me that their opinions have some value in the military history community.

Traditional (including operational) military history may currently be out of favor within the subfield of military history, but that doesn't mean it isn't important, as Earl Hess' recent prize-winning work demonstrated: https://journalofthecivilwarera.org/2016/11/earl-j-hess-accepts-tom-wat…

A decade ago Rob Citino wrote: " Operational history remains a vital part not only of military history, but of history at large. It would be strange indeed if a scholarly field with such broad interests did not make room for analysis of war and battle—surely not the least significant of human undertakings. Moreover, the sustained popularity of military literature places a certain demand on the entire historical profession. Millions of people continue to read these books, and someone is going to be writing them. The profession needs to ask itself, wouldn't it be preferable if that “someone” were a scholar of Showalter's or Browning's stature, or one of the dozens of other fine operational scholars currently active, such as Megargee, Geoffrey Wawro, Adrian R. Lewis, or Michael V. Leggiere, rather than your friendly neighborhood re-enactor or war buff?" https://academic.oup.com/ahr/article/112/4/1070/11966

And Citino's comments were echoed by Hess in his acceptance speech for the Tom Watson Brown Award in the link above.

My advice to aspiring military historians is: Don't try to trim your sails to the fickle winds of the field, but do what really interests you and trust that things will work out. Because if you're doing what you love and doing it well, there will be opportunities for you.

My "advice to aspiring military historians" --DON'T. That is, in an academic setting. More than 1/2 of history faculty are temps or adjuncts, and military history is not exactly a hot field, like trans-gender studies. All that sweat for the doctorate and you wind up as an adjunct at East Walla Walla State "University", --as an adjunct.

Regards,

Stanley Sandler

Citino also said in the article that Dr. Rein cited that "military historians need to become less resistant to contemporary trends in research—from social history to postmodernism to the new cultural history."

Citino's point is something worth thinking about -- and, adding to his thought, perhaps rather than repeating a conversation about how badly treated operational military history is, which H-War has done a fair number of times, we might ask why we want operational military history to be better treated by academia? What do the careful descriptions of campaigns and battles have that non-military historians need to understand and respect?

For what its worth, I agree and disagree with Dr. Rein. Yes, there should be someone writing operational history with better breadth and depth of knowledge about history and the discipline. I also agree that you have to do what you enjoy. But there are realities of the market that Dr. Sandler point out. I combined both, taking exams in women's history to help my prospects but working it into my dissertation obliquely. I blame the Recession of 2008 for shattering my academic career, but embracing the realities of the market and combining it with a niche, subfield (rural history) made me a better scholar and has helped to keep me afloat by giving me breadth I didn't have with my area of focus.

My recommendation is: whatever you do, make it publishable. Graduate students either need a good pedigree or a good publishing record to make the cut for many of the available jobs.

Alex (currently on Plan B)

I appreciate Alexandra and David's comments. I did not mean to imply that operational military historians should blithely ignore trends and turns within the field--that would defeat the entire purpose of mastering the historiography. I pursued a minor field in environmental history, not because I thought the intersection between military and environmental history would become a growth area, although it has, but because I had a genuine interest in the subject. I was simply suggesting that scholars interested in operational history should not avoid it because they believe it is unmarketable. Rob Citino, perhaps the current Dean of operational history who, admittedly does it at a very high level, has had a number of opportunities both within and outside of the academy. My dissertation and first book, completed at KU under Adrian Lewis’ direction, was also an operational history and I too have had several opportunities, both within traditional academia and in the PME world. Academics may not currently value operational history, but it has been around since Thucydides, so the pendulum could swing again. (Especially if Boards of Regents ever start paying attention to what is currently being taught in many departments!)
By not attending a Top-10 program, (none of which offer concentrations in military history) you've already self-eliminated from most tenure-track positions. Having military history as major field further reduces your options. So, if you've already painted yourself into a minuscule corner of the field, it makes no sense to suddenly start worrying about employability by trying to make yourself into something that you aren’t. If you’ve already decided you want to do military history, you might as well do it the way you think it should be done. The PME world has changed significantly within the past decade or so, as a result of the continued production within the academy and the decline of available positions in those same departments. The stereotypical PME faculty of a retired officer with a MA from one of the service schools is being replaced by faculty with terminal degrees, some of whom have, but many of whom haven’t served on active duty. Academia's loss has been PME's gain. And the starting pay is probably more than your tenured advisor is making. So, if you really want to do operational history, don’t shy away from it because you think it will be the one thing that keeps you off the tenure track. It might just be the skill set that lands you stable, enjoyable and fulfilling employment.

Thanks to all. The thread, as usual, meandered a bit a way from primary question, turning into something of a discussion of the military history rather than its subset operational history.

Two things.
First--I tend to agree with Stan Sandler--don't make military history your primary thing. It should be a subset. I, for example, consider myself an American historian first, and a military, naval, Asian, civil-military historian(s), second. Sometimes I consider myself a philosopher first and an American historian second! sometimes I consider myself a son first, and a father second. Other times, vice versa. At one point, I was something known as a systems engineer in electronic warfare systems design. See? Identity is a slippery chameleon sort of thing that "more than changes its colors to suit its surroundings." So do not put yourself in a box and then build walls that keep you in.

Second, the main point. If the Journal of Military History is open to all views and disciplinary approaches to what is now broadly categorized as "military history" (to include all the flavors of the various age/month), then an occasional article on operational history that brings something new to the table should be _considered_ by the editors. I do not include book reviews in this category or the authors of them. I mean articles or, perhaps, review essays.

A lob of an associated hand grenade, then, might be in order.
SECOND HAND GRENADE FOR DECEMBER 2017. Should the ability to write operational military history (to include naval history) be a primary skill for the military historian, or only secondary or even tertiary? My position might be inferred from this-- the term H-WAR, has the word "war" in it. "Essentially war is fighting, for fighting is the only effective principle in the manifold activities generally designated as war." On War (2:1, 127 Howard and Paret). Merry Holiday of your Choice.

Unless we want to change the title of this venue, that is.

My latest ruminations can also be found here:
http://cimsec.org/reconsidering-american-way-strategy/34726
Perhaps something the editors would like to repost to H-WAR

vr, John T. Kuehn

I don't think my department at Clemson University has ever advertised for a military historian, but shortly after I was hired as an East Asian historian, the department head asked me to develop a sideline in military history. I did so, and that is now both most of my teaching and most of my research. I moved fast up the ranks to full professor. Only one thing I have written, my book on the Tonkin Gulf incidents, goes deeply into the details of military operations, but that is the best book I have ever written.

Years later, hiring a historian of the southern US, we picked one who had a sideline in military history. He does more operational military history than I do. He also rose to full professor.

I have never had a sense that my department devalues or disrespects operational military history.

Operational history is a difficult proposition because it sits in between areas of study where you can get expertise in education alone. it is possible to get a good feel for tactical combat, strategy, and policy. Operational warfare sits at the divide between those, and tactical action doesn't cleanly translate to operational activity. Similarly, studies of strategy and policy require treatments (both theoretical and concrete) of things like large-scale maneuver and logistics that require more technical expertise. To do so requires an understanding of operational art that few servicemembers gain, let alone historians.

Foundations of understanding operational art requires working knowledge of national and military policy, strategy, AND tactics, in addition to facility with the military theory that is associated with the discipline. I suspect I'd be hard pressed to about it had I not been through some of the US Army's professional military education courses along with utilization tours in that discipline - which shaped my later work in history.

There is much potential for false cognates when trying to reason by analogy from tactics or policy to operational art. I am not sure how one might develop historians in that field through any deliberate method because the baseline expertise is hard to get.

While not technically about operational history, my thoughts on the skills required to do so, particularly of recent conflicts, are a matter of public record:
https://history.army.mil/armyhistory/AH99(W).pdf

Francis Park

The proposal that military historians attempt to make their specialty more mainstream by embracing current fads in historiography (media studies, gender studies, trans-sexual concerns, etc.) reminds me of the quote, attributed to Mark Twain, that trying to clean up American politics by having more gentlemen run for office was like trying to stamp out brothels by sending in more virgins. Military history, diplomatic history, economic history, the history of technology, are all important fields that have fallen by the wayside in the historical profession in favor of a focus of minute aspects of social history that are deemed to be cutting-edge, although after 30+ years of seeing these fads dominate most of the sessions at the OAH and AHA conferences, one wonders if it isn't high time to get away from the trendy fluff and go back to basic studies.

Brian Gordon

Chris Rein posts "By not attending a Top-10 program, (none of which offer concentrations in military history) you've already self-eliminated from most tenure-track positions." While I regularly preach the reality and the problems with the narrow band of programs that are likely to get you a job, his premise is fundamentally incorrect. US News and WOrld Report History graduate program rankings for 2017 include both Yale, Wisconsin, and Michigan--all of which have military history programs. UNC comes in tied at 11th, and Duke and UVA tied at 18th.

I have done operational history, although it's not my specialty. What I have tried to encourage in the field (through my historiographical essays and my former book series at NYU) is for operational history be integrated with other forms of history. Not just Keegan's experiential model, but that we look to EXPLAIN operational conduct and outcomes via culture, social mobilization systems, technological access or capacity, and so on. Many already do this, but there is room for more.

We have been rehashing complaints about the acceptability or popularity of military history within academia for a very long time now. I acknowledge that there are quite a number of historians out there who are uncomfortable with it. But us denigrating what they teach isn't going to change their mind. And although I admit to being extraordinarily lucky in my own career path, I think the situation is better than we fear it is.

It has been many years since I have posted to H-Net, but though it worth doing so now. It is important for us to be realistic about the prospects for someone with an operational military history focus within academia - and particularly within the civilian university world. We certainly owe it to graduate students to be as honest as we can be. Some civilian universities continue to hire military historians who do research that has an operational focus - and as noted above, there are jobs within the military academic world (for example at JSCSC Shrivenham in the UK, or ADFA in Australia). However, there is considerable opposition to more traditional military history - and particularly operational military history - within very many civilian university History departments. It doesn't matter whether you do operational military history within a broader context (as I have tried to do in my recent book on the Red Army, and as my contemporaries such as Ben Shepherd, David Stahel and others do) - if ultimately you are concerned with operational military history you will be shunned within many departments where the expectation is that your primary focus should be on more 'trendy' themes. That military history - and particularly operational military history - can draw large numbers of undergraduates often seems irrelevant in the hiring process. When I was looking for a tenure-track post more than a decade ago now, I could legitimately (on the basis of my education) market myself as a historian of the Soviet Union with a research focus on military history - with an operational focus within that. I did get some limited-term positions on that basis, but where the department heads were very traditional/conservative in their outlooks and took the lead in hiring me. In one instance I was hired despite resistance from some within the department, one member of which was reported as stating that I couldn't be hired simply BECAUSE I was a military historian. Despite having been fortunate enough to go to a university with some status, I got few interviews for tenure-track 'Russia'/'Soviet' positions within departments that did not have an existing military history focus or were not linked to the armed forces. I did however get interviews for positions within departments where 'military history' was not an anathema (at the time, for example, Salford and Aberystwyth in the UK). With first monograph finally in press I ended up getting a position at the University of Calgary where there was a strong core of military historians. I consider myself fortunate to have done so. We not longer have the same strength in military history as we did - and the chances of future hires with a focus on operational military history are diminishing given the way we make hires and the shifting composition of our department. I have told more than one of my graduate students that by focusing on operational military history you are excluding yourself from many positions within civilian academia even if you highlight your area (e.g. Soviet) expertise rather than operational military in an application. I do however point out that there are probably more civilian opportunities within the military academic world than there were 20 years ago. By having a clear expertise in operational military history (set in a broader context) they are arguably going to be well positioned for such hires and the few civilian university opportunities available. Civilian-trained military historians have much to offer the military-academic world because they set the operational within a broader context, and their contact with the military world is extremely valuable in honing their understanding of the more operational (and tactical and strategic) dimensions to their work.