The Myths of the "Few"

I don't know if this is the reaction you are seeking but I keep thinking of the German saying, "Die Truppe das Spiegelbild ihrer Führer” (good leadership makes good soldiers).

The essence of leadership was articulated by General William Slim in a speech to the officers of the 10th Indian Division in May 1941 in Iraq as related by John Masters in his memoir, _The Road Past Mandalay_. Masters relates Slim stated the most important thing about a commander is his effect on morale. Further, leadership is of the spirit composed of personality and vision; its practice is an art, while management is of the mind, and calls for accurate calculation; its practice is a science. Managers are necessary; leaders are essential. This was stated in a different form by William T. Bowers, _Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea_ and it is further articulated in Slim's memoir, _Defeat Into Victory_ in "Chapter VI Aftermath," and "Chapter IX The Foundations," pp. 111-121 and 168-196, respectively. At the end of his memoir (p. 551) he admits spending much time writing about staff officers and generals, and "their problems, difficulties, detailing "their problems, difficulties, and expedients their success and their failures." He emphasizes the war in Burma was a _soldiers war_. Further, "There comes a moment in every battle against a stubborn enemy when the result hangs in the balance. Then the general, however skilful and far-sighted he may have been, must hand over to his soldiers, to the men in the ranks and to their regimental officers, and leave then to complete what he has begun. The issue rests with them, on their courage, their hardihood, their refusal to be beaten either by the cruel hazards of nature or by the fierce strength of their human enemy."

I think you are railing against so-called popular history and film which presents individuals performing heroic deeds because it is hard to "glamorize" the work that put the RAF pilots in the cockpit or the work that allowed the Navy's plans to be formed and executed. Again this is my take at first reading.

And as if on order, Larrie Ferraro has just published, with Oxford University Press, that makes many of these same points (e.g. David Silbey) with Churchill's American Arsenal.

As for blame, pretty broad...I would characterize the blame for credit not going where credit was due to the air power/bomber mafia and their willing enablers in the Air Ministry like Inskip--not just Churchill.

As a Pacific Partisan, I have always found that that often-neglected theater (by the bomber mafias of both UK and US) benefitted from that neglect, benign neglect if you will--and thus did a better job all round with air power both from the land and from the sea. If air power proved its worth as a military tool, it was in its use in combined arms and combined (joint) operations in the Asia-Pacific, more quickly and more broadly, in all its aspects.

Unfortunately, that neglected as tended to extend to historian of air power (with the exception, of course, of historians of naval air power).

But after the war, it was the ETO bomber guys getting the credit and kudos that they absolutely didn't deserve--despite the heroic (and one might say often needless) sacrifice of their bomber crews.

Well, this riposte has had several "mini" handgrenades, has it not?

vr, John T. Kuehn

This post has some interesting threads to pull on and questions to consider.

Do we really need to expand the definition of "hero" to include the bureaucrats and rear echelon commanders? Not to say they aren't important (I was one for nearly 30 years), but shouldn't that term be reserved for the folks doing the shooting and getting shot at?

Isn't it natural for a government, especially of a democracy, in need of support and participation from the population to emphasize the actions of the "little guy"? Governments need to create sympathy and heroes, and it's much easier to describe the actions of the people on the pointy end of the stick, and easier for the general public to understand and empathize with them.

The "romance" and supposed chivalry of aerial combat was well-established in the public mind during the previous war. Do you raise the spirits, morale, and support of the public by touting the design and operation of the integrated air defense system and the man in charge of it (however vital it is) or by singing the praises of the "knights of the air," engaged in deadly combat, holding the line against seemingly overwhelming odds?

Churchill's speech to the House of Commons (20 Aug 1940) was not about "the few." It was a broad report to Parliament and the British people on the war and status of British forces. The famous sentence isn't uttered until over half-way through, in a paragraph that also praises the efforts of the bomber crews. The previous paragraph highlights the successes of Lord Beaverbrook and the Ministry of Aircraft Production in increasing output as well as salvage and repair efforts. So yes, Churchill praises the 'little guy,' but only in the context of a larger, comprehensive report. The sentence, one of those Churchillian phrases that captures the ear and the heart, subsequently has taken on a life of its own.

Re: Midway. The most important point you highlight is the responsibility of historians to 'get it right' (or at least make the best effort possible to do so). Historians surely need to give leaders, bureaucrats, logisticians, etc. their due, but it's too much to ask movie makers to try to make their contributions "exciting" enough to put on the screen. And even though Spruance and Fletcher were in harm's way with the fleet, Lewis Bernstein's point (by way of Slim) that leaders at that level ultimately become spectators as their subordinates execute their plans is well taken. At least both the earlier and recent Midway movies pay credit to the role of the intel analysts who broke the Japanese code and identified Midway as the target. The best historians examine the contributions of both the leaders and the little guys. I recently reviewed Nick Lloyd's The Western Front, and he does exactly that. But how do we convey both to the public and in popular culture?