Member Book- Raymond-Thai Military Power: A Culture of Strategic Accomodation

Greg Raymond Discussion

My book entitled Thai Military Power has just been published.  

 Thai Military Power: A Culture of Strategic Accomodation

Gregory Vincent Raymond

NIAS Press 304 pages

ISBN 978-87-7694-239-7 (Hardback)

ISBN 978-87-7694-240-3 (Paperback)

This year is the 100th anniversary of the Thai military’s World War I deployment to France to support the Allied powers.  The force of 1100 arrived in July of 1918 and by November when the Armistice was signed, some 19 had lost their lives, although none through combat.  The Thai soldiers marched in victory parades in Paris, and two received the Croix de Guerre.  In subsequent years Thailand used the deployment to press its case for the removal of the unequal treaties with Western nations.

In my recently-published book Thai Military Power  I argue that this success, together with an enduring elite national strategic culture placing a premium on diplomacy as the first line of defence, shaped a subsequent pattern of decision-making.  Thailand’s political elites struck out on a path where the Thai military was often used as a means of extracting security benefits from major power partners, rather than as the primary bulwark of Thai external security.  This was demonstrated in later deployments to the Korean and Vietnam wars alongside US forces, and from the 1980s onward, cooperation with Chinese forces in supporting the Khmer Rouge’s resistance to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia.

This elite culture, which emerged during the critical state-building reign of Thailand’s King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) has arguably influenced an apparent tendency to underbalance against external threat (an actor who underbalances chooses to respond to increases in external threat with less effort or resourcing than they are capable). For example, in the 1980s Thailand chose not to spend enough on external defence to defeat a Vietnamese invasion.  This was in spite of the presence of 160,000 Vietnamese troops not more than 300km from Bangkok during its occupation of Cambodia.

Thailand’s underbalancing, I argue, also arises from a relative lack of return on investment when it comes to the Thai military’s operational capability.  In my view weaknesses in Thai military doctrine and command have meant that Thai forces have not performed as effectively as they might in conventional combat, given their first-rate arms.  This has meant that the Thai military has come off second-best in conflicts it could have been expected to win, such the border conflict with Laos in 1987-1988.  It has been difficult for the Thai military to address these issues, and indeed difficult for it to undertake any serious reform, because of its resistance to central government direction.   

The Thai state, with its successful strategy of employing the military to support its primarily diplomatic security strategy, has accommodated its military’s resistance to reform.  It continues to display a culture of strategic accommodation, both in adapting externally to changing power balances, but also in coping with the realities of the Thai military’s position as a political actor, and the consequences for military operational capability.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction.

2. National Strategic Culture.

3. Military Organizational Culture.

4. National Strategic Culture and the Integration of Force and Diplomacy

5. Military Organizational Culture and State-on-State Military Operations

6. Major External Security Crisis: Vietnam's Occupation of Cambodia 1979-1989

7. Minor External Security Crisis: Thailand -Cambodia Temple Conflict 2008-2011

8. Defence Budget and arms Purchases: Moderate Spending, Profligate Procurement

9. Conclusion

For further information: http://www.niaspress.dk/books/thai-military-power