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I am inclined to agree with the analysis thus far. A weak understanding of true Iraqi capability, increased by a remarkably difficult logistics effort, compounded by Cold War operational thinking. In the end I feel the "Hail Mary" screen was too far west and wasted precious time and materials. Frank can be faulted, but not blamed.
Patrick R Jennings, PhD American Battlefield Protection Program, USNPS
Submitted by John McGrath on Thursday, April 24, 2014
I do not think a one-division advance by VII Corps would have made a difference. The corps pretty much advanced as fast as it could and the lead ACR was pretty much moving without stopping until 73 Easting. The Iraqis were already retreating due to the "holding" attacks and the Air Force was pounding the highway of death. If one division or a corps had reached the stop line it probably wouldn't matter as Colin Powell was determined to stop the campaign when it looked like the Iraqis were getting pounded excessively. Given the overestimation of Iraqi abilities, it seems that a one division advance, particularly against the "elite" Republican Guard, would have been conducted very cautiously.
Absolutely true about overestimating. I think this was an "inside the Beltway" problem, as too few IC analysts had operational military experience or much familiarity with the Iran-Iraq War.
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