In the latest podcast from the Royal United Services Institute's 'Talking Strategy' series, Adam Storring discusses the strategy of King Frederick II of Prussia ('Frederick the Great', reigned 1740-86), focusing particularly on Frederick’s concept of ‘short and lively’ wars and its cautionary lessons for contemporary strategy-makers.
The whole podcast is available to listen to here:
Regarding: "Have historians started working on the marriage of AI to nuclear weapons, military history, and strategy in thinking about AI and nuclear weapons?"
I assume by this you mean nuclear weapons controlled and/or launched by AI? I don't see that happening anytime in the foreseeable future. Currently, US law requires two commissioned officers to make the decision to launch / release nuclear weapons. I can't imagine Congress changing this to permit AI.
Mike Taint Lt Colonel, USAF (Ret)
In the latest research note published by Dr Michael Hankins (Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum) discusses Project Suntan, or the huge hydrogen aircraft that might have blown up Southern California.
Dr Ross Mahoney
(Not sure this new format works but attempting to post a query here.) Here, day to day now, all talk is about impacts of technology through new efforts of artificial intelligence -- AI.
Wonder, and is likely true, if this revolution is every bit as important as the Manhattan Project proved to introduce the new nuclear age in military history.
Have historians started working on the marriage of AI to nuclear weapons, military history, and strategy in thinking about AI and nuclear weapons? Would expect others are doing so already.
I'm perfectly satisfied proposing a panel the old fashioned way via the SMH site, but thought I'd look for like-minded group here first. Overarching theme is Operation Barbarossa, but paper is versatile in the sense it can go off on many complimentary tangents. It combines spatial-temporal analysis of German officer losses taken from Army Group Center primary source material, applied to "big data" manipulated in an Excel database. The analysis shows that even during Barbarossa, defensive fighting was very prevalent. Statistical data backs up judgements by Glantz, Stahel, and others concerning